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Abstract 
 
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a sustained growth in religious schooling in 
Australia generally and with it, an intense dispute has swirled around the 
acceptability and desirability of this trend. In turn, these debates in the realm of 
education are not separate from broader questions arising in ostensibly secular-liberal 
nations like Australia over what has been termed the ‘new visibility of religion’ in 
public life. 
 
In this thesis, I bring the questions surrounding the new public visibility of religion to 
bear specifically on the issue of religious schooling in Australia. In the first half, I 
offer an extended genealogical account of how education in such schools has come to 
be officially defined as concerned with the transmission of private beliefs in 
supernatural objects alongside the delivery of state-mandated training requirements. 
The antecedents for this definition lie, I contend, in the nominalist, Protestant and 
Anglo-liberal inheritance of the present neo-liberal regime. 
 
On the basis of this, I consider the effects of such a definition of religious schooling 
with reference to the case of the Neo-Calvinist ‘Parent-Controlled’ schooling 
movement in the latter half of this thesis. This religious schooling movement was 
initiated in the 1950s in explicit opposition to the mainstream education system in 
Australia, advancing instead an expansive view of religious discourse as affecting all 
educational practices. The movement remains insistent on its religiously distinctive 
‘foundational values’ despite its present integration into the mainstream education 
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system today. I examine how this is negotiated in the discourse of the NCPC 
schooling movement within the present conjuncture. 
 
Through this specific example, I submit that the new visibility of religious schooling 
in Australia is predicated on two conditions of acceptability defined by the 
hegemonic discourse of neo-liberalism: firstly, that religious schooling is able to 
conform to a broad consensus on the purpose of schooling as a means of training 
worker-citizens; and secondly, religion of the sort articulated by such religious 
schooling adopts a form marketable to consumers, who are free to choose schools on 
the basis of their private preferences. This has implications not only for the way 
religion is conceived in religious schools that are currently operant, but also for those 
whose religious discourses are less amenable to such articulations. 
  
6 
Table of Contents 
 
Statement of Originality ................................................................................................. 2 
Acknowledgements......................................................................................................... 3 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 4 
Figures ............................................................................................................................ 9 
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................11 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................12 
The new visibility of religious schooling in Australia .......................................21 
Contours of the debate over religious schooling ................................................26 
On liberalism and neo-liberalism .......................................................................35 
Excursus: Arriving at the non-neutrality of religion and education ...................39 
A conjunctural approach to discourse, tradition and hegemony.........................48 
The long route through history: Thesis in outline ..............................................61 
Chapter 1 – A prolegomenon to genealogies of religious education ............................68 
Introduction ........................................................................................................68 
How is religious education officially conceived in contemporary Australia? ....68 
The contingencies of religion and education ......................................................76 
Why genealogies of religious education? ...........................................................85 
Discursive traditions ...........................................................................................90 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................100 
Chapter 2 - Religious education in the Anglo-liberal tradition ...................................103 
Introduction ......................................................................................................103 
Liberalism as a discursive tradition ..................................................................104 
Religion/world: Nominalism and the cleavage of belief from practical reason109 
Religion/practice: The Protestant reformation and the individualisation of belief124 
Religion/public: The Anglo-liberal state and belief in the private sphere ........141 
7 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................167 
Chapter 3 – The development of religious education in Australia .............................170 
Introduction ......................................................................................................170 
Religious education in Australia: Foundational politics ...................................173 
Religious education in Australia for the national good ....................................191 
Religious education in Australia as a market good ..........................................209 
The market-state and education ........................................................................224 
The marketisation of education ........................................................................237 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................241 
Chapter 4 – ‘Christ, who is Sovereign over all’: Religious education in the neo-
Calvinist tradition .......................................................................................................246 
Introduction ......................................................................................................246 
Calvin and the sovereignty of God ...................................................................248 
Neo-Calvinism and sphere sovereignty ............................................................258 
Neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schools in Australia ....................................265 
Theological underpinnings and foundational values of neo-Calvinist ‘parent-
controlled’ schools ...........................................................................................271 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................292 
Chapter 5 - Fulfilling their God-given Talents: Neo-Calvinist schooling and the neo-
liberal ‘public purpose of education’ ..........................................................................295 
Introduction ......................................................................................................295 
Neo-liberal discourse on the public purpose of schooling ...............................297 
The neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schooling movement on the public 
purpose of schooling ........................................................................................307 
Neo-Calvinist schooling for the training of worker-citizens: Discursive 
antecedents .......................................................................................................318 
The neo-liberal regulation of religious schooling: Discursive processes .........342 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................353 
8 
Chapter 6 - A God-given Responsibility to Choose: Neo-Calvinist schooling and the 
neo-liberal market for school choice ..........................................................................358 
Introduction ......................................................................................................358 
Neo-liberal discourse on a market for school choice .......................................360 
The neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schooling movement on school choice 369 
Neo-Calvinist schooling as market choice: Discursive antecedents.................375 
The neo-liberal marketisation of religious schooling: Discursive processes ....394 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................412 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................418 
Religious schooling: Privatisation, anti-secularism, or neo-liberal hegemony?419 
References ..................................................................................................................436 
 
  
9 
Figures 
 
Figure 1: Number of Schools, by affiliation .............................................................. 23 
Figure 2: Number of full-time and part-time students by affiliation, 2001-2011 ...... 24 
Figure 3: Proportion of Full-time and Part-time students by affiliation, 2001, 2006 
and 2011............................................................................................................ 25 
Figure 4: The relationship between discourse, hegemony and regime ...................... 59 
Figure 5: Conventional understanding of confessionalisation as religious 
differentiation leading to the ‘wars of religion’ .............................................. 145 
Figure 6: More recent understandings of confessionalisation as social, cultural, 
religious and political de-differentiation within nation-states and differentiation 
between nation-states. ..................................................................................... 147 
Figure 7: Circuit of power between the public sphere of politics and private sphere of 
religious education, based on Gramsci’s formulation of ‘State = political 
society + civil society’ .................................................................................... 166 
Figure 8: Liberal and Protestant assumptions about how ‘religious education’ is to be 
conducted become institutionalized in the form of ‘Public education’ for the 
good of the nation ........................................................................................... 190 
Figure 9: A social liberal regime as tending toward state regulation of the market 
economy .......................................................................................................... 196 
Figure 10: Religious education administered through regulations and directed 
towards the good of the nation........................................................................ 207 
Figure 11: Pages of Commonwealth subordinate legislation, 1962-2006 ............... 220 
Figure 12: Average pages of Commonwealth Acts of Parliament passed per year, by 
government ..................................................................................................... 220 
Figure 13: A neo-liberal regime as entailing an emphasis on market exchange ...... 222 
Figure 14: Religious education steered through regulation and linked to the market 
state for the imperatives of neo-liberal discourse ........................................... 232 
Figure 15: Locations of CEN member schools in Australia (CEN, 2010)............... 271 
Figure 16: The logic of equivalence between schools (Catholic ≡ State ≡ NCPC) that 
are designated as performing under a ‘shared/public purpose’ as measured by 
state-enforced standards.................................................................................. 352 
10 
Figure 17: A logic of difference in the market that positions NCPC schooling as 
nominally ‘different’ vis-a-vis other forms of schooling (Catholic ≠ State ≠ 
NCPC)  ........................................................................................................... 408 
 
  
11 
Abbreviations 
 
AACS Australian Association of Christian Schools 
ACARA Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Agency 
 
ASCRG  Australian Standard Classification of Religious Groups 
 
ALP Australian Labor Party 
CEN Christian Education National 
Coalition Liberal Party of Australia and National Party Coalition  
CPCS Christian Parent Controlled Schools 
DEEWR Australian Government Department of Education, Employment 
and Workplace Relations 
 
EPAC Economic Planning and Advisory Council 
MCEETYA Ministerial Council for Education, Employment, Training and 
Youth Affairs 
 
NCPC Neo-Calvinist ‘Parent-Controlled’ 
NICE National Institute for Christian Education 
NSW State of New South Wales, Australia 
NUPCCS National Union for Parent Controlled Christian Schools 
  
12 
Introduction 
 
Faith-based schools… are the new engine rooms of muscular 
fundamentalist religion, where a literalist interpretation of the 
Bible, Koran or Torah dictates curriculum. […] Allowing the 
gifts of the Enlightenment to be chipped away in the 
classrooms of fundamentalism is a dangerous path. 
Governments should act before it is too late. (John Kaye, 
New South Wales Member of Parliament, as cited in 2008) 
 
Is it just me or has anyone else noticed that the arguments 
against choice in schooling are becoming increasingly 
divisive and anti-religious? […] If we want a truly generous 
and open future for all, we will do well to support the right to 
choose, and to celebrate the place of beliefs and values in the 
progress of our nation. (Stephen O’Doherty, Chief Executive 
of Christian Schools Australia, 2008) 
 
The lessons kids learn in government schools – resilience, 
motivation, community and tolerance – hold them in much 
better stead than hand-holding, spoon-feeding, mollycoddling 
and segregation [...] The independent and Christian schools 
are divisive, discriminatory, reliant on hand-outs and 
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implicitly teach children that some kids deserve nicer 
playgrounds than others. (Catherine Deveney, comedian, 
social commentator and columnist, 2011) 
 
Research, both nationally and internationally, also concludes 
that Catholic and independent schools, even after adjusting 
for a school’s socio-economic profile, are able to achieve 
stronger results that government schools in areas like 
academic standards, completion rates and entry to tertiary 
studies. (Kevin Donnelly, director of Education Standards 
Institute and newspaper columnist, 2011) 
 
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a sustained growth in religious schooling 
in Australia and with it, an intense and at times polemical dispute has swirled, as is 
demonstrated by the agonistic positions of public figures and commentators quoted 
in the epigraphs above. This is perhaps unsurprising for, as a cursory reading of the 
above statements evince, what are considered to be at stake in these debates over 
religious schooling in Australia are questions about some of the most cherished 
ideals of contemporary liberal societies, not least rational and critical thinking as 
‘gifts of the Enlightenment’; freedoms of choice, belief and values; the qualities of 
citizenship like ‘resilience, motivation, community and tolerance’; and the desired 
ends of education like ‘academic standards, completion rates and entry to tertiary 
studies.’  
14 
 
In turn, these debates in the realm of education are not separate from broader 
questions arising in ostensibly secular-liberal nations like Australia over what has 
been termed the ‘new visibility of religion’ (Hoelzl & Ward, 2008). This latter 
concept refers to social trends like the rapid growth of Pentecostalism in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia, as well as in Australia (see Connell, 2005), the growth of 
New Age spiritualities in Western societies (see Redden, 2011); the invocations of 
religious motifs by prominent political leaders such as Tony Blair in the United 
Kingdom, George W. Bush in the United States and John Howard in Australia (see 
respectively, Parmar, 2005; Maddox, 2005), and violent ‘irruptions’ of religion into 
the political sphere of the West in events like 9/11 in New York, 7/7 in London and 
the Bali bombings of 2002. Put pithily by Ward (2004), what this new visibility of 
religion or the post-secular condition entails is ‘not simply the refusal of religion to 
go away but, more significantly, the new public visibility of religion,’ that is, ‘the 
point where religion has a public voice [and] religion becomes political again’ (p. 3). 
These trends and events have raised new questions about the place of religion in 
avowedly secular and liberal societies. 
 
Apart from the problematic of what the new visibility of religion might mean 
for secular and liberal societies, these broader trends, events and questions have also 
spurred the renewed questioning of secularism and liberalism themselves as 
historically and culturally particular ways of defining society and human being. So 
while prominent social theorists like Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor have 
called into question the secular as an apparently universal principle or more 
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developmentally advanced vantage point from which to judge particular religions on 
the one hand, a range of scholars such as Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Craig Calhoun, 
William Cavanaugh, William Connolly, Timothy Fitzgerald, Stanley Fish, Saba 
Mahmood and John Milbank have, on the other hand, challenged the alleged political 
neutrality and superiority of liberal regimes in adjudicating between religious 
differences on the basis of a secular, non-religious ethos. These broader questions, I 
shall argue in this thesis, also bear significance for the apparently more local debates 
over the place of religious schooling in Australia and its relation to schooling that is 
considered both secular and public. 
 
With regard to the secular, in the first place, increasing doubt has been cast on 
its definition as a progressively ‘liberated’ sphere of non-religion that approximates 
to rational knowledge without illusions. Taylor (2007) for example, in his magisterial 
account of secular modernity entitled A Secular Age, labels such definitions as based 
on untenable ‘subtraction stories’ whereby religion is sloughed off and ‘[w]hat 
emerges from this process – modernity or secularity – is to be understood in terms of 
underlying features of human nature which were there all along, but had been 
impeded by what is now set aside’ (p. 22). What this view of the secular bears is a 
narrative of a progressive diminishment of religion in the public sphere and its 
replacement by rational thought, which is also known as the process of 
‘secularisation.’ Such an understanding is based on a strict secular/religious 
dichotomy in conjunction with the notion that the latter will eventually supplant the 
former. This view has been pervasive in liberal societies, and is perhaps especially 
pronounced within scholarly circles (Mendieta & VanAntwerpen, 2011). Yet 
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Habermas (2010) as a onetime exemplar of such a view points out, it is now evident 
that there is no intrinsic connection ‘between societal modernization and religion’s 
increasing loss of significance, a connection that would be so close that we could 
count on the disappearance of religion’ (p. 1).  
 
In light of the questions raised by Taylor and Habermas, Mendieta and 
VanAntwerpen (2011) thus surmise that such ‘dominant stories about religion and 
public life are myths that bear little relation to either our political life or our everyday 
experience’ because, on the one hand, ‘[r]eligion is neither merely private... nor 
purely irrational’ and on the other hand, ‘the public sphere is neither a realm of 
straightforward rational deliberation nor a smooth space of unforced assent’ (p. 1). 
This brings to the fore fresh questions about the common sense, dichotomous 
construal of the secular/religious and its corresponding boundaries of the 
public/private, as well as renewed attention to the historical and political conditions 
that have given rise to them. 
 
The latter dichotomy of public/private is also related to the avowed neutrality 
of formally non-religious (or secular) liberal regimes. On this point, critics have 
pointed to the normative political thrust of the liberal search for principles and 
procedures that mediate between different conceptions of life, and which are 
expressed in the liberal ideals of tolerance, openness and multiculturalism 
(Robertson, 2001). Fish (1999), for instance, highlights how, within societies built on 
this basis, it is supposed that if every citizen agrees to ‘confine his or her religious 
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life to the heart and the chapel, religion would flourish without interference from the 
state, and the state would flourish without interference from religion’ (p. 177). Hence 
a public/private demarcation is established whereby the line between them is drawn 
from what is claimed to be ‘a vantage point that is neutral between competing 
religious views, all of which are equally cabined and equally protected’ (Fish, 1999, 
p.  177). This construal of society is predominant in Anglo-liberal societies such as 
Australia and constitutes the ‘common sense’ of public political discourse that seems 
to be above reproach (Milbank, 2004). As Mahmood (2003) highlights, ‘the idea that 
the liberal political system is the best arrangement for all human societies, regardless 
of their diverse histories and conceptual and material resources, is rarely questioned 
these days’ (p. 19). Yet such a claim to neutrality is untenable because the liberal 
conception of religion inevitably rests upon and advances partisan beliefs about 
society, authority, rationality and the nature of the self, which is in turn a product of 
provincial histories and politics (Robertson, 2001). 
 
Taken together, then, what these theorists and scholars bring to the fore is that 
neither secular rationality nor liberal procedures are ‘merely given’ or capable of 
mediating religious differences on a universal basis and in a neutral way; any 
construal of the secular/religious and public/private is in their view always 
historically and politically contingent and particular. This problematisation of 
common sense categories at a more general level raises questions that have a bearing 
on the religious schooling debates in Australia today. For example, how does the 
historicity of these categories make us rethink the relationship between non-religious 
politics vis-à-vis religious social groups? Is the secular-liberal construal of society 
18 
along these lines necessarily the most desirable one? What does this understanding 
preclude, under what kinds of presuppositions and for what ends?  
 
In this thesis, I seek to bring the questions of the new visibility of religion at 
the broader level, as well as the interrogation of the predominance of secular and 
liberal presuppositions by social theorists and scholars, to bear on the issue of 
religious schooling in Australia. To do this will require addressing the conjunction 
between ‘religion’ and ‘education’ in the form of contemporary religious schooling 
in Australia. In the first three chapters of this thesis, I seek to broadly historicise the 
present common sense around these terms by asking what and who defines religion 
and education? As well, how have these come to be so defined, particularly along the 
lines of public/private and secular/religious?  
 
On the basis of findings to these questions, I also inquire into their political 
implications by asking: How are these definitions acted upon in the present? What 
are the effects of such definitions on religious schooling? And, within the present 
conjuncture, for what ends? In the latter three chapters of this thesis, I approach these 
questions by looking more closely at the relationship between a type of religious 
‘private’ schooling – the neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ (NCPC) schooling 
movement – in its context within the Australian education system, which is in turn 
embedded within the broader configurations of socio-political order. In particular, I 
seek to interpret the discursive processes at the conjunction, on the one hand, of the 
dominant discourse in Anglo-liberal societies today – neo-liberalism – as ‘the 
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common sense and key ‘shared mental model’ [of] a globalizing world’ (Cerny, 
2008, p. 2), and on the other hand the religious discourses of the neo-Calvinist type 
of religious schooling.  
 
NCPC schooling represents an interesting instance of religious schooling that 
Australian social analyst Marion Maddox (2011) has termed an ‘overlooked sector in 
Australia’s education market,’ and one which warrants attention because of an 
apparent paradox whereby, ‘such schools profess – and teach – potentially 
controversial positions about the relationship between church and state and about 
Christian citizens’ position in relation to secular law’ and at the same time, ‘receive a 
substantial proportion – in many cases, the majority – of their funds from the state’ 
(p. 300). While the selection of this particular type of religious schooling inevitably 
excludes a deeper engagement with other, potentially insightful cases (e.g. Catholic, 
Islamic, Jewish, Adventist, etc.), I submit below that the peculiar position of NCPC 
schooling within the present Australian education market as argued by Maddox, as 
well as the peculiar historical passage of this schooling movement, presents as an 
instructive case for broader questions about the new visibility of religious schooling 
in Australia today. 
 
My hypothesis is that despite the persistent debates over the appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of ‘religion in education’ as manifest most prominently in the form 
of religious schools in the mainstream education system, the very question of what 
constitutes ‘religion’ or ‘education’ themselves, their assumed modus operandi and 
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the relationship between these two elements have been centred on the one hand 
around a historically and politically contingent conception of what it means to 
educate, and on the other hand an equally historically and politically contingent 
conception of religion vis-à-vis the ostensibly secular public sphere. In addition, I 
also seek to explore in detail the interrelations between these two spheres and how 
they are articulated in the institution of religious schooling through the example of 
NCPC schooling. 
 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I shall offer a working definition 
of religious education in the form of religious schooling and canvass the impetus for 
the debates surrounding it, most prominently the relative growth of enrolments in 
religious schools sine the mid-1990s. This represents a particular manifestation in the 
field of education of the new public visibility of religion at a broader, societal level. I 
then offer a broad sketch of the positions in the debates over these trends, which can 
be understood as coalescing around the interrelated dichotomies of public/private and 
secular/religious. In addition, I also intersperse the descriptions of these various 
positions with some critical questions raised by the abovementioned scholars 
regarding the apparent universality and neutrality of secular and liberal assumptions 
about social order, which all sides of the debate appear to implicitly draw upon. 
Following this, I shall foreground how I arrived at the problematic of religious 
education and the present social order via the insights of liberation theology and 
critical pedagogy during my time as a teacher in religious and non-religious schools. 
This will serve to locate the researcher in the research by foregrounding some of the 
background influences that I bring to this thesis (du Preez, 2008). Arising from this, I 
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then elaborate some reasons for why I have chosen to focus on the NCPC schooling 
movement and why I have chosen to characterise the present socio-political order as 
neo-liberal. This will be followed by a brief description of the theoretical approach 
taken in this thesis, which can be understood broadly as form of conjunctural 
analysis informed by the discipline of cultural studies. Such an approach, I shall 
argue, allows for an attentive portrayal of how particular traditions have construed 
religious education – in this case, the liberal and neo-Calvinist traditions – as well as 
the interactions between them within specific socio-political contexts. Finally, I 
present an outline of how the following chapters of this thesis are structured and the 
key questions that these chapters are designed to address. 
 
The new visibility of religious schooling in Australia 
 
Religious education in Australia as manifest in the form of religious private 
schooling can be preliminarily understood as a conjunction of ‘religion’ and 
‘education’ as officially defined by the government. That is, with regard to the latter, 
they denote institutions that typically teach much the same general curriculum as 
other schools, and share the state and federal government aim of preparing children 
for their future lives of citizenship and employment in exchange for government 
funding. In addition, owing to their particular ‘religious affiliations,’ it is supposed 
that they also seek to pass on a particular set of religious beliefs about a ‘supernatural 
Being, Thing or Principle’ and the associated conducts arising from such beliefs 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS], 2006). This arrangement is outlined in an 
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overview given by the Australian Government’s Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations (2011): 
 
States and territories have the primary responsibility for 
funding state government schools. They also provide 
supplementary assistance to non-government schools. The 
Australian Government is the primary source of public 
funding for non-government schools, while also providing 
supplementary assistance to government schools. Most non-
government schools have some religious affiliation, with 
approximately two-thirds of non-government school students 
enrolled in Catholic schools. 
 
The recent growth of such religious, formally ‘non-government’ or ‘private’ 
schools in Australia has been conspicuous. In the most populous state of New South 
Wales (NSW) alone, for example, some 330,000 students or thirty-three per cent of 
the state’s total attend religious schools (God in the Classroom, 2003). The 
Independent Schools Council of Australia (2012) has declared that eighty-five per 
cent of independent schools have a religious affiliation, while Catholic schools alone 
account for over twenty-percent of total student enrolments in Australia. In total, 
enrolments in NSW’s 904 non-government schools grew by fifteen percent between 
1996 and 2002 against the national average of thirteen percent (ABS, 2006). This 
growth in both relative and absolute numbers of students has also been paralleled by 
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a numerical growth of religious schools. According to a Sydney Morning Herald 
report in 2003, in NSW alone there were 586 Catholic schools, 90 Christian, 53 
Anglican, 23 Seventh Day Adventist, 13 Islamic, and eight Jewish schools, as well as 
clusters of schools of other religious traditions (God in the Classroom, 2003). The 
same report also states that 26 religious schools were opened in NSW between 
January 2000 and March 2003 at an average rate of one every six weeks.  
 
According to the ABS (2012), there were 9,435 Australian schools in 2011, 
comprising 6,705 government schools, 1,710 Catholic schools and 1,020 
Independent schools. While state-run schools continue to educate the majority of 
students in Australia – as of 2011, there were almost twice as many students 
attending government schools (2,315,253) as there were attending non-government 
schools (1,226,556) – the number of students in the independent schools sector has 
increased by 35 per cent since 2001 (ABS, 2012).  
 
Figure 1: Number of Schools, by affiliation (ABS, 2012) 
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So while the split between enrolments at government schools to non-
government schools was sixty-nine per cent and thirty-one per cent respectively in 
2001, by 2011 the split of students between government and non-government schools 
was sixty-five per cent and thirty-five per cent respectively (ABS, 2012). These 
figures reinforce the long-term drift of students from government schools to non-
government schools.  
 
Figure 2: Number of full-time and part-time students by affiliation, 2001-2011 (ABS, 2012) 
 
In addition, of the increase in absolute student numbers in Australia from 2010 
to 2011, the largest proportional increase in student numbers also occurred in 
independent schools, where student numbers rose by close to two per cent (9,257), 
followed by Catholic schools at one and a half per cent (10,683), and government 
schools by half a per cent (10,994). This is in continuity with the long term trend of 
more pronounced relative growth in student numbers at independent schools. Since 
2001, for instance, the number of students at independent schools has increased by 
close to thirty-five per cent (129,151). Over the same time, the number of students at 
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Catholic and government schools increased by eleven per cent (75,402) and two per 
cent (40,650) respectively (ABS, 2012). 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of Full-time and Part-time students by affiliation, 2001, 2006 and 2011 (ABS, 
2012) 
 
These trends indicating the relative growth of religious schooling are a cause 
célèbre amongst public figures of a broadly liberal-secularist perspective like NSW 
Minister of Parliament John Kaye, who express concern at these trends and what it 
might mean for education as a modern national enterprise for training rational 
thinkers. Conversely, for proponents of religious schools like Chief Executive of 
Christian Schools Australia Stephen O’Doherty, the same trends are an encouraging 
affirmation signalling a freedom of religion and choice for parents. A particular focal 
point of this debate is whether religious schooling contributes or diminishes societal 
cohesion in an ostensibly liberal, non-religious (or secular) nation, and therefore 
whether religious private schools should be permitted and funded over and/or 
alongside state-run public ones owing to the national benefits accruing from each 
type of schooling. For social and media commentators opposed to religious schooling 
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like Catherine Deveney, the answer to this question is overwhelmingly to the 
negative with reference to the skills needed for citizenship in a plural society, which 
religious schools supposedly encumber. Conversely for others like Kevin Donnelly, 
the academic performance of students in such schools as measured by standardised 
tests and post-school destinations of their graduates suggest that they are to be 
considered a national good. 
 
Contours of the debate over religious schooling 
 
In addition to the media commentaries offered above, but also raising similar 
questions, are the more scholarly or research-informed debates over religious 
schooling in Australia. In light of the definition of religious schools as entailing a 
conjunction of ‘education’ and ‘religion’ as described above, the debates over 
religious schooling along the public/private and secular/religious lines surveyed here 
can also be understood as corresponding respectively to the function of religious 
schools as schools with regard to the general aim of schooling to train students for 
citizenship and employment as a public good on the one hand, and with regard to the 
religious function of religious schools, which is taken to be the transmission of 
particular and private beliefs and values on the other. It is useful at present to offer a 
sketch of them in order to orient my research to what I – following the work of 
critical scholars of religion and secularity – consider to be some their shared yet 
questionable bases.  
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The first of these lines can be seen as part of a broader debate over 
public/private schooling of which religion is one element of contention alongside 
other demographic factors like socioeconomic status and ethnicity. For those who 
argue along this line, the key question appears to be about whether religious private 
schooling – which is partly funded by the Australian Federal Government – is to the 
benefit or detriment of the nation and its general populace, or what is known as ‘the 
public.’ This way of framing the question is in turn predicated on the broader liberal 
axiom, as shall be outlined more fully below, that freedoms such as religious belief 
belong alongside others like consumer choices, sexual preferences and so on in 
private. These private freedoms are in turn guaranteed by a general ‘public’ 
agreement on the common rights and responsibilities of citizens (Ackerman, 1980). 
Thus, the debates over religious schooling concern whether it represents an over-
privileging of the private sphere of religious choices to the detriment of the public 
agreement to educate citizens for a liberal polity. 
 
For critics of religious schooling, religion is considered to have encroached on 
the public terrain of liberal and secular schooling, which is taken to be a neutral 
space between all particular traditions and cultures. So, for example, the prominent 
Australian commentator on education Simon Marginson (1993) in his early work 
Education and Public Policy in Australia asserts that the fundamental difference 
between secular public and religious private schools is that the former are universal, 
open and democratic while the latter are not. Thus, Marginson argues, private 
schooling of any sort does not have the obligations and constraints that are 
incumbent upon state-run public schools. On the issue of inclusion, more 
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specifically, he asserts – while acknowledging that few ‘private’ schools formally 
pick and choose from the whole population – ‘all private schools are to some degree 
selective in comparison with public schools’ (p. 200). In this sense, Marginson’s 
critique of private schooling implies that religious schools, by their very operation on 
religious lines, are effectively exclusive and discriminatory while public schools are 
universally accessible. 
 
Along similar lines but stated more explicitly, education scholar Anthony Potts 
(1999) highlights the ‘religious and historical dimensions’ at stake in the 
public/private schooling debate (para. 15). Against the growing trend in private 
religious schooling, Potts (1999) posits the argument that by ‘allowing every tinpot 
fundamentalist religious group to start schools with federal funding with funds 
withdrawn from the allocation to government schools,’ is likely to ‘resurrect, in a 
multifaceted form, the sectarian divide that blighted Australia for most of its history 
until the 1970s’ (para. 33). Also bringing the arguments of cohesion and inclusion 
versus sectarianism and exclusivity to bear on the public/private debate are Deb 
Wilkinson, Richard Deniss and Andrew Macintosh (2004) of the Canberra-based 
think-tank The Australia Institute, who concur with the early-Marginson and Potts by 
arguing that the private religious schools cannot achieve the degree of inclusiveness 
said to be ‘inherent in the public school system’ (p. viii). 
 
Approaching religious education in this way raises the question of how the 
notion of ‘the public’ as a universally accessible and inclusive space has come to be 
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seen as distinct in character from ‘the religious,’ which is understood as a private 
affair of free choices. To be sure, religion in this reckoning is recognised and even 
protected as a private belief, but it is also cordoned off insofar as it is kept rigorously 
beyond the bounds of empirical understanding in the public sphere, which is 
demarcated by the boundaries of the nation-state. Religious language should thus 
remain private and its entry into the public sphere is legitimate only to the extent that 
it can be rendered in (ideally rational) terms that are not specifically religious 
(Calhoun, 2011). On this basis, the determinant of whether religious schools should 
be permitted as part of the education system or not pivots on whether the former, 
which concerns private beliefs, can contribute something to the general public in the 
form of high-quality education and a tolerant and harmonious society. Yet these 
prescriptions themselves beg the key question of how ‘education’ is defined and the 
type of society, public and nation envisioned as normative, and to which religious 
schooling is in turn obliged to tolerate and be in harmony with. 
 
Interestingly, this understanding of privatised religion vis-à-vis the nation’s 
public as the ultimate political purpose is also shared by proponents of religious 
schooling. Conservative education scholar Jennifer Buckingham (2010), for example, 
rejects the implication that such schools are by nature undemocratic, undermine 
social cohesion and give rise to intolerant attitudes. Drawing on survey data in her 
research, Buckingham (2010) agrees with the likes of Wilkinson et al about the 
public good, differing sharply from the latter only insofar as the data she deploys 
indicates the opposite – that is, ‘that people who attended non-government schools 
(which are usually religious schools) do not express opinions that are less socially 
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liberal or less tolerant of difference than people who attended government schools’ 
(p. ix). Likewise, education scholar Dick Carpenter (2012) defends Protestant 
Christian schools as a public good. He does this by appeal to the ‘valuable Western 
ideals’ that such schools are claimed to promote, which contribute to the health of 
Western nations like Australia that are said to be built on a ‘Christian intellectual and 
moral heritage.’ Yet as with the critics of religious schooling, questions arise as to 
how the public good, the national good and good citizenship are defined, and to 
which such things as ‘Christian heritage’ or ‘diversity’ are supposed to accrue. 
 
The debate along the public/private line and the question of what best serves 
the national good brings forth a second, corollary debate over religious schooling in 
Australia: one that is contested along a secular/religious axis. There are two 
discernible points of contention along this line. Firstly, some tend to focus more 
specifically on the political tendencies that are assumed to be inherent in religion 
itself and the consequences this may have on the nation and its public. For example, 
sociologists Colin Symes and Kalervo Gulson (2008) in their survey of ‘new’ 
Christian schools in Australia argue that such schools are inherently conservative and 
connect directly to right-wing politics. New Christian schools, according to Symes 
and Gulson (2008), are built upon an evangelical, fundamentalist and prosperity 
gospel nexus, which ‘intimates that God has substantial equity in capitalism’ (p. 
240). Likewise, education scholar John Knight (1984, 1985) draws on a case study of 
Seventh Day Adventist schooling to argue that such schools are undergirded by a 
certain religious fundamentalism, which is tied to a .broader conservative attack on 
public education. He warns that while Christian fundamentalists in education may be 
considered by many to be a ‘wholesome and benign’ minority, they actually bear a 
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plot to transform Australia into a ‘totalitarian fundamentalist Christian society’ 
(Smith & Knight, 1978, p. 226). 
 
For both Symes and Gulson and Knight, secularity and liberalism function as 
general societal norms while the religious represents a particular and potentially 
dangerous anomaly. For these critics of religious schooling, the proliferation of the 
latter represents a perilous trajectory that serves to undermine the cohesion of the 
social order predicated on a liberal, secular education as opposed to divisive, 
sectarian tendencies. In this they are joined by sociologist Andrew Jakubowicz 
(2009), who argues that the rise of religious schooling is symptomatic of ‘ethno-
religious racism’ (p. 4). For him, such ethno-religious racism leads to a sectarianism 
that can only be mediated by the affirmation of secularism as a principle by the 
Australian Government and its institutions. 
 
Interestingly, by insisting on some inherent or essential conservatism of 
religion in general and Christianity in particular, these progressive critics of religious 
schooling share a common presumption made by a long line of conservative 
politicians such as former Australian Prime Minister Howard and former Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher. For both long-serving 
politicians, as will be discussed further in Chapter 5, Christianity is indeed 
intrinsically coupled with a certain politics that leads to free-enterprise economics. 
The point emphasised at present is that assuming an essence of religion – and by 
implication, religious education – necessarily gives rise to certain type of politics, 
Symes and Gulson and Knight on the one side and on the other, Howard and 
Thatcher, appear to abide by what Wendy Brown (2008) labels the ‘culturalization of 
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politics.’ This view holds, whether implicitly or explicitly, that every cultural 
formation (including religion) has a discernible essence that defines it, and so all 
subsequent political positions taken can be explained as a necessary consequence of 
that prior essence. Yet do religious schools and their traditions bear a tangible, 
unchanging essence that necessitates a specific approach to society and politics? Or 
can the political position of religion and religious schooling be explained in other 
ways? 
 
The notion of secularism as a principle of government that attenuates religious 
divisiveness is also shared by social and educational commentators Chris Bonnor and 
Jane Caro in their book A Stupid Country: How Australia is dismantling public 
education (2007), which is intended to be a defence of public schools against the 
encroachments of private schooling, including religiously-based schools. For these 
authors, secularism and secular instruction are taken to be neutral beyond religious 
differences. Hence, they assert: ‘We should start asking what impact schools that are 
built around specific religious beliefs might have on cohesion in the wider 
community’ (Bonnor & Caro, 2007, p. 99). This assumption that social cohesion and 
the good of the nation are linked to a secular education – by contrast to particularistic 
forms religious education based on disparate, possibly ‘sectarian’ traditions that are 
antithetical to it – draws on a particular narrative of the development of education in 
Australia shared by many secularist critics of religious schooling like Jakubowicz, 
Symes and Gulson, all of whom attribute the ‘success’ of Australia as a modern 
nation to the establishment of a liberal and secular education system. This narrative 
advanced by the critics abovementioned can thus be seen as a story that heralds 
secularism as the saviour of the Australian nation from divisiveness and sectarian 
33 
religious strife. A secular public in this estimation thus offers a vantage point beyond 
religious differences from where social divisions can be attenuated. 
 
This, of course, raises questions about the alleged neutrality of the secular view 
and secularism, not least because in the reckoning of the abovementioned critics, 
secularism appears to be defined only negatively – that is, the absence of religion or 
what is left after religion fades. Yet might it be the case that, as Calhoun, 
Juergensmeyer and VanAntwerpen (2011) contend, secularism is neither in itself 
neutral nor merely an absence (of religion), but rather a normative stance variously 
entailing ‘an ideology, a worldview, a stance towards religion, a constitutional 
framework [or] an aspect of some other project [like] a science or a particular 
philosophical system’ (p. 5)? This is an important question because the very 
deployment of the term ‘secular’ always signifies a reference to the secular/religious 
dichotomy, which presumes upon not only a definition of the apparently secular 
(public) space itself, but also the realm of the religious (Calhoun et al, 2011). It is 
therefore important to inquire into the shifting and reciprocal relations between the 
two categories, for how the secular has emerged as a mode of educating in Australia 
is also concomitantly how religious education has emerged as its defining opposite. 
 
By contrast to critics of religious schooling, its contemporary proponents like 
historian Stuart Piggin (2006) argue that religion – specifically Christianity – is a 
form of ‘spiritual capital’ that in fact enriches social institutions such as the 
education system (p. 2; also 2004). Thus, he argues, far from fermenting social 
divisions, the Christian religion has in fact been integral to the formation of Australia 
as a modern nation. However, those who appeal to such notions of ‘Christian 
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heritage’ like Piggin and Carpenter have the added burden of demonstrating how 
such a heritage might exist given that Christians in Australia – incorporating 
disparate groups like Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Baptists and others 
– have valued a wide range of often inconsistent things on the basis of different, 
often conflicting interpretations of traditional texts and ways of life. From a different 
angle and with regard to religious schooling more generally, education scholars John 
Scott and Ann Armstrong (2011) also frame their arguments in terms of the modern 
nation as the key point of reference, albeit a multicultural and globalising one. They 
argue that because of multiculturalism and globalisation, schooling in Australia 
should rightly include a ‘faith-based dimension.’ In this reckoning, religious schools 
can contribute to society in general as long as they can affirm the value of the 
individual through their particular religious lexicons. Yet this position brings us back 
to the question of what constitutes the good of the nation that religious schools are 
meant to serve and who decides.  
 
It thus appears that a common underpinning of the different positions in the 
debate over religious schooling, whether fought along the public/private or 
secular/religious lines, is an idea of Australia as a modern nation and its public, 
which is rightly served by institutions within the education system. On this basis, the 
point of contention is whether religious schools, which are based on private beliefs, 
should be permitted as part of the education system or not depending on whether 
they can contribute something in the form of a ‘good education’ and social cohesion. 
This is in turn predicated on two assumptions corresponding to the conjunction of 
religion with school-based education: firstly, that there is a certain understanding of 
the ‘religious’ as private vis-à-vis the ‘secular’ as public, and secondly, that there is 
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an agreement on what ‘good education’ entails. In this thesis, I shall problematise 
these two assumptions, which I understand to be borne by a broadly liberal tradition 
and articulated specifically within a neo-liberal context. 
 
On liberalism and neo-liberalism 
 
By the term neo-liberal, as I shall argue in more detail in Chapter 3, I denote a 
dominant interpretation of social reality that has shaped contemporary Anglo-liberal 
societies like Australia. I am cognisant that ‘neo-liberalism’ is a notoriously slippery 
term that is difficult to abstract theoretically from its concrete manifestations. In 
contemporary scholarship, the use of this term ‘straddles a wide range of social, 
political and economic phenomena at different levels of complexity’ (Saad-Filho and 
Johnston, 2005, p. 1). However, I take the term ‘neo-liberal’ to name the present 
socio-political order in Australia because with regard to religion and religious 
education, it is especially useful as a heuristic term in that it highlights some 
continuities with the presuppositions of liberalism as an intellectual and political 
movement, while at the same time representing a novel configuration of it in the 
present historical moment. I shall presently give a brief explication of what I mean 
by liberal and neo-liberal, and how their continuities and discontinuities relate to 
religion.  
 
Liberalism, as will be explicated more fully in Chapter 2, can be characterised 
as a discourse that is formally concerned with upholding the freedom of individuals 
to be in charge of their own lives and choices (Raz, 1994, p. 105). Thus, liberal forms 
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of political order claim to be neutral about different ways of life, claiming no 
position about what the ‘good life’ should entail and so shifting questions about 
normative values out of the public sphere and into the private (Clayton, 2005, sec. 7). 
As mentioned above, religion under liberalism is regarded as properly belonging to 
the private sphere as an expression of individual free choice. The public sphere – 
most prominently manifest in the institutional apparatuses of the state – is formally 
concerned only with the most effective means of administering, adjudicating and 
guaranteeing the expression of individual rights and free choices (MacIntyre, 1998a). 
In order to sustain this normative vision of individual freedom then, liberalism in 
practice requires a contingent settlement between two poles:  politically, it implies 
that collective decision-making should involve a constitutional state with limited but 
substantive powers of economic and social intervention, which seeks to ‘limit the 
anarchy of self-interest’ through the enforcement of contractual agreements 
(MacIntyre as cited in Bielskis, 2005, p. 119); and economically, it endorses the 
expansion of the capitalist market economy – that is, the institution of conditions 
whereby individuals’ free choices based on private preferences can be expressed and 
mediated by monetised exchange in as many realms of social life as practicable 
(Jessop, 2002). 
  
On this basis and in the first instance, the neo-liberal perspective on social 
order should be seen as neo-liberal insofar as it emphasises one aspect of liberalism 
over the other (without negating it entirely). To put it simply, neo-liberalism at the 
broadest level is driven by a vision of the inexorable expansion and convergence of 
global capitalist markets – what is popularly termed ‘globalisation’ (Unger, 1998). 
This apparent ‘fact’ of social and political life in turn necessitates a type of nation-
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state that seeks to forge a citizenry capable of securing employment and prosperity in 
expectation of such global trends, as well as the institution and facilitation of internal 
markets as an efficient means of achieving this goal (Wiseman, 1998, p. 43). In this 
sense, a neo-liberal regime can be understood as privileging the economic pole of 
liberalism – that is, private preferences mediated by market exchange – while 
maintaining the role of the state as an adjudicator, regulator and facilitator of the 
latter, thus remaining in continuity with a broadly liberal form of government. 
Religion in such a context, as scholars like Ward (2006), Kitiarsa (2010) and Turner 
(2011) have variously argued, is at once considered private as in traditional 
liberalism and yet newly visible insofar as it represents an expression of the private 
preferences of individuals in the market. 
 
This expansion of the market highlights the fact that while the neo-liberal view 
of social order can be seen as in continuity with liberal presuppositions about the 
necessary co-presence of the state and the market, it also represents a new 
configuration of the relationship between the two. As such, it is also neo-liberal. As 
Treanor (2005, para. 18) characterises it, neo-liberalism is a novel discourse on the 
arrangement of society insofar as it insists on a hitherto unprecedented intensification 
and expansion of the market into social life by increasing the number, frequency, 
repeatability, and formalisation of contractual exchange. The telos of neo-liberalism 
is a world where all human actions are modelled on individualised market 
transactions and conducted in competition with other individuals on a global scale 
(Treanor, 2005, para. 17). The state and its diverse institutional apparatuses, 
including the education system, are thus seen as responsible for the facilitation of this 
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globalising vision and the production of particular subjects that inhabit this 
increasingly marketised environment (Foucault, 1979; also Rose & Miller, 1992). 
 
Preliminarily, therefore, to designate the contemporary Australian socio-
political order as a neo-liberal regime is to say that its legislations, policies, 
institutions and constituent social practices are defined by a vision of the inexorable 
globalisation of world markets as defined by neo-liberal discourse and are 
preoccupied by positing a response adequate to it. This is chiefly manifest in the 
form of a state that, through the education system, seeks to prepare a citizenry 
capable of maximising their opportunities in the face of such global trends, as well as 
the institution and facilitation of a market in education as the most efficient means of 
achieving this goal. The question then arises as to the place and role of religious 
private schooling in relation to this broader, formally secular public vision and its 
instrumentalities of the state and the market. 
 
Before outlining my critical approach to the conceptions of religion and 
education in Australia, I shall presently foreground the circumstances and influences 
that have led me to question the dominant understandings of these two terms. This 
will take the form of background considerations that have led me to this thesis. du 
Preez (2008) terms such information ‘parenthetical considerations,’ which implies 
bringing forth issues not sufficiently critical to the overall argument to be included in 
the main body of work, yet containing background and contextual information about 
the researcher that demands a place in the research, albeit in parenthetical form (du 
Preez, 2008, pp. 510-511). In particular, it involves outlining some autobiographical 
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details that express something of the genesis of the present research – that is, how is 
it that I am here, now, doing this study on religion and education in Australia? 
 
Excursus: Arriving at the non-neutrality of religion and education 
 
You can’t be neutral on a moving train. (Zinn, 1994) 
 
I was born and spent the early years of my childhood in Malaysia, a formally 
Muslim country that is not technically an Islamic State. From as early as I can recall, 
my days from dawn to dusk were punctuated by the rhythms of the call to prayer 
from the neighbourhood mosque’s loudspeaker. Even though I was a non-Muslim 
from an animist family, from a young age I could see the differentiated character of 
Islam embodied in the lives of my friends, neighbours and their families and 
extended relations: some were outwardly pious and spoke often about what they had 
learnt from their Qur’ān study classes, with a few peers even performing in public 
Qur’ān recitations with proud family members in the audience; others played in 
heavy metal and punk rock bands; some were heavily involved with the 
skateboarding subculture; others spent most of their weekends evading the hot sun 
reading books like H.G. Wells’s War of the Worlds and the English folktale Robin 
Hood (two of our group favourites); most held a desire to participate in the Hajj one 
day, insha’Allah. Islam was neither a compartment of their lives nor something 
merely for the privacy of their individual households; for just as they never ceased or 
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diminished being Muslim through the manifold activities they participated in, so 
there was never one Islam that they embodied, but rather a variety. 
 
In my adult years while completing degrees in economics, politics and 
education in Australia, I associated with many friends who were avowedly 
evangelical Christians and I often attended church with them. While this particular 
brand of Christianity struck me at many points as difficult to reconcile with my 
experiences and studies of society and cultural differences, I came to realise that 
even evangelical Christianity was not one, but carried within it internal debates and 
was embodied differently amongst its adherents. This led me to a study of 
Christianity more concertedly, but contrary to my Evangelical friends, I have always 
felt a pull toward the more radical interpretations of liberation theology, which 
included works of Black, feminist, queer and third-world theologians like Juan Luis 
Segundo, Gustavo Gutiérrez, Leonardo and Clodovis Boff, James Cone, Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, the Rainbow Spirit Elders, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and 
Marcella Althaus-Reid. From the work of these writers, I learnt that religion is 
neither neutral nor merely supernatural, standing ‘above’ the fray of society, culture, 
economics and politics; rather, it always presumes upon and expresses itself in 
concrete practices (or praxis) and institutions in relation to the broader socio-political 
context. As Segundo (1976) puts it straightforwardly, the perspective of liberation 
theology rejects ‘the naïve belief that [religious] language is applied to human 
realities inside some antiseptic laboratory that is totally immune to the ideological 
tendencies and struggles of the present day’ (p. 7). 
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As a young schoolteacher, I was also significantly influenced by Paulo Freire’s 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1995[1970]), which remains the most well-thumbed 
book in my collection of works on critical pedagogy. In particular, Freire’s insistence 
on the impossibility of educational neutrality impressed itself heavily upon me in a 
workplace increasingly occupied by the delivery of state-mandated content. 
Consistent with what I had learnt about religion through the abovementioned radical 
theologians, he argues that in education too: 
 
There is no such thing as a neutral education process. 
Education either functions as an instrument which is used to 
facilitate integration of the younger generation into the logic 
of the present system and bring about conformity or it 
becomes the practice of freedom, the means by which men 
and women deal critically and creatively with reality and 
discover how to participate in the transformation of their 
world. (Freire, 1995[1970], p. 34) 
 
This insight about the non-neutrality of education is also affirmed by adherents 
of critical pedagogy who have followed after Freire. As one such adherent, I thus 
affirm Joe Kincheloe’s (2008) point in his Critical Pedagogy Primer where he 
characterises critical pedagogy’s practitioners as ‘aware that every minute of every 
hour that teachers teach, they are faced with complex decisions concerning justice, 
democracy, and competing ethical claims’ (p. 1). The central tenet of critical 
pedagogy thus maintains that education is always-already ethically and politically 
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normative both as regards the form of education and its content. That is, ‘the 
classroom, curricula, and school structures teachers enter are not neutral sites waiting 
to be shaped by educational professionals,’ for ‘these contexts are shaped in the same 
ways language and knowledge are constructed, as historical power makes particular 
practices seem natural – as if they could have been constructed in no other way’ 
(Kincheloe, 2008, p. 2). In sum, contra the instrumental or technical view of 
education that is neutral to questions of class, gender, race, religion and history and is 
primarily concerned with the transmission of ‘how-to’ knowledge – for example, 
knowledge on how to pass examinations, how to be a good citizen, how to achieve 
success at work, and so on – critical pedagogy taught me as a teacher to always 
inquire into the relationship between education and the broader socio-political order 
in the different situations of my practice (Giroux, 1988).  
 
Yet what I had learnt from Freire and other critical pedagogues on the non-
neutrality of education and the liberation theologians on the non-neutrality of religion 
sat increasingly uncomfortably over the six years that I spent as a high-school teacher 
in Sydney. In a relatively short teaching career that involved work in both state-run 
public and so-called private schools, both self-identified religious and non-religious 
schools, I grew more aware of some problem in these categorisations: firstly, despite 
these categories, all schools seemed to serve the same primary functions through 
similar educational practices – i.e. teaching from set curricula, standardised 
assessment and examinations, reporting involving rating and ranking students, and a 
significant emphasis, especially in the latter years of schooling, on securing desirable 
post-school destinations. What differed were the languages in which these were 
framed.  
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Secondly and closely related was the experience that despite the identifications 
of schools along the secular/religious and public/private line and the heated debates 
in the media and internet around this difference as typified above by Kaye, 
O’Doherty, Deveney and Donnelly, religious private schools seemed to share a lot of 
practices with non-religious public schools and vice-versa. Such similarities, apart 
from the explicitly educational practices mentioned above, included the shaping of 
the academic calendar around Easter holidays, Christmas celebrations as well as 
national commemorations like ANZAC, Australia and Melbourne Cup days. Finally 
and above all, it seemed peculiar to me that despite the gravity of tone and frequency 
of public arguments around the place of religion, values and social purpose in the 
different types of schools, year after year much credence was given to the ranking of 
schools and individual students in the state-wide Higher School Certificate (HSC) 
results, fuelled in no small part by popular media. For example, in my final year of 
high school teaching in 2010, the Sydney Morning Herald newspaper released its 
annual ‘HSC Performance’ league table which measures the ‘success rate’ of schools 
measured by the results achieved by its students (‘HSC Performance,’ 2010). A 
cursory glance at the schools listed in the top twenty is instructive to my point (see 
Table 1): 
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Table 1: HSC 2010 Top School Performances (‘HSC Performance,’ 2010) 
School Name 2010 Rank 
 
2010 Success Rate 
James Ruse Agricultural 
High School 
1 76% 
North Sydney Girls High 
School 
2 57% 
Hornsby Girls High 
School 
3 56% 
Baulkham Hills High 
School 
4 54% 
Sydney Girls High 
School 
5 54% 
Sydney Boys High 
School 
6 49% 
Northern Beaches 
Secondary College 
Manly Campus 
7 47% 
North Sydney Boys High 
School 
8 47% 
Sydney Grammar School 9 46% 
SCEGGS Darlinghurst 10 46% 
Abbotsleigh 11 45% 
Ascham School 12 44% 
Fort Street High School 13 43% 
Kambala 14 43% 
Malek Fahd Islamic 
School 
15 42% 
Moriah College 16 42% 
Normanhurst Boys High 
School 
17 41% 
St George Girls High 
School 
18 41% 
Pymble Ladies’ College 19 39% 
Loreto Kirribilli 20 38% 
 
In this list, there are eleven formally ‘government’ public schools and nine 
‘non-government’ private schools, the latter of which consists of three Anglican 
schools, one Roman Catholic, one Uniting Church, one Orthodox Jewish, one 
Islamic, one non-denominational and one secular school. Beyond these differences 
amongst the twenty schools, however, lies one commonality: despite all the 
wrangling debates over religion, values and social purpose, all these schools are 
ultimately commensurable, measurable and comparable on a single scale. 
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Observing this, it seemed to me in light of Freire’s critical pedagogy that 
despite the cursory nod to democratic values, diversity and opportunity, the direction 
of the education system in Australia was not neutral, but tended generally to 
encourage competitive individualism and the homogenisation of form and content at 
the service of a broader political program, or what Freire may term the ‘integration of 
the younger generation into the logic of the present system.’ Thus, questions arose in 
my mind as to what this present system is and what its logic entails, as well as how 
this present system is served by education though schooling. Yet while the measures 
of ‘performance’ and ‘success’ appeared to increasingly cut across substantive 
differences between schools, the public debates over religious schooling were 
simultaneously reaching a climactic point owing to a high-profile incident in the 
Sydney suburb of Camden. 
 
On 17 October 2007, the local government council of Camden made public an 
application from the Quranic Society – a private religious institution based in Sydney 
– to build Camden College, a primary and high school for 600 students (see 
Senescall & Narushima, 2007). This proposal generated a wave of dissent from local 
residents, with a protest rally involving up to 1,000 people and up to 3,000 formal 
submissions to the local council expressing disdain at the possibility of an Islamic 
school in their area of residence for various reasons. Tensions reached a climax in 
November 2007 when two pigs heads – considered ḥarām or ‘sinful’ within the 
Islamic tradition (see Al-Qardawi, 2001, p. 42) – were rammed on metal stakes with 
an Australian flag draped between them at the school’s proposed site (Camden 
Council Rejects Islamic School, 2008). In the midst of this controversy, I noted that 
several Protestant churches (i.e. Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian and Baptist) in 
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Camden had also issued a pointed letter attacking the idea of religious education 
predicated on the Islamic faith (see Churches Unite Against Islamic School, 2009). 
According to the letter, the school is to be opposed because by contrast to forms of 
‘acceptable’ religion in Australia which deal with supernatural concerns in the 
private sphere, Islam is not a private religion: 
 
The Quranic Society espouses a world view which is not 
compatible with broad, Australian, egalitarian culture...  in 
direct opposition to the expectation[s] outlined by the 
Australian government.  
[…] 
In Australia, we have learned the secret of living peacefully 
with others, respecting one another’s religious and 
philosophical beliefs. In fact, most world religions are 
capable of living in harmony in our community. This is 
because [religions] are predominately ‘spiritual’ in nature and 
look forward to the ultimate resolution of mankind’s 
struggles in a ‘life beyond this world.’  
[...] 
lslam however, is not simply a private religion. It is driven by 
a powerful political agenda. It is an ideology with a plan for 
world domination. The ideology backs into the religious 
belief system… Muslim people are challenged not to be 
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content until all non-Islamic laws are replaced by Shariah 
law… The proposed Islamic legal system— built on Quranic 
teaching— seeks to legislate in areas of personal life that 
Australians would find impossible to accept or tolerate. 
(Camden Ministers Fraternal, 2008) 
 
Notwithstanding my scepticism regarding the unverified claims about a 
generalised Muslim intention for ‘world domination’ and the alleged aim held by 
‘Muslim people’ for all non-Islamic laws to be replaced by sharī ah law, I noted that 
this letter from established Protestant churches expressed three interrelated 
assumptions about the place of religion and religious education in contemporary 
Australia: firstly, that religions and religious education are to conform to mainstream 
Australian culture and the ‘expectations outlined by the Australian government’; 
secondly, those ‘world religions’ that are acceptable are necessarily otherworldly and 
confined to the private realm for the sake of ‘living in harmony’; thirdly, and 
consequently, any religion or religious education that seeks to govern all areas of life 
is unacceptable. 
 
This incident raised many questions in my mind around the question of 
religious education more generally – and religious schooling more particularly as its 
most conspicuous institutional expression – within the present educational system in 
Australia. Taken together with the questions I had about the present system and its 
logic, I now also began to ask some questions that would form the basis for this 
thesis: Are some forms of religious schooling considered more acceptable than others 
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and how has this come to be decided? If so, then how are the religious claims and 
values of such ‘acceptable’ religious schools understood to be substantiated in the 
context of the present educational system? Are particular religious schools so 
different if, in their manifold variety, they can be rated and ranked beside differently 
religious and non-religious schools? And, if religion does not exist as a transcendent 
object above the fray of history, society and politics but always involves immanent 
practices, then what is the role of religious schooling within the present social order? 
 
These critical questions coincide with the new public visibility of religion in 
ostensibly secular-liberal societies and speak directly to the debate over its presence 
in the educational apparatus of the Australian State. Taking the NCPC schooling 
movement as a particular instance of ‘acceptable’ religious schooling in Australia – a 
movement whose religious bases I have some familiarity with owing to several years 
of teaching in a NCPC school1 – this thesis can be seen as an initial step on the way 
to seeking answers to these questions, questions that are at once social and personal, 
public and private, secular and religious, and always inescapably political. 
 
A conjunctural approach to discourse, tradition and hegemony 
 
According to Ward (2004, p. 4), the new visibility of religion in the public 
sphere is occurring at the same time as the latter sphere itself undergoing change, 
which means that the crucial task in this present moment is an investigation of the 
                                                          
1 In this time, I also completed a Certificate in Christian Education on the foundations for a neo-
Calvinist approach to education, as well as a course on the ‘development of Christian schooling in 
Australia,’ which provided a historical perspective on the development of neo-Calvinist schooling 
alongside other forms of religious and non-religious schooling in Australia. Both courses were 
conducted by the National Institute for Christian Education, which is the teacher education arm of the 
NCPC schooling movement and an accredited provider of higher education courses. See Chapter 4. 
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connection between the two forms of cultural change. In the first half of this thesis, I 
seek to contribute to this task by looking broadly to the historical antecedents of the 
present understanding of religious education vis-à-vis non-religious (or secular) 
education in Australia. This will be followed in the latter half by a critical inquiry 
into the place of religious schooling within the present socio-political context and the 
effects of the latter on the former. In this regard, I shall look at the example of the 
NCPC schooling movement as a specific type of religious schooling within an 
educational system structured along neo-liberal lines. Apart from the status of NCPC 
schooling in academic research as ‘an overlooked sector in the Australian education 
market’ and my own facility with its religious underpinnings mentioned above, I 
submit that the NCPC schooling movement presents as an important and instructive 
instance of religious schooling for three further reasons brought to the fore by the 
Protestant churches in the case of the proposed Islamic school in Camden.  
 
Firstly, with regard to the claimed necessity for religions to accept mainstream 
Australian cultural values and abide by the expectations of the government, the 
NCPC schooling movement was initiated in the 1950s explicitly as a movement 
opposed to the mainstream, state-run education system in Australia (Justins, 2002). 
For the Dutch neo-Calvinist migrants who were the impetus for the movement, as 
will be detailed further in Chapter 4, their expansive religious vision led them to 
regard mainstream Australian culture’s impact on education at the time – including 
shared moral expectations that students be ‘courteous towards older people and do 
many good deeds’ and ‘goodness, friendliness, politeness’ (as cited in Justins, 2002, 
p. 59) – as radically insufficient without God and hence unacceptable in itself. 
Concurrently and secondly, in light of broader questions regarding the ‘acceptability’ 
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or ‘unacceptability’ of certain religious schools owing to their acceptance or refusal 
to confine religion to the private realm for the sake of ‘living in harmony,’ the NCPC 
schooling movement in Australia was marked at the outset by the refusal to bracket 
its religious discourse off from aspects of schooling and life considered to be non-
religious. As NCPC schooling proponent Janet Nyhouse (1980) asserts:  
 
The children will be taught about the effects of sin, the 
misery and suffering it causes in our countries and throughout 
the world, and the task of the body of Christ in bringing 
redemption to bear on all of life. The Christian school is a 
place where children are prepared to be the salt of the earth, 
to bring renewal and reformation to the world. (p. 83) 
 
The charge to bring ‘redemption to bear on all of life’ and ‘bring renewal and 
reformation to the world’ brings up the third reason why the NCPC schooling case is 
instructive; for if it is the case that any religion or religious education that seeks to 
govern all areas of life is unacceptable, then why is it that the NCPC schooling 
movement – with its insistence on the all-pervasiveness of its religious discourse in 
education – is not only acceptable as rare a exception to the education system, but 
now incorporates over 80 schools across Australia with approximately 23,000 
students and 2,000 teaching staff (CEN, 2010)? More specifically, how does NCPC 
schooling render itself amenable to the broader education system and in turn, how 
does the education system render NCPC schooling amenable to its goals? The 
passage of the NCPC schooling movement from an antagonistic alternative to the 
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mainstream education system to its current status as an institutional feature of the 
latter thus presents as a potentially illuminating story of religious schooling in 
Australia, in particular of what constitutes ‘acceptable’ forms of religion in education 
and how this is managed in relation to the present neo-liberal regime. 
 
In order to discern the place and role of the NCPC schooling movement as an 
instance of religious schooling in the present socio-political order, I submit that the 
crucial focus should lie on how the religious language and practices of the former are 
elaborated in relation to non-religious language and practices within shifting 
historical and political contexts (see Salvatore, 2007). In this way, I understand its 
religious aspects not merely as a set of beliefs but as a discourse, which, as I shall 
elaborate further below, entails ‘an entire practice which works like an economy (and 
as a language) distributing and proportioning reality through a series of substitutions 
and exchanges’ (Milbank, 2009b, p. 109). 
 
As such, I do not regard religion as a universally identifiable ‘thing’ by 
recourse to an essence – for example, faith or sublime experiences – but rather as 
involving a diversity of complex (re)interpretations and (re)formulations across time 
and space, not least in relation to that against which it is defined – that is, the non-
religious or secular. This is an important point because as mentioned above, 
‘religion’ and ‘the secular’ are mutually implicated and how they are defined and 
demarcated does not stand apart from those historical and political contexts in which 
such definitions and demarcations are put into effect (Asad, 2001). Thus, as Asad 
(1993) points out, objects considered to be religious symbols in a particular context – 
for example, the Qur’an or the name ‘Jesus Christ’ in Islamic or Christian types of 
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schools respectively – ‘cannot be understood independently of their historical 
relations with non-religious symbols or of their articulations in and of social life, in 
which work and power are always crucial’ (pp. 53-54). What he means by ‘work and 
power’ I take to mean the connection between religious language and particular 
social practices on the one hand, and broader political relations on the other. 
Elsewhere, for instance, Asad (2001) states in different terms that religious ‘faith’ is 
‘a relationship created through, maintained by, and expressed in practice’ (i.e. work), 
while the secular entails not merely a lack of religion, but the imposition of 
politically normative ‘behaviours, knowledges and sensibilities in modern life’ (i.e. 
power) (pp. 208, 25). This connection between religious and secular is also 
highlighted by MacIntyre (1998a), who comments about the conceptual difficulties 
he has faced in segregating the area of religious belief and practice from the rest of 
social life – that is, ‘treating it as a sui generis form of life with its own standards 
internal to it’ (p. 257). This is because ‘the claims embodied in the uses of religious 
language and practice are in crucial ways inseparable from a variety of nonreligious 
metaphysical, scientific, and moral claims’ (MacIntyre, 1998a, p. 257). 
 
Following these broad prescriptions about how the religious and non-religious 
should be seen as mutually defined within the context of broader political relations, 
how then should the relationship between religious schooling and its socio-political 
situation in Australia be approached in my specific case at hand? To inquire into the 
NCPC schooling movement as a particular instance of religious schooling in relation 
to the broader neo-liberal context, I adopt a general mode of inquiry that can be 
characterised as a ‘conjunctural analysis’ in the discipline of cultural studies. 
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Following the work of cultural studies scholar Stuart Hall (e.g. 1988), Lawrence 
Grossberg (2010) defines a ‘conjuncture’ as: 
 
[C]haracterized by an articulation, accumulation, and 
condensation of contradictions, a fusion of different currents 
or circumstances. A conjuncture is a description of a social 
formation as fractured and conflictual, along multiple axes, 
planes and scales, constantly in search of temporary balances 
or structural stabilities through a variety of practices and 
processes of struggle and negotiation. (pp. 40-41; also 2006) 
 
Based on this, an analysis of conjunctures can thus be broadly understood as an 
approach that is attentive to the configuration of different historical tendencies and 
political elements into a stable set of societal and institutional arrangements that 
prevail in a given time and place, forming what I have labelled a regime, albeit only 
contingently and temporarily (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 106; also Grossberg, 
2010, pp. 25, 317n42). So, in the present case, religious schooling can be seen as a 
conjuncture based on specific understandings of ‘religion’ and ‘education.’ The 
function and meaning of religion in education from such a view cannot be 
determined as given, but is dependent upon how it articulates with other social 
forces within a specific time and place (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) – that is, in this 
case, how the relation among religious and non-religious elements are established 
such that the meaning of both are modified as a result of the articulatory practice. 
This point is well explicated by Hall (1996), who argues that while ‘in one historical-
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social formation after another, religion has been bound up in particular ways, wired 
up very directly, as the cultural and ideological underpinning of a particular structure 
of power’ (p. 142), nonetheless what characterises religion must be sought within 
specific conjunctures. This is because: 
 
Religion has no necessary political connotation... it has no 
necessary, intrinsic, transhistorical belongingness. Its 
meaning – political and ideological—comes precisely from 
its position within a formation. It comes with what else it is 
articulated to. Since those articulations are not inevitable… 
religion can be articulated in more than one way. (Hall, 1996, 
p. 142) 
 
Religion in this approach should thus not be supposed as having a fixed or 
essential meaning, but should be understood in relation to specific political relations 
(e.g. schools within a neo-liberal context) and their deployment by specific 
movements (e.g. NCPC schooling movement). As Redden (2011, p. 658) points out 
following Hall, these specificities inflect, develop and engage with religion to 
construct narratives that transform people’s awareness of themselves and their 
potential in directions that cannot be determined a priori. So Christianity, for 
example, ‘has been articulated with groups that advance very different social agendas 
and associated subject positions, from political liberation to colonial civilizing 
missions and the domestication of social conservatism’ (Redden, 2011, p. 659). This 
point is also elaborated by Žižek, Santner & Reinhard (2005), who point out 
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specifically with regard to the Jewish and Christian commandments to ‘love God’ or 
‘love your neighbour’ that the meaning of these injunctions cannot be taken as self-
evident, even for those who claim adherence to them: 
 
[For] just as love of God can be interpreted in terms of many 
divergent practices, from private meditation to public 
martyrdom, so the intent and extent of the commandment to 
love the neighbor are obscure and have frequently been 
points of radical disagreement and sectarian division, even in 
mainstream interpretation. (p. 5) 
 
Hence, in the present thesis, I maintain that the ‘religious’ aspects of religious 
education cannot be taken as self-contained units of belief that either have secondary 
effects on education, or are themselves secondary effects. Rather, it should be 
characterised as a product of the conjuncture that is religious schooling today, that is, 
specific articulations within a specific socio-political context between different 
interpretations of what constitutes ‘religious education’ as borne by different 
historical lineages, or what I following Asad (1986) have termed discursive 
traditions. 
 
The concept of discursive traditions used in this thesis emphasises the 
historicity of the present and the attempted coherence of subjectivities, practices and 
institutions within particular socio-political situations. It brings to the fore the 
historical specificity of ways of understanding that frame, discipline and order 
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perceptions, actions and participation in the world. As an analytical device, it 
involves the concatenation of two theoretical concepts: ‘discourse’ and ‘tradition.’ 
Briefly put, a discourse is here defined as any ‘relational totality of signifying 
sequences that together constitute a more or less coherent framework for what can be 
said and done.’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 300) This notion of discourse signals the centrality 
of interpretations of meaning in every aspect of social life. When a particular 
discourse achieves moral, intellectual and political dominance through the 
agglomeration of other discourses under its particular set of norms, values, views and 
interpretations of the world, it can be considered hegemonic – that is, ‘what is at a 
given moment accepted as the ‘natural’ order, jointly with the common sense that 
accompanies it’ (Mouffe, 2009, p. 549; also Gramsci, 1971, pp. 630-656). 
  
It is important to note that by ‘agglomeration’ I do not mean that the 
proponents of a dominant interpretation simply compel those who hold to other 
understandings; rather, as Strinati (1995) points out, the notion of hegemony 
following Italian Marxist writer Antonio Gramsci holds that: ‘subordinated groups 
accept the ideas, values and leadership of the dominant group not because they are 
physically or mentally induced to do so, nor because they are ideologically 
indoctrinated, but because they have reason of their own’ (p. 166, emphasis added). 
As such, when considering the example of the NCPC schooling movement in the 
second half of this thesis, I take it as important to focus on its particular discourse as 
a specific instance of religious schooling in this thesis, for such attention is necessary 
in order to discern the ‘reasons of their own’ that may explain their place within a 
regime structured according to neo-liberal discourse. 
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In turn, if a hegemonic discourse regulates social life through the institution of 
its interpretation of the world, which also involves the suppression and exclusion of 
other interpretations – for example, by establishing a system of schooling based on a 
certain construal of ‘good education’ over others or encouraging certain forms of 
religious expression and excluding others through state power – then it can be 
characterised as a regime. By this latter term, I denote specific forms of government 
that call attention both to the rule of particular groups, as well as the particular 
routine practices – that is, a regimen – that come to constitute a way of life in a given 
historical conjuncture (Cantor, 1995). Drawn from the Greek notion of politeia (i.e. 
polity), it foregrounds the political establishment and direction of every society, 
which consists in setting the form of its institutional arrangements and routine 
practices, as well as the horizons of its expectations and aspirations. The political 
philosopher Leo Strauss (1988[1956]) offers an apt description of this key term:  
 
Regime is the order, the form, which gives society its 
character… Regime is the form of life as living together, the 
manner of living of society and in society, since this manner 
depends decisively on the predominance of human beings of 
a certain type, on the manifest domination of society by 
human beings of a certain type. Regime means that whole, 
which we today are in the habit of viewing primarily in a 
fragmentized form: regime means simultaneously the form of 
life of a society, its style of life, its moral taste, form of 
society, form of state, form of government, spirit of laws. (p. 
36) 
58 
 
Following this broad definition, a regime can thus be taken to denote a form of 
rule, or more specifically a ruling element, within any given society and the ruling 
norms embodied within it (Zuckert and Zuckert, 2006, p. 191). As such, every 
regime can be characterised as the institution of social practices, most prominently 
through policies and legislation, which are based on a particular interpretation of the 
world – that is, a hegemonic discourse. According to Michel Foucault (1980, p. 131), 
such a discursive regime – or what he aptly terms a ‘regime of truth’ – works not 
only to promote and make commonsense its vision of life and the future, but also to 
discipline and coerce conformity with it through institutions, primarily the state and 
its constituent apparatuses such as the education system, legislation and social 
policies: ‘their power is persuading people to their logic; to believe and act in 
relation to this logic.’ (Dodge, 2004, p. 205; also Grossberg, 2010, pp. 25, 317n42) 
In this thesis, I use the concept of regime to characterise the institution of a particular 
hegemonic discourse – neo-liberalism – and its normative ideals over others and 
through that to explain a host of related phenomena like religion and education 
within its purview (Cantor, 1995). 
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Figure 4: The relationship between discourse, hegemony and regime 
 
If the theoretical concept of discourse foregrounds the political relations 
between contending interpretive frames that seek to inscribe meaning to reality in a 
given conjuncture, then tradition on the other hand is a heuristic device that stresses 
the historicity of all discourses. According to Hirschkind (1995), the concept of 
discursive traditions names the politically contingent and historically evolving sets of 
meanings embodied in the languages, practices and institutions that are embedded in 
societies or social groups. According to this perspective therefore, all human beings 
live in a stream of history and are hence always already located in traditions of 
discourse. 
 
Tradition so understood should thus not be taken as an inert body of 
sedimented knowledges and practices from the past, but rather the ‘continuity of 
meaning in history through its re-articulation and re-actualisation [because] tradition 
is both the condition and the process of our understanding.’ (Bielskis, 2005: 106) In 
this sense, discursive traditions can be defined as the historically evolving set of 
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discourses embodied in the practices and institutions of various social groups vis-à-
vis their contingent historical and political circumstances, and which are deeply 
imbricated in the material life of those inhabiting them. In the first three chapters of 
this thesis, I seek to demonstrate by means of a genealogy of the concept of 
‘religious education’ how the present neo-liberal regime is built upon a particular 
discursive tradition – namely, the Anglo-liberal tradition. In these chapters, I 
construct a broad narrative about how religious education has been conceived in this 
tradition over time and the key historical antecedents that have given rise to present 
conceptions.  
 
In the latter three chapters of this thesis, I turn from the broad genealogical 
story of religious education within the neo-liberal regime to focus more specifically 
on the NCPC schooling movement in relation to it. The point of this analytical move 
is to foreground the manner in which the respective inherited presuppositions arising 
from the discursive tradition of the latter interact with that of the former. My primary 
goal in these chapters is thus to discern the historical and contemporary processes by 
which, and the extent to which, the discourses of NCPC schooling are rendered 
amenable to the dominant discourse of neo-liberalism and what effects this might 
have on NCPC schooling specifically, and the question of religious schooling more 
generally. On a broader level, I seek to contribute to the broader debates over the 
new public visibility of religion by pointing to the historical and political processes 
of how it has unfolded (and is unfolding) in the field of school education in 
Australia, as well as how the categories of secular/religious and public/private may 
be inadequate for capturing the manner in which the hegemony of neo-liberal 
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discourse is sustained by a regime that traverses, through various instruments, these 
dichotomies at the same time as it upholds them.  
 
The long route through history: Thesis in outline  
 
In his sweeping account of religion and the secular, Taylor (2007, pp. 90-95) 
cautions against ‘straight path accounts’ of modern secularity as a linear, progressive 
realisation of a rational and scientifically ordered world, where an autonomous 
nature is said to be ‘freed’ from a religious outlook. Following Taylor’s advice for 
my own, far humbler thesis project, I shall address the question of how religious 
schooling is related to the neo-liberal regime in the present by taking a path 
described by philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1991, pp. 24-25) as the ‘long route of 
hermeneutic detours,’ particularly through history (also Kearney, 2006, pp. ix-xi). 
For in order to come to grips with how particular commonsense ‘facts’ come to be 
so, ‘we do not begin with pure reflective consciousness,’ for such a task can only be 
‘accomplished by means of a long detour through those significations of history and 
culture that reside outside our immediate consciousness’ (Ricoeur as cited in 
Kearney, 2004, p. 13).  
 
Following Ricoeur’s analytical metaphor of a long route of detours, I shall in 
the first place seek to offer a genealogical account of how religion and religious 
education vis-à-vis secular education came to be politically constituted by such 
contemporaneously commonsense distinctions as secular/religious and 
public/private, as well as its corollaries like natural/supernatural, other-worldly/this-
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worldly and beliefs/practices. On the basis of this detour through history, I will then 
seek to discern how the NCPC schooling movement as an instance of religious 
education in Australia positions itself and is positioned in relation to neo-liberal 
regime, and whether the present debates along the public/private and 
secular/religious lines are adequate for capturing this. 
 
In Chapter 1, I establish a framework for a genealogical account of the way 
religion and religious education is defined in official discourse and presupposed in 
debates over religious schooling in Australia today. Structured as a prolegomenon 
(i.e. preliminary observations and interpretive key; see Kant, 1977; Lukes, 1971) to 
the rest of this thesis, I begin by asking: What is religious education, particularly as 
expressed in the form of religious schooling in Australia? I begin addressing this 
question by means of an extended engagement with the debates that surround it along 
the public/private and secular/religious lines and how representatives of each 
position might negatively or positively construe religious schooling. In addition, I 
examine through various critical scholars of religion and secularism some of the 
presuppositions that the various positions in these debates may implicitly rely upon 
in their understanding of what religious schooling entails. I then go on to specify how 
religious education is officially understood by governmental and juridical institutions 
in Australia today before historicising the present definition of religious education as 
a product of a particular discursive tradition, specifically the Anglo-liberal tradition. 
Given that the focus, even at the most general level, is driven by a critical inquiry 
into how religion and religious education are construed in Australia today, I neither 
pretend to offer a comprehensive history of liberalism or education in the European 
West, Britain or even Australia, nor a comprehensive history of Christianity in the 
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West, Britain or Australia let alone a history of religions in general. Rather, what I 
seek to offer is a particular historicised account of how religious education has come 
to be defined, debated and acted upon over time in relevant geographic and cultural 
spheres insofar as it explains the Australian case. In short, my genealogical accounts 
in Chapters 2 and 3 are governed by the question: How has religious education come 
to be defined and positioned as it is in Australia today? 
 
Drawing on this conception of tradition as it has been successively developed 
in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Alasdair MacIntyre and Talal Asad, I begin 
addressing this question by interpreting what I understand to be the historical 
antecedents of religious education in what I call the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition 
to its overlapping influences from nominalism, Protestantism and early-English 
liberalism in Chapter 2. In addition, I also counter-pose the commonsense framing of 
religious education along the public/private and secular/religious lines with the 
notion of hegemony and the related concept of the ‘integral state’ from Gramsci and 
others (e.g. Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). In doing so, I seek to demonstrate how the 
public/private and secular/religious distinctions in Anglo-liberal discourse – one 
presupposed by nearly all the positions in the debate over religious schooling in 
Australia – mask a latent ‘circuit of power’ between the two spheres that reinforce 
hegemonic judgments of acceptable and unacceptable religious education and by 
what standards and for which purposes such judgments can be made. 
 
The operation of this circuit of power is further demonstrated in Chapter 3 
through a consideration of how ‘secular’ and ‘public’ schooling in Australia and 
particularly the ‘mother colony’ of New South Wales was established after 
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colonisation in 1788. In this chapter, I develop the Gramscian reading introduced in 
the previous chapter to underscore the populist politics involved in this establishment 
of state-run public education in the late Nineteenth century and the concomitant 
institution of a nominalist, Protestant and liberal definition of its ‘other’ – practices 
of religious education that are considered amenable and acceptable for the progress 
of the nation versus those that are not, specifically Roman Catholic education. 
Following this, I chart how religious education in this discursive tradition was built 
upon through the period of nation-building under what I label a broadly social liberal 
regime geared towards securing the good of the nation, to its eventual supplanting by 
the prevailing neo-liberal regime oriented toward preparing the nation for the 
globalisation of capitalist markets through the standardisation of education and the 
institution of a market in school choice.  
 
In such a context, how is religious education as expressed in the NCPC 
schooling movement to be understood? In order to address this question, I shift focus 
in Chapter 4 by introducing religious education as it is understood in a discursive 
tradition adjacent to the Anglo-liberal one – that of the neo-Calvinist tradition – 
stressing their points of divergence and overlap. In particular, I trace the genealogy 
of the NCPC schooling movement by interpreting the development of neo-Calvinist 
discourse on religious education from the expansive theo-political teachings of 
second generation Protestant Reformer John Calvin, through the politics of Theo Van 
Prinsterer and Abraham Kuyper in nineteenth-century Netherlands, to a movement in 
Australia borne by post-Second World War Dutch migrants for a particular type of 
schooling based on religious education as it is understood in this tradition. After an 
account of its inception and growth in Australia from the 1950s-on, I outline some of 
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the theological principles and ‘foundational values’ of contemporary neo-Calvinist 
‘parent-controlled’ schools, the latter specifically emphasising the primacy of 
parental responsibility over the education of their children and the vision of training 
‘responsive disciples’ who will glorify God/Christ in every arena of social life. I 
close this chapter by posing questions relating to the conjunction between the NCPC 
schooling movement – as bearers of a particular discursive tradition of religious 
education – and the discourse of the broader neo-liberal regime in Australia built on 
the presuppositions of the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition. In particular, I ask: How 
does the NCPC schooling movement relate its theologically-informed foundational 
values to the neo-liberal imperative to prepare the citizenry for globalisation, 
specifically though the institution of standardised education and a market for school 
choice? 
 
In attempting to answer this question, Chapters 5 and 6 draw on the discursive 
antecedents of the neo-Calvinist and Anglo-liberal traditions outlined in the previous 
chapters that undergird the contemporary NCPC schooling movement and the 
prevailing neo-liberal discourse respectively, as well as a consideration of the 
discursive processes that characterise the relations between the two in the context of 
the present institutional arrangements in Australian education. In order to discern the 
logics of the neo-liberal regime, I have chosen to focus on Australian Government 
policy platforms and documents pertaining to education.  This emphasis is based on 
the assumption that policy discourses generate discursive ‘commonsense’ insofar as 
they ‘produce frameworks of sense and obviousness within which policy is thought, 
talked and written about’ (Ball, 2005, p. 44). Here, I follow Easton’s understanding 
of policy as ‘the authoritative allocation of values’ (as cited in Rizvi & Lingard, 
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2010, p. 7). By drawing from a variety of key Government policies and declarations, 
I argue that this gives an indication of the regulatory logics that constitute the 
broader neo-liberal regime and that frame the NCPC schooling movement.  
 
Specifically in Chapter 5, I deal with the relationship between the NCPC 
schooling movement’s avowed foundational value of training ‘responsive disciples’ 
by actualising their God-given gifts and talents, and the neo-liberal ‘public purpose 
of schooling,’ which is to train students as future worker-citizens to be productive 
and employable under conditions of an (allegedly) inevitable globalising labour 
market. In taking into account the discursive antecedents of both the neo-Calvinist 
and Anglo-liberal traditions, I argue that the mediating nexus between the two 
discourses on education are federally-imposed measures of standards, which function 
to regulate schools through accountability requirements and comparative ratings. On 
the basis of such regulations, as I shall explore in Chapter 6, the institution of a 
national market for school choice is also made possible under a neo-liberal regime 
insofar as these standardised measures provide a uniform scale for comparison 
between choices. The relationship between this marketisation and the NCPC 
schooling movement’s foundational value of parental responsibility is considered, 
again taking into account the discursive antecedents of both the neo-Calvinist and 
Anglo-liberal traditions and the discursive processes that mark the relationship 
between the NCPC schooling movement and its broader neo-liberal context in the 
present. In both Chapters 5 and 6, a Gramscian reading as used in the previous 
chapters will be elaborated to demonstrate how the hegemonic regime is sustained 
through the circuit of power encompassing regulation through policies and 
legislation flowing in one direction, and consent by the NCPC schooling movement 
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flowing in the other. In other words, it involves discursive processes that belie any 
simple bifurcation of religious schooling along the public/private or secular/religious 
lines. 
 
In the concluding chapter of this thesis, I return to the debate over the new 
visibility of religious schooling in Australia on the basis of the entire argument 
unfolded in these chapters. In particular, I restate the arguments presented in this 
thesis and relate these to the present categorisations of religious schooling along the 
secular/religious and public/private lines. In cognisance of the limitations of this 
thesis, I also gesture towards further research that can be done, in particular 
conjunctural analyses of the discursive traditions and political positioning of non-
Christian religious education in contemporary Australia. Finally, I close by drawing 
on the findings in this thesis to put forward some provisional responses and further 
questions regarding the new visibility of religion in Australia and other societies 
similarly structured along (neo)liberal-secular lines.  
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Chapter 1 – A prolegomenon to genealogies of religious education 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter is intended to function as a prolegomenon for the chapters that 
follow in this thesis. The broad question that governs this chapter is the following: 
What is religious education, particularly in the form of religious schooling? I begin 
by foregrounding how religious education – in particular its most prominent 
institutional manifestation in the form of religious schooling – is officially 
understood by governmental and juridical institutions in Australia in the present 
historical conjuncture. Having sketched what religious education is as defined 
officially, I then historicise the present definitions of religious education by asking: 
How has it come to be defined as such? In order to address this question, I draw 
primarily on the analytical device of ‘discursive traditions’ as developed variously in 
the work of hermeneutic scholar Hans-Georg Gadamer, moral philosopher Alasdair 
MacIntyre and anthropologist Talal Asad. On the basis of this approach, the 
subsequent three chapters will then locate the prevailing definition of religious 
education as a product of a particular Anglo-liberal discursive tradition, one that was 
implanted into Australia after colonisation in 1788 and subsequently built upon, as 
well as how religious education is defined in an adjacent discursive tradition – that of 
neo-Calvinism. 
 
How is religious education officially conceived in contemporary Australia? 
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Contemporary religious education in Australia can be seen as a conjunction of 
two key elements  – ‘religion’ and ‘education’ – both of which are complex terms 
that frequently recur in political and policy debates. With regard to the first term, the 
difficulties faced in trying to define it and its relation to broader social formations 
and politics are not lost on many Australian political theorists such as Smith, Vromen 
and Cook (2006), who in their popular handbook Keywords in Australian Politics 
have called attention to ‘religion’ as ‘a notoriously difficult concept2‘ (p. 152). 
Nevertheless, in order to determine how religious education is conceived in Australia 
today, I have taken as a starting point the official definitions of each term – that is, 
‘religion’ on the one hand and ‘education’ on the other – as expressed in the 
conjuncture of religious schooling in government policy and subsequently debated in 
the field of politics. First of all, the complications arising from trying to define 
religion as a variegated phenomenon are not lost at the level of policymaking and 
government. As the official statistical apparatus of the Federal Government – the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2006) – readily admits: ‘Precise definition of 
the concept of religion, or of what generally constitutes ‘a religion,’ is difficult, if not 
impossible, because of the intangible and wide-ranging nature of the topic.’ 
 
                                                          
2 Despite their initial caveat, Smith et al (2006) nevertheless assert that ‘religion’ is commonly 
differentiated from ‘spirituality’ in Australian political discourse insofar as ‘religion is usually defined 
in a sociological way as shared beliefs, experiences and practices relating to the sacred that unite 
people into more or less organised group’ while ‘spirituality’ designates the belief in ‘the sacred’ – 
‘[which] may encompass one or more gods, as well as other forces that transcend or go beyond 
everyday human experiences’ (p. 152) – at the level of the individual. However, it is clear from Smith 
at al neither where the demarcation of ‘religion’ from ‘spirituality’ lies, nor what role it plays in the 
relations between individuals and groups. I submit, following the work of Carette and King (2005), 
that the contemporary definition of the difference between religion and spirituality, just like the 
distinctions between the religious and the secular or religion and the public that are the focus of the 
present thesis, cannot be understood without a consideration of the specific historical and political 
antecedents that have given rise to this distinction, as well as the social and political uses of this 
distinction and its effects.  
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Having acknowledged the near impossibility of the task, however, the ABS 
nonetheless provides a working definition of what constitutes a religion for the 
purposes of classification – known as the Australian Standard Classification of 
Religious Groups (ASCRG): 
 
Generally, a religion is regarded as a set of beliefs and 
practices, usually involving acknowledgment of a divine or 
higher being or power, by which people order the conduct of 
their lives both practically and in a moral sense. (ABS, 2006) 
 
The ASCRG’s definition of religion as a mixture of beliefs, practices and a 
cognitive assent to ‘a Supernatural Being giving some form and meaning to 
existence’ (ABS, 2006) refers specifically to a landmark ruling in the High Court of 
Australia: the 1982-83 Church of the New Faith v Commissioner for Pay-Roll Tax 
(Vic) case. In this matter, the High Court held that the beliefs, practices and 
observances of the Church of the New Faith (i.e. Scientology) were to be recognized 
as a religion in the state of Victoria. As part of the ruling, it was stated that:  
 
For the purposes of the law, the criteria of religion are twofold:  
first, belief in a Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle; and 
second, the acceptance of canons of conduct in order to give effect 
to that belief, though canons of conduct which offend against the 
ordinary laws are outside the area of any immunity, privilege or 
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right conferred on the grounds of religion. (Church of the New 
Faith v. Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax [Vic], 1982-3) 
 
Thus, religion for the purposes of the ASCRG as well as its legal definition as 
stipulated by the High Court of Australia can be summarised as twofold: firstly and 
primarily, religion is a belief in a Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle – i.e. an 
extra-empirical object/s; and secondly as a consequence of such belief, particular 
types of conduct that are taken to arise from that prior belief. What is noteworthy 
about this governmental definition of religion is its generality: by its own parameters, 
it is broad enough to encompass mental states, concerns and practices that are not 
conventionally considered to be religious. For example, patriotism expressed in the 
form of avowed loyalty to the nation-state accompanied by participation in national 
celebrations and pilgrimages to iconic sites of military battle or, alternatively, an 
intellectual and practical commitment to a Marxist revolution, would qualify as 
‘religion’ under the terms of such a definition (see respectively, Marvin & Ingle, 
1999 and Irons, 2001, p.295). However, that such beliefs and practices are not 
considered to be categorised as such for governmental purposes raises the question of 
how religion is defined and for what purposes. As Asad (1989) suggests, rather than 
attempt to demarcate what is within the sphere of religion and what is not, a better 
question would be: ‘how does power create religion?’ (p. 45) More specifically with 
regard to the concerns of this thesis, what are the politics underlying the 
categorisation of certain forms of education as religious and others as non-religious 
or secular? 
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Having sketched the prevailing definition of religion for the purposes of legal 
and official classification, it is now appropriate to canvass the prevailing definition of 
the second term in the articulation of religious education: that is, of education as it 
pertains to schooling, which is the primary focus of this thesis. According to the 
Australian Government Department of Education, Employment and Workplace 
Relations (DEEWR), education through schooling is described as a key training 
ground for its future citizens, workers and indeed, for the prospects of the nation as a 
whole: 
 
Australia’s future depends on a high quality and dynamic 
school education system to provide students with foundation 
skills, values, knowledge and understanding necessary for 
lifelong learning, employment and full participation in 
society. The education system is of the highest standard and 
enjoys international renown. (DEEWR, 2011) 
 
Schooling described as such serves the stated function of developing subjects 
committed to the continuous accumulation of skills and knowledge throughout an 
individual lifetime, their employment prospects and civic participation. Where then, 
can religious education in the form of religious schooling be located with regard to 
this national imperative of education? According to the DEEWR (2011) and as 
mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, primary and secondary schools in 
Australia are formally divided into ‘government’ and ‘non-government’ schools, 
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with the latter consisting mostly of schools with some religious affiliation 
(approximately 94 per cent). 
 
Thus, under the present institutional arrangements, Australian schooling 
consists of two broad sectors along which the non-religious or secular/religious 
distinction corresponds broadly with the categories of government/non-government – 
or synonymously, public/private – respectively. However, despite their non-
government and private status, religious schools remain funded and governed by the 
Australian Federal and State governments (DEEWR, 2011). While the regulatory 
conditions underlying such a commitment to religious schools on the part of 
successive Federal and State governments will be touched on in the later chapters of 
this thesis, which focus on the effects of such conditions on the form and content of 
religious education particularly in NCPC schooling, suffice to point out at present 
that for the purposes of classification and governance, education in religious schools 
is categorised as a form of schooling that is considered non-government and private. 
However, such schools are still obligated to administer, to a large extent, the 
‘foundation skills, values, knowledge and understanding’ held as necessary for the 
good of the nation and its citizens. Within the Australian context, the articulation of 
religion and education in the form of religious schooling thus denotes a particular 
conjunction of belief in a Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle with its associated 
moral conduct on the one hand, and the training of desired citizens and workers on 
the other. 
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Such a conjunction is evident in the public discourse of politicians and 
policymakers when articulating the appropriate relationship between the two 
elements. For example, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard, when pressed on the 
question of religion and religious institutions' provision of social services, including 
education, asserts:  
 
I think the church in contemporary society, obviously it is the 
mainstay, the sort of wellspring of faith and belief and existence for 
literally millions of Australians, and that’s to be respected [...] 
Government does what it can and can provide resources, but often 
the real innovation, the real human touch comes from churches, 
comes from not-for-profit organizations, that then take those 
resources and use them in their own special way. (as cited in 
Stephens, 2010) 
 
From this statement, two points should be noted: firstly, the conventional 
regard of religion and religious institutions as per the legal and official governmental 
definition as a ‘wellspring of faith and belief and existence’ that then produces ‘real 
innovation, the real human touch’; and secondly, the relationship of the Australian 
Government to such religious institutions as one of ‘providing resources.’ With 
regard to religious schooling, the precise nature of such ‘resourcing’ in the form of 
standardised guidelines on various aspects of schooling will be considered in more 
detail in later chapters. More specifically, the following statement by Barry McGaw, 
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Chair of the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA), 
can be seen as indicative of how religious education in such institutions may be 
conceived. Speaking on the planned design and implementation of a nationwide 
standardised curriculum in 2013/143, he states: 
 
We’ve got to make a clearer statement of what the whole 
curriculum will look like and what its time demands will be 
[...] My aim would be that the total curriculum would not 
command more than 80 per cent of a student’s time, the 
equivalent of four days a week. The rest of the time is for all 
the other things that schools do: the camping, excursions, 
cultural activities, the religious education in faith-based 
schools. We must leave space for these important things. 
(McGaw as cited in Milburn, 2011) 
 
McGaw here defines ‘religious education’ as one element in ‘faith-based 
schools’ that approximates to 20 per cent of school time or one school day, as well as 
setting it in a relation of equivalence to other ‘important things’ such as camping, 
excursions, etc. Drawing from the official legal and governmental definitions of 
‘religion’ and ‘education’ in conjunction with McGaw’s positioning of religious 
education and Gillard’s articulation of the role of religious institutions such as 
schools vis-à-vis the Australian Government, a general definition of how religious 
                                                          
3 All states and territories in Australia will implement the proposed national curriculum in 2013 with 
the exception of the state of NSW, which will implement the national curriculum in 2014. See ‘Lack 
of funds, uncertainty delay NSW national curriculum start date’ (2011). 
76 
education in religious schools is conceived in the present may be summarised as 
follows: Religious schools typically teach much the same general curriculum as 
common schools, and share the general aim of preparing children for the aims of 
citizenship and employment; but, in addition, they seek to pass on a particular set of 
religious beliefs about extra-empirical objects and their associated moral conducts. 
This latter objective is commonly defined as religious education. In light of this, the 
debates over religious schooling along the public/private and secular/religious lines 
surveyed in the previous chapter can thus also be understood as corresponding 
respectively to the function of religious schools as schools with regard to the general 
aim of schooling to train students for citizenship and employment as a public good 
on the one hand, and with regard to the religious function of religious schools, which 
is taken to be the transmission of particular and private beliefs and values on the 
other. 
 
The contingencies of religion and education 
 
The historical narratives of a cultural history pay particular 
attention to change or ‘ruptures’ in knowledge and how these 
changes order, intern, and enclose social, cultural, and 
political action. When considering educational history, the 
concern is how ideas construct, shape, coordinate, and 
constitute social practices through which individuals ‘reason’ 
about their participation and identity. (Popkewitz, Franklin & 
Pereyra, 2001, p. x) 
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So far, I have outlined how religious education, especially as it pertains to the 
institutional form of religious schooling, is held to be concerned with the delivery of 
educational services in a religious context. Yet such a definition elides the question 
of how ‘religion’ and indeed ‘education’ themselves have come to be understood as 
such. As critical pedagogues such as Paulo Freire (e.g. 1972), Ira Shor (1992), Peter 
McLaren (1989), bell hooks (1994) and Henry Giroux (1988; 1992) have brought to 
the fore in the past several decades, the two prevalent educational myths within 
liberal social orders are that education is a neutral activity, and consequently that 
education is – or should be – an apolitical activity involving the transmission of 
necessary ‘know-how’ (also Torres, 1998). According to such a liberal perspective, 
education – including education not directly controlled by the liberal state – is 
subject to the requirement of neutrality, which is understood as the eschewal of any 
particular conception of political or ethical good in the delivery of key ‘educational 
resources’ (Elliot & Hatton, 1994, pp. 52-54). By contrast, the position taken here 
concurs with critical pedagogy’s refusal to regard how education is defined as 
politically neutral or innocently technical. As McLaren (2009) elaborates, school 
knowledge in education is inextricably tied to differential power relations (or what I 
call politics) in history and society: 
 
Critical educational theorists view school knowledge as 
historically and socially rooted and interest bound. 
Knowledge acquired in school – or anywhere, for that matter 
– is never neutral or objective but is ordered and structured in 
particular ways; its emphasis and exclusions partake in a 
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silent logic. Knowledge is a social construction deeply rooted 
in the nexus of power relations. (p. 63) 
 
If historicity and politics are part and parcel of how education is conceived in 
the present, then one may say the same thing with regards to ‘religion.’ That is to say 
how religion is defined is not neutral trans-historically or trans-culturally. As with 
‘education,’ variations in the historical relationships between power and knowledge 
are such that the search for a universal or neutral definition of religion constitutes a 
futile exercise. Asad (1993, p. 29) argues, for example, that ‘there cannot be a 
universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and 
relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the 
historical product of discursive processes.’ Any attempt, therefore, to produce a 
universal or neutral definition of religion constitutes a denial of the historical 
specificity of religious phenomena, as well as the historically specific interplays of 
power and knowledge that define religion (and non-religion) in particular ways for 
particular societies. To define religion is thus always a politically partial act (Asad, 
2001, p. 220). The work of religious studies scholar Timothy Fitzgerald (1995, p. 35) 
concurs with Asad’s argument, pointing out that the usage of the words ‘religion,’ 
‘religions’ and ‘world religions’ by scholars of society and culture often betrays a 
certain ‘fuzziness, ambiguity and contradictoriness.’ He argues that phenomena 
categorised as ‘religion’ must always be understood first in their political function as 
the opposite of the modern secular state and rational science in Anglo-European 
societies, and historically peculiar insofar as ‘the invention of ‘religions’ in modern 
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discourse is also the invention of the secular state and the modern idea of ‘science’ as 
essentially different from ‘religion’’ (Fitzgerald, 2008a).  
 
What Asad and Fitzgerald are referring to as the categorisation of religion and 
its invention as an essentially distinct domain can be understood as a consequence of 
an influential perspective in the social sciences about the secularisation of the public 
realm, which has been labelled ‘modernisation theory’ (Hurd, 2004, pp. 242, 244). 
Summarily put, modernisation theory consists of a methodological assumption that 
religion is concerned essentially with irrational beliefs (commonly labelled as ‘faith’) 
and subjective values, an assumption that is in turn predicated on a social scientific 
creed of a progressive and functional ‘differentiation of social institutions’ whereby 
such irrational and subjective aspects of life are confined to the private sphere apart 
from the public realm, which is rationally administered. ‘As societies grow and 
become more elaborate,’ according to a leading proponent of this view sociologist 
Steve Bruce (2009, pp. 147), ‘they evolve specialised roles and institutions are 
created to handle specific functions previously embodied in one role or institution’ 
(also Tschannen, 1991). So while religion may have performed an integral function 
in a socially homogenous context, modernisation theory holds that the institutional 
pluralism of modern society propels the loss of religious monopolies on social 
functions and the decline of religion – for example, where modern institutions like 
schools, workplaces, government bureaucracy and psychological counseling services 
take over the functions of confessional education, vocational direction, political 
mediation and moral guidance that once belonged to religion (Bruce, 1996). 
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This view is in turn built upon Max Weber’s (1949, 1978) general theory of 
social evolution toward delineated ‘spheres’ of state, society and culture each with its 
own separate forms of rationality (see also Habermas 1984[1981], pp. 143-271). 
Most prominently for Weber, there are two forms of rationality in each sphere – 
namely, value rationality and instrumental rationality (Weber, 1978) – which are 
distinguished by orientations regarded as mutually exclusive: commitments based on 
conventions and convictions in the former case and commitments to strict 
calculability based on empirical evidence in the latter (Oakes, 2003, pp. 39). For 
Weber (1949), those aspects that make up value rationality are counterpoised to 
empirically-grounded rationality, which is the domain of ‘free’ human thought and 
action unencumbered by the former:  ‘[Therefore] we associate the measure of an 
empirical ‘feeling of freedom’ with those actions which we are conscious of 
performing rationally – i.e. in the absence of physical and psychic ‘coercion,’ 
emotional ‘affects’ and ‘accidental’ disturbances of the clarity of judgment’ (pp. 124-
125). 
 
So as instrumental rationality in each sphere grows with modernisation 
according to this Weberian rendering of social development, religion as an 
archetypical form of value rationality is increasingly rendered as irrational. This is 
because ‘[f]rom the standpoint of instrumental rationality… value rationality is 
always irrational, and increasingly so as the [instrumental] value to which the action 
is oriented is elevated to the status of the absolute value’ (Weber, 1978, p. 26). In 
consequence of this modernisation process, religion is supposed to be increasingly 
privatised because, as Nandy (1990, p. 129) describes this view, ‘managing the 
public realm is [seen as] a science which is essentially universal and [...] religion, to 
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the extent it is opposed to the Baconian world-image of science, is an open or 
potential threat to any polity.’ This presupposition of modernisation theory has in 
turn informed the secularist assumption in such disciplines as economics, political 
science, sociology and education studies about the ‘relative autonomy of state, 
economy and civil society’ and the intellectual habit of treating each of these – 
especially the state and economy – as separate from the proper domain of religion, 
which belongs to civil society as a matter of private volition (Calhoun et al 2011, p. 
4). The domain of social science, by contrast, was to be ‘value free.’ 
 
This normative lens presents as a teleological narrative of modernity. The 
progressive emptying of religion from the public realm can be most prominently seen 
in the influential works of sociologist Peter Berger in The Sacred Canopy (1967) and 
social theorist Jürgen Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action 
(1984[1981]), which was published as the first volume of an indicatively titled series 
on Reason and the Rationalization of Society. In his work, Berger examined the 
challenges posed to religion in the modern world by secularization and pluralism, 
focusing on the interplay between these two phenomena whereby secularization 
generates pluralism by undermining the plausibility structure of monopolistic 
religious institutions and beliefs while pluralism, in turn, relativises the taken-for-
granted or ‘objective’ nature of religious meaning systems, thereby encouraging the 
growth of the secular sphere at the expense of the religious sphere (see also 
Karlenzig, 1998). Since then, Berger (1999: 2) has revised his initial assertion, 
arguing on the basis of religious revivals globally that ‘the assumption that we live in 
a secularized world is false’ because the world today ‘is as furiously religious as it 
ever was and in some places more so than ever.’ So while this ‘does not mean that 
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there is no such thing as secularization,’ he argues, it does mean that ‘this 
phenomenon is by no means the direct and inevitable result of modernity’ (Berger, 
2001, p. 445). 
 
In a similar vein, Habermas (1984[1981], p. 77) also assumed that with the 
development of modern, pluralised liberal societies, the function of religion in 
fostering social integration is essentially transferred to a secular, consensus-based 
‘communicative reason’: ‘[For] the socially integrative and expressive functions that 
were at first fulfilled by ritual practice pass over to communicative action [and] the 
authority of the holy is gradually replaced by the authority of an achieved consensus’ 
(see also Reder and Schmidt, 2010). As for Berger, Habermas (2006) has more 
recently admitted that what was once thought of as a universal process of 
secularisation through modernisation and rationalisation of the public sphere now 
appears to be a very culturally-specific deviation: 
 
The significance of religions used for political ends has 
meanwhile grown the world over. Against this background, 
the split within the West is rather perceived as if Europe were 
isolating itself from the rest of the world. Seen in terms of 
world history, Max Weber’s ‘Occidental Rationalism’ now 
appears to be the actual deviation. [...] In this way, the 
Occident’s own image of modernity seems, as in a 
psychological experiment, to undergo a switchover: the 
normal model for the future of all other cultures suddenly 
becomes a special-case scenario. (p. 2) 
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What the recent admissions of Berger and Habermas highlight is that, as with 
education, how religion is understood in relation to the secular is relative to the 
particular political and historical circumstances within a given context. As Berger 
(2001, p. 445) asserts, it has ‘becomes an important task for the [study] of religion to 
map the phenomenon of secularization – both geographically and sociologically – 
not as the paradigmatic situation of religion in the contemporary world, but as one 
situation among others.’ Therefore, I argue, religion can neither be accurately 
defined apart from a consideration of the prevailing discourses in specific times and 
places, nor by recourse to a supposed teleological supersession of religion by a 
rationalised secular sphere. There is, in other words, no trans-historical and trans-
cultural essence of religion or secularity, but at different times and places and for 
different purposes some things have been categorised as religious or non-religious 
(i.e. secular) (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 119). Short of specifying the historical and 
political contingencies that give rise to such categorisations, there is a tendency to 
reify both the religious and the secular by recourse to static categories that render 
analysis simplistic. As Fitzgerald (2008) elaborates: 
 
In any given context of modernity we are always dealing with 
‘religion’ in various binary oppositions, which are all 
dependent on the bottom-line distinction between religion 
and whatever is assumed to be non-religion, now referred to 
rhetorically as the secular. In discussions about religion, its 
separation from, and thus relation to, other discursive non-
religious domains such as science, politics or economics is 
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usually only acknowledged tacitly and in passing, if at all, 
conveying (say) an untroubled and unquestioned sense that 
religion and politics or religion and science or religion and 
economics are essentially distinct, and thus in danger of 
getting confused. 
 
In light of this type of questioning, Strenski (2010) has argued for shifting the 
notion of religion as a reified ‘thing’ that can or ought to be defined in the abstract 
toward an understanding of the term as one that ‘needs to be defined variously as 
contexts and strategies of inquiry change’ (p. 11). And with regard to such contexts 
and strategies of inquiry, Nye (2008) highlights the additional problem that because 
the term religion ‘means many different things, and so there are many different ways 
in which we can say something is ‘religious’,’ there is thus ‘no activity, no way of 
thinking or talking, and no particular type of place or text which is intrinsically 
religious’ (p. 17). Yet if there is no essential content that marks certain groups or 
institutions as a priori religious, then the fact that such a marker is used to define 
some and not others should prompt an awareness of the inevitably historical and 
political contingencies that give rise to specific definitions (Moosa, 2006, p. 123), 
and consequently how such definitions are part of a broader regimes that produce 
particular social effects through the very designation of some things as religious or 
non-religious and secular (see Coronil, 1996, pp. 77-78). 
  
Given that historical and political specificities define, demarcate and fix both 
what is commonly understood as religion and education in a given time and place, 
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Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis seek to elucidate how the present conceptions of 
religious education in Australia as an Anglo-liberal society – particularly in its 
contemporary institutional form of religious schooling – are descended from the 
historically and politically contingent ways in which these categories have been 
differently defined and demarcated over time. In particular, I shall seek to produce a 
genealogy of its avowedly secular-liberal frame, pointing to the nominalist and 
Protestant theological inheritance of Anglo-liberal discourse. This will be held in 
comparison to how religious education has been conceived in an adjacent historical 
discourse in Chapter 4 – the neo-Calvinist tradition – which will bring to the fore the 
historical specificities of both and establish a context for explaining the relationship 
between them in the present conjuncture.  Before launching into the genealogies of 
religious education in these respective traditions, however, it is necessary to explain 
the bases and efficacy of some key conceptual tools such as genealogy and discursive 
traditions that I will use for the task. 
 
Why genealogies of religious education? 
 
So if it is the case, as I have thus far argued, that both the definitions of 
religion and education in the present are contingent upon the particular discourses 
prevailing at a particular time and place, then prior questions as regards the specific 
historical and political conditions that have given rise to the predominant definitions 
of religious education inevitably emerge. How, for example, did it come to be 
assumed by juridical and governmental discourses in the present, as well as in the 
debates that swirl around them, that religious education is composed of belief in a 
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Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle with its associated moral conduct on the one 
hand, and the training of desired citizens and workers on the other? If what constitute 
the core components of religious education are particular discourses, practices, 
communities and institutions, then how does this differ from the history of non-
religious education? More specifically, what is the relationship between education 
constituted as religious, and hence, private vis-à-vis public and secular education, 
how did this division come about, and what are the political effects of such a 
division?  
 
The purpose of the genealogies advanced in the chapters that follow is to 
reconnect generic definitions of religious education in the present with categories 
such as the political, the economy and the state with which it has been intertwined 
for most of Western European history (Taylor, 2007, pp. 25-90). In doing so, I call 
into question the categorisation of religious aspects of education in religious schools 
as something that exists in and for itself, as something autonomous and essentially 
distinct from other spheres of knowledge and practice (Fitzgerald, 2008a, p. 5-6). By 
way of contrast between two distinct but adjacent traditions, I shall argue that 
religious education as it is conceived in the Australian present is an effect of the 
particular historical shifts in the discourses of what sociologist of religion José 
Casanova (2006, p. 11) terms the ‘Anglo-Protestant cultural area’ – what I have 
termed the Anglo-liberal tradition following a common parlance in political theory 
(e.g. Hay, 2010; Mudge, 2008) – in particular the creation of an apparently 
autonomous non-religious or public sphere from its religious beginnings. This 
supposed autonomous sphere then constructs and authorises its ‘other’ – religion and 
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religious education for the purposes of transmitting belief and values – while 
educational practices are concerned with the ‘commonsense’ and ‘objective’ task of 
cultivating economic and state subjects. 
 
The primary aim of the genealogies of education in this thesis is to seek to 
demonstrate how the question and problem, and indeed the political arrangements, 
that define religious education in Australia, are a result of contingent and contested 
turns in the history of European Christianity and the colonial settlement of Australia, 
not as the outcome of inevitable laws or necessary trends. History understood as 
such, following Popkewitz et al (2001, p. 4), ‘is an understanding of the present and 
collective memory as the weaving together of multiple historical configurations that 
establishes connections that make for common sense.’ Thus the genealogical 
approach taken here, by mining the complex interactions and conflicts that have 
given rise to the taken for granted understandings and institutional arrangements such 
as religious education in the present ‘makes possible a ‘suspension of history itself’; 
that is, it makes visible what is assumed through the narratives that join time, space 
and the individual’ (Popkewitz et al, 2001, p. 4). 
 
As social theorist Roberto Unger (2004) argues in his work, genealogies of 
existing institutional arrangements are able to address what he calls the ‘mythical 
history’ of contemporary Western societies that retrospectively rationalises its 
configuration of social order as ‘the necessary expression of deep-seated economic, 
organizational, or psychological imperatives’ (pp. 174-175). In opposition to such 
mythical histories, a genealogical approach takes as its task the unearthing of the 
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effective history4 of a seemingly ‘natural’ institutional arrangement, tracing its 
history to the effects of various beliefs and practices – including purportedly 
transcendental or universal ones – and which brings to the fore the ‘radical historicity 
of everything we may be tempted to think of as permanent’ (Jameson, 1981, p. 372; 
also Howarth, 2002, p. 128; Gadamer, 2004[1975], pp. xxix-xxxi, 300-301). The 
fruits of such an approach to history, according to Walter Benjamin, is that it enables 
a critical engagement with the present by making its production of collective 
memories available for scrutiny and revision (cited in Popkewitz et al, 2001, p. 4). 
 
With regard to the question of religious education in different traditions, its 
actions, practices and institutions are described by reference to the historical lineage 
that informs them, which is defined not by an essence or fixed principles of religion 
or secularity or education, but as the particular slice of the past that best explains the 
assumptions and arrangements of the present (see Bevir, 2008). As such, the 
genealogies that follow in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 do not so much bracket questions of 
‘truth’ and ‘value’ as operate on the assumption that ‘truth’ or ‘value’ do not stand in 
a position of exteriority to politics, but is always ‘a thing of this world’ (Foucault, 
1980, p. 131), and as such is internally connected to relations of power and politics 
within specific historical conjunctures (Howarth, 2002, p. 128). While this will 
                                                          
4 It is important to note the terms ‘effective history,’ ‘historicity,’ ‘to historicise’ or ‘historicised 
accounts’ as used in this thesis stand in contrast with what is known as ‘historicism.’ The former 
terms name an interpretative approach to the past that seeks to ‘bring us up short against the radical 
difference of other societies and of their lived experience, and against the radical historicity of 
everything we may be tempted to think of as permanent (the structure of the psyche, the body, and the 
senses, fully as much as ‘values,’ emotional reactions, and the like)’ (Jameson, 1981, p. 372). By 
contrast, the latter term denotes accounts of the past encompassing univocal, linear and distinct stages 
of development, and which are often taken to be universal. As Chakrabarty (2000) defines it, 
historicism is ‘a mode of thinking about history in which one assumed that any object under 
investigation retained a unity of conception throughout its existence and attained full expression 
through a process of development in secular, historical time’ (p. xiv). 
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inevitably involve a consideration of how religion and education have been 
conceived in the past insofar as religious education is a derivative concept from 
broader discourses around its two constituent elements, the primary aim here is a 
‘history of the present.’ As Foucault (1977, pp. 30-31) points out, the writing of 
history is not so much an unlocking of the unfathomable remoteness of the past 
because any writing of history will always be a history of writing the present (see 
also Roth, 1981). Thus, the genealogies produced in the following chapters make no 
claim to being a comprehensive ‘history of education’ or ‘history of religion’ in 
Anglo-liberal societies. The more modest task that is attempted in Chapters 2 and 3 is 
a focused exploration of how religious education in Australia came to be defined as it 
is via the continuities and discontinuities within the Anglo-liberal tradition. This is 
followed by a comparison in Chapter 4 with religious education as it is understood 
within the neo-Calvinist tradition that emerged in Australia most prominently the 
Post-War years, while Chapters 5 and 6 will then explore the interaction between 
both and specify some effects of the way religious education has been conceived and 
acted upon in the present conjuncture. As such, it draws on historical discourses only 
insofar as they address the question: How has religious education come to be defined 
in Australia as it is today? Summarily put, then, the concern of the chapters 
immediately following is on how the historicity of the present continues to shape the 
presuppositions about what religious education is and where it belongs in relation to 
the broader socio-political order. Having traced the varying conceptions of religious 
education within the adjacent traditions of Anglo-liberalism and neo-Calvinism, the 
later chapters will then proceed to examine how the particular religious discourse of 
the NCPC schooling movement based in the latter relates to the hegemonic discourse 
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of the present neo-liberal regime in Australia, which is built on the basis of the 
former. 
 
Discursive traditions 
 
Men [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but 
under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from 
the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like an Alp on 
the brains of the living. (Marx, 1972) 
 
As metioned in the introduction, the concept of a ‘discursive tradition’ 
emphasises the historicity of the present and the attempted coherence of 
subjectivities, practices and institutions within particular social and political contexts. 
It brings to the fore the historical specificity of ways of understanding that frame, 
discipline and order perceptions, actions and participation in the world. It involves a 
concatenation of two theoretical concepts: discourse and tradition. Discourses, as 
interpretive frameworks of meaning, are not merely secondary descriptors to pre-
existent objects, but rather ‘systematically form the objects of which they speak’ 
(Foucault, 2002[1972], p. 49). What the notion of discourse draws attention to is that 
all ‘facts’ are interpreted against the background of a prior schema, which includes 
patterns of meaning that may be visual, spatial or temporal, and may comprise 
anything from face-to-face interaction to the definition of national boundaries. The 
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‘objects’ that discourses carve out (or ‘form’ in Foucault’s words) include all the 
things that are seen, referred to and taken for granted as actually existing ‘out there’ 
(Parker, 1999, p. 3). The articulation of a variety of such meaningful interpretations 
of reality into a relatively unified and stabilised whole under the aegis of one 
discourse, including the exclusion of discourses considered ‘unacceptable,’ is defined 
here as a hegemonic discourse (Torfing, 1999, p. 301). Put simply by Jessop (1982), 
hegemony is in this approach a ‘discourse of discourses’ (p. 199). In turn, if a 
hegemonic discourse configures institutional apparatuses and its associated 
mechanisms to sustain and reproduce itself – for example, a certain type of education 
system and a legislated procedure for regulating performance respectively – then it 
can be described as a regime (or a ‘regime of truth’; see Hall, 2001, pp. 76-77). 
These mechanisms or ‘technologies of power’ according to Foucault (1980) seek to 
regulate life within its purview down to its ‘capillary form of existence’ (p. 39) – that 
is, the level of mundane and commonsense detail of ‘everyday’ routines – in order to 
inhere and cohere various social practices like religion or schooling according to its 
interpretation of reality.5 
 
Following the discourse theory elaborated by Ernesto Laclau (1990, 1996, 
2005), Chantal Mouffe (2000; 2005; 2005a) and others (e.g. Chia, 1994, 2000; 
Torfing, 1999; Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Parker, 1990, 1990a, 1992), I understand 
discourse to be ontologically primary in analysis insofar as ‘the very possibility of 
                                                          
5 To emphasise the primacy of interpretation is not to deny that ‘objects’ exist beyond human 
perception; it is rather to posit that the very act of naming an object is already an interpretive act, 
which relies upon recognising the object within an entire schema of language and meaning. Laclau 
and Mouffe (in Laclau 1990, p. 101) propose a helpful example: ‘A stone exists independently of any 
system of social relations… [But] it is, for instance, either a projectile or an object of aesthetic 
contemplation only within a specific discursive configuration.’ 
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perception, thought and action depends on the structuration of a certain meaningful 
field which pre-exists any factual immediacy’ (Laclau, 1993, p. 431), albeit one in 
which meaning is constantly renegotiated (see Torfing, 1999, p. 85). In short, insofar 
as life, practices and institutions are embedded in systems of meaning, the notion of 
discourse(s) foregrounds the point that all such systems of meaning are always 
particular interpretations of the world. 
 
Tradition, on the other hand, is a heuristic device that stresses the historicity of 
all discourses. As Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004[1972], p. 277) points out, all human 
beings are inescapably situated within tradition and history; that is, to exist at all is to 
be always already participating in a common body of inherited assumptions, 
frameworks, methods and practices within a shared form of life discourses that have 
a history, which in turn provide the tools for its subjects to know and act in the 
world. Traditions thus bear the continuity of meaning in history through its lived 
rearticulation and re-actualisation, according to Gadamer (Bielskis, 2005, p. 106). 
Likewise, for Alasdair MacIntyre, who draws upon this aspect of Gadamer’s work 
(see MacIntyre, 1976; also Bielskis, 2005, p. 107-116), to reason or judge anything 
in life is to measure according to criteria that have been developed within 
historically-specific traditions in which people have been formed and their associated 
presuppositions. According to his historicising construal of different forms of life, 
even commonly used notions like ‘rationality’ or ‘justice’ are argued to make sense 
only within the context of traditions, for: ‘Rationality itself, whether theoretical or 
practical, is a concept with a history: indeed, since there are a diversity of traditions 
of enquiry with [diverse] histories, there are, so it will turn out, rationalities rather 
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than rationality, just as it will also turn out that there are justices rather than justice’ 
(MacIntyre, 1988: 9). 
 
More specifically, the concatenation of discourse with tradition is drawn from 
the work of anthropologist Talal Asad, who combines the concept of tradition from 
MacIntyre with Foucault’s conception of discourse in the academic practice of 
constructing genealogies. In brief, a genealogy as deployed by Foucault can be 
conceived as an exercise in ‘counter-memory’ that is attentive to the historical 
contingencies that have given rise to prevailing discourses – or accepted 
knowledge(s) – in the present. It is:  
 
[A] perspectival form of historical analysis concerned with 
tracing out discontinuous lines of ‘descent’ (identifying ‘the 
accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely the complete 
reversals – the errors, the false appraisals and the faulty 
calculations that give birth to those things that continue to 
exist and have value for us’) as well as ‘emergence’ (that is, 
the particular play of forces and powers that produce effects 
of knowledge). (Scott, 2006, pp. 138-139; see also Foucault, 
1984) 
 
If genealogy is, on the one hand, a practice that seeks to pinpoint the specific 
historical and political forces that have coalesced incidentally to give rise to 
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discourses in the present – ‘a way of (re)telling history by tracing contingencies that 
have come together to form an apparently natural development’ (Asad, 2006, p. 234) 
– then tradition on the other hand can be characterised as a preoccupation with ‘the 
ways in which historical forms of life, binding experience to authority, are built up 
over periods of time into regularities of practice, mentality and disposition’ (Scott, 
2006: 140). In short, while a genealogy tends to emphasise the discontinuities in the 
history of a discourse, tradition emphasises the continuities that have given rise to 
certain interpretations of the world in the present.  
 
Combining these two concepts into the heuristic device of ‘discursive tradition’ 
is thus for Asad (1986, p. 7) an effective means of studying the history of how 
religious movements and institutions such as Islam and Christianity connect 
‘variously with the formation of moral selves, the manipulation of populations (or 
resistance to it), and the production of appropriate knowledges’ (see also Asad, 2006, 
pp. 233-235). Mahmood (2005, p. 115) parallels this notion of discursive tradition to 
Foucault’s concept of a ‘discursive formation,’ which denotes ‘a form of relation 
between the past and present predicated on a system of rules that demarcate both the 
limits and the possibility of what is sayable, doable, and recognizable as a 
comprehensible event in all its manifest forms.’ In this sense, it can be defined as the 
historically evolving set of discourses embodied in the practices and institutions of 
various social groups vis-à-vis their contingent historical and political circumstances, 
and which are deeply imbricated in the material life of those inhabiting them. To 
discuss a discursive tradition therefore implies attending to specific articulations of 
material processes, structures, and practices, including practices of reasoning and 
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expression, embedded in the society or social group under study (Hirschkind, 1995; 
also Zaman, 2002: 5-6; Faisal, 2011).  
 
In this thesis, I deploy the concept of discursive traditions primarily as a means 
to discern how historically constructed discourses shape, coordinate and constitute 
social practices through which the relationship between educational practice and 
religiosity is ‘reasoned,’ in particular within the Anglo-liberal and neo-Calvinist 
traditions. Drawing on the framework put forward by Asad as well as that of 
Gadamer and MacIntyre, I submit that the concept of a discursive tradition furnishes 
three axioms that enable attentiveness toward the historical constitution of how the 
self, others, social practices and institutional formations come to be understood 
within particular moments in time. 
 
Firstly, the concept of discursive traditions brings to the fore the inescapably 
historical basis of all present ways of knowing and being. What this means is that all 
human subjects can only come to grasp objects of knowledge or enquiry – e.g. what 
constitutes ‘religion’ or ‘education’ – from the vantage point afforded by a 
relationship to some specific social and intellectual past through affiliation to some 
particular tradition of discourse, thereby extending the history of that tradition into 
the present (see MacIntyre, 1988, p. 401). ‘From the beginning to the end of our 
journey to understand,’ as Tracy (1981) puts it, ‘we find ourselves in a particular 
linguistic tradition (primarily our native language) which carries with it certain 
specifiable ways of viewing the world, certain ‘forms of life’ which we did not 
invent but find ourselves, critically and really, within’ (p. 100). Hence, tradition 
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plays a vital role as an ontological and explanatory concept; for insofar as discourses 
in the present are marked by historicity, all beliefs and practices that emerge from 
them must have their roots in some tradition whether they are considered aesthetic or 
practical, sacred or secular, legendary or factual, pre-modern or scientific, valued 
because of their lineage or their reasonableness (Bevir, 2000, p. 42). 
 
In this sense, the category of discursive tradition functions for the purposes of 
the present genealogical research because it highlights how particular conceptions, 
practices and institutions of religious education vary within different discourses with 
different historical frames. Tradition thus functions as a heuristic for ‘social 
inheritances’ that constitute the necessary background to the beliefs, subjectivities 
and practices people adopt and perform (Bevir, 2000, p. 31; also Kögler, 1999, p. 
26). It names the common body of assumptions, frameworks, methods and practices 
inherited over time within a shared form of life, which in turn provide the tools for its 
subjects to know and act in the world: ‘History does not belong to us; we belong to 
it. Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we 
understand ourselves in a self evident way in the family, society and state in which 
we live.’ (Gadamer, 2004[1972], pp. 277) Thus, insofar as all human beings are 
embedded in particular cultural histories, all attempts at perception and 
understanding are thus always already interpenetrated by discursively mediated and 
historically determined meanings – that is, by traditions– which render particular 
human actions and beliefs intelligible against the background of a shared pre-
understandings and others unintelligible by reference to it. This includes the customs, 
rituals, knowledge(s), political regimes, governmental and social institutions and so 
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on, which are shaped and reshaped within a broader authoritative discourse inherited 
from the past (Faisal, 2011, p. 9). 
 
This notion of tradition as both historical transmission and perpetual movement 
brings up the second axiom: because it highlights the inescapable location of all 
subjects and objects of knowledge within historicity, the concept of discursive 
traditions makes clear the both the limits of discourses as well as their openness to 
contingency. Traditions can in this sense be understood along the lines of what 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (2009) calls ‘language-games’ that engender particular ‘forms 
of life,’ each with their own distinctive logics of language and practice developed 
over time and into which participants are initiated (sec. 332-335; also Thiselton, 
1980, p. 376). However, unlike certain implications of Wittgenstein’s notion of 
‘forms of life’ that presume a self-referential linguistic group in a sui generis manner 
(e.g. Lindbeck, 1984), traditions are understood here not to be self-enclosed 
totalities, but rather historically dynamic and always changing starting points for 
their participants (Lawn, 2004, pp. 19-40). Gadamer, for example, insists that 
tradition should be seen as a ‘weak totality’: ‘The idea of the whole is itself to be 
understood only relatively. The totality of meaning that has to be understood in 
history or tradition is never the meaning of the totality of history’ (as cited in 
Roberts, 1995, p. 166).  
 
As such, to approach a discourse as a tradition does not imply a uni-linear, 
static account of reality or history; for while traditions furnish discourses for creating 
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order and orientation in the process of ordering the societal environment and human 
behaviour in such an environment, they are also to be understood as enabling human 
cultural practices, critique and challenge, which is essentially and historically 
unpredictable in its modalities (Bauman, 1973, pp. 82, 146-149; also Rorty, 1989, pp. 
3-43). Understood as historically-constituted horizons that are both limiting and 
enabling, discursive traditions are thus taken neither merely nostalgically nor as 
suggestive of a homogenous unity over time. Rather, the emphasis of this concept is 
to highlight how all practices and institutions such as education and schooling – 
whether religious or non-religious – are predicated on a relation with a past marked 
by debate and conflict. 
  
Thirdly and further to the genealogical efficacy of the concept of discursive 
traditions, the latter also foregrounds how both avowedly religious and non-religious 
(i.e. secular) subjectivities, practices and institutional formations arise from 
particular cultural histories. More specifically, it makes the point that the ways in 
which religion and religious education are understood, identified and acted upon is 
always a product of particular historical and political contexts. For if tradition 
constitutes the inescapable background to human life, then it is possible to give an 
account of particular traditions out of the general flux of history by tracing the 
temporal and conceptual connections that flow out of particular object or objects of 
its discourse for explanatory purposes (Bevir, 2000, p. 50). However, to trace 
continuity and connections of a particular object or objects of discourse within a 
tradition is not to presume a linear account of its ‘development,’ but rather to attend 
to the shifting ways in which such discursive objects may be conceived owing to 
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conflicts and debates within and between traditions. According to MacIntyre (1984, 
p. 222) then, a ‘living tradition’ – i.e. one that persists in the present – is a 
historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part 
about the goods and values which constitute that tradition. Therefore, they are 
marked by two types of conflict: On the one hand, ‘those with critics and enemies 
external to the tradition who reject all or at least key parts of those fundamental 
agreements,’ and on the other hand, ‘those internal, interpretative debates through 
which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be 
expressed and by whose progress a tradition is constituted.’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 12) 
 
So with regard to the question of religious education, the concept of discursive 
traditions highlights that it cannot be seen as an absolute, metaphysical, unchanging 
or even linearly evolving object of discourse, but rather one that is historically 
contingent and a product of conflicting claims within and between traditions (Zaman, 
2002, p. 4). As Islamic studies scholar Ebrahim Moosa (2003) argues, such 
historicizing of traditions is critical to an understanding of the present because it 
provides ‘a narrative as to why things had changed and to get an accurate picture of 
how ideas, practices, and beliefs were implemented in the past,’ and more 
importantly, ‘it helps us understand how two identical ideas applied in different 
epochs may actually have opposite outcomes’ (p. 31). I thus take the task of 
genealogies of religious education, such as the ones advanced in the following 
chapters, as offering perspicacious historicised accounts of how religious education 
has come to be defined in the present within two particular discursive traditions, as 
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well as the political contexts and conflicts that have given rise to their respective 
definitions of it. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this prolegomenon, I sought to respond to the question: What is religious 
education, particularly in the form of religious schooling? I began by outlining how 
religious education is officially understood by governmental and juridical institutions 
in Australia in the present – that is, as a conjunction of ‘religion’ defined primarily as 
beliefs about a supernatural Being, Thing or Principle with an associated set of 
values/ethics, and ‘education’ through schooling defined as schooling as a key 
training institution for future citizens, workers and the prosperity of the nation as a 
whole. Within the Australian context, then, the combination of religion and 
education in the form of religious schooling denotes an institutional conjunction of 
belief in a Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle with its associated practices and 
values/ethics on the one hand with the training of desired citizens and workers on the 
other. The debates over religious schooling along the public/private and 
secular/religious lines can thus be seen as corresponding respectively to the educative 
function of religious schools with regard to the general aim of schooling to train 
students for citizenship and employment on the one hand, and with regard to the 
religious function of religious schools, which is taken to be the transmission of belief 
and values on the other. 
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In seeking to answer a subsequent question – that is, how has religious 
education come to be defined in this way? – I sought to foreground how the official 
definition of religious education and the presuppositions of the debates surrounding it 
are based on contingent historical and political settlements. To demonstrate this, I 
argued that genealogical accounts are efficacious for historicising the terms under 
which religious education is presently understood. When conducted using the 
analytical device of ‘discursive traditions’ as developed variously in the work of 
Gadamer, MacIntyre and Asad, I conjectured, it enables an attentiveness toward the 
historical constitution of knowledges of the self, others, social practices and 
institutional formations within particular moments in history that have given rise to 
the present commonsense understandings of religious education. This is so for three 
reasons: firstly, the concept of discursive traditions brings to the fore the inescapably 
historical basis of all present ways of knowing and being; secondly, it highlights both 
the limits of discourses as well as their openness to contingency; and thirdly, it 
foregrounds how both avowedly religious and secular subjectivities, practices (e.g. 
education) and institutional formations (e.g. schools) are not ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable,’ 
but rather arise from particular cultural histories inflected by particular political 
conflicts and contexts.  
 
The task of the genealogies that follow will thus be to discern how religious 
education has been defined over time in two, adjacent discursive traditions – the 
Anglo-liberal and the neo-Calvinist. In the next chapter, I begin with a genealogy of 
how religion and religious education are construed in the Anglo-liberal tradition that 
102 
constitutes the basis for Australian political discourse. Specifically, I trace the 
lineage of this definition back to three key historical moments: the cleavage of 
religion from practical reason in late-medieval nominalist theology; the primacy of 
individual belief as the locus of religion in the Protestant reformation; and the 
development of nominalist and Protestant definitions of religion in early-liberal 
discourse.   
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Chapter 2 - Religious education in the Anglo-liberal tradition 
 
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are 
secularized theological concepts not only because of their 
historical development… but also because of their systematic 
structure. (Schmitt, 2005, p. 36) 
 
Introduction 
 
In the introduction, I mapped out some of the representative positions in the 
present debates over the merit and appropriateness of religious schools in Australia, 
intimating that the competing positions along the secular/religious and public/private 
lines operate on several shared premises, not least of which are the presupposition of 
these categorical dichotomies themselves. In this chapter, I seek to historicise the 
prevailing understanding of religious education, calling into question the liberal 
terrain upon which the contending perspectives are grounded. I do so by conducting 
a genealogy of how religious education has been positioned within the Anglo-liberal 
tradition upon which the Australian political system has been constructed – that is, as 
the transmission of some belief in a Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle and 
practices and conduct that are taken to be an effect of such prior belief – by tracing 
the complex historical imbrications between pre- and post-Protestant theology and 
the emergent territorial states of early-modern Europe. I begin by defining liberalism 
as a particular discursive tradition before offering a historical account of three 
moments that have given rise to its conception of religion more broadly and religious 
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education more specifically: firstly, that religion and religious education are 
primarily concerned with supernatural objects that are outside the realm of worldly 
reason; secondly, that the locus of religion and religious education is the belief of the 
individual in a supernatural God; and thirdly, that religious education represents the 
cultivation of belief in the private sphere while in the public sphere of politics, such 
beliefs are inappropriate and excluded. 
 
Liberalism as a discursive tradition 
 
The Australian debate over the appropriateness of religious education pivots on 
the oft-repeated division between the public and private – with public schools held to 
be operating on a neutral and universally-accessible basis in contrast to religious 
private schools with their particularistic beliefs. That the latter have in recent times 
encroached on the terrain of schooling is predicated both on the broader liberal 
assumptions that institutions named ‘public’ and ‘secular’ are neutral between all 
particular traditions, and that religious institutions are necessarily ‘private’ insofar as 
the locus of religiosity resides in the subjective beliefs of individuals and groups.  
 
Liberalism can be broadly defined as a political theory or a normative political 
doctrine of government which ‘treats the maintenance of individual liberty as an end 
in itself, and therefore views liberty as setting limits of principle both to the 
legitimate objectives of government [by the state] and to the manner in which those 
objectives might legitimately be pursued’ (Hindess, 2004, pp. 27-28). On this basis, 
because the ethos of liberalism is concerned with what Raz (1994, p. 175) 
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summarises as ‘uphold[ing] the value for people of being in charge of their own life, 
charting its course by their successive choices,’ liberal government claims to be 
neutral about different ways of life, claiming that the state should take no position 
about what the ‘good life’ should entail and so shifting questions about normative 
values out of the public sphere and into the private (Clayton, 2005). This, however, 
means that liberalism cannot merely be taken as an absence of restraint against 
choosing as one wants – what prominent liberal theorist Isaiah Berlin (1967) terms 
‘negative liberty’ – but is itself a normative modus operandi for ordering society: 
Because liberalism asserts that each individual has a right to pursue good or value in 
his or her own way, and because the versions of good or value individuals pursue are 
inevitably mutually incompatible, these are confined to the private sphere; the public 
sphere is formally concerned only with the most effective means of administering, 
adjudicating and guaranteeing the expression of individual rights and free choices – 
what in liberal discourse is termed ‘liberty’ and ‘justice’ respectively (MacIntyre, 
1998, pp. 235-238; 1998a, 258; also Hindess, 2004). In this reckoning, insofar as 
religion is a form of discourse that makes certain substantive claims about the nature 
of life and reality, it must remain in the private sphere and have no place in public-
political deliberation, which is taken to be a non-religious (or secular) space that is 
neutral to all claims (Schindler, 2011, pp. 71-73). 
 
Yet is this terrain – that is, one that presupposes universalising, ahistorical, 
rational and ‘objective’ basis that mediates between differences in particularistic 
faiths, beliefs and values of religion – tenable?  It is the burden of this chapter to 
demonstrate that the construal of religion and religious education within the 
prevailing regime, despite its apparent universality and neutrality, is itself a product 
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of a particular tradition with its own authoritative texts and figures, hierarchies of 
value, distributions of political power, institutional configurations and boundaries 
that determine acceptability and inclusion against unacceptability and exclusion, just 
like any other tradition. However, where liberalism differs from other traditions is 
that it does not normally recognise itself as a particular tradition; as MacIntyre 
(1988) argues, political regimes based on liberalism sustain the impression that they 
are beyond all traditions and particularities and are thus able to provide the very 
ground for competing traditions: 
 
In the course of history liberalism, which began as an appeal 
to alleged principles of shared rationality against what was 
felt to be the tyranny of tradition, has itself been transformed 
into a tradition whose continuities are partly defined by the 
interminability of the debate over such principles. (p. 335) 
 
Such an alleged universality and neutrality of liberalism as a clearinghouse for 
the debates between other traditions may be understood, following Unger (2004, pp. 
173-176, 180-230), as predicated on a myth of its own necessity. What he means is 
that as a particular discourse, liberal discourse retrospectively rationalises its 
configuration of institutional arrangements as the only plausible order of society. 
While the focus of Unger’s analysis is predominantly on the assumptions underlying 
the institutional configurations of the economy in Anglo-liberal societies, this is no 
less the case for the manner in which religion and religious education are understood 
in these contexts. By positioning the prevailing liberal presuppositions as a product 
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of a particular tradition, then, I take as the task of this and the following chapter to 
unearth the genealogy of this discourse, tracing the history of the present to the 
effects of various beliefs and practices – including purportedly necessary or 
universalising ones, and which brings to the fore its irreducible historicity. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, to use discursive tradition as a heuristic 
device for situating the particularity of the prevailing liberal socio-political 
arrangements is to insist on both its historicity and discursive constitution; for ‘we 
cannot adequately identify either our own commitments or those of others in the 
argumentative conflicts of the present except by situating them within those histories 
which made them what they have now become’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 13). Yet insofar 
as the present socio-political arrangements appear (temporarily) to be in good 
working order for many of its participants, its historical and discursive particularities 
that are the presupposition of its constituent activities and enquiries may well remain 
just that: unarticulated presuppositions which are never themselves the objects of 
attention and enquiry. As MacIntyre points out following the work of Thomas Kuhn 
(1996[1962]) on the historical conditions leading to epistemic crises of established 
ways of thinking, it is ‘generally only when traditions either fail and disintegrate or 
are challenged do their adherents become aware of them as traditions and begin to 
theorise about them’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 8). In a similar vein, I argue that the 
growth of certain religious institutions and movements in Anglo-liberal and 
ostensibly secular societies, many of whom may not share the same presuppositions 
to those which predominate in such societies, presents a unique historical challenge 
not only because of what Hoezl and Ward (2009) call the ‘new visibility of religion,’ 
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but also to the new visibility of secular-liberalism itself as a product of a provincial 
tradition (Chakrabarty, 2000, pp. 4, 243; Turner, 2011, p. 128). 
 
Framed as such, I argue that the prevailing account of religious education in 
Australia presupposes the history of one particular discursive tradition – the Anglo-
liberal tradition. As such, it obscures the specificity, historicity and contingency of 
the prevailing definition of religious education which, as Schmitt (2005, p. 36) points 
out (quoted in the epigraph above), entails a particular theological and religious 
inheritance. Put more pointedly by Surin (1990), modern liberal society ‘was 
‘produced’ along with the ‘western’ society that emerged out of Christendom, a 
society which, though it may today largely repudiate Christianity, is nonetheless one 
that is thoroughly inflected by its Christian past’ (p. 84). More specifically, as I shall 
show in what follows, the definition of religious education in contemporary Australia 
has been marked by the passage of religion from its definition in medieval Latin 
Christendom as encompassing localised and diverse pedagogical, moral, social and 
political practices to the present understanding of it as sets of beliefs that may be 
appended onto schooling, which is in turn run as a hegemonic practice for the 
prevailing neo-liberal regime. I shall partially trace the historical lineage of the 
prevailing definition of religious education to an inheritance arising from three 
identifiable moments in the Anglo-liberal tradition: firstly, the theological and socio-
political shifts associated with the rise of nominalism and the cleavage of religious 
belief from practical reason and material objects in the late-medieval period; 
secondly, the individualisation and nationalisation of religion as an effect of the 
Protestant Reformation; and the regulation and legitimation of a particular Protestant 
form of religion in the private sphere of the early-modern liberal state. This will then 
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form the background to the next chapter, where the development of institutional 
arrangements deriving from  the Anglo-liberal tradition in Australia will be sketched, 
specifically how religious education came to be established, construed as ‘values’ 
rendered serviceable to the nation-state, and finally positioned as a ‘value-added’ 
option in the formation of a market in school education.  
 
Religion/world: Nominalism and the cleavage of belief from practical reason 
 
The notion of religion and religious education as a separate sphere from that of 
the secular and secular education is a taken for granted presupposition in 
contemporary educational studies in Australia (see critics of religious schooling in 
the introduction; also Bonnor & Caro, 2007, pp. 141-158). Yet as Milbank (1990) 
points out, the concept of political secularity as a space apart from the religious did 
not always exist, for: ‘Once there was no secular and the secular was not latent, 
waiting to fill more space with the steam of the ‘purely human,’ when the pressure of 
the sacred was relaxed’ (p. 9). Rather, ‘the secular as a domain had to be imagined, 
both in theory and in practice.’ So while the use of the term ‘secular’ is often defined 
negatively – that is, implying a realm of non-religion or what is left after religion 
fades – it is not in itself neutral; rather, it is itself a normative political project. It is 
thus useful for the present purposes to explore how it is that contemporary religious 
education has come to be constituted as the opposite to secular education. 
 
The beginnings of religious education as it is contemporaneously defined can 
be traced to the thirteenth century development of nominalism by Franciscan 
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theologians John Duns Scotus (c.1265-1308) and William of Ockham (c.1288-
c.1348). Nominalism, which posited the divine as utterly transcendent and only 
arbitrarily connected to the world and its inhabitants, arose as a challenge to the 
hegemony of medieval scholasticism and its legitimation of the hitherto prevailing 
ecclesiastical and feudal regime. According to medieval scholasticism – whose 
exemplar Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) synthesised elements of Aristotelian and 
Islamic philosophy with the theology of Augustine – all intellect and human 
endeavour are understood to naturally aspire to the ‘knowledge of God’ (Davies, 
1992, p. 21ff.; Burrell, 2004; also Fakhry, 1968; Bullough, 1996).  Thus, the 
aspiration of human practices, whether mundane actions such as eating or more 
complex ones involving scholastic, artisanal or agrarian crafts, was understood to be 
intrinsically connected to divine transcendence insofar as all particular practices were 
at the service of a natural teleology; religion and practice formed an interlocking 
whole that I define as practical reason – where there is a continual interplay between 
ends and means, as well as between thought and action. Reason understood as such 
primarily involves concern with the concrete and embodied rather than abstract and 
disembodied, embraces moral judgment and cosmological worldviews that are often 
tacit rather than formalised, and involves know-how rather than propositional 
knowledge – including what is sometimes referred to as ‘practical wisdom’ (Sayer, 
2011, p. 61). Religious life understood through practical reason, far from 
emphasizing the primacy of belief, was ‘sensually rich’ insofar as participants 
‘encountered God in the physical environment, through the five senses. The Christian 
faith of the Middle Ages was firmly anchored in the body: the body of the cosmos, 
the body of the person, the Body of Christ’ (Goizueta, 2006, p. 173). 
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Correspondingly, the educative processes in these domains thus involved 
induction into the historically-accreted practices considered rational within the 
community of specific craft through master-apprentice relations. As Macintyre 
(1990) describes, it involved the direction of an authoritative master that guided 
others toward the ‘natural ends’ of a given type of activity: 
 
The authority of a master within a craft is both more and other than 
a matter of exemplifying the best standards so far. It is also and 
most importantly a matter of knowing how to go further and 
especially how to direct others towards going further, using what 
can be learned from the tradition afforded by the past to move 
towards the telos [i.e. ends] of fully perfected work… (pp. 65-66) 
 
This view of educative processes corresponded with the socio-political 
arrangements of feudalism, which maintained that each person was born into a 
relatively distinct, unchangeable, and unquestionable place in the socio-political 
hierarchy ordained by the Christian God (Hobson & Sharman, 2005, pp. 81-85; also 
Kayatekin & Charusheela, 2004). For most, therefore, education was intrinsically 
religious and the religious was practical insofar as it was based on acquiring the 
ability to perform the craft and social functions that each was born into. Conversely, 
because all such activity possessed natural ends and the socio-political arrangements 
were conceived as the natural order ultimately ordained by God, the passage of life 
itself could itself be broadly understood as intrinsically educational. As Goering 
(2004) describes in his study of the thirteenth-century English parish, what might 
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today be regarded as religious education occurred throughout the communal life of 
its participants: 
 
Most thirteenth-century parishioners saw formation in faith 
not as a clerical monopoly, or even much of a clerical 
responsibility, but rather as a family and community activity. 
Nor was it narrowly centered on the parish church, at least 
not on the sanctuary or the altar, which was the priest’s 
domain, but on the nave, the church porch, the churchyard, 
and the streets and houses of the town or village. (p. 216) 
 
It is evident from Goering’s account that such ‘formation in faith’ was not 
demarcated along clear institutional lines that separated the religious from the non-
religious, but was rather diffuse throughout life itself. Put more generally, the 
relationship between education and religion was held to be one and the same insofar 
as, according to Aquinas, ‘the idea of the divine wisdom, moving all things to their 
due end, has the nature of law,’ and hence, ‘the eternal law is nothing other than the 
idea of the divine wisdom insofar as it directs all acts and movements’ (as cited in 
Oakley, 1961, p. 67). 
 
Education as such, being intrinsically religious, was defined as attainment of 
the knowledge of God. In this schema, such knowledge would entail a ‘bottom-up’ 
articulation that ascended from the empirical multiplicity of the finite world and 
human practices upward through abstract universals such as ‘the True’ (verum) or 
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‘the Good’ (bonum) toward the divine, which was held to be its natural completion 
(telos) (see Eco, 1988, p. 56ff). As Fromm (1969) depicts of common craftspeople, 
the ends of educational, religious, political, economic and moral spheres intersected 
in the practical reason exercised in various occupations: 
 
The craftsmen since the later part of the Middle Ages were 
united in their guilds. Each master had one or two apprentices 
and the number of masters was in some relation to the needs 
of the community. Although there were always some who 
had to struggle hard to earn enough to survive, by and large 
the guild member could be sure that he could live by his 
hand’s work. If he made good chairs, shoes, bread, saddles, 
and so on, he did all that was necessary to be sure of living 
safely on the level which was traditionally assigned to his 
social position. He could rely on his ‘good works’…  
[…]  
There is no place in medieval theory for economic activity 
which is not related to a moral end. (pp. 69, 71) 
 
Conversely, to knowingly engage in bad or shoddy practice was considered a 
breach of this religious, moral and intellectual order. As Sears (2006, p. 228) points 
out in her detailed reading of Thirteenth Century craft practices, it was not an 
uncommon preventative measure for masters joining the trade guilds to be asked to 
swear that they would work according to true and good uses and customs of the trade 
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for the sake of the saints, Holy Gospels or God. This approach to particular practices 
and things as analogous to a transcendent unity is known as the doctrine of analogia 
entis (‘analogy of being’), which presupposes that insofar as ‘God is the cause of 
creation, creation will express something of the character of God, however faintly or 
tangentially’ (Oliver, 2009, p. 13). Insofar as human knowledge is finite and thus 
insufficient to comprehend the Divine in toto, held Aquinas, it must then be 
‘completed’ by authority, which resides in the teachings of the catholic (i.e. 
‘universal’) Church (Tillich, 1968, p. 186). 
 
In this view, education as the attainment of practical reason was itself inscribed 
into the socio-political configuration of Medieval Latin Christendom, which operated 
on the basis of a ‘natural law’ conception of status and hierarchy (Taylor, 2004, pp. 
9-10). For the law itself, understood as such by Aquinas, is ‘nothing else than a 
dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a complete 
community,’ and it follows therefore, ‘that the whole community of the universe is 
governed by the divine reason’ (as cited in Oakley, 1961, p. 67). The socio-political 
arrangements of feudalism, simply put, were predicated on a God understood as a 
providential placeholder insofar as ‘everything-that-is’ (i.e. human beings, objects, 
nature, etc.) exists in a way as to be distinct from the divine, but was held together by 
it in a ‘natural hierarchy’ (Burrell, 2004, pp. 88-89). Fromm (1969, p. 57) describes 
this as a time where subjects typically occupied a ‘chained’ location with little 
mobility either socially or geographically. In general, he explains, this meant:  
 
[H]aving a distinct, unchangeable, and unquestionable place in the 
social world from the moment of birth, man [sic] was rooted in a 
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structuralised whole... A person was identical with his role in 
society; he was a peasant, an artisan, a knight and not an individual 
who happened to have this or that occupation. [For] the social order 
was conceived as a natural order... (Fromm, 1969, p. 58) 
 
Economic activity and work in such a system were also understood to be 
sustained by moral and theological ends insofar as ‘economic interests are 
subordinate to the real business of life, which is salvation [and] economic conduct is 
one aspect of personal conduct upon which as on other parts of it, the rules of 
morality are binding.’ (Tawney, 1964, p. 31) This form of social order was one 
where, as Taylor (2007) surmises of the medieval age in the West, ‘God’s felt 
presence in the world’ was diffuse. This presence can be summed up in a threefold 
way: firstly, in the natural world in which people lived in, ‘which has its place in the 
cosmos they imagined, testified to divine purpose and action’; secondly, God was 
also implicated in the very existence of society itself so that  ‘[a] kingdom could only 
be conceived as grounded in something higher than mere human action in secular 
time’ (pp.25-26; see also Berman, 1981, p. 16; Capra, 1982, p. 52). In addition, this 
also extended to the manifold societal and economic institutions insofar as ‘the life of 
the various associations which made up society, parishes, boroughs, guilds, and so 
on, were woven with ritual and worship’; and thirdly, people lived in an ‘enchanted’ 
world, which describes ‘a world of spirits, demons, and moral forces.’ In such a 
world, ‘the Christian God was the ultimate guarantee that good would triumph or at 
least hold the plentiful forces of darkness at bay.’ (Taylor, 2007, p. 25) In short, 
Taylor (2007) posits: ‘One could not but encounter God everywhere’ (p. 25).  
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‘Religion’ in such a context was thus not understood as a generalised system of 
beliefs, but rather named the specificity of pedagogical techniques such as practical 
and moral habits or monastic rituals that augmented an acquired virtue of sanctity. 
Aquinas, for example, wrote two main addresses in which declensions of the word 
religion (Latin: religio) appear in the title and both are defenses of religious orders 
while one used religio in the specific sense of something approximating devotional 
practices (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 64). Described as such, religion (religio) names ‘the 
activity by which man [sic] gives the proper reverence to God through actions which 
specifically pertain to divine worship’ (Aquinas as cited in Harvey, 2008, p. 111; 
also Asad, 1993, p. 83-124). The particular modes in which such religion-as-practice 
was undertaken were locally-defined and ranged across the terrain of Medieval Latin 
Christendom. In this sense, historical sociologist Martin Stringer (2005, p. 235) 
distinguishes between ‘dominant’ and ‘demotic’ levels of religious discourse in this 
time, with the former pertaining to more formal practices of the institutional Church 
while the latter entailing such practices as devotions at local shrines and to local 
saints, popular processions and others. Yet despite this discernible difference, he also 
points out that ‘[e]ach level of religious discourse clearly interacts, to a greater or 
lesser extent, with all the others, but need not overlap in terms of perceived 
contradictions or tensions’ (as cited in Goizueta, 2009, p. 52). For this reason, Asad 
(1983) surmises that there was little direct regulation and enforced uniformity of 
religion by Church authorities and where such regulation was imposed, it was 
specifically targeted and dedicated to ensuring that the manifold practices were 
ultimately analogically unified: 
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In the Middle Ages such discourses ranged over an enormous 
space, defining and creating religion… The medieval Church 
did not attempt to establish absolute uniformity of practice; 
on the contrary, its authoritative discourse was always 
concerned to specify differences, gradations, exceptions. 
What it sought was the subjection of all practice to a unified 
authority, to a single authentic source which could tell truth 
from falsehood. (p. 238) 
 
The point of canvassing the medieval conceptions of socio-political order vis-
à-vis religiosity is to highlight that the category of religion in the medieval epoch is 
quite different from that in modern liberal societies. Religion in this reckoning, far 
from being a uniform structure of belief, was always differently distributed and 
manifest through the particular ways in which it created and worked through 
institutions, the different types subjects which it shaped and responded to, and 
different categories of knowledge which it authorised and made available. In short, 
religion did not give rise to types of education or training; religion itself named the 
differentiated modes of pedagogical practice. Thus, for example, Aquinas can state 
both a religious unity in that ‘[a]ll knowers know God implicitly in all they know’ (as 
cited in Cunningham, 2001, p. 292), and a plurality insofar as ‘[a]ll things known are 
in the knower in a way appropriate to the knower’ (as cited in Marshall, 1989, p. 
374). The modern liberal assumption that there is an essence of religion isolable in 
history apart from society and politics is thus untenable because even within Western 
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Europe as a broad cultural sphere there has never been a structural uniformity to 
religion that can be abstracted and made universally viable. 
 
If medieval religion named the particular and localised practices through which 
subjects – most commonly monks – sought to render themselves more reverent to 
God, then how did the present notion of religion in Australia as a set of beliefs with 
no intrinsic relation to practical reason and the material world arise? A basis for this 
modern rendering can be traced to the political rejection – following the failure of the 
Crusades, the loss of significant Christian colonies in the Levant and the rise of 
Islamic military power in the late-Thirteenth Century (Gillespie, 2008, p. 21) – of 
allegedly Muslim-inflected Aristotelian influences in medieval (Thomistic) theology 
by the Archbishop of Canterbury Robert Kilwardy and Bishop of Paris Etienne 
Tempier (Oakley and Urdang, 1966, pp. 100-101; also Korkut, 2011). Most 
prominently in the year 1277, Tempier condemned over two hundred true or alleged 
Aristotelian positions and gave forceful expression to a growing fear among 
theologians and clerics that the metaphysical necessitarianism of Aristotle (and by 
implication, Aquinas) and his Muslim commentators like Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, 980–
1037) and Averroës (Ibn Rušd, 1126-1198) was ‘blasphemously’ invading ‘the 
Cardinal Prerogative of Divinity, Omnipotence’ and ‘chaining up [God’s] armies in 
the adamantine fetters of Destiny’ (as cited in Oakley and Urdang, 1966, pp. 100-
101; also White, 1978, p. 51). This official Condemnation, which stressed the 
omnipotence of the Christian God beyond reason, was in turn developed into a 
systematic anti-Thomistic theology by Franciscans Scotus and Ockham (Gillespie, 
2008, p. 23).  
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Where for medieval realism the finite might apprehend the infinite through 
situated practices, Scotus posited that there is an unbridgeable chasm between the 
finite and the infinite (Pickstock, 1998, p. 123; Dupré, 1993, pp. 93-113; also Taylor, 
2007, pp. 94, 144). According to this latter discourse – the ‘nominalism’ referred to 
earlier – the finite human being cannot grasp the infinite divine logos at all. This 
meant that the sense of Good or Truth, as well as knowledge of the divine, cannot be 
attained through concrete, finite practices ‘ascending’ to the infinite as posited by 
Aquinas and the worldview of analogia entis. For Scotus, there is no resemblance 
between human practices and the world vis-à-vis the divine, thus excluding any 
possibility of figural or analogical determinations of God that give any degree of 
substantive knowledge about what is Good or True (Pickstock, 1998, p. 123). What 
this apparently obscure theological shift entails is the radical separation of human 
practical reason and the world from the divine because a vast quantitative gap is 
established between the finite and the infinite. 
 
By emphasising the absolute omnipotence and utter imperceptibility of God, 
nominalist theology attacked the universals and natural ends upon which the 
medieval worldview (including its educative practices) had hitherto been predicated. 
Therefore, contra Aquinas, for whom particular actions and/or objects are 
understood to participate in the divine through the multiplicity of the socio-political 
order, for Scotus there is only one way open to receive God: the way of revelation 
received by the authority of the Church (Tillich, 1968). What this engendered was a 
shift from a synthetic view of revelation as pervasive in the manifold practices of the 
social body across Christendom (i.e. the corpus Christianum) to a centralisation and 
concentration of power to the institutional Church as the sole locus of religious 
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revelation. In turn, this marks a crucial staging post towards what Oliver (2009, p. 
22) has described as the ‘bracketing of God’ from the world. For insofar as God is 
taken to be distant, this very distance opens up the possibility of a space for which 
God is largely irrelevant; this space is hence autonomous, self-standing and governed 
by laws and causes apart from the divine (Oliver, 2009, p. 22; also Nasr, 1988). Thus 
the conception of ‘the secular’ (Latin: saeculum) which had since Augustine of 
Hippo (354-430) denoted a time between the temporal order and its divinely-
appointed apocalyptic end (see Markus, 1988), was transposed onto the world as a 
spatial order in parallel to the religious one (Calhoun et al, 2011, pp. 12-20). 
 
This nominalist discourse initiated by Scotus is further developed a century 
later in the influential work of Ockham, who rejected the teleological approach to the 
understanding of nature and work that was presupposed by Medieval Latin 
Christendom. God, according to Ockham, cannot be approached at all by practical 
reason or nature, whether in the form of observation or ritualised monastic 
disciplines or moral and vocational learning; the divine can be reached only by the 
gratuitous will of God and individual subjection to Biblical revelation (Gillespie, 
2008, p. 24). In a manner that prefigured the Protestant reformation, Ockham held 
that even in the latter aspect, human subjects can only attain to the knowledge of the 
divine and the Bible if the ‘habit of grace’ from God enables them to receive the 
revelation of God (Tillich, 1968). What this effectively meant was that religio came 
increasingly to be redefined from the (now futile) educative practices to systems of 
belief that could be embraced voluntarily by individuals about what is ultimately true 
and important in their lives (Harvey, 2008, p. 111). According to Harrison (1990, p. 
12), it was Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464), cardinal bishop of Brixen (Austria) who 
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first systematised this nominalist rendering of religion by attributing different modes 
of faith as the result of epistemic limitations of finite human beings, with a single, 
infinite reality standing behind the heterogenous expressions. Again, this was a 
political move taken within Latin Christendom in relation to growing Islamic 
military power; Cusa was apparently so shaken by the violent fall of Constantinople 
to the Turkish forces of Sultan Mehmed II in 1453 that he wrote his treatise De Pace 
Fidei in an attempt to arrive at some principle of dialogue and unity among the 
peoples of the earth, who worshipped in many different ways (Franke, 2006, p. 64; 
Nederman, 2011, p. 355). What is novel about Cusa’s use of religio6 is that practices 
are not essential to it (and in fact are considered burdensome); rather, ‘religio is a 
universal, interior impulse that stands behind the multiplicity of rites’ (Cavanaugh, 
2009, p. 70). 
 
This shift toward nominalism produced an important break in the medieval 
weltanschauung and in consequence, how religious education was understood. For 
while the divine had hitherto been apprehensible insofar it performed the function of 
a transcendent capstone for the socio-political order, it was now separated from the 
world by an infinite distance and knowable only through faith as belief (Dupré, 1993, 
p. 3) In such a schema, the religious as expressed in practical reason is replaced by 
an appeal to divine revelation and mystical experience. For Ockham for example, 
actions are ultimately made right or wrong by a divine command, so even if educated 
or trained forms of reason may dictate that an act is right or wrong, ‘the agent does 
not always recognize that the action’s rightness or wrongness depends upon a divine 
command’ (Osborne, 2005, p. 1). Thus, knowledge of God and the moral rules 
                                                          
6 The full phrase from Cusa is ‘religio una in rituum verietate’ (‘one religion behind the many rites’) 
(see Laursen, 1999, p. xvii n4) 
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enjoined by the divine are taken to have no immanent justification at all (MacIntyre, 
1967, p. 119). 
 
The nominalist interventions of Scotus and Ockham also mark a crucial staging 
point in the move towards modern liberal understandings of religion whereby the 
latter’s concern with a Supernatural Being, Principle or Thing is understood to lie 
beyond the realm of reason. This version of God as both infinitely powerful and 
utterly inscrutable posited a radically unsettling break from medieval realism, which 
while conceiving of God as infinite, nonetheless held that divine glory and goodness 
were manifest and attainable in nature everywhere. By contrast, the nominalist God 
‘was frighteningly omnipotent, utterly beyond human ken, and a continual threat to 
human well-being. Moreover, this God could never be captured in words and 
consequently could be experienced only as a titanic question that evoked awe and 
dread.’ (Gillespie, 2008, p. 15) Divine commandments in this schema became 
arbitrary edicts which demanded a non-rational obedience (MacIntyre, 1967, p. 119). 
 
This fissure of the medieval view of religion led to an important consequence 
that continues to have profound effects on the Anglo-liberal tradition’s construal of 
religious education, as well as the relationship between religion and society more 
broadly: a chasm is established between religion on the one hand, and practical 
reason and materiality on the other. For if subjects can neither apprehend God in 
their particular social locations and experiences in the world, nor through scholastic 
learning or practices inherent in their given vocations, then faith in revelation apart 
from reason becomes the only means of accessing the divine. In addition for 
Ockham, the locus of revelation and divine command is ultimately the individual 
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conscience. In so arguing, Ockham draws a sharp distinction between the realms of 
morality and religion; individual conscience becomes a parameter of practical, moral 
action whilst obedience is a religious duty (Shogimen, 2001, p. 618). As Eastern 
Orthodox theologian David Bentley Hart (2003) notes, the nominalism of Ockham, 
Scotus and others would come to reshape the very foundational understandings of 
religiosity in Latin Christendom; for insofar as this discourse succeeded in shattering 
the unity of faith and practical reason, it became for most Christian religion – both 
Catholic and Protestant – more or less axiomatic that ‘faith, to be faith, must be 
blind’ (p. 133). Simultaneously, theology in Latin Christendom started to conclude 
that human beings have two separate final ends – a natural and a supernatural one – 
and that the first remains substantially independent of the former; the notion of the 
secular as a parallel realm of ‘pure nature’ was thus conceivable (Pinckaers, 2005, 
pp. 359, 365; also Nasr, 1989). Paradoxically then, as Milbank (2007) points out, the 
beginnings of the secular as a space was a move internal to Christian theology that 
sought to emphasise the omnipotence of God:  
 
[T]he secularising gesture which permitted its arrival was 
entirely a theological gesture, and even one which sought to 
conserve the transcendence of God and the priority of the 
supernatural, by insisting on the sheer ‘naturalness’ and self-
sufficiency of human beings without grace, as a backdrop for 
augmenting [divine] grace’s sheer gratuity. (pp. 13-14) 
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In sum, the rise of nominalist theology in Latin Christendom marked the 
decline of medieval realism and its attempt to formulate an integrated culture 
predicated on Christian metaphysics. The withdrawal of the transcendent component 
in culture begun under nominalism has, argues Dupré (1993), been completed in 
modern liberal societies so that while it is not the case that contemporary culture 
denies the existence of God or of the divine, the notion of divine transcendence plays 
no vital role in the integration of culture – ‘Symbolic universes became sovereign 
realms, beholden only to self-made rules’ (pp. 696-697). By positing the separation 
of the world into distinct realms of natural and supernatural, then, nominalism can 
thus be seen as an important staging point in the axiomatic division of religion on the 
one hand and worldly practical reason on the other. As will be argued below, it also 
forms the basis of other distinctions like religion/practice in the Protestant 
Reformation and religion/public in the early-modern liberalism of John Locke, and 
which persist in contemporary liberal discourse on religion which emphasises the 
primacy of privatised belief and religious education as the transmission of such 
beliefs (see Dupré, 1994, pp. 44, 48). 
 
Religion/practice: The Protestant reformation and the individualisation of belief 
 
…the very concept of religion as such – as an entity with any 
distinction whatever from other human phenomena – is a 
function of the same processes and historical moments that 
generate the individualistic concept of it. (Arnal as cited in 
Fitzgerald, 2007, p. 1) 
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The definition of religion as belief in an extra-empirical deity quite apart from 
practical reason set in motion by nominalist discourse in the late-Middle Ages would 
be most prominently developed in the early-modern period by the Protestant 
reformer Martin Luther who, in seeking to overcome the concentration of religious 
authority in the Roman Church and the gulf between human beings and the 
inscrutable, distant and terrifying God of nominalism, would come in turn to 
construct a theological and socio-political edifice on the basis of its presuppositions 
(Schaff, 1910; Gillespie, 2008, pp. 101-128; Knight, 2007, pp. 64-68). In doing so, 
Luther’s Protestant Reformation would come to be a key moment for the modern 
liberal conceptualisation of religious education as concerned with moral practices 
that flow out of personal belief. 
 
As well, as I shall elaborate in the following section, the socio-political 
implications of Luther’s theology is also a foundational moment in the ideological 
development of early-modern liberal nation-states and the systems of schooling that 
would come to be their key apparatus for mass education. Three overlapping aspects 
of Luther’s theological and political articulations will be considered here that are 
judged to have had the most enduring effect on the way religion – and in turn, 
religious education – are conceived in the Anglo-liberal tradition: firstly, the 
individualisation of faith as (unreasonable) belief by delimiting the locus of religion 
to the ‘inner’ life, which represents a radicalisation of nominalist theology; secondly, 
as a consequence of this individualisation, Luther’s rendering of ‘outer’ practices as a 
mere expression of the freedom of ‘inner’ religion, thus rendering practical reason 
and ‘worldly’ practices as incidental – though still important – to faith itself as belief; 
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and thirdly, because practical reason is not intrinsic to religion, the former is 
appropriately governed by secular authorities that secure the conditions for ‘true 
religion’ defined as individual faith. In turn, this discourse on religion gave rise, as 
can be expected, to new configurations of religious education, in particular the 
institution of standardised mass schooling that sought to construct a society where 
religiosity was cultivated in the ‘inner’ self while ‘outer’ social practices were 
directed toward obedience to the sovereign state. 
 
Firstly, in seeking to break the hold of a centralised Roman Church Luther saw 
as authoritarian and corrupt, he combined mysticism with a specifically nominalist 
conception of Christianity as a religion centred on the interior life of the believer, in 
particular one that centred on the individual encounter with God mediated through 
the Bible as the ‘Word of God’ (Luther, 1962[1523], p. 392; see also Taylor, 2007, p. 
43-83; Tillich, 1968, p. 242-245). The discursive structure of this novel formulation 
can be best captured in Luther’s confession before the imperial and papal authorities 
at the Diet of Worms7 (Reichstag zu Worms) in 1521: 
 
I have been overcome by the scriptural references which I 
adduced and my conscience is bound by God’s Word. 
Therefore I neither can nor will revoke anything since it is 
neither certain nor right to act against one’s conscience. (as 
cited in Lohse, 1960, p. 348) 
                                                          
7 The Diet of Worms 1521 was an imperial assembly of the Holy Roman Empire held in Worms, 
Germany, where Luther was compelled to answer to local, imperial and papal authorities for his 
public claims against the Church (see Bainton, 1978, pp. 167-190). ‘Diet’ as used here refers to a 
deliberative assembly. 
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The importance of Luther’s statement lies in two, interrelated points: firstly, 
the role accorded to the individual conscience as the locus of revelation, and to which 
religious authorities had to appeal for legitimacy; and secondly, the primacy of 
scriptural references as self-evidently ‘God’s Word’ and hence as the normative 
authority for the individual conscience. The phrase of ‘God’s Word’ for Luther is 
predicated on the notion that the Bible contains Christ himself for the one who 
believes8. In other words, the Bible itself is the sole medium through which the 
individual conscience comes to deal with, concentrate on or drive toward Christ; it 
contains within it ‘powerfully and Spiritually the word of God which deal with Christ 
and His work’ (Tillich, 1968, p. 243). In this formulation, it is evident that late-
medieval nominalism is one of the key sources from which Luther drew, even though 
he openly spurned the theological discourses that had preceded him. Luther’s fideism 
– that is, ‘[t]he attitude of those who hold that the proper Christian attitude is to 
accept doctrines ‘by faith,’ without questioning their origin, significance, or 
rationality’ (Gonzalez, 2005, p. 63) – is a reflection of Ockham’s nominalism in that 
both posited an inscrutable, absolute and voluntarist God (i.e. defined primarily by 
his omnipotent will; see Gonzalez, 2005, pp. 180-181) knowable only by faith as 
belief. However, where Ockham surmises from this that the locus of revelation is to 
be found in the institutional Roman Catholic church, for Luther salvation is an 
individual revelation to be gained by faith alone (sola fides) through the encounter 
with scripture alone (sola scriptura) (Kennedy, 2000, p. 34). Consonant with this 
formulation, Luther and the Protestant reformers after him insisted on using the Bible 
                                                          
8 Luther asserts that: ‘If I know what I believe, I know the content of the Scripture, since the Scripture 
does not contain anything except Christ’ (as cited in Tillich, 1968, p. 243). 
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as the sole guide for faith, thus rejecting church tradition, natural revelation or 
practical reason as additional sources of truth. 
 
With the overwhelming emphasis on the individual vis-à-vis the Bible came a 
new, distinctly Protestant emphasis on personal piety; each Christian, now justified 
by faith as belief and not ‘good works’ (i.e. practices), stood free from condemnation 
but in direct, unmediated relationship with God. As Nelson (2004, p. 16) points out, 
Protestants elevated the vernacular Bible to a place of prominence and authority in 
their communities while simultaneously eschewing images, saints, relics, 
pilgrimages, holy days and rituals as ‘superstitions’ that were extrinsic to true 
religion.  Concomitantly, the scholastic discourse on religious education was equally 
belittled. Luther explains that depending too much on inherited traditions for 
theological concepts results in a ‘Babel of philosophy,’ preferring instead to call 
believers over and over again to use the ‘words of Christ in simple faith’ (as cited in 
Gray, 2007, p. 187). Here, Luther’s nominalism is most apparently evinced in his 
constant exhortation for the ‘simple faith’ of the individual in contrast to natural 
reason insofar as such reason is offended by the unreasonable volition of God: 
 
Common sense and natural reason are highly offended that 
God by his mere will deserts, hardens, and damns, as if he is 
delighted in sins and in such eternal torments, he who is said 
to be of such mercy and goodness. […] There is no use trying 
to get away from this by ingenious distinctions. Natural 
reason, however much it is offended, must admit the 
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consequences of the omniscience and omnipotence of God. 
(as cited in Bainton, 1978, p. 197) 
 
With regard to religious education therefore, reason – whether attained 
practically or by theoretical learning – cannot for Luther grasp any transcendent 
telos; for this purpose one has to rely on revelation in the Word of God alone. But 
even then revelation does not yield a foundation for a teleological morality of 
practices, concerned as it is primarily with exposing the sinfulness of the humans and 
their dependence on God alone as regards their individual salvation (MacIntyre, 
1998[1967], pp. 78-79; also Alfsvåg , 2005). The Protestant reformation was thus, on 
one level, a direct attack on the remainders of practical reason as intrinsically 
educative for religious ends. Yet on another level, the Protestant reformation was not 
merely a destructive force on religious education; on the contrary, the necessity for 
instituting a new order of things based on the identification of the Christian life with 
faith in the Word rather than worldly practices required that the Christian had access 
to the Word in the form of the gospel. Hence, what was impressed upon newly 
Protestant populations represented an intensification of religious education through 
the proliferation of technologies such as printed material – most prominently 
Luther’s translation of the Bible into the German vernacular – as well as stipulations 
on the reform of liturgy, catechisms and later, schools. Consequently, while Luther’s 
Protestantism emphasised individual faith as separate from worldly reason and 
practice, it was not devoid of political effects – most prominently as a central 
moment in the consolidation of the authority of the sovereign territorial state. 
According to Edwards (2007), ‘the principal political effect of the production of a 
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common written language inscribed in increasingly widely circulated printed 
literature was, in concert with the Lutheran denunciation of the Romanists, a greater 
identification between the temporal authorities and the German-speaking populations 
over which they ruled’ (p. 14). 
 
Despite Luther’s strong emphasis on the primacy of individual faith, it would 
be incorrect to conclude that he, the Protestant reformers who followed him, or the 
secular authorities that supported them were unconcerned with outward practices. 
Rather, as Tawney (1964) points out: ‘If anything, indeed, their tendency was to 
interpret [socio-political relations] with more rigorous severity, as a protest against 
the moral laxity of the Renaissance, and, in particular, against the avarice which was 
thought to be peculiarly the sin of Rome’ (p. 89). The difference between the 
emergent Protestant discourse on religion and practices and its medieval predecessor 
was – and this represents its second enduring effect on the Anglo-liberal tradition – 
the former’s division of human nature into two: soul and flesh, ‘inner’ and ‘outer,’ 
religion (or faith) and practices (or works). What now matters is not the action done 
or left undone, but the faith that moved the agent (MacIntyre, 1967, p. 122). The 
relationship of practices to faith is thus considered to be nominal, extrinsic and 
secondary as expressed in the High Court of Australia’s definition of religion 
primarily as belief. 
 
According to Luther, in encountering the revelation of God by faith through the 
scriptures, freedom is something possessed by the ‘inner’ human person alone and 
therefore, ‘it is evident that no external thing has any influence in producing 
Christian righteousness or freedom, or in producing unrighteousness or servitude’ (as 
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cited in Edwards, 2007, p. 9). In other words, whatever effects the world has on the 
external flesh of a person has no impact on the essential ‘inner’ freedom guaranteed 
by faith. Yet practices in the form of good works in the ‘outer’ world still have a 
function: ‘the point of good works is that they constrain the external or fleshly man 
and thus instruct men to be faithful to the Word of God’ (Edwards, 2007, p. 10) In 
other words, while the Christian person does not need works, they should 
nevertheless be done so that ‘man may not go idle and may discipline and care for 
his body’ (Luther as cited in Marcuse, 2008[1972], p. 15). Practices in this account 
thus serve the secondary function of regulating the ‘sinful body,’ which is struggling 
against inner freedom of belief, as a discipline and a divine service. As Marcuse 
(2008[1972]) aptly describes, this discourse radically reconfigures the relationship of 
human persons to their practices (or praxis) insofar as for Luther and Protestantism: 
 
...the true human subject is never the subject of praxis. Thereby the 
person is relieved to a previously unknown degree from the 
responsibility for his [sic] praxis, while at the same time he has 
become free for all types of praxis: the person secure in his inner 
freedom and fullness can only now really throw himself into outer 
praxis, for he knows that in so doing nothing can basically happen 
to him. And the separation of deed and doer, person and praxis, 
already posits the ‘double morality’ which, in the form of the 
separation of ‘office’ and ‘person’ forms one of the foundation 
stones of Luther’s ethics. (p. 14) 
 
132 
The immediate political effect of what Marcuse terms ‘double morality’ 
whereby the inner freedom of faith is primary and cleaved from its secondary 
practices of outer morality was to radicalise certain elements of the Protestant 
reformation such as the Anabaptist movement. According to the proponents of the 
latter such as Thomas Müntzer and his revolutionary followers who raised the 
Peasant Rebellion (1524-1525),9 this new freedom could only be realised with the 
total subordination of the secular realm to the Word of God; all princes had to heed 
the call of God or be exterminated (Edwards, 2007, p. 20; Gillespie, 2008, p. 111). 
Luther, having argued that inspiration trumped outward acts of morality and 
obedience, thus had to articulate a paradoxical theology of worldly politics that 
sustained his emphasis on inner faith while encouraging civil obedience. In order to 
do this, he extends the nominalist division between faith and reason into a political 
doctrine: every Christian, according to him, is simultaneously subject to ‘Two 
Kingdoms’ or ‘Two Governances’ – the spiritual and the temporal. Luther posits that 
this division of the socio-political world represents a divine sanction: ‘God has 
provided for [people] a different government beyond the Christian estate and 
                                                          
9 The Peasant Rebellion of 1524-25 was a widespread and popular revolt in the German-speaking 
areas of Central Europe. It can be understood as a culmination of a series of smaller scale and local 
revolts. In turn, these were triggered by the social dislocations wrought by the collapsing feudal order 
and the rise of a monetary economy, which allowed for a greater concentration of wealth amongst 
provincial rulers. According to Drummond (1979): ‘The slow conversion of the German - and 
especially the Saxon - economy to a monetary one, with the increased exploitation of the great silver 
mines in Saxony and on the borders with Bohemia, led to an upheaval in all social relations which was 
uncontrollable and which was widely interpreted as the onset of the end of the world. This upheaval 
affected all layers of society - in the towns, where the guild system was crumbling; in the country, 
where peasants were gradually forced to accept new measures and taxes, to pay in money what had 
previously been paid in kind, to abandon the land for the towns. [...] The Saxon princes... were the 
wealthiest in Germany and possibly in Europe. The mines sunk in their lands yielded reliable silver 
for trade and for nascent industry’ (p. 64). It was in this context that Saxon theologian Thomas 
Müntzer articulated a theo-political discourse of civil disobedience, drawing widespread support from 
those whose livelihoods had been severely affected by these developments. As Drummond (1979) 
points out: ‘In his life Müntzer preached and was active principally [among the peasants and urban 
lower classes] and his supporters... were almost exclusively plebeian, burgher, or from the mining 
communities’ (p. 66). Müntzer considered Luther’s acquiescent approach to civil authorities to be 
‘selling the Reformation to the highest bidder by serving both God and the princes of Saxony’ (as 
cited in Drummond, 1979, p. 64). For the contrast of political implications between Anabaptist and 
Lutheran discourses, see also Stayer (1991, pp. 45-92, 107-159). 
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kingdom of God’ in the absence of which sinful ‘men [sic] would devour one 
another, seeing that the whole world is evil and that among thousands there is 
scarcely a single true Christian’ (1962[1523], p. 91).  
 
For Luther therefore, secular authorities are part of God’s provision of order in 
the wake of the fall of humankind into sin. Because the governed in any sovereign’s 
territory is assumed by Luther to consist mainly of ‘non-authentic’ Christians, the 
role assigned to this provision is politically fundamental; it is essential to the 
government of non-Christians by a Christian ruler (McNiell, 1941, p. 226). Secular, 
temporal authority is ultimately ‘but a very small matter in the sight of God’ and it is 
no more than a means for punishing wrongdoing, but even where it is run by corrupt 
people a Christian should obey it for ‘my faith in God still pursues its own course 
and does its job, for I do not have to believe what the temporal power believes’ 
(Luther as cited in Edwards, 2007, p. 12). Disobedience to secular authorities ranging 
from the active rebellion of the Anabaptists and peasant rebels to the people that 
‘speak evil of the government and curse it’ are thus considered sinful (Luther as cited 
in Edwards, 2007, p. 12). In sum, Luther posits the primacy of faith in the inner 
person as the locus of revelation while insisting that outer practices have no intrinsic 
religious efficacy on the one hand, and paradoxically on the other, asserting the 
necessity for obedience to secular authorities who are ordained as part of God’s 
natural law in a sinful world. In the face of the Peasant Rebellion, this articulation of 
inner faith and outer obedience forms the basis of Luther’s appeal to secular 
authorities to institute systematic mass education to preserve the spiritual and 
temporal welfare of the German nation (Luke, 1989, p. 83ff.; Lenz, 2005, pp. 9-18). 
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This paradox in Protestant theology following Luther and its political effects 
brings to the fore its third historical contribution to the liberal discourse on religion: 
that because religion as faith is centred on the individual’s inner belief, the realm of 
outer practices is legitimately ordered by secular authorities for the purpose of 
securing conditions for ‘true religion.’ Consistent with his articulation of the ‘two 
kingdoms’ and opposition to the Peasant Rebellion, Luther maintains that order in 
the worldly kingdom protects righteousness in the kingdom of heaven. Secular 
authority is always justified as God’s plan insofar as it is compatible with the leading 
of a Christian life – so long as it does not actively interfere with a Christian’s 
personal faith – it is to be presumed part of God’s natural order10 (Edwards, 2007, p. 
17). 
 
Thus, while Luther’s Protestant theology sought to preserve the primacy of 
individual faith as the locus of revelation, the political effects it engendered 
represented a radical reconfiguration of religion vis-à-vis secular authorities that had 
hitherto prevailed. Coercive power, under the Protestant schema, is ordained by God 
but is given exclusively to the secular authorities so that social order may be 
maintained; institutional forms of religion such as the church are left with ‘a merely 
suasive authority, that of preaching the Word of God’ (Cavanaugh, 2002, p. 23). As 
such, religious institutions were not merely minimized in relation to personal faith, 
                                                          
10 The extent of this is exemplified in his publication on ‘Whether Soldiers Too Can Be Saved,’ where 
Luther compares the murder involved in soldiery to the practice of necessary amputation for the sake 
of preserving civil order: .’.when I think of a soldier fulfilling his duty of office by punishing the 
wicked, and creating so much misery, it seems an un-Christian work completely contrary to Christian 
love. But when I think of how it protects the good and keeps and preserves wife and child, house and 
farm, property, and honour and peace, then I see how precious and godly this work is; and I observe 
that it amputates a leg or a hand, so that the whole body may not perish’ (Luther as cited in Edwards, 
2007, p. 17). The positing of the civil order as an end in itself owing to God’s will is in marked 
deviation to the Medieval discourse of social formation, whereby Christian subjects are subordinate to 
the sovereign – at least in theory – only insofar as the sovereign is subordinate to the ‘highest good’ 
given by natural law. 
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but were also redefined as subordinate in temporal matters to the power of secular 
authority. An independent jurisdiction is thus carved out and handed over to the 
secular authorities while the church is consigned to the task of religious education in 
a manner still presupposed in modern liberal societies: i.e. as the purely interior 
government of the souls of its members while their bodies are handed over to the 
secular authorities (Cavanaugh, 2002, p. 25; Skinner, 1978, p. 15). 
 
As Tillich (1968, p. 254) points out, this political arrangement may well have 
been brought about by an ‘emergency situation’ wrought by the Protestant rupture 
with the Roman Catholic Church, for there were no bishops or ecclesiastical 
authorities and yet the church needed administration and regulation to oversee its 
reformation: ‘So emergency bishops were created, and there was nobody else who 
could be this except the electors and princes. [Thus] the church became more or 
less… a department of the state administration, and the princes became the arbiters 
of the church.’ While such secular authorities were not considered to rightfully have 
a claim on religious matters, they were now responsible for administering the ius 
circa sacrum or ‘law around the sacred’ for the churches in their territories (Tillich, 
1968, p. 254; see also Knight, 2007, p. 68). However, even though this may well 
have been articulated as a pragmatic administrative tactic, it had the lasting political 
effect of demarcating the authority of churches at the boundaries of ‘secular matters.’ 
Ecclesial boundaries were henceforth relocated within the territorial boundaries of 
the sovereign’s territories.  
 
By positing the sovereign territorial state as the highest earthly authority for 
governing the practical world of their populations, the Protestant reformation 
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legitimated the ‘realization of a single, unquestioned political centre would make 
equivalent and equal each individual before the law, thereby freeing from the caprice 
of local custom and sub-loyalties which would divide them from fellow citizens’ 
(Cavanaugh, 2002, p. 74). Freed from such ‘caprice,’ the allegiance of the individual 
to the sovereign territorial state becomes the sole political association that necessarily 
binds the individual (Harvey, 2008, p. 114). In short, Protestantism, by casting 
religion as subject to the secular government, establishes temporal authority absolute 
priority over religious authority in all matters concerning worldly conduct. As Luther 
himself asserts: 
 
I say therefore that since the temporal power is ordained of 
God to punish the wicked and protect the good, it should be 
left free to perform its office in the whole body of 
Christendom without restriction and without respect to 
persons, whether it affects pope, bishops, priests, monks, 
nuns, or anyone else. (as cited in Edwards, 2007, p. 13) 
 
Under this socio-political configuration, Protestant Christianity thus becomes 
paradigmatic of ‘religion’ as defined in the liberal discursive tradition: a name for 
systematised sets of beliefs based on the interior lives of individuals and which may 
engender practices and codes of conduct, but ones which must be in conformity with 
the rules of governing authorities. As Cavanaugh (1995, p. 411) surmises, religion 
may henceforth ‘take different cultural and symbolic expressions, but it remains a 
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universal essence distinct from political power which then must be translated into 
publicly acceptable ‘values’ in order to become public currency.’ 
 
This translation of religion to publicly acceptable values is most evident in the 
way religious education was conceived and arguably still is. Indeed, Luther urged the 
establishment of a vast network of compulsory schooling in Protestant territories on 
the basis of both spiritual and temporal exigencies in an effort to appeal to Protestant 
rulers who, in his reckoning, were the only ones capable of enforcing it (Lenz, 2005, 
p. 10). According to him, schools serve the function of training future citizens even if 
the spiritual considerations were subtracted from it: 
 
Now if (as we have assumed) there were no souls, and there 
were no need at all of schools and languages for the sake of 
the Scriptures and of God, this one consideration alone would 
be sufficient to justify the establishment everywhere of the 
very best schools for both boys and girls, namely, that in 
order to maintain its temporal estate outwardly the world 
must have good and capable men and women, men able to 
rule well over land and people, women able to manage the 
household and train children and servants aright. (Luther, 
1967[1566], p. 60) 
 
This type of reasoning was made effective in the period from 1539-1600 by 
rulers and administrators in Protestant territories (see Green, 1979, pp. 105-108). 
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According to the excavation of discourses surrounding education in this period 
conducted by Carmen Luke (1989; 1989a), mandatory schooling for children 
emerged from this context and was seen by civic authorities and Protestant reformers 
alike as the most effective means of enforcing law and order among youth who, as 
adults, ‘would hopefully embody the kind of self-discipline, piety, morality, and 
obedience to civil and spiritual authority needed to build and uphold a unified state 
and church’ (Luke, 1989, pp. 71-72). For if the key to salvation, following Luther’s 
theology, lay in the personal faith in God’s grace through the individual’s reading of 
the Bible as ‘Word of God,’ then only individual confrontation with the divine words 
would enable an authentic and unmediated relationship between God and the 
individual. As Luke (1989, p. 70) points out, this theological impetus – along with 
political antagonisms arising from internal and external threats – gave rise to 
Luther’s urgency to ensure the masses knew how to read and in turn, his appointment 
of former pupil and collaborator Philip Melanchthon to establish a system of mass 
and compulsory schooling within which to institutionalize the learner and learning 
process (also Kusukawa, 1999).  
 
While undoubtedly inflected theologically, the push for schools was also seen 
as the most pragmatic way for civic authorities to bring about order of thought and 
behaviour among peoples of a spiritually and socially disunified nation-state (Luke, 
1989, p. 70). More particularly, such education sought to create obedient, pious, and 
diligent subjects of their German princes to avoid the sorts of revolts typified by the 
Peasant Rebellion (Luke, 1989a, pp. 79-81; Fromm, 1969, pp. 101-102; Marcuse, 
2008[1972], p. 18), as well as to defend the Protestant territories against 
139 
encroachments by Roman Catholic and Turkish Islamic forces11 (Lenz, 2005, pp. 12-
13; Luke, 1989, p. 131). As Melanchthon (1988) asserts in an address delivered upon 
the opening of a new school in Nuremberg in 1526: ‘In the well constituted state the 
first task for schools is to teach youth, for they are the seedbed of the city’ (p. 63) 
 
Thus, by the late sixteenth century, Lutheran-inspired ‘folk schools’ 
proliferated across German provinces and displayed a regularity and repetition of 
instructional procedures, curricular content and state administration procedures such 
as school inspections and extensive record keeping that constitute the many of the 
principal formal characteristics of the modern education systems (Luke, 1989, p. 80; 
Luke, 1989a, pp. 111-131; Lotz-Heumann, 2008, pp. 251-254; Green, 1979, pp. 96-
105) More broadly, religious education and territorial sovereignty were fused 
together in a ‘large scale surveillance network’ (Luke, 1989, p. 84), and the 
technologies of this surveillance were standardised confessions of faith, liturgical 
uniformity, and moral policing, enforced by frequent visitations of local churches by 
officials of church and state (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 170; Luke, 1989, p. 83ff). 
 
In sum, the Protestant reformation triggered by Luther and his followers can be 
seen to have three, overlapping impacts on how religion is conceived in liberal 
discourse today: firstly, by developing the nominalist definition of faith as belief by 
delimiting its locus to the ‘inner’ life of individual subjects, it plays a key role in the 
formation of the modern liberal conception of ‘religion’ as private belief in a 
                                                          
11 A widely distributed and regularly sung Lutheran hymn in schools of the time contained the words:  
‘Maintain us, Lord, within thy word, 
And fend off murd’rous Pope and Turk, 
Who Jesus Christ, thy very Son, 
Strive to bring down from his throne’ (quoted in Mathis, 2009, p. 2). 
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Supernatural Being, Principle or Thing; secondly and consequently, ‘outer’ worldly 
practices, while still important, are no longer seen as intrinsic or primary to religion, 
but are rather merely expressions of inner faith or enacted to secure the conditions 
for such a faith, thus cementing the priority of belief as the key feature of religion; 
and thirdly, because practical reason is not intrinsic to religion in itself, worldly 
practices are appropriately subject to and governed by secular authorities who are 
appointed by God’s natural law, and hence appropriate religious conduct in the 
political realm should ultimately seek only to secure the conditions for ‘true religion’ 
defined as belief.  
 
Through this articulation of Protestant theological discourse with the pragmatic 
politics of territorial sovereignty during the reformation, the territorial state thus 
assumed a greater authority and responsibility over the socio-political order in its 
entirety, including its sovereignty over religious institutions. This dependence of 
churches on the patronage of secular authorities had significant effects. As Gray 
(2007, p. 185) points out, the Protestant reformed churches lacked an explicitly 
separate institution that could support disagreements with the state—as it was, the 
churches were governed and controlled by state apparatuses to limit critique and, 
more importantly, curtail the opportunity for competing spiritual centres of authority 
to arise. In this context, the institution of compulsory and systematic schooling can 
be seen as necessity arising from the desired sustenance and perpetuation of this new 
socio-political arrangement. In turn, this can be seen to furnish two significant 
moments in the conceptualisation of religious education in the liberal tradition: on 
the one hand, the shift of ultimate authority over education from the church to the 
sovereign state (Luke, 1989, p. 131) and on the other, the diffusion of a certain 
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Protestant and nominalist discourse through its definitions of religion, law of nature 
and civility (Martin, 2010, pp. 33-57; Fitzgerald, 2008, p. 143ff).  
 
Religion/public: The Anglo-liberal state and belief in the private sphere 
 
While comprehensive schooling did not arrive in Luther’s lifetime, Prussia had 
by the end of the eighteenth century inaugurated a national system of public schools 
for all children as ‘the modern state increasingly [considered] teaching as falling 
under its sole jurisdiction, following the principle that the church is within the state.’ 
(Julia, 2006, p. 162) Scholar of Christian education Brian Hill (1985, p. 40) likewise 
argues in a celebratory tone that ‘it was a significant commentary on Luther’s 
approach that the passage of time had so weakened its religious rationale that a law 
in 1803 released the schools from the obligation to uphold any particular religious 
confession.’ The usual explanation given for this transition of educational 
responsibility from church to state parallels a broader historical narrative within the 
Anglo-liberal tradition: that of a shift in Europe from theocratic coercion to religious 
freedom and tolerance, with a corresponding institutionalisation of a separation 
between church (or religion) and the (secular) state. While proponents of this account 
occupy diverse positions within the Anglo-liberal tradition and by no means concur 
on every detail regarding antecedents and key players, there appears to be a broad 
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agreement12 amongst scholars on the necessity of the separation of religion from the 
political sphere because it is held to be irrational, other-worldly and prone to 
violence. This then serves as a condition of possibility for the emergence of modern 
liberal states that can be understood to be broadly situated within the Anglo-liberal 
tradition’s narrative of the triumph of the peaceable liberal state over religious 
violence. This is expounded concisely and with rhetorical flair by Fukuyama (1992): 
 
There was a time when religion played an all-powerful role in 
European politics, with Protestants and Catholics organizing 
themselves into political factions and squandering the wealth of 
Europe in sectarian wars. English liberalism... emerged in direct 
reaction to the religious fanaticism of the English Civil War. 
Contrary to those who at the time believed that religion was a 
necessary and permanent feature of the political landscape, 
liberalism vanquished religion in Europe. (p. 271; emphasis in 
original) 
 
By contrast to this narrative, I concur broadly with such diverse scholars as 
Karl Marx (1992, p. 222), Michel Foucault (2007, p. 229) and Giorgio Agamben 
                                                          
12 So for Quentin Skinner (1978, p. 352) it was the politique theorists of sixteenth and seventeenth 
century France for coming to the conclusion that ‘if there were to be any prospect of achieving civic 
peace, the powers of the State would have to be divorced from the duty to uphold any particular faith’; 
for Judith Shklar (1984, p. 5) it was Michel de Montaigne who rejected the cruelty of institutional 
Christianity that pre-empted the alternatives of ‘cruel military and moral repression and violence, and 
a self-restraining tolerance [born out of the cruelties of the religious civil wars] that fences in the 
powerful to protect the freedom and safety of every citizen’; and for Ian Hunter (2005, p. 7-8), the 
liberal state’s policy of toleration can be understood as the innovation of ‘Brandenburg-Prussia’s 
leading ‘civil philosophers’—Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius—[who] had grounded 
private religious freedom not in the subjective right of individuals but in the state’s refusal to enforce 
confessional imperatives’ (see also Hunter, 2001). Such positions may be multiplied with some 
differences in detail (see also Stout, 1981, p. 235-238; Rawls, 1993, p. xx-xxv; Kymlicka, 1996, p. 2-
3).  
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(2007) that the emergence of the modern liberal state is better understood as a shift 
from one Christian-inflected regime to another Christian-inflected regime, 
particularly one with a Protestant and nominalist cultural horizon that continued to be 
operative. From this perspective, the triumphal liberal-secularist accounts are 
arguably misleading insofar as they largely ignore the extent to which the discourses 
and norms produced by Protestant and nominalist presuppositions continued to 
operate within, and indeed abet the emergence of the modern liberal state (see 
Martin, 2010, pp. 34-35). Particularly important with regard to conceptions of 
religious education is that this view fails to bring into relief what Martin (2010, p. 
59ff.) labels the ‘circulation of power’ that constitutes the liberal hegemony of 
modern European states whereby the discourse produced by ‘privatised’ institutions 
such as (and perhaps especially) religious institutions perform the social function of 
habituating citizens for the state. In turn, the state, as the regulator of public affairs, 
grants recognition to certain religious institutions within its sovereign territory by 
recourse to dominant discourses of acceptable religiosity and social civility.  
 
In this section, I shall furnish a genealogy of such a liberal socio-political 
arrangement, which will be specifically focused on how the concern of religious 
education came to be defined as the cultivation of private religious convictions on the 
one hand and governed as a deliverer of educational services on behalf of the state on 
the other. This is centred on two moments broadly corresponding to Martin’s 
diagram of the ‘circulation of power’ in liberal states: firstly, the post-Protestant 
reformation consolidation of the state as sovereign over religion and religious 
institutions within its territory, and which regulates the operations of the latter; and 
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secondly, the diffusion of a Protestant and nominalist hegemony that defines religion, 
‘God’s law’ and civility through religious education for the sustenance of the state. 
 
Firstly, as mentioned in the previous section, one of the key political effects of 
the Protestant reformation following Luther was the increased authority of the 
territorial state over the socio-political order in its territories, which included 
sovereignty over religious institutions, over and against the Roman Catholic Church. 
This was formalised under the Augsburg Settlement of 1555, which saw the legal 
division of Christendom between its Catholic and Protestant territories (Hughes, 
1992, p. 58ff). Most significantly, the treaty established at Augsburg granted 
territorial sovereigns the right to determine ecclesial affiliation of their subjects, to 
which the principle of cuius regio, eius religio (‘whose realm, his religion’) is often 
(mistakenly13) attributed. It is at this point that the narratives within the Anglo-liberal 
tradition have traced what sociologists have termed the ‘process of social 
differentiation’ in which the original unity of Latin Christendom gave way to 
religious divisions along confessional14 lines (see Gorski, 2000, p. 157; see Figure 5 
below). Hunter and Saunders (2002), for example, argue from this perspective that 
the post-Protestant reformation period saw ‘the splitting of the ‘universal’ church 
into several rival confessions, and the emergence of a series of territorial states bent 
on asserting their sovereignty against the supranational structures of the Holy Roman 
Empire and the Papal Church’ (p. 3). Thus Confessional Europe, where Christian 
                                                          
13 Cavanaugh (2009, p. 74) points out that the doctrine of cuius regio, eius religio, which is usually 
attributed to the Augsburg Settlement (1555), was in fact invented by a German jurist around 1600 
and could not have been used by the writers of the treaty. 
14 ‘Confessional’ as used here refers to Christian churches – particularly Lutheran and Reformed 
(Calvinist) churches – whose fundamental doctrines are stated in particular documents called 
‘confessions.’ A ‘confession of faith’ is thus both an act by which the doctrine of a church is declared 
and the resulting document from such an act, for example, the Augsburg Confession of 1530, 
Westminster Confession of 1646, etc (Gonzalez, 2005, pp. 37-38). 
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universalism in the medieval times was supplanted by religious particularism that is 
understood to be the source of conflict that led to the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), 
otherwise labelled as the ‘wars of religion.’ The history of European modernity is 
thus marked, in this account, by a distinctive ‘quest for security’ from the violence 
and insecurity of the ‘religious wars’ which eventually found a solution in the 
emergence of the secular state and its ‘liberal sensibility’ (Mavelli, 2011, p. 5). 
 
 
Figure 5: Conventional understanding of confessionalisation as religious differentiation leading to the 
‘wars of religion’ (Gorski, 2000, p. 151) 
  
By contrast, however, recent work on the confessional states has highlighted 
that the process of social differentiation was also accompanied by a process of 
religious, social, cultural and political de-differentiation; that is, according to Gorski 
(2000, p. 152), while on the religious level there was an apparent splintering of the 
once dominant Roman Church, within territorial bounds confessionalization also 
involved the re-imposition of state-led ecclesiastical discipline on both the clergy and 
the laity. On a societal level, confessionalization involved efforts to ‘Christianize’ 
everyday life, and to bring individual conduct into line with Biblical law, a campaign 
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in which church and state often joined hands. On the cultural level, 
confessionalization involved efforts to suppress popular ‘superstitions’ and to impose 
a new, more ‘fully Christian’ ethos. Finally, on the political level, confessionalization 
meant a deepening of the alliance between church and state and a tightening of the 
relationship between confessional and ‘national’ identity. In doing so, the territorial 
sovereigns exploited the potential for social cohesion and the capacity to mobilize 
allegiances of religious tradition to sharpen the boundaries of the religious 
communities and make them coextensive with the boundaries of the state (Mavelli, 
2011, p. 6).  Thus, an argument could equally be made that far from a simple causal 
relation between religious differentiation and the Thirty Years War, it was in fact the 
emergence of European territorial states as sovereign over their respective churches 
that was the focus of antagonisms (see Figure 6). More specifically, to the extent that 
the emerging states willingly contributed to amplifying confessional differences in 
order to establish its sovereignty it may be argued, along with Cavanaugh (2009, p. 
162), that the wars of religion were not the events which necessitated the birth of the 
modern State as peaceable saviour, but rather were themselves the means — ‘the 
birthpangs’ — through which the state came to life (see also Mavelli, 2011, p. 6).  
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Figure 6: More recent understandings of confessionalisation as social, cultural, religious and political 
de-differentiation within nation-states and differentiation between nation-states. (Gorski, 2000, p. 152) 
 
So while the official adoption of reformed religion contributed to the power of 
different territorial sovereigns in different ways, the process of confessionalisation in 
Europe saw a trend toward the absorption of religious institutions – along with their 
educative functions – into the state, as had occurred in the Protestant territories in 
Germany after Luther. For example, Henry VIII in England, Christian III in 
Denmark, and a dozen leading German princes, confiscated church property within 
their territories or absorbed into their states adjoining bishoprics or monastic estates, 
which enabled a firmer grip on education from school level to universities 
(Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 169). According to Turner (2011), the modern process known 
as ‘secularisation’ can be understood in this historical context – that is, where 
‘ecclesial property was handed over to a secular authority’ (p. 128; also 
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Sommerville, 1992, pp. 111-128). For religious institutions such as schools, such 
secularisation meant ‘the nation’ now formed its institutional apex and ‘territory’ 
demarcated its bounds. Consequently, the process of de-differentiation which took 
place within territorial states saw secular and ecclesiastical bureaucracies expand in 
parallel and become intertwined, which helped consolidate a more intensive form of 
the state; for now, the articulation of sovereign power to religious institutions, which 
integrated the governing, disciplining and educative functions formerly belonging to 
the church, ‘provided the means to regulate, down to the parish level, changes which 
had the potential to reach every subject’ (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 169). The work of 
social historian of the sixteenth and seventeenth century German confessional state 
R. Po-Chia Hsia concurs with this, describing the confessionalisation process as a 
key moment in the history of the state’s sovereignty over life in its territories, in 
particular its ability to deploy religion for the ends of national identity. ‘Conformity 
required coercion,’ argues Hsia (1989), which gave rise to the Church and state 
formation of ‘an inextricable matrix of power for enforcing discipline and 
confessionalism’ (p. 6) Thus, the history of confessionalization in early modern 
Germany is, according to him, not so much the history of religious sectarianism so 
much as the history of the territorial state. 
 
This trend toward de-differentiation was intensified with the political stability 
established under the Treaty of Westphalia (c.1648), for hence the European civil 
authorities who were newly minted as nation-states were temporarily freed from 
boundary disputes and wars caused by sudden changes in confessional and political 
allegiances to focus on the administration of the spiritual and social dimensions of 
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the people within their realms (Tilly, 1992, p. 61). The Treaty helped to establish the 
principle of state sovereignty which remained in force for centuries and allowed for 
the absorption of ecclesial properties and educational institutions into nation-states. 
Following the ideas of the Enlightenment thinkers Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, 
Samuel Pufendorf and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, post-Westphalian sovereignty too was 
eventually modified as liberal ideas began to challenge the authority of the monarchs 
in Europe (Fosson, 2007, p. 33). The emergent liberal notion of ‘popular 
sovereignty’ required that sovereignty reside in the hands of the people as ultimately, 
according to this discourse, it was the will of the people that gave legitimacy to the 
law. This idea that sovereignty emanated from the will of the constituent people 
began to challenge and eventually superseded the perception, created at Westphalia, 
that sovereignty was held by a single ruler. This type of popular sovereignty is 
synonymous with ‘public opinion’ as broadly understood today, which as Gramsci 
argues, ‘was born on the eve of the collapse of the absolutist State’ (as cited in 
Buttigieg, 2005, p. 46). Henceforth, the modern (i.e. constitutional) state15 can be 
characterised by its general function as a factor of cohesion or unity for a 
                                                          
15 I acknowledge that a definition of the modern state is one that has been a subject of long debates by 
theorists from the political sciences, history, economics, sociology and cultural studies. In the most 
basic sense, the modern state can be characterised as a distinct ensemble of institutions that has the 
authority to make the rules which govern society, with the distinct trait – in the words of Max Weber 
– of possessing a ‘monopoly on legitimate violence’ within a specific territory (Marshall, 1998, p. 
635). Beyond this basic definition, further theoretical elaborations on the state can be broadly 
characterised as: (1) liberal-pluralist, which generally sees the state as acting in the interests of the 
individual and group constituents in society (e.g. Galston, 1991, pp. 79-97); (2) Marxist, which sees 
the state primarily in its role within a capitalist mode of production in order to attenuate social class 
conflict (e.g. Poulantzas, 1974); (3) autonomous, which sees the state as encompassing personnel who 
have interests of their own, and who pursue them independently of the various groups in society (e.g. 
Nordlinger, 1981); or (4) decentred, which sees the state not as a unified agent – following a certain 
reading of Foucault on ‘governmentality’ – but as decomposed into distinct apparatuses, agencies, 
departments and other units each with specific tasks for governing aspects of social life (e.g. Rose & 
Miller, 2008, pp. 53-113). In this thesis, I draw primarily from the work of Gramsci alongside the later 
works of Foucault (1979, pp. 92-93) and Poulantzas (1980, pp. 126-129) in arguing that seen 
genealogically, the modern liberal state is a – if not the – crucial ‘institutional crystallization’ or 
‘material condensation’ of contingent hegemonic relations within a given political regime (also 
Jessop, 2007). This is a conception of the modern state that incorporates the liberal-pluralist stress on 
social consensus, the Marxist emphasis on social conflict and the decentred perspective on a 
multiplicity of state apparatuses all within a single theoretical framework. 
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differentiated and divided social formation and whose precise place, particular form, 
institutional arrangements and boundaries reflect a ‘material condensation’ 
(Poulantzas, 1980, pp. 128-129, 145) or ‘institutional crystallization’ (Foucault, 
1979, pp. 92-93) of unequal social relations that prevail within a given political 
regime (see also Mayo, 2011). In short, the state is no longer the body of the 
sovereign, but ‘a complex social relation that reflects the changing balance of social 
forces in a determinate conjuncture’ (Jessop, 1982, pp. 221). 
 
The success of the Treaty of Westphalia in cementing state sovereignty and 
liberalism in spurring the evolution of governmental arrangements from the figure of 
the Sovereign to ‘popular sovereignty’ eventually gave rise to what Foucault (2009, 
pp. 337-358) has labelled ‘Reason of State’ (raison d’état). By contrast to the 
medieval Christian notion of temporal authority subordinated to supernatural ends 
whereby ‘just government was government in accord with a hierarchy of human, 
natural and divine laws’ (Bell, 2001, p. 23), the emergent modern conception of 
government according to Reason of State operates on its opposite: a nominalist logic 
of aggregation, whereby the state is seen as the institutional embodiment of the will 
of its constituent people. The novelty of Reason of State was thus its predicate that 
the state as the expression of sovereign will was not accountable to any transcendent 
law or principle. Instead, the principles of government are immanent in the state 
itself or, to put it in other terms, government comes to be concerned with the 
perpetuity and economic prosperity of the state as the highest good in itself (Bell, 
2001, p. 24). As Foucault (2009, pp. 338, 340) surmises, the end of the Reason of 
State is the state itself, and if there is something like perfection, happiness, or 
felicity, it will only ever be the perfection, happiness or felicity of the state itself. 
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This in turn requires an articulation (and sometimes exclusion) of the disparate 
historical traditions and particularities such as religious bodies contained within its 
territorial bounds, which are amalgamated to form a unifying narrative of history 
whereby the state comes to be the bearer of their collective fate. As Poulantzas 
(1980) describes it, the state:  
 
[I]tself has no original legitimacy in the body of the 
sovereign, but is successively grounded in the people-nation, 
whose destiny it represents. This State realizes a movement 
of individualization and unification; constitutes the people-
nation in the further sense of representing its historical 
orientation; and assigns a goal to it, marking out what 
becomes a path. (p. 113) 
 
The Reason of State thus entailed a new, pastoral kind of relationship between 
the state and the individual, for while the logic of the former is concerned first and 
foremost with strengthening and perpetuating the state, it acknowledges that its 
strength and economic prosperity lie in its population. The state now takes an abiding 
interest in the individual details of its subjects’ lives. Each individual is now 
addressed in terms of how their particular existence may contribute to or detract from 
the state’s strength (Bell, 2001, p. 24). It is within the logic of this emergent 
population-territory-wealth nexus that the reactivation of religious education re-
emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, specifically in the form of 
religious institutions as a means of moral formation. As Foucault (2007, pp. 229, 
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230) argues, the socio-political shifts in the sixteenth century onwards did not 
represent an absolute diminution of religious pastoralism but rather, ‘an 
intensification of the religious pastorate in its spiritual forms... [and] also in its 
extension and temporal efficiency’ through a development of ‘forms of the activity 
of conducting men outside of ecclesiastical authority.’ For the tendency towards 
Reason of State, far from being an ethos ‘that began to identify the ends of 
government with the purely ‘worldly’ security and prosperity of a territory and its 
population’ over the ‘unity of [‘other-worldly’] faith’ (Hunter, 1995, p. 438; 
emphasis added), was in Protestant states undergirded by the hegemony of Protestant 
norms that defined terms such as ‘religion’ and ‘civility’ in historically and 
geographically particular ways. 
 
The persistence of these assumptions is best exemplified in the work of British 
Enlightenment pioneer John Locke (1632-1704), a political writer and government 
official whose work on the division of religious and civil (i.e. public) realms 
continues to be a source of authority for the Anglo-liberal configuration of society 
(Uzgalis, 2010; also Kennedy, 2006, p. 93; Roover and Balagangadhara, 2008, p. 
524ff; in Australia, see Gascoigne, 2002, pp. 39-44). Locke is commonly lauded in 
this tradition as ‘the philosopher of the Anglo-Saxons [who] championed consensual 
parliamentary politics and economic individualism’ (Kennedy, 2006, p. 93) and as 
one of the key founders of modern Anglo-liberal democracy, which is ‘a system 
clearly descended from Lockean liberalism’ (Zuckert, 2002, p. 1). Indeed, Kateb 
(2009) goes so far as to argue that Locke, being ‘a major intellectual source of the 
process we call modern ‘secularization,’ made an ‘unequaled contribution to the 
emergence of secularism in general and political secularism in particular’ (pp. 1006, 
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1001). Given his authoritative status within the liberal tradition to the extent that ‘it is 
largely due to Locke’s influence that [liberal] beliefs are so widespread today’ 
(Forster, 2005, p. 21), I shall deal more closely with Locke as both an exemplary 
instance and a foundational source of the liberal discourse on religion and politics. 
This will be done in two parts: firstly, with regard to Locke’s political principles on 
the appropriate place of religion in the politics of liberal society; and secondly, his 
prescriptions on the function and manner of religious education that stem from these 
principles. The interplay of these two moments, I argue, foregrounds both the 
regulation of religion by the state as well as the persistence of progressively 
‘secularised’ nominalist and Protestant presuppositions in the Anglo-liberal discourse 
on society and politics. 
 
Over twenty-two years, beginning with An Essay Concerning Toleration 
(1667) and ending with A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), Locke set out to 
assault the socio-political arrangements of the confessional state, which had 
conferred upon sovereigns both the right and the duty to establish true religion within 
their territories, order the outward form of the church and punish those who refused 
to conform (Stanton, 2006, p. 85; also Coffey, 2000). Against this, he sought to 
demarcate the appropriate bounds of both religion and the politics of state that in 
time would become liberal orthodoxy (Stanton, 2006, p. 86), one that sought to 
‘distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and settle 
the just bounds that lie between the one and the other’ (Locke, 2003, p. 218). In a 
seventeenth-century English society where there existed more than one Christian 
denomination, Locke asserted that for the sake of civil order, no denomination may 
use the state to dominate, enfeeble, or eliminate other denominations, and the state 
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may not use its power for its own purposes to do the same (Kateb, 2009, p. 1018). In 
order to do this, he articulated a political doctrine for what Forster has appropriately 
termed ‘belief regulation,’ which consists firstly in distinguishing between 
substantive religious discourse as opinion about uncertain mysteries and public 
reason as those ‘common offices of humanity and friendship’ demonstrable by 
natural law and empirical observation (Locke as cited in Forster, 2005, p. 52), and 
secondly by extending this distinction to his version of an overlapping ‘twofold 
society’ of religion/politics that ‘almost all men in the word are members’ (Locke as 
cited in Roover and Balagangadhara, 2008, p. 530). 
 
Consistent with the nominalist presuppositions advanced by Scotus and 
Ockham abovementioned, Locke argues both that God is infinite and thus cannot be 
approached by finite human minds, as well as the empirical arbitrariness of the 
connection between human ‘ideas’ and empirically perceived ‘objects’ in the world 
(as cited in Forster, 2005, pp. 58-63). As Forster (2005, p. 62) points out, Locke’s 
insistence on the distinction between ideas and the objects that create them is far 
from a mere epistemological technicality; it plays a key role in belief regulation 
insofar as it sets limits to mental powers and hence its inadequacy for substantive 
ideas about ‘metaphysical objects such as God and other spirits.’ On this basis, 
Locke defines ‘realm of religion’ as stemming from the individual soul, which is 
concerned only about the ‘bare fact’ that eternal life has been promised to people (i.e. 
Protestants) and that this ultimate end should guide conduct (see also Forster, 2005, 
pp. 64-65): 
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Every man has an immortal soul, capable of eternal happiness 
or misery; whose happiness depending on his believing and 
doing those things in life, which are necessary to the 
obtaining of God’s favour, and are prescribed by God to that 
end. [...] seeing one man does not violate the right of another, 
by his erroneous opinions, and undue manner of worship, nor 
is his perdition any prejudice to another man’s affairs; 
therefore the care of each man’s salvation belongs only to 
himself. (Locke, 2003, p. 242) 
 
On this basis, the realm of religion is defined by Locke as the province of the 
immortal souls of all humans, who strive for salvation by worshipping God. Thus, its 
primary end is the otherworldly salvation of the individual soul. By contrast, the 
realm of civil society/government, according to Locke, lacks concern for 
otherworldly ends, but rather is concerned only with the socio-political order of this 
world. He defines the latter as follows: 
 
But besides their souls, which are immortal, men have also 
their temporal lives here upon earth; the state whereof being 
frail and fleeting, and the duration uncertain, they have need 
of several outward conveniencies to the support thereof, 
which are to be procured by pains and industry... But the 
pravity of mankind being such, that they had rather 
injuriously prey upon the fruits of other men’s labours than 
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take pains to provide for themselves; the necessity of 
preserving men in the possession of what honest industry has 
already acquired, and also of preserving their liberty and 
strength, whereby they may acquire what they farther want, 
obliges men to enter into society with one another; that by 
mutual assistance and joint force, they may secure unto each 
other their properties, in the things that contribute to the 
comfort and happiness of this life... (Locke, 2003, p. 242) 
 
Here, it is important to note as De Roover and Balagangadhara (2008, p. 532) 
have done, that Locke’s conceptual scheme is virtually identical to the theology of 
‘Christian freedom’ advanced by Luther – i.e. where the individual’s ‘inner’ freedom 
of belief exists simultaneously with the necessity of an ‘outer’ government for civil 
order, without which sinful human beings would either ‘devour one another’ or, in 
Locke’s terms, ‘the pravity of mankind’ would tend to ‘injuriously prey upon the 
fruits of other men’s labours than take pains to provide for themselves.’ It is no 
surprise, therefore, that scholars such as Forster (2005), Stanton (2006), Dunn (1969) 
and others have insisted on the theological background of apparently universal liberal 
categories inherited from Locke, not least the liberal model of separating religion 
from politics that he and later liberal thinkers advanced as a secularized replica of the 
Protestant theology of Christian liberty and separation of the ‘two kingdoms,’ which 
is in turn predicated on a specifically nominalist view of religion as individual faith 
in eternal life and public reason as based on empirical facts extrinsic to faith. This 
division of the social world into two spheres persists in the contemporary principle of 
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toleration in liberal discourse: a public-political sphere of interpersonal transactions 
regarding ‘bare facts’ and a private sphere of religion or substantive conceptions of 
the good derived from – as defined by the High Court of Australia – ‘belief in a 
Supernatural Being, Principle or Thing.’ As long as the rule of law is respected for 
the sake of civil order, according to this prevailing view, the liberal state ought not to 
interfere in the religious and moral life of its subjects (see De Roover and 
Balagangadhara, 2008, p. 527). It is perhaps unsurprising that this view prevailed in 
the emergent Anglo-liberal society in the seventeenth century and its colonies like 
Australia in the eighteenth century, as Goldie argues, because the language of ‘civil 
religion’ and its synthesis of civility and individual piety stemmed from the 
Protestant Reformers’ theology of the church-state and ‘were among the most 
pervasive concepts in early modern Europe’ (as cited in Fitzgerald, 2008, p. 162). In 
sum, this schema holds that the state should remain indifferent to questions of 
religion defined as individual belief while on actions and practices, insofar as they 
affect civil order, religion is subordinate to the state.  
 
However, it is precisely on the question of ‘civil order’ that the 
interconnectedness latent in the separate spheres of public politics and private 
religion in Locke (and liberal discourse more generally) becomes most apparent: how 
was ‘civil order’ to be determined, according to Locke? While the contemporary 
liberal model of separation between politics/religion and its corresponding 
public/private demarcation is detectable in its early form in Locke’s influential 
political pamphlets, to project the associated modern division of secular/religious 
back to Locke would be anachronistic. As Martin (2010: 58-108) demonstrates 
through a close reading of Locke’s texts, despite the latter’s insistence on the 
158 
separation of civil government from matters of religion, he nonetheless insists that 
‘God’s moral law’ remains an immutable precondition for the conduct of a liberal 
society based on contract and consent (as cited in Martin, 2010, pp. 63, 76; also 
Forster, 2005, p. 53). The moral law, argues Locke, is discernible because of the 
universality of the ‘law of nature’: a principle instituted by God that sets the 
boundaries to individual liberty understood as the innate power of reason for freedom 
of conscience and religious belief, and which in turn shapes the character of 
government as embodying the consent of the majority (Hindess, 2007, p. 5).  
 
For Locke, writing in the Christian context of seventeenth-century England 
amongst other Christian European powers, to fall back on such a theological 
legitimation of political institutions, however minimal, was not beyond the pale 
(Forster, 2005, p. 22). The existence of God, then, far from being an ‘other-worldly’ 
concern removed from ‘worldly’ government for the sake of civil order, was in fact 
the ground of its moral legitimacy.  In fact, the basic preconditions for appropriate 
conduct, or for abiding by the law of nature according to Locke, includes the belief in 
at least all of the following: one must know that God exists, one must know that God 
has not appointed any one individual an authority over another in the state of nature, 
and one must realize that the belief in God’s existence (and his willingness to punish 
vice) is necessary for keeping contracts (Martin, 2010, p. 77). It is with reference to 
these reasons that atheists, Roman Catholics and some Muslims, according to Locke, 
should not be tolerated; the former, involving a rejection of ‘God’s moral law,’ is 
regarded by Locke (2002, p. 211) variously as a criminal and insane while the latter 
two, pledging ‘foreign’ allegiances to the pope or ‘blind obedience to the mufti of 
Constantinople’ represented seditious segments of the population that contradicted 
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the ‘law of nature’ and hence, failed to respect natural liberty and the natural 
character of government (see also Locke, 2003, pp. 240-241). In other words, 
although claiming to be instituted by a universal law of nature, civil order is in fact 
defined by the particular religious discourse of Anglo-liberal societies of that time – 
a Protestant theological minimalism (that accommodated the Church of England and 
dissenting groups) that, as Zagorin (2003) points out, presumes a consensus on the 
‘essentials’: e.g. ‘the role of Christ as savior and redeemer’ and ‘obvious moral truths 
on which no one disagrees’ (p. 113). 
 
Yet given the particularity and indeed novelty of Locke’s universal claims 
regarding the moral law and the law of nature, how are individuals to come to an 
acknowledgment of this ‘truth’ about their powers of reason and the character of 
government? The answer, in short, was education. Education is crucial according to 
Locke because it provides the character formation necessary for becoming a person 
and for being a responsible citizen (see Yolton, 1968, p. 3). For despite the insistence 
that humans are ‘subject to the rule of natural law which was ultimately God’s law 
made known to man [sic] through the voice of reason’ (Crantson, 1969, p. 11), Locke 
maintains that the majority of people take as certain and true the ‘errors’ passed 
down to them by local customs, religious traditions and other ‘untrustworthy’ 
sources, rather than employ their own ‘reason’ to discern for themselves truth from 
error (Martin, 2010, p. 72). As he argues in his highly influential 1693 treatise Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education: 
 
The great mistake I have observed in people’s breeding their 
children has been, that this has not been taken care enough of 
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its due season; that the mind has not been made obedient to 
discipline, and pliant to reason, when at first it was most 
tender, most easy to be bowed. (Locke, 1996, sec. 34) 
 
In order to ensure the habituation of ‘pliant’ young into reasonable and free 
individuals as they are ‘supposed to be’ under the law of nature, Locke points 
precisely to religious education and its theological content that, under his political 
schema, are now considered beyond the purview of the public-politics of the state. 
As the epistemological foundation of this regime of education, argues Locke (1996), 
‘there ought very early to be imprinted on his [sic] mind a true notion of God, as of 
the independent supreme Being, Author, and Maker of all things, from whom we 
receive all our good, who loves us, and gives us all things: and, consequent to this, 
instil into him a love and reverence of this Supreme Being’ while pedagogically, he 
prescribes ‘keeping children constantly morning and evening to acts of devotion to 
God, as to their Maker, Preserver, and Benefactor, in some plain and short form of 
prayer, suitable to their age and capacity’ (sec. 136). With regard to the content of 
education, Locke (1996)  prescribes ‘the Lord’s prayer, the creed, and ten 
commandments, [and] it is necessary he should learn perfectly by heart; but, I think, 
not by reading them himself in his primer, but by somebody’s repeating them to him, 
even before he can read’ (sec. 157). Such educational practices, Locke assumes, will 
be of much more use to them in not only in other-worldly religion, but also as a 
foundation for this-worldly knowledge and moral behaviour.  
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Here, the paradox that characterises Locke’s, and indeed the Anglo-liberal 
tradition’s demarcation of religion/politics and private/public becomes apparent; for 
if a citizen or public official (e.g. magistrate, civil servant or politician) were to be 
habituated according to Locke’s educational prescriptions, then the public ‘reason’ 
that s/he employs and deploys to discern what is true or false according to the law of 
nature will be, in no small part, derived from the religious education s/he and others 
have received. In turn, because citizens are the constituents of the liberal state and its 
apparatuses under popular sovereignty, the judicial-administrative definition of 
religion, as well as the demarcation of what forms should be tolerated or excluded, 
will tend to approximate and legitimate prevailing understandings. Thus, if it is the 
case that, for Locke and the liberal tradition more broadly, the ends of education are 
the welfare and prosperity of the nation, which is in turn measured by the personal 
happiness and social usefulness of its citizens (see Deighton, 1971, p. 20), then the 
division between the private ‘religious sphere’ and ‘religious education’ on the one 
hand and the public ‘political sphere’ on the other must be seen as inextricably 
connected; for insofar as such private institutions and discourses serve to inform, 
enable and delimit what is good, tolerable, appropriate and civilised in the public 
sphere, then the liberal discourse on the separation between the two spheres can be 
said to mask the ‘circulation of power’ between state and private institutions whose 
production of discourse goes unnoticed and undiagnosed, and, because it is 
considered inconsequential to politics, is free to circulate (Martin, 2010, p. 90). 
 
Locke’s import in establishing the ‘common sense’ liberal categories regarding 
religion and politics –predicated as they are on particular nominalist and Protestant 
theological assumptions – can be discerned in the discourses of this tradition that 
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defines religion as a private matter of belief. However, it is at this point that a 
paradox surfaces in the liberal separation of religion and education: for while 
insisting that religion belongs in the private sphere, being primarily concerned with 
‘other-worldly’ things and hence by nature separate from the public sphere, it 
obscures the functioning of religious institutions in habituating citizens that will 
occupy the latter sphere. This discursive slippage thus renders unintelligible the role 
of ‘private’ institutions like religious schools as social, material and temporal 
institutions concerned with the training and disciplining of religious subjects who 
believe, desire and enact certain things, subjects who will also come to occupy the 
positions of citizen, magistrate, government officials, etc. What Locke’s political 
categorisations in conjunction with his educational prescriptions actually effected 
was that so-called private institutions, which at their inception encompassed 
Protestant sects, schools and families, educate children in the discourses necessary 
for governing society for civil order. However, what constituted threats to civil order 
was determined explicitly by recourse to the ‘truths’ of seventeenth century 
Protestant theology and theism, which was produced and circulated by ‘private,’ 
‘religious’ institutions (Martin, 2010, pp. 88-89).  
 
More specifically, religion that was tolerated excludes certain traditions (such 
as Roman Catholicism or Islam) that were considered to be a danger to civil order; 
the basis for such a political decision was the definition of religion as primarily 
private belief and acceptable moral conduct, which was a feature of precisely the 
type of religion (i.e. a broad Protestantism) that was tolerated and taught to children. 
Turner (2011, p. 8) is thus accurate in the case of Locke when he states that ‘the 
Enlightenment philosophers were hostile to institutionalised Christianity, specifically 
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the Roman Catholic Church, rather than to religion per se.’ This is further evinced in 
the enshrinement of Locke’s prescriptions in England’s Toleration Act of 168916, 
which specifically excluded the Roman Catholic minority as a threat to English 
society, can be seen as an effect of this (re)productive circuit between the two 
spheres (see Cavanaugh, 2002, pp. 39-41). Such a circuit of power, according to 
Foucault (1980, pp. 158-160), tends to take the form of a pyramid whereby the apex 
(e.g. the state) and the lower elements of the hierarchy (e.g. religious institutions) 
stand in a relationship of mutual support and conditioning.  Religious education, 
which is defined and governed by state regulations to cultivate ‘acceptable’ private 
beliefs on the one hand and public citizen-subjects for the state on the other, can be 
seen as an institutional conduit for this purpose. 
 
The operant circuit of power between ‘private’ religious education and the 
‘public’ political sphere is perhaps best explicated through the work of Antonio 
Gramsci. By contrast to liberal discourse that draws a strict delimitation of the state 
as the sphere of public-politics and religion, religious education and other such 
institutions as belonging to the private sphere, Gramsci regarded the latter – which he 
terms ‘civil society’ – as an integral part of the state. In his view, civil society or the 
private sphere, far from being inimical to the state is, in fact, its most resilient 
constitutive element, even though the most immediately visible aspect of the state is 
public-political society, with which it is often (mistakenly) identified (Buttigieg, 
1995, pp. 4).  
                                                          
16 The Toleration Act of 1689 was an act of the English Parliament that granted freedom of worship to 
Nonconformist Protestants (e.g. Presbyterians, Baptists and Congregationalists). The act did not apply 
to Catholics and Unitarians and maintained the existing social and political restrictions (including 
exclusion from political office) for Nonconformists. For the politics leading up to the passing of this 
act, see Spurr (1989) 
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For Gramsci, therefore, the public political sphere and private civil society are 
in fact part of the one ‘integral State’: a sociopolitical order characterized by a 
hegemonic equilibrium constituted by a ‘combination of force and consent which are 
balanced in varying proportions, without force prevailing too greatly over consent’ 
(as cited in Fontana, 2002, p. 159). In this schema is a recognition that coercion and 
domination by force are not the only, nor necessarily the most effective, means of 
control and government in society; rather, the circuit of power between political 
society (i.e. what in liberal discourse is called ‘government,’ or ‘the state’) and civil 
society (i.e. the ‘private sector’ or ‘private sphere’ in liberal discourse) mutually 
reinforce each other to the advantage of certain strata, groups, and institutions 
(Buttigieg, 1995, pp. 6-7). This is encapsulated in Gramsci’s (1971) formulation of 
‘State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the 
armour of coercion’ (p. 532). As he elaborates, this view of the state incorporates 
both public and private initiatives that seek to harness a population for particular 
ends: 
 
[E]very State is ethical in as much as one of its most 
important functions is to raise the great mass of the 
population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or 
type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces 
for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling 
classes. The school as a positive educative function, and the 
courts as a repressive and negative educative function, are the 
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most important State activities in this sense: but, in reality, a 
multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities 
tend to the same end—initiatives and activities which form 
the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the 
ruling classes. (Gramsci, 1971, p. 526) 
 
Thus, from a Gramscian reading, civil society or the private sphere as that ‘vast 
network of contacts, associations, families, churches, and informal gatherings in 
which people move from day to day without direct involvement from the state’ is 
best described not as the sphere of freedom and consent as asserted by Locke, but of 
hegemony (Litowitz, 2000, p. 515) – i.e. the terrain of socio-political struggle 
whereby eventually a ‘particular social force assumes the representation of a totality 
that is radically incommensurable with it’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. x). In short, if 
civil society conceived as a site of private organizations is itself the locus of ethico-
political effects, its relation with the state as a public instance becomes blurred 
(Laclau, 2000, p. 50); The term ‘state’ is thus better understood as a synthesis and the 
interpenetration of the two spheres via regulation and hegemony (see Fontana, 2002, 
p. 159).  
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Figure 7: Circuit of power between the public sphere of state and private sphere of religious 
education, based on Gramsci’s formulation of ‘State = political society + civil society’ 
 
While the operations of particular contexts of liberal hegemony and its 
relationship to religious education will be explored in more detail in the following 
chapter, suffice to state at present that the liberal demarcation of public/private 
spheres tends to obscure the complex, political interrelation between the two spheres. 
By contrast to the strict distinction between private religion and religious education 
on the one hand and the public politics of the state on the other that is derived from 
the inheritance of nominalism, Protestantism and Lockean liberalism, the Gramscian 
notion of the integral state highlights the intricate, organic relationships between 
private civil society and public-political society that enable particular ‘private’ 
discourses (e.g. Anglo-liberal forms of religion such as Protestantism) not only to 
gain dominance within the state but also, and more importantly, to maintain it by 
structuring, excluding and/or subordinating other discourses (e.g. Catholicism and 
Islam) (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 182ff). 
 
Further, once such a discursive tradition is sedimented and codified into legal 
doctrines in the form of laws such as the British Toleration Act of 1689, it serves to 
State
Religious 
education
Hegemony Regulation 
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further naturalise and legitimate/exclude certain discourses, institutions and practices 
by recourse to its own definitions and logics. That is, discourse codified into law 
sustains particular hegemonic arrangements and meanings by excluding and closing 
off alternative understandings, as well as by positing ‘common sense’ meanings of 
discursive categories (e.g. religion, education, public, private, etc.) that are broadly 
accepted as legitimate (see Litowitz, 2000, p. 545-548). As will be argued in the 
following chapter on the evolution of the dominant discourse around religious 
education in Australia, the establishment and codification of ‘religion’ as defined 
within the Anglo-liberal tradition, not least in the legislation on school education, 
authorises and produces a set of educational institutions and practices that belie their 
particularistic beginnings in nominalist and Protestant theology. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I sketched three key moments in the Anglo-liberal tradition’s 
conception of religion as a particular set of beliefs in a supernatural Being, Thing or 
principle that give rise to a set of values and conducts, and religious education 
broadly defined as the transmission of such religion. It is defined as such in Anglo-
liberal discourse, I argued, in large part owing to an inheritance from the discourses 
of nominalism, Protestantism and English liberalism as exemplified in the work of 
John Locke. I also argued that the institutional arrangements prescribed by the liberal 
tradition in the formal ‘separation’ between the public sphere of politics on the one 
hand and the private sphere of religious belief on the other belies the interconnected 
relations between the two spheres. In particular, the liberal insistence on such a 
168 
separation tends to obscure how the theological discourses of nominalism and 
Protestant religion in England gave rise to hegemonic assumptions about religion 
through its ‘private’ influence on ‘public’ citizens and officials who, in turn, 
determine what forms of religion are acceptable or unacceptable for civil order. This 
is done, I argued, through so-called private religious education and its formation of 
subjects that eventually come to inhabit the realm of public politics and the state.  
 
Rather than accepting the liberal framework of a separation between religion 
and politics, which is itself predicated on a nominalist rendering of religion as belief 
apart from practical reason and a Protestant separation of ‘Two Kingdoms,’ I posited 
an alternative view based on Antonio Gramsci’s notion of the ‘integral state.’ In the 
latter schema, so-called ‘private’ institutions or what Gramsci calls ‘civil society’ – 
the vast network of contacts, associations, families, churches, and informal 
gatherings in which people move from day to day without direct involvement from 
the state – is actually the site of hegemony whereby dominant discourses  are 
disseminated at the level of popular belief, a feat that cannot be accomplished by 
force but only through messages, codes and the wide acceptance of a particular 
discourse and its way of representing reality (Litowitz, 2000, p. 524). Such popular 
beliefs – or common sense – then form the basis for the public sphere involving, 
amongst other things, the institution of the state, legislation, legal doctrine and 
politics. As such, the public sphere of politics encompassing these elements is better 
seen as forming a ‘circuit of power’ in conjunction with the private sphere of 
religion. In turn, religious education can be seen in this schema as a conduit for the 
circulation of dominant discourses insofar as its ‘acceptable’ forms are regulated by 
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the state on the one hand, while on the other it (re)produces constituent citizens of 
the state that adjudge ‘acceptability’ by reference to their religious education. 
 
In the following chapter, I shall proceed by offering a genealogy of how this 
Anglo-liberal discursive tradition as it was extended and developed in Australia after 
1788. Focusing on the colony of New South Wales in particular, I shall account for 
how religious education came to be institutionalised as consisting primarily of the 
transmission of belief with secondary values and conducts on the one hand and on 
the other, the regulated and standardised delivery of government-approved 
educational services for the training of desired citizens and workers on the other. 
Through various configurations of the hegemonic liberal arrangements in Australia 
over time, I shall argue that the presuppositions about religion and religious 
education inherited from nominalism and Protestantism outlined in this chapter 
remain not only evident, but are instrumental in providing the conditions of 
possibility for the articulation of religious educational institutions to the prevailing 
socio-political order. 
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Chapter 3 – The development of religious education in Australia  
 
It may be a happy accident that this effort of defining religion 
converges with the liberal demand in our time that it be kept 
quite separate from politics, law, and science – spaces in 
which varieties of power and reason articulate our 
distinctively modern life. The definition is at once a strategy 
(for secular liberals) of the confinement, and (for liberal 
Christians) of the defence of religion. (Asad, 1993, p. 28) 
  
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I sketched three key moments in the Anglo-liberal 
tradition’s conception of religion as a particular set of beliefs in a supernatural Being, 
Thing or principle and their associated values/ethics. Religious education conceived 
on such a basis, I argued, can in large part be understood as an inheritance from the 
discourses of nominalism’s separation of religion from worldly practical reason, 
which was developed in Protestantism’s emphasis on the primacy of ‘inner’ belief 
over ‘outer’ practices and objects, and which was in turn developed into English 
liberalism’s demarcation of religion in the private sphere and politics in the public 
sphere as exemplified in the work of John Locke. I also argued that the institutional 
arrangements prescribed by the liberal discursive tradition in the form of the latter 
separation fails to make apparent the interconnected relations between the two 
spheres. In particular, the liberal insistence on such a separation tends to obscure how 
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the predominant discourses of nominalism and Protestant religion in England sustain 
hegemonic assumptions about religion through its private influence on public 
citizens and officials who, in turn, determine what forms of religion are acceptable or 
unacceptable for civil order. In particular, this is done through so-called private 
religious education and its formation of subjects that inhabit the realm of public 
politics. 
 
In this chapter, I seek to trace the extension and development of the Anglo-
liberal discourse on religion and religious education to Australia. The focus here is 
on the changing configurations of liberal discourse and how such changes have 
affected the way religious education is conceived and articulated within broader 
socio-political configurations. I shall do this by identifying three moments that have 
given rise to its official conception and political articulation in the present: Firstly, I 
outline the political institution of the nominalist and Protestant-inflected assumptions 
about religion as belief in extra-empirical objects, which dominated liberal 
conceptions of religious education amongst government officials and the majority 
populace from the early-colonial period. Driven in no small part by populist anti-
Catholic sentiment, this dominant discourse would be codified into two key pieces of 
legislation in the nineteenth-century ‘mother colony’ of New South Wales: that is, 
the 1866 Public Schools Act (NSW) and the 1880 Public Instruction Act (NSW), 
which would come to frame debates over religious education in that state to the 
present (Turney, 1969, p. ix). The most persistent impact of these acts, I argue, is the 
political institution of Anglo-liberal forms of religion in education – that is, religion 
that is tolerated and indeed encouraged both defines and is defined by hegemonic 
definitions of what constitutes religious education, its proper function and 
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appropriate boundaries. Conversely, religious education that fails to abide by such a 
definition and demarcation is labelled ‘sectarian’ and excluded, as was the case with 
Roman Catholic schools up to the 1960s. 
 
Secondly, I explore how the liberal definition and demarcation of religious 
education enables the latter to be articulated toward nation-building under broadly 
‘social liberal’ arrangements that prevailed from the time of Federation in 1901 to the 
1980s. That is, religious education, while considered to belong in the private sphere 
of civil society, if exercised appropriately under hegemonic conditions, is actually 
productive of certain morals and values that accrue to the nation. Such values include 
certain moral and ethical norms normally categorised under the heading of 
‘citizenship.’ In this regard, I focus on how the discourses around the 1880 Public 
Instruction Act framed the place of religious education, and how these themes are 
picked up and developed in the highly influential 1973 Schools in Australia report – 
better known as the Karmel Report – which was implemented as policy by the 
Whitlam government in 1974 and re-opened the possibility of religious schools 
receiving funding as an articulated part of the nation-state’s educational apparatus. 
However, I argue, by abstracting the values of religious education from their loci 
within particular traditions and articulating religious schools onto the terrain of state 
regulation alongside non-religious schools, this policy simultaneously reinforced the 
nominalist and Protestant presuppositions about religion and religious education 
primarily concerning private convictions as borne by Anglo-liberal discourse. This, I 
argue, paved the way for competition between schools on the basis of the strict 
division between education as the objective of training citizens and workers 
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regardless of the particularities of school or tradition, and religion as abstract 
values/ethics that appeal to the preferences of individual students and families. 
 
Thirdly, on this basis, I seek to discern how these assumptions about the place 
and function of religion vis-a-vis education persist in the shift from social liberal 
toward so-called ‘neo-liberal’ imperatives in the 1980s, the difference being a 
regulatory (re)configuration away from goals articulated for the good of the nation-
state toward education for a competitive labour market that is allegedly globalising 
inexorably. School education incorporating both religious and non-religious schools 
are tasked with habituating students with the skills necessary to compete in such a 
globalising labour market, and the means held to ensure the transmission of such 
skills is the discipline of competitive market relations both between and within 
schools. However, contrary to popular representations of neo-liberalism, such market 
relations are by no means naturally ‘free,’ but rather require persistent facilitation 
and regulation by state managers, not least through the institution of standardised 
accountability measures that allow for comparisons to be made between students, 
schools and Australian schooling on aggregate. On the hegemonic terrain of neo-
liberal marketisation, the values of religious education, having been abstracted from 
their substantive traditions and practices as defined in Anglo-liberal discourse, then 
serve religious schools as a ‘value-added’ option in the competitive market for 
individual students and parents as clients and customers of educational services. 
 
Religious education in Australia: Foundational politics 
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The whole history of educational development in Australia 
from the earliest beginning shows the application of ideas and 
methods which we share with the mother country. (Francis 
Anderson in 1914, as cited in Turney, 1969) 
 
Reflecting the fledgling liberal discourse of late eighteenth-century England, 
early colonial governmental and religious authorities saw education as crucial in 
securing the moral and social ‘improvement’ of the whole population, including 
convict and indigenous populations. Such education was initially conducted by the 
Anglican Church (i.e. the Church of England) and aided by the state, the former 
being regarded as the Established Church in New South Wales (NSW) in the decades 
immediately after British settlement in 1788 (Wilkinson, Caldwell, Selleck, Harris 
and Dettman, 2006, p. 2). According to Gascoigne (2002), the impulses of Protestant 
Christianity – especially in its Evangelical forms most prominent in New South 
Wales under the influence of First Fleet Anglican chaplain Richard Johnson and his 
successor Samuel Marsden – and the ideals of the Anglo-liberal tradition often 
converged in their approach to problems in Australia such as education: ‘both in their 
different ways could subscribe to the basic tenet that the world could be improved 
and human beings made better as the result of conscious human planning and 
disciplined endeavour’ (pp. 6-7).  
 
This state-sponsored Anglican monopoly ended after the 1829 Catholic 
Emancipation Act (UK) for British colonies generally and more specifically in NSW, 
with the 1836 Church Act. This resulted in the recognition of four ‘Established 
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Churches’ and a corresponding four state-aided denominational school systems 
providing elementary education: Anglican, Catholic, Presbyterian and Methodist 
(Barcan, 1965, pp. 51-52). In 1848, National schools were added as a fifth system in 
New South Wales. These systems were organised under two boards: the Board of 
National Education for state-run National schools, and the Denominational Schools 
Board for the church-run schools (Barcan, 1965, p. 83). 
 
However, this arrangement proved to be neither efficient for the governmental 
purpose of extending school-based education to the population, the numbers of 
which had swelled since the cessation of convict transportation in 1840 and the 
waves of new migrants from Britain, nor with regard to the finances of the colonial 
administration with an apparent oversupply of schools that simultaneously increased 
government expenditure while failing to reach the majority of the population. Given 
this situation, the unification of the boards into one single authority became a popular 
demand insofar as it was perceived that ‘the placing of all the schools under one 
authority would... remove all the disorders inherent in the heterogeneous systems that 
had grown up.’ (Fogarty, 1959, p. 62) The direction of all the Australian colonies in 
the nineteenth century was thus driven toward the centralisation of control over 
schooling as the solution to the policy problems of educational extension and 
financial prudence, with legislation passed to this effect in South Australia in 1851, 
Queensland in 1860 and Victoria in 1862 (O’Farrell, 1985, p.151; Jones, 1974, p.17).  
Yet denominational opposition to such moves remained strong until the passing of 
the 1866 Public Schools Act in the case of New South Wales by a coalition of forces 
under Premier James Martin, Colonial Secretary Henry Parkes and educational 
administrator William Wilkins (Barcan, 1965, p. 127). The formation of this 
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legislative act effectively articulated the popular consent of nonconformist 
Protestants and the majority of the Anglican laity. In addition, at this point, Roman 
Catholic liberals in parliament like William A. Duncan and Michael Fitzpatrick were 
also content to work with other liberals to achieve the common objective of 
improving school education through the 1866 Act (Haines, 1979, p.63; also 
O’Farrell, 1985, p.146).  
 
 
The 1866 Public Schools Act, according to Morris (1969, p. 171), had two 
significant and lasting impacts on education in New South Wales to which pragmatic 
and ideological justifications can arguably be attached respectively: firstly, it brought 
all public education under the control of a single board, an apparently ‘independent’ 
Council of Education; and secondly, it expanded the reach of the public school 
system (previously known as National Schools) while simultaneously reducing the 
religious denominational schools to a subsidiary position. With regard to the first 
point, some of the main justifications of the Public Schools Act were pragmatic: to 
save money by amalgamating the Board of National Education and the 
Denominational Schools Board, provide more schools that were particularly needed 
in rural areas, rationalising economic and material resources and ending wasteful 
competition between denominational and national schools in the same area (Barcan, 
1965, p. 127). With regard to the second point, the Act was buoyed in no small part 
by the growing current of secular and liberal feeling which, having achieved the 
abolition of state aid to churches in 1862, now proceeded to curtail the role of the 
latter in elementary education (Barcan, 1965, pp. 127-128).  
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Thus the Public Schools Act sought, under the stated justification of promoting 
greater efficiency in teaching, the establishment of dominance of the administrators 
of the national system over the four denominational systems (Barcan, 1965, p. 127). 
However, it is important to note that ‘liberal’ and indeed ‘secular’ did not denote, at 
that point, a sphere of non-religion. Rather, as evinced by the most ardent supporters 
of the centralised system and the abolition of state aid to religious schools – for 
example the Presbyterian clergyman and politician John Dunmore Lang and James 
Greenwood, Baptist minister and founder of the Public Schools League (est. 1873) – 
the call for liberal and secular education was driven in large part by the non-Anglican 
Protestant convictions strongly opposed to ‘sectarian teaching,’ advocating instead a 
‘complete secularism’ in schools (Fogarty, 1959, pp. 122, 121). Insofar as 
‘liberalism’ denoted, as it did for Locke, a broadly ‘anti-dogmatic principle’ 
undergirded by a theological minimalism about morality and civility, and ‘secular’ 
included the various non-dogmatic types of religious instruction defined as the 
‘general principles of Christianity,’ ‘Bible without note or comment’ and ‘general 
religious teaching as distinguished from  dogmatic and polemical theology’ that 
specifically excluded creeds, catechisms and rituals then the 1866 Public Schools Act 
can be seen as  a significant shift in Australian education toward a liberal and secular 
system (Fogarty, 1959; also Morris, 1969, p. 175).  
 
Such trends toward liberal and secular schooling were resisted by the Roman 
Catholic Church and in their Provincial Council of 1869, the Australian bishops 
defined education by contrast to the emergent liberal secular principles. Education, 
according to the bishops, ‘must take place in, and be infused by, a religious 
atmosphere which would act upon the child’s whole character of mind and heart’ 
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(O’Farrell, 1985, p.160). By this standard, of course, all schemes of secular 
education – including those that admitted a separate religious component as favoured 
by many Protestants in the colony – were considered fundamentally defective. As 
then-Archbishop Polding remarked, the vice was their ‘sin of omission’ and their 
attempt to achieve a sort of general Christianity a ‘specious assumption’ (O’Farrell, 
1985, pp.160-161). These statements by the Roman Catholic bishops in 1869 were 
made, according to O’Farrell (1985, pp.161), in the face of prevalent social attitudes 
that were overwhelmingly anti-Catholic in two forms: Protestant and secularist. For 
while the denominational system had both Protestant and Roman Catholic schools 
within it, suspicion of Catholics – who were also predominantly Irish – proved 
sufficient to divide the majority Anglo-Protestant population. By 1869, a large 
section of Protestant opinion was opposed or indifferent to the continuation of the 
denominational system, but if its continuance benefited Roman Catholics, then this 
seemed to many Protestants to be a good reason to demand that it cease (O’Farrell, 
1985, p.161). As O’Farrell (1985), describes it, what had been, ‘in the early 1850s, a 
liberal tolerance of religion in education had hardened into a belief that church 
opposition to change was simply reactionary and selfish deriving from awareness 
that educational progress would be an enemy of religious obscurantism’ (p.162). 
 
In the period of 1865-79 under the Council of Education, therefore, the 
nonconformist Protestant denominations voluntarily abandoned two-thirds of their 
own schools in favour of the public schools. By the second half of the nineteenth 
century, Anglican opinion and educational practice had also exhibited a gradual shift 
from firm denominational opposition to align closely with a general Protestant 
position. This effectively split the opinion in the majority Anglican community 
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broadly between the clergy and laity, and sometimes among the clergy themselves 
(Fogarty, 1959, pp. 131-132). Parkes, whose objective was to establish a single 
school system run by the state, had himself counted on the division within the 
majority Anglican church in his political calculation: ‘From the first, the lay 
members of the English Church did not warmly sympathise with the heated feelings 
of their clergy; and in the course of time, the clergymen themselves, for the most 
part, withdrew from the conflict and accepted the new system’ (as cited in Fogarty, 
1959: 134). By 1879, a number of well-known Anglican denominational schools had 
been abandoned contrary to the Bishops’ express wishes and members of the 1879 
Anglican Synod were openly encouraged to agree with the withdrawal of state aid 
and the acceptance of the government system (Fogarty, 1959, p. 133). As a 
prominent lay member of the Anglican community asserted at the 1879 Synod, ‘if 
the clergy wished for the assistance of the laity they must face the inevitable doom of 
the denominational schools,’ which meant having to ‘separate from their old allies of 
the Roman Catholic Church in this respect, and endeavour to give religious 
instruction in harmony with the inevitable course of the law of the land’ (Gibbs as 
cited in Fogarty, 1959, p. 134). The most strident tendencies were evident in the 
Sydney Anglican archdiocese, which was evangelical and substantially staffed with 
Ulster clergymen (i.e. Protestant Irish loyal to the British Crown) and active 
members of the ultra-Protestant Orange Order, and who were inclined to see 
denominational education as solely serving the interests of Rome and thus any 
Anglican support that might strengthen the Roman Catholic cause as misguided 
(O’Farrell, 1985, p.163). Conversely, the Roman Catholic Archbishop Polding 
lambasted Parkes’s moves to centralise schooling under the state as ‘an infidel 
system of education’ that dealt the ‘heaviest blow that could have been struck at the 
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welfare and true liberty of our people... by destroying gradually denominational 
education’ (as cited in O’Farrell, 1985, p.151). 
 
Thus, while Protestant grievance in the earlier stages of the debate over the 
denominational system was directed predominantly by nonconformists against both 
Anglican and Roman Catholic churches, by the 1870s when the former had closed a 
great number of their schools, the antagonism was concentrated on the latter who 
retained its opposition to amalgamating its schools with the proposed state-run 
system (Forgarty, 1959, p. 142). The popular movement for the abolishment of state 
aid to denominational schools can hence be understood, in large part, by the 
perceived unacceptability for Protestants to ‘compromise’ on that demand if it meant 
a conferral of a special advantage on the Catholic Church; for there existed a fear 
amongst the majority Protestant population of what Catholics might do with this 
advantage (Forgarty, 1959, p. 142-143). Politician and Presbyterian clergyman John 
Dunmore Lang, for example, argued that the Catholic defence of its own educational 
institutions was a ‘hostile movement on the part of the Romish priests and bishops,’ 
and which was nothing but an attempted grab ‘for power, for pelf, and for the means 
of proselytising unwary Protestants to Romanism’ (as cited in Fogarty, 1959, p. 143). 
Likewise in 1872, the Protestant Political Association was established with the 
expressed intention to be a bulwark against a perceived advance of ‘that political 
conspiracy against the rights and liberties of man, commonly called the Church of 
Rome’ (as cited in Fogarty, 1959, p. 143). Indeed the popular sentiment for a secular, 
state-run education at the time was buoyed by so strident a populist Protestant 
discourse buttressed by a suspicion of Roman Catholics that at meetings in support of 
secular and state-run education: 
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Some went to extremes in expressing their hatred for Rome. The 
Reverend Zachary Barry, for example, would assert that ‘he would 
not barter a [single] Protestant child for 50,000 Catholic children’; 
others would rouse their audiences to vociferous replies by calling 
upon them to answer questions like the following: did they want 
‘the Queen of England [to] rule this country or the Pope of Rome.’ 
(Fogarty, 1959, p. 143) 
 
Interestingly, in this period, the discourses deployed in defence of Anglican 
denominational schools also began to draw on anti-Catholic populism, with some 
Anglican heads warning of a looming Catholic separatism that would be a danger to 
the British system of liberal society established in Australia. Anglican Bishop Barker 
in Sydney, for example, warned in 1876 that Protestants who were disposed to turn 
against the denominational schools that they would call into existence a dual system 
of education of ‘the very worst kind’ by handing over education of the children of 
Roman Catholics to ‘Jesuits, Marists, Redemptorists, Premonstrants, and others’ over 
whose teaching they would have no control, thus creating a system of ‘closed 
schools’ which would grow and an army of ‘aliens, enemies of the English crown, of 
English laws, and of that constitution which declares that no foreign prince, or 
prelate, or Pope [should] have dominion in England’ (as cited in Fogarty, 1959, p. 
144). 
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The mobilisation of such anti-Catholic discourse, shared in general by 
Protestant groups at the time, was undergirded by nominalist, Protestant and liberal 
ways of understanding religion (cf. Fogarty, 1959, p. 143). More specifically, this 
antagonism was fuelled by two sources: firstly, suspicion of the predominantly Irish 
Catholics as disloyal subjects of the British Crown and harbouring what the 
Protestant Political Association in 1872 called a ‘political conspiracy against the 
rights and liberties of man, commonly called the Church of Rome’ (as cited in 
O’Farrell, 1985, pp.163-164); and secondly, particularly Protestant ways of 
understanding religion that led to an aversion to Roman Catholic practices of 
devotion and doctrines, and above all its religious leaders – what Frances (2011) 
describes as the Anglo-Protestant disregard for Irish Catholicism as ‘an inferior form 
of Christianity, characterized by superstition and dominated by ignorant and 
misguided priests’ (p. 444). By effectively articulating the shared suspicion of 
Catholicism, the emergent discourse on liberal and state-run secular education also 
managed to divide the majority of the Anglican laity from their leaders’ support of 
denominational schools, thus creating a formidable ‘historical bloc’ for a state-
controlled system of education with the sole object of ‘preventing the establishment 
of Roman Catholic schools throughout the colony’ (Perry as cited in Fogarty, 1959, 
p. 145). For the Protestant majority and liberals, to support the denominational 
system of education came to be taken as tantamount to supporting the perpetuation of 
Catholic schools. While this historic bloc also included some liberals who had no 
desire to destroy religion or weaken Catholicism, it was reasoned that the interests of 
Australian education as a whole were best served by using the authority of the state 
in spite of the Roman Catholic position (O’Farrell, 1985, p.164). 
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The shift towards the political institution of a state-run liberal and secular 
education can thus be seen as driven, in large part, by a hegemonic Protestant-liberal 
populism. A brief consideration of the discursive structure of populism, or what 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985, pp. 130-131) have described as a ‘two nation’ approach to 
national politics, is instructive at this point. According to Laclau (2005, p. 93ff), two 
of the sine qua non dimensions of populism are, firstly, a bond of equivalence 
constructed between disparate individuals and groups within a social formation 
beyond a vague feeling of solidarity toward a generalised demand, and secondly, the 
need for an internal frontier that unifies those partial and particular demands against 
a common ‘enemy’; for it is only through the recognition of the same enemy in a 
plurality of mutually exclusive positions that a historical bloc – whether constituted 
as ‘the nation,’ ‘the people’ or simply ‘we’ – acquires a sense of its own identity, 
hence the notion of ‘two nations.’ In the case of education in New South Wales, the 
passage from the 1868 Public Schools Act through the populist Protestant ferment to 
the 1880 Public Instruction Act can be seen as an outcome of the political institution 
of liberal-Protestant demands for a secular education run by the state and a desired 
elimination of Catholic education as the enemy within. As Fogarty describes the 
situation in Australia circa-1879 in language reminiscent of Gramsci, Laclau and 
Mouffe, Protestant populism fused with ardent educational secularism and formed a 
historical bloc for state-run education on the basis of shared demands for ‘the nation’ 
against its ‘unjust and oppressive,’ ‘hateful and anti-national’ rivals: 
 
In this way great numbers of Protestants were brought over into the 
camp of the secularists. The result was a formidable bloc. To the 
arguments of one group were added the grievances the other and 
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the joint presentation of their case took on an added degree of 
consistency and conviction: education had been on a 
denominational basis, but had proved unsatisfactory; now it was 
unjust and oppressive, hateful and anti-national as well. Having 
laid the foundations of a new system, the state could no longer be 
expected to tolerate a rival one. (Fogarty, 1959, p. 148) 
 
Therefore, it was upon the popular consent of the Protestant majority that 
Parkes’s push for ‘one state school system’ under a single ‘unit of administration’ 
enshrined in the 1880 Public Instruction Act was dependent (as cited in Fogarty, 
1959, p. 158; cf. Barcan, 1965, p. 150). In practice there emerged a great deal of 
common ground between the liberal push for state schools and the Protestant 
churches insofar as state schools permitted children to receive both a ‘general,’ non-
dogmatic Christian education as part of the secular curriculum – which included the 
teaching of Christian morals through scripture, the use of the Lord’s Prayer and the 
celebration of Christian festivals (Potts, 1999) – and specific religious instruction 
during allocated school hours from ministers of their own denominations. Apart from 
the obvious Protestant influence, the inheritance of nominalist presuppositions is also 
evident insofar as religious education was seen as divisible between a general 
‘secular’ education and a specific religious instruction, with the latter implying no 
intrinsic practices that may constitute the former. It was the case, as Gascoigne 
(2002) points out, that ‘[i]n a culture which emphasised the extent to which 
Christianity could be combined with the major intellectual legacies of the [British] 
Enlightenment – an emphasis on individual rights, a belief in reason, and the 
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possibility of progress – schools and churches were seen as having a common 
civilising mission’ (p. 114). In turn, those who opposed the modus operandi of this 
liberal-Protestant historical bloc under the aegis of ‘the nation,’ in particular the 
Catholic population were regarded as its retrograde enemies. As Parkes characterises 
the latter, the ‘whole power of these people is used against the enlightened progress 
of the age’ (as cited in Morris, 1969, p. 176).  
 
For Catholics, by contrast, such an arrangement was unacceptable precisely 
because of liberalism’s covert nominalist and Protestant presuppositions. Indeed, the 
foundational assumption of this liberal framing of ‘general religious education’ (i.e. 
broad Christian values and morals) as suitable for secular instruction while ‘special 
religious education’ (i.e. dogmatic theology) as merely adventitious and accessory – 
an assumption made by the populist Protestant push for a state-run system, as well as 
by Parkes and his main education advisor Wilkins in their design of a liberal state 
schooling system (cf. Fogarty, 1959, p. 186) – was rejected by the Catholic Church. 
For the latter, any education which overlooked doctrine was defective insofar as 
Christian dogmas were not merely nominally linked to character-development and 
educational practice as implied by the popular movement for state-run education 
(Fogarty, 1959, p. 186). As Roman Catholic Archbishop of Sydney John Polding 
explained in 1879, the ideal of education in Catholic discourse was a unity of religion 
and practices; this meant not only learning the content of religious doctrines, but also 
the ‘daily and hourly moulding of disposition which should follow and become the 
practical application [of it]’ (as cited in Fogarty, 1959, p. 187). Thus for the Catholic 
Church, to consign the entirety of religious instruction or doctrinal observance to one 
period of the day or one day out of seven was objectionable; on the contrary, 
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Christian education was regarded as a ‘thing of life’ with the mutual influence of the 
parts and every kind of instruction imparted to students should be interpenetrated by 
Catholic doctrine, by Catholic feeling and practice (Fogarty, 1959, p. 187). In short, 
by contrast to the nominalist presupposition of religion as predominantly belief with 
only a nominal connection to practices, and the formal Protestant and liberal 
separation between religion in private life contra a secular public life (albeit 
informed by a generalised Christian morality and values), Catholics insisted on the 
totality of education and life as religious.  
 
It was on the basis of religion defined as such that in 1879, the Catholic 
Archbishop of Sydney Roger Vaughan and his three subordinate bishops issued a 
Joint Pastoral letter attacking the then-existent system of state education in New 
South Wales as ‘seed-plots of future immorality, infidelity and lawlessness, being 
calculated to debase the standard of human excellence, and corrupt the political, 
social, and individual life of future citizens’ (as cited in Franklin, 2006, p. 88). 
According to Haines (1979), Vaughan’s move was deliberately intended to harness 
the Irish laity’s ‘feeling of social inferiority to the development of Catholicism’ by 
invoking themes of separate a Irish history, identity and struggle by positing Catholic 
education as ‘the only tenable intellectual position and that it was noble to fight and 
suffer for it’ (p.153). The immediate political effects of the Pastoral Letter, whatever 
its intentions, were the immediate withdrawal of large numbers of Catholic children 
from the public schools to Catholic schools, and the exacerbation of popular anti-
Catholic sentiment that would see the passage of the 1880 Public Instruction Act. 
 
187 
The passing of the 1880 Public Instruction Act, which arguably remains the 
normative legal basis for the avowedly ‘free, compulsory and secular’ public 
education system in New South Wales (Walker, 1970, p. 22), can thus be seen both 
as a retaliation to the Joint Pastoral and an opportunity seized by the architects of the 
state-run system of education, buoyed in no small part by soaring populist anti-
Catholicism. Parliamentarians, for example, regarded the Joint Pastoral as an 
‘audacious [and] seditious attack... on the Government’ (cited in Fogarty, 1959, p. 
252), while the Sydney Morning Herald newspaper called upon the citizens of New 
South Wales to avenge the insults hurled at the nation’s schools (Fogarty, 1959, p. 
250). Parkes thus framed the Bill for the 1880 Act as an outcome of his opposition to 
‘the disposition to establish an ecclesiastical tyranny in the country, dangerous to the 
liberty of the subject [and] dangerous to the growth of the free national spirit’ (as 
cited in Gascoigne, 2002, p. 114). 
 
Supported by the Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist and Congregational 
Churches as well as a large segment of the Anglican Church and a notable Anglo-
Jewish minority17, all of whom were satisfied with the clause for separate religious 
                                                          
17In the period under consideration, the cultural characteristics of this minority group could be 
characterised as predominantly English. Prominent historian of Australian Jewish settlement Susan 
Rutland (2001) describes the communal life of the ‘Anglo-Jewry’ in this period as reflecting an 
articulation of ‘both Jewish tradition and English culture’ and that such ‘anglicising of Judaism was to 
be of great importance in the development of the early Australian Jewish community, which was 
reliant on the British chief rabbinate until the 1930s’ (p. 5). This Anglo-Jewish identification was 
evident in the Judaic religious practices of this milieu, which were modelled on the Anglican Church 
(see New South Wales Jewish Board of Deputies, 2009). This cultural hybridity partially explains 
why the position of Jewish education taken by this minority group was articulated with the Anglo-
Protestant historical bloc for ‘secular education’ against (Catholic-dominated) ‘religious education’ 
(see Solomon, 1970, p.8). Despite the existence of separate Jewish schools in Australia in the 
nineteenth century, the Jewish minority’s support for the ‘secular education’ acts of 1872 in Victoria 
and 1880 in New South Wales were based on their identification with the broader political demand by 
Protestant nonconformists – that is, for a particular and contingent form of religious equality (see 
Solomon, 1970, pp. 9-10; see also Solomon, 1968). However, as with any hegemonic bloc, the 
articulation of Jewish education with secular schools was not permanent but historically contingent. 
Indeed, as economic and political circumstances changed in the twentieth century – specifically the 
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instruction in state-run schools by visiting clergymen and the ability of regular 
teachers in these schools to deliver ‘non-denominational scripture lessons’ and a 
‘general religious education,’ the Bill passed by forty-two votes to six. By this time 
no Roman Catholic politician publicly supported the Bill: all six members of the 
NSW Parliament who voted against the Bill were Catholics while four other Catholic 
members did not record their votes18 (Haines, 1979, p.178). The lasting political 
outcome of the 1880 Act is concisely described by Sherington and Campbell (2004): 
 
The legacy which the establishment of colonial public schools left 
was thus closely associated with the nineteenth century colonial 
liberal middle class Protestant agenda. Bureaucratically and 
centrally managed in the apparent interests of efficiency and good 
order, Australian public schools offered a secular education which 
was essentially a form of common Protestantism. Left out of this 
settlement, the Roman Catholic Church and its communities had to 
build schools based on local parishes and religious orders pledged 
to uphold the faith against the threat of the secular state. (p.62) 
 
Henceforth, education in New South Wales (and in Australia more generally; 
see Jones, 1974, p.17; Thompson, 1994, pp.18-19) was both compulsory and divided, 
consisting of a ‘secular’ education run by the state and a Catholic education system 
                                                                                                                                                                    
migration of Jewish people in response to anti-Semitic policies in Europe and, most significantly, in 
the mid-twentieth century in response to Nazism in Europe and the Shoah (see Rutland, 2005, p.95) – 
so did the position of many in the Jewish community on Jewish schools. 
18 The six members who were opposed to the third reading of the Bill were: William Browne, Walter 
Coonan, George Day, Andrew Lynch, John McElhone and Daniel O’Connor. The four abstentions 
were from John Dillon, Michael Fitzpatrick, John Hurley and Joseph Leary. See Haines (1979, p.178) 
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run predominantly by religious orders (Fogarty, 1959, pp. 208-289), notwithstanding 
some elite Anglican Grammar schools serving a small segment of the population. It 
is also from this time onward that the term ‘private school’ no longer referred 
specifically to the small, private-venture school run as a profit-making establishment 
by a teacher-owner; the term now frequently extended to include the numerous 
Catholic and some Anglican schools, almost all of which were maintained by (or 
associated with) a church (Barcan, 1965, p. 172). 
 
At this point, it is again useful to recall the Gramscian notion of the integral 
state – that is, State = political society (i.e. public sphere) + civil society (i.e. private 
sphere) – to explain the political institution of the 1880 Act that continues to frame 
the debates over religion and religious education in schools. As described in the 
previous chapter, the notion of the integral state rejects the Lockean liberal 
bifurcation between public/private, preferring to foreground the ‘circuit of power’ 
that operates between these formally divided spheres. In this frame, the passage of 
the 1880 Public Instruction Act was far from being what had been popularly 
described by the liberal discourse at the time as educational progress in the form of a 
‘gradual emancipation of primary education from ecclesiastical surveillance [that 
was] bound to be achieved’ due to ‘the operation of an inevitable law,’ as proclaimed 
by civil servant William Wilkins in 1879 (cited in Barcan, 1965, p. 166). Rather, it 
can instead be understood as the institution of hegemonic nominalist, Protestant and 
liberal assumptions about religious education against the Catholic view (see Figure 
8). 
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Figure 8: Liberal and Protestant assumptions about how ‘religious education’ is to be conducted 
become institutionalized in the form of ‘Public education’ for the good of the nation, which includes a 
‘General Religious Education’ element. This is counter-posed to the Roman Catholic forms of 
religious education, which are taken to be opposed to the good of the nation 
 
For the 1880 Public Instruction Act, insofar as it defined ‘secular instruction’ 
to include ‘religious teaching as distinct from dogmatical or polemical theology’ 
(sec. 7), can be understood to presume a common understanding of what constitutes 
‘general’ religious teaching and morality that is good for the nation; a commonality 
afforded only by a broadly Protestant consensus sustained by ‘privatised’ religion. In 
addition, the division of the school day between such secular instruction and 
‘religious education,’ in which ‘a portion of each day not more than one hour [to be] 
set apart when the children of any one religious persuasion may be instructed by the 
clergyman or other religious teacher of such persuasion’ (sec. 17), can be seen as the 
legal and institutional development of the Lockean liberal distinction between public 
and private spheres, which as I argued in the previous chapter can itself an 
inheritance drawn from the nominalist cleavage of religion from practical reason and 
the Protestant distinction between the ‘Two Kingdoms.’ As Campbell and Sherington 
(2007, p. 35), Ely (1978, pp. 16-19, 51-52) and Connell and Irving (1980, pp. 126-
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127) have variously concurred in their readings of Australian history, the politics and 
administration of education was part of a cultural consensus that emerged among the 
predominantly Protestant middle-class in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. For 
these Protestants, with their more individual-oriented theological tendencies and 
liberal social outlooks, state-administered secular education was not perceived as a 
move away from religious education, but an institutionalisation of religious 
education that allowed both its specific teachings to be carried on in the realm of the 
‘private’ and the public inculcation of a general religious education – mostly 
concerning morals and civility – that are necessary for the prosperity of the nation 
that guarantees such an arrangement. 
 
Religious education in Australia for the national good 
 
The new nation-states tend to look at religion and ethnicity 
the way the 19th-century colonial powers looked at distant 
cultures which came under their domination — at best as 
‘things’ to be studied, ‘engineered,’ ghettoed, museumized or 
preserved in reservations; at worst as inferior cultures 
opposed to the principles of modern living and inconsistent 
with the game of modern politics, science and development, 
and therefore deservedly facing extinction. (Nandy, 1990, p. 
140) 
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The Australian passage from a series of colonies to a federated nation-state, 
akin to the passage of its European forebears, required the ‘reformation of 
subjectivities and the reorganization of social fields in which subjects act and are 
acted upon’ toward the cultivation of ‘the desire for progress’ both for the good of 
individuals and by extension, the good of the nation (Asad, 1992, pp. 337, 339; 
Hunter, 1994). On this pedagogical mission, as I have mentioned above following 
Gascoigne (2002, pp. 1-14ff), Protestant Christianity in Australia coalesced with the 
broader Enlightenment discourse of the Anglo-liberal tradition in their mutual 
commitment to the ‘improvement’ of the population. Yet as Gascoigne (2002) also 
rightly points out, the apparently universal ends to which such improvement was 
directed ‘inevitably reflected what British white society considered as desirable 
goals; these were defined by concepts such as industry, sobriety and the advancement 
of prosperity’ (p. 21). Built upon this hegemonic discourse, the emergence of 
Australia as a modern nation-state can be understood to have encompassed the 
allegiance of disparate individuals and groups based on the assumption that the state 
provided the necessary public goods (e.g. an education directed toward ‘industry, 
sobriety and the advancement of prosperity’), which would in turn enable the 
majority of people – i.e. those considered to be part of the ‘nation’ – to be free to 
achieve their own private goods (Gascoigne, 2002; cf. Bielskis, 2008, p. 50). As 
Williams and Young (1994) surmise, the architecture of such liberal nation-states is 
predicated on a strictly Lockean distinction between the public/private spheres 
whereby: 
 
[T]he State should be a neutral framework within which 
competing conceptions of the good can be equally pursued. 
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Linked to such notions of a neutral state, indeed required by 
them, is the notion of ‘civil society’ characterized as a realm 
of freedom in which individuals engage in formally 
uncoerced transactions. Finally, this complex of concepts 
requires a certain notion of the self, a free choosing 
individual who is the best, indeed the only judge, of his 
interests.  ... [It] is this free individual who is at the core of 
liberal belief. (p. 93) 
 
In order to sustain this normative vision of individual freedom then, liberalism 
in practice requires a contingent settlement between two poles:  politically, it implies 
that collective decision-making should involve a constitutional state with limited but 
substantive powers of economic and social intervention, and which seeks ‘limit the 
anarchy of the self-interest’ through the enforcement of contractual agreements 
(MacIntyre as cited in Bielskis, 2005, p. 119); and economically, it endorses the 
expansion of the capitalist market economy – that is, the institutional expression of 
individuals’ free choices through monetized exchange, which may be extended into 
as many realms of social practice as possible (Jessop, 2002, pp. 47-48). In a social 
order conceived upon individuals who seek their own preferences, then, policy 
debate and political disagreement tend to oscillate between two recognizable and 
predictable positions:  
 
[T]he contending parties agree... there are only two 
alternative modes of social life open to us, one in which the 
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free and arbitrary choices of individuals are sovereign and 
one in which [state] bureaucracy is sovereign, precisely so 
that it may limit the free and arbitrary choices of individuals. 
[...] the society in which we live is one in which bureaucracy 
and individualism are partners as well as antagonists. 
(MacIntyre, 1985, p. 35) 
 
In this way, liberal discourse has always framed society and politics in what 
Grassl (2011, p. 2) calls a ‘dichotomous social ontology’: of self versus others and 
individual versus the state. Society, in such a reckoning, is understood as a 
contingent aggregate of individuals, and government as a coercive institution 
necessitated by the anti-social propensities of the human soul (Grassl, 2011). Being 
predicated on such a dichotomous social ontology, regimes built on the basis of the 
liberal discursive tradition are marked by an irreducible co-presence of a capitalist 
market economy for the expression of private preferences through exchange, and 
some form of state regulation in order to institute, facilitate, regulate and delimit the 
operation of the market – a co-presence that corresponds to the distinction of private 
and public spheres respectively (Bielskis, 2005, p. 120; Chakrabarty, 2000, pp. 4, 41-
42; also Connolly, 1989). As Lindblom (1977) portrays it, ‘the greatest distinction 
between one government and another is the degree to which market replaces 
government or government replaces market’ (p. ix; also Underhill, 2003). 
 
This general characterisation also holds in the particular case of the liberal 
socio-political order in Australia (Jones, 2002, pp. 58-59; also 1994), which from the 
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period beginning at the federation of colonies and territories in 1901 to the 1980s can 
broadly be characterised as weighted toward the collaboration of particular 
instruments of bureaucratic statecraft that directed and delimited the market economy 
under the sign of the nation-state and the national economy (Brown, Halsey, Lauder 
and Wells, 1997; also Wells, 1989). Such a governmental configuration can be 
understood as the contingent historical balance of multiple political forces and wills 
intersecting to form a temporary regime that abetted orderly social arrangements, 
secured economic growth and the social reproduction of free liberal subjects known 
as ‘citizens’ notwithstanding the historical exclusions of specific groups such as 
indigenous peoples, women, immigrants and people differently able to the status of 
full citizenship in Australia (see McGrath, 1993; also Meekosha and Dowse, 1997). 
 
In Australia, this liberal socio-political arrangement can be broadly 
characterised by social liberal configurations that upheld a more interventionist role 
for the state in both facilitating and correcting the operation of market forces for 
economic growth and distribution, as well as in shaping the identities held by its 
citizens for service to the nation-state (Sawer, 1993, 2000; also Beitz, 1999).  This 
social liberal regime – variously known as the ‘new liberalism’ or the ‘welfare state,’ 
which reached its apogee in the post-war period (Jones, 2003) – was broadly 
buttressed by a steady economic growth via macroeconomic and welfare state 
policies, social contracts articulated between capital, labour and the state, and 
government intervention to promote investment, stability and consumption 
(Broomhill, 2001, p. 122). At the sub-national level, the state and territory 
governments also abetted economic growth by facilitating political stability and 
social reproduction through a redistributive tax system, the provision of public 
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economic and social infrastructure services such as education (Broomhill, 2001, p. 
123; Low, 1995, p. 211; also Kratke and Schmoll, 1991). Brown et al (1997) have 
labelled this arrangement in liberal Western nations ‘economic nationalism,’ which 
was undergirded by the ideals of prosperity, security and opportunity for their 
respective citizens: ‘What tied these three elements of economic nationalism together 
was the view that the nation state not only had the power to deliver prosperity, 
security, and opportunity, but that it had a responsibility to do so’ (p. 2). In short, 
with reference to the governmental problematic stated above, social policies in this 
version of a liberal regime can be broadly characterised by the prevalence of state 
regulation in the market economy through bureaucracies geared toward the economic 
prosperity of the nation (see Figure 9).  
 
 
Figure 9: A social liberal regime as tending toward state regulation of the market economy 
 
Education in such a regime can also be broadly characterised by its articulation 
to the project of a ‘national good,’ where it was ‘the right and duty of the state to 
assume responsibility for education.’ (Apelt and Lingard, 1993, p. 62) For religious 
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schools, with the exception of Catholic schools (until the 1960s)19, having been 
secularised and centralised under the respective state Education Acts in the late-
nineteenth century for the ‘good’ and ‘progress’ of the nation, reflected the mix of 
liberal governmental aims and assumptions about education in relation to the social 
liberal configuration. Of these, two are most prominent: firstly, that economic 
efficiency in advanced industrial societies depended on getting the most talented 
people into the most important and technically demanding jobs, regardless of their 
social circumstances and therefore correlatively, that educational opportunities 
needed to be extended, given that the vast majority of jobs were predicted to become 
increasingly skilled, requiring extensive periods of formal education (Brown et al, 
1997, p. 4).  
 
According to Ely (1978), effective arguments for the state-directed schooling 
arrangement in this period from the 1880 Public Instruction Act (NSW) onward were 
discursively framed on a notion of ‘meritocracy’ in academic schools and technical 
education designed for a ‘skilled workforce,’ which were predicated on extending 
opportunities from the elite to those children who were ‘ambitious and able on the 
outer tracks of the social relay race’ (p. 75) – that is, the working classes. 
Conversely, the consequences of educational inferiority were framed as having dire 
economic and political implications for the nation as a whole. Schools, therefore, 
                                                          
19 In the early-1960s, the financial status of Catholic schools had reached a crisis point. By this time, 
as Potts (1992) explains of the political situation, many Catholic communities could no longer fund 
increasingly costly schooling: ‘The nature of schooling had changed, and a single teacher in front of a 
class of 60 or more students simply could not cope with newer approaches to teaching and learning. 
Catholics waged increasingly desperate political campaigns, such as the closing in 1962 of the 
Catholic schools in the city of Goulburn, not far from the national capital of Canberra. Such a measure 
placed unbearable strains on the state school system. After more than 20 years in opposition and 
following bitter debates, the Federal Labor Party decided that it would gain office only by giving up 
its opposition to state aid for church schools, thereby securing a proportion of the Catholic vote. 
[…]The Labor Party was elected nationally in December 1972. Part of the reason for its success was 
its new policy on school funding.’ 
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were understood to be intimately attached to social liberal arrangements and, as 
Holbrook and Bessant (1987) have highlighted, the education system as a whole was 
harnessed as a national macroeconomic instrument, for example to facilitate (or 
delay) the entry of young workers into the labour market, in particular during periods 
of economic downturn and high unemployment or, alternatively, for the planned 
expansion of technological knowhow of the national labour force. The notion of the 
nation-state as the ultimate reference point for education thus gained ground, largely 
through the argument that the needs of national development were identical with the 
interests of the population as a whole (cf. Price, 1984/5, p. 46).  
 
Secondly, education was seen as contributing to the operation of Australian 
liberal democracy through the training of its constituent citizens. From its formal 
institutionalisation in the late nineteenth century in Australia, the liberal system of 
mass education was targeted at what Goodson (1990) has described as a ‘grand 
project of modern nation-building’ (pp. 219, 227-228). Apart from the training of 
skilled labour for the national economy, this also involved what Elias (1994) has 
termed a ‘civilising process’ whereby standards regulating bodily functions (e.g. 
hygiene), social etiquette (e.g. appropriate conduct between children and adults, men 
and women, social superiors and subordinates, etc) and attitudes to violence (e.g. the 
state’s legitimate monopoly on violence) are inculcated into subjects as expectations 
of social conduct (also Boyd, Pudsey & Wadham, 2007, p. 111). This was indeed one 
of the perceived urgencies upon which the late-nineteenth century architects of the 
various ‘free, compulsory and secular’ education acts in Australia legitimated their 
policies was the expressed confidence that mass schooling would produce ‘good 
citizens,’ i.e. ‘children who would respect authority, follow the ‘democratic’ 
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processes, and generally act in the manner in which they were instructed in the 
schools’ (Bessant, 1984, p. 10).  
 
The conditions of possibility for an education geared toward industry and 
national citizenship were provided by the architecture of educational systems in 
Australia such as the 1880 Public Instruction Act in NSW, which as mentioned 
above, was informed strongly by a consensus emphasising a nominalist model of 
religious life informed by Protestant and liberal discourses. This meant that religious 
education in its ‘general’ form sought to cultivate generalised Christian morals while 
its ‘specific’ forms bore no intrinsic connection with particular practices of 
education; hence, religious education as a whole was made more pliable to the social 
outlook of the emergent liberal nation-state. For the historical bloc of Protestants and 
liberals who inaugurated it, state-administered ‘secular’ education was not perceived 
as a move away from Christian instruction, but rather allowed the ‘inner’ freedom for 
an individual relationship with God and the inculcation of ‘outer’ practices, which 
included accepted habits of civility and industry for the overriding purpose of 
making the nation, in action and in law, ‘the symbol of common citizenship.’ 
(Gregory, 1973, p. 118; also Austin, 1961) 
 
In sum, then, education in the social liberal regime can be seen as predicated on 
meeting the needs of national prosperity and the production of good citizens. As 
Hunter (1996) puts it in general terms, ‘education emerged as a new domain of 
government in which the school would take shape as an instrument for training 
whole populations in the capacities required for participation in more sophisticated 
forms of social, economic, and political life’ (p. 155). More specifically, it was 
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proposed that educational policies and reforms targeted toward these ends would 
then enable ‘meritocratic social mobility, and strengthen communities and nation-
building’ (Botrell & Goodwin, 2011, p. 25). In the course of the twentieth century, 
this emphasis on education as a necessary means of training productive workers and 
good citizens under a social liberal arrangement meant was that religious education 
in Australia increasingly existed in a context that no longer sustained the latter as a 
necessary form of ‘moral chaplaincy for the majority’ (Crawford & Rossiter, 1996; 
Rossiter, 2010). Religious schools can thus be seen to have had several options for 
operating and retaining legitimacy in such a context and, in general, three paths were 
taken in Australia.  
 
Firstly, religious education could withdraw from the public realm and remain 
privatised by focusing on the ‘inner’ beliefs of its students. This is the route taken by 
many Protestant and Anglican schools in NSW following the 1880 Public Instruction 
Act, willingly relinquishing their educational functions and subsumed into an 
emerging state system in which a general background of non-denominational 
Christian beliefs and values was more or less generally taken for granted (Roberts, 
1989: 31; cf. Judge, 2001, p. 467). Such ‘secular’ education administered by the state 
was further supplemented by a proviso within the Act for ‘special religious teaching’ 
in which a portion of each day was to be set apart for instruction by religious 
teachers of particular persuasions. 
 
A second approach to religious education in an emergent liberal social order 
was taken predominantly by the elite, Church-affiliated grammar schools who argued 
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for the exemplary societal consequences of particular beliefs or values that they had 
transmitted to individuals. According to Williams and Carpenter (1991), these 
traditionally self-funded non-Catholic religious schools maintained the traditions of 
the British Grammar schools in that they were designed to provide an elite education 
for the offspring of the social and economic elite: ‘The virtues that built and 
maintained the British Empire are the virtues developed in these schools: discipline, 
self-reliance, courage, judgement, integrity, adaptability – all the virtues necessary to 
produce a Christian gentleman/woman, and the leaders of the nation’ (see also 
Gronn, 1992; Teese, 1995). 
 
A third option provided a path for religious education – in both Protestant and 
Catholic (after 1962) schools – to retain their confessional identities while retaining 
some legitimacy for operating schools within a liberal socio-political order. Such 
schools attempted to shape individual students’ beliefs and morals according to an 
ethical comportment at once linked to a particular religious tradition and 
generalisable to the majority.  The individual students would then go into the public 
realm with a purpose according to particular sets of personal ethics, or what has 
come to be popularly represented as ‘values’20 (Wright, 2004, pp. 20-21; also Clarke, 
2006). This third option has received an enormous boost in Australia since the early 
1970s, where the national direction of schooling was problematised in order to foster 
equality of opportunity and diversity through the distribution of state funding for 
                                                          
20 Indeed the modern notion of ‘values’ demonstrably presupposes a nominalist understanding of 
morality and ethics, coming to mean the pattern of life preferences expressed by a collection of like-
minded individuals. According to Clarke (2006), values as a way of expressing religious morality is ‘a 
relatively recent invention, compared with such words as ‘ethics,’ ‘morals’ or ‘virtues.’ Whereas those 
words hark back to Graeco-Roman philosophers, before Christian times, ‘values’ seems to be a 
product of the recent economic age. It displaced ‘virtue’ and ‘vice,’ as the modern age sought more 
utilitarian or malleable means of describing what society judges desirable.’ 
202 
state-run schools and existing religious schools, as well as the then-emergent 
‘community schools’ – such as those established by adherents of Montessori, Steiner, 
independent Christian and other minority faiths (Hunter, 1994, pp. 126-131; also 
Marginson, 1993, pp. 200-228; Modway, 2004, pp. 38-59). Exemplary of such 
concerns was the 1973 Schools in Australia report produced by the Interim 
Committee of the Australian Schools Commission – better known as the Karmel 
Report after its chairperson – and its implementation by the Whitlam Government in 
1974, which (amongst other measures for educational equality) made provisions for 
religious schools to begin to receive substantial financial support from governments, 
both Federal and State (Karmel, 1974; also Crittenden, 1974; Boyd, 1987). As will 
be touched on in Chapter 4, it was in the context of such an amenable policy 
environment that the neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schooling movement acquired 
an institutionalised presence in the field of Australian education. 
 
The commonality between these three historical options for religious education 
in Australia is evident: in the liberal socio-political order that has emerged since its 
implantation from colonisation, particular religious traditions have had to conform to 
nominalist and Protestant assumptions about religious education whereby the moral 
teachings of particular traditions are increasingly abstracted from their realization in 
the form of collective practices – including educational practices – that are their 
embodiment. By positing the realm of the personal and private as the locus of 
religiosity and religious values, liberal types of political regimes presume to separate 
religion from the public, collective and practical basis that renders its traditions 
viable across time.  
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Yet as Bauman (1991) points out, such a transvaluation of religion from the 
‘outer’ world to the ‘inner’ worlds of individuals is precisely one of the processes 
upon which the ‘assimilatory project’ central to the development of modern 
European-style liberal societies is historically based; that is, ‘an exercise in 
discrediting and disempowering the potentially competitive, communal or 
corporative sources of social authority’ (p. 106). Such a project was part and parcel 
of the process of dismantling older, deeply rooted forms of communal life which 
may have provided alternative, or potentially even oppositional, frameworks of 
social power to the nation-state (van Krieken, 2005). In place of such variegated 
communal life, the modern liberal state effects what Milbank (1997, pp. 268-292) 
describes as a ‘simple space,’ which shifts the overlapping jurisdictions and levels of 
authority within varied communal contexts (i.e. ‘complex space’) to one 
characterized by a duality of individual and state to whom allegiance is owed in a 
way that trumps all other allegiances (also Cavanaugh, 2004, p. 251). 
  
Within a social liberal regime, then, the assimilation of individual differences 
into the national space is predicated on the denigration of differing communal 
identities so that ‘tolerant treatment of individuals was inextricably linked to 
intolerance aimed at collectivities, their ways of life, their values, and above all, their 
value-legitimating powers’ (Bauman, 1991, p. 107). Thus, any substantively 
differing form of life, conception of morality and/or political practices may up to a 
point be held as a private option by individuals or groups, but any attempt to embody 
it in public life must be proscribed for the good of the nation. Indeed, it is precisely 
this qualification to citizenship as a necessary condition for membership in the nation 
that, despite its claim to cultural and religious neutrality, reveals the liberal socio-
204 
political order as predicated on one particular tradition amongst others; for it does 
indeed have its own normative conception of the good, which it is ‘engaged in 
imposing politically, legally, socially, and culturally wherever it has the power to do 
so, but also that in so doing its toleration of rival conceptions of the good in the 
public arena is severely limited’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 336). As Van Krieken (2005) 
depicts in his analysis of liberal government in modern Australia and assimilation: 
 
The price to be paid by individuals for entry into liberal 
citizenship in the modern state… has always been to leave all 
their previous communal cultural identities behind, apart 
from some remnant in the form of quaint customs wheeled 
out at ceremonial occasions. 
 
Such a socio-political context undoubtedly opens up the cultural landscape for 
the emergence and growth of religious institutions and the tolerance of religious 
education defined within its discursive parameters. This was especially so following 
the 1973 Karmel Report, which saw the re-integration of religious schools into a 
national system on the pretext of a ‘devolution of responsibility.’ As the report states: 
 
The Committee favours less rather than more centralised 
control over the operation of schools. Responsibility should 
be devolved as far as possible upon the people involved in the 
actual task of schooling, in consultation with the parents of 
the pupils whom they teach and, at senior levels, with the 
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students themselves. Its belief in this grass-roots approach to 
the control of the schools reflects a conviction that 
responsibility will be most effectively discharged where the 
people entrusted with making the decisions are also the 
people responsible for carrying them out, with an obligation 
to justify them, and in a position to profit from their 
experience (sec. 2.4)  
 
 
Yet, while autonomy was granted to religious schools through the Karmel 
Report’s ‘belief in this grass-roots approach to the control of the schools’ on the one 
hand, on the other hand, due to the ‘obligation to justify’ their decisions according to 
the predetermined responsibilities involved in ‘the actual task of schooling,’ they 
were rearticulated along with state schools onto a ‘single plane of administrative 
comparisons,’ thus enabling their problematisation as a governmental object of state 
bureaucracy for ‘making them more equal, at least from the point of view of their 
contribution to the economic prosperity and social security of the state’ (Hunter, 
1994: 111). Religious education under such an arrangement must appeal to a broader 
social legitimacy – or what the Karmel Report terms as ‘responsibility’ and its 
‘obligation to justify’ decisions – if this growth is going to continue, a legitimacy 
only attainable by translating the particularities of religious discourse into the 
hegemonic discourse of the social liberal regime.  
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Drawing again on Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, p. 130) analytical framework, 
one can describe this form of hegemony as ‘one nation’ politics21, which entails the 
differential absorption of demands by particular religious education groups 
(including Catholic schools, the former ‘enemy within’). The politics of social 
liberalism and its expression in the field of education through the Karmel Report thus 
stands in marked contrast to the populist institution of the 1880 Public Instruction 
Act (NSW) through a ‘two nations’ politics of equivalence against an internal enemy. 
This means that different religious schools can be included alongside state-run 
schools, but only by assuming a mediating function in which their students are 
mainstreamed into the norms, practices and institutional arrangements of the 
prevailing social liberal regime’s educational requirements and in so doing, framing 
religious commitments in a manner conducive to the economic prosperity and social 
security of the nation-state – i.e. either as private belief or publicly generalisable 
‘values’ abstracted from their particular discursive traditions (cf. Wright, 2004, p. 21) 
(see Figure 10).  
 
                                                          
21 However, as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) are also quick to point out, such a bureaucratic state politics 
is based on a ‘positivist illusion’ that assumes that ‘the ensemble of the social can be absorbed in the 
intelligible and ordered framework of a society’ (p. 130). In this case, for example, the method of 
differential absorption of different educational demands required on the one hand a breaking of the 
liberal-Protestant chains of equivalence that instituted ‘public’ state-run education and assimilating 
other traditions of education as objective educational differences within the system – that is, 
transforming them into part of the ‘national education system’ – but on the other hand, doing so also 
displaced the frontier of antagonism to the periphery of the social. Under social liberalism and 
economic nationalism, this frontier beyond ‘society’ was primarily demarcated by the boundaries of 
the nation-state. 
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Figure 10: Religious education administered through regulations and directed towards the good of the 
nation 
 
For example Roberts (1989), with regard to the history of education in 
Australia up to the 1980s, articulates just such an appeal for legitimacy by correlating 
the ‘dynamism’ of colonial education with its Christian inflection, arguing that the 
success of Australian education as a whole would be served by a restoration of this 
arrangement: 
 
[The] Bible-based church-related school of early colonial 
times was remarkably successful in meeting the academic 
and spiritual/moral needs of the younger generation of that 
day. …when certain principles undergirding this Christian 
school movement were disregarded, Australian education 
began to lose its dynamic. It is suggested that this Christian 
dynamic can and must be restored to Australian education 
today. (p. 25) 
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What Roberts’s intervention as an apologist for Christian schooling 
demonstrates is a distinct reliance on the liberal discursive tradition that has been 
outlined in this chapter so far: firstly, the categorical distinction he draws between 
‘academic’ and ‘spiritual/moral’ in his celebration of colonial education’s success is 
consistent with the nominalist and Protestant presuppositions of the liberal discursive 
tradition and its strict bifurcation between public/private and practices/religion, with 
academic matters corresponding with the first terms in each binary and religion with 
the second terms; in addition, by articulating the ‘Christian dynamic’ with the 
dynamic of Australian education as a whole, Roberts presupposes that the ends of 
religious education correlate with the ends of the hegemonic consensus of the time – 
that is, religious education serves the ‘good of the nation.’ Religious schools, albeit 
bearing the title of ‘private schools,’ are thus in this reckoning evidently part-and-
parcel of the integral state under a social liberal regime.  
 
The insistence of the separation of private/public spheres and its concomitant 
division between religious communities in the former and the formally secular 
nation-state in the latter thus seeks to effect a ‘projection of all social feelings into 
the state’ (Fromm, 1955, p. 141) as the ultimate point of cohesion for social existence 
under the social liberal arrangement. In such a schema, religious education becomes 
a means by which particular ‘values’ can be made amenable to the general project of 
nation-building. In order to function as such, however, such a strategy requires that 
religious schools either abstract their particular commitments and practices derived 
from traditions into a ‘neutral’ discourse that disarticulates certain publically 
generalisable ‘values’ from its particularities, or else keep religion private and away 
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from interfering in the educative tasks common to the public. This is a requirement 
that has intensified in the time since the 1973 Karmel Report, paradoxically, under 
the signs of school ‘choice’ and ‘diversity’ associated with the rise of neo-liberal 
hegemony over social liberal discourse and its subsequent reconfiguration of the 
liberal regime. 
 
Religious education in Australia as a market good 
 
On globalisation, nowhere [at the Commonwealth 
Government National Strategies Conference] was there a 
‘Little Australia’ perspective. The force and inevitability of 
continued internationalisation was recognised and accepted 
from all quarters as was the potential for deriving major 
benefit from pursuing a global orientation for the country’s 
affairs. What is now recognised as unavoidable, has also 
become a strongly shared objective, that is, for Australia to 
develop fully as a global nation to achieve its national goals. 
(Economic Advisory and Planning Committee [EPAC], 1995, 
p. 5) 
 
The neo-liberal regime in Australia can be seen to have arisen out of the 
successive crises of its social liberal predecessor. For despite a prolonged period of 
sustained national prosperity from the late 1940s in Australia, by the late 1960s the 
strain was beginning to show in the prevailing institutional arrangements and its 
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ability to sustain a regime of economic growth and social stability. Due to the multi-
layered economic, social and geopolitical nature of the crisis,22 not all of the 
difficulties could be resolved satisfactorily in order to re-establish some kind of 
stable settlement (Lloyd, 2008, p. 49). Thus, the disintegration of the social liberal 
regime brought about a period of transition in Australia beginning in the late-1980s. 
It was in this period of crisis that neo-liberalism – a hitherto marginal discourse that 
had emerged as a minority reaction against the welfare state in the 1930s and 1940s – 
gained ascendency throughout the 1980s-90s to become the modus operandi of 
political institutions and state bureaucracies (see Cahill, 2004a, 2004b, 2010; also 
Pusey, 1991). Insofar as it has since become, and remains, the hegemonic discourse, 
neo-liberal presuppositions are shared across the spectrum of policy-making in 
Australia, where the conservative and ‘Third Way’ social democratic policy makers 
have generally presupposed an important new ‘fact’ about socio-political life: the 
view that there is an international process of economic convergence known as 
‘globalisation’ that is inevitable and inexorable.  
 
As Sjolander (1996) and Hirst and Thompson (1992, 1995; also 1996) explain, 
there is a widespread belief amongst politicians and policy-makers that globalisation 
entails, at its most basic level, an economic process with political consequences, a 
                                                          
22 The period lasting from the mid-1970s to the early-1990s was characterized by a series of crises that 
steadily decomposed the social liberal arrangement in Australia. Where such crises led to the eventual 
failure of the social liberal regime in Australia, the factors may be understood as threefold: firstly, a 
failure to secure a regime of capital accumulation due to cyclical crises of productivity and 
accumulation as well as ‘stagflation’ (Broomhill, 2008: 21; Bell & Quiggin, 2008: 73); secondly, a 
failure to a secure the social reproduction due to dissatisfaction amongst employers at the increased 
power of the labour movement and its gains in wages and working conditions (Broomhill, 2008:  21), 
as well as broader social instability on several fronts including ‘economic (e.g. stagflation, mining 
boom and ‘Dutch disease’), cultural (e.g. Asian immigration, feminism, Aborigines), and geopolitical 
(e.g. British EEC membership, Asian wars and Asian trade engagement) [that led] to a shift of 
ideology, culture and public policy by the early 80s’ (Lloyd, 2008: 49); and thirdly, external crises in 
the form of the oil price rises in late 1979 that slowed global growth rates, causing Australia’s current 
account to deteriorate dramatically in 1980-1 and again in 1981-2, which in turn slowed economic 
growth further and trebled foreign debt in a short period of time (Broomhill, 2008: 22). 
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process which is described as the transformation of the business environment where 
goods, capital, and knowledge flow freely across international boundaries abetted by 
advances in transportation and information and communications technology. This is 
undergirded by a broadly shared narrative that ‘from the 1970s onwards we have 
witnessed the creation of a truly global economy, one in which world market forces 
are stronger than even the most powerful states’ so that nation-states are being 
‘subsumed into one global economy’ (Hirst and Thompson, 1995, p. 414). Driven by 
changing investment strategies of financial markets and transnational corporations, it 
is believed, globalisation heralds a significant restructuring of the global capitalist 
economy – the heralding of a global market in goods, services, knowledge and 
hence, the labour required to produce these. What neo-liberal discourse thus gives 
rise to is an interpretation of the socio-political world that assumes that ‘emergent 
trade and investment patterns are seen to create their own necessary pressures on the 
political organization of the world economy and the space available for state 
response,’ so that all peoples and states are equally subject to the logics of 
globalisation – which are on the whole beneficial and necessary – and that societies 
have no choice but to ‘adapt’ to the new international economic conjuncture 
(Sjolander, 1996, pp. 608, 604). 
 
As a consequence of these inexorable global ‘facts,’ neo-liberal discourse 
maintains that states are consigned to the role of regulators and facilitators in the 
adaptation of the national economy to the new realities of convergent international 
economic structures – or what political philosopher John Gray (1998) has dubbed a 
‘false dawn’ parasitic on an Enlightenment myth of progress towards a ‘universal 
civilisation by way of the worldwide spread of western – and more particularly, 
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Anglo-Saxon – practices and values’ (p. 215). In this view, all that remains for 
nation-states to do is ‘creat[e] the policy environment, both nationally and 
internationally, which favours the globalization of production and service industries’ 
(Sjolander, 1996, pp. 608-609). This has the effect of increasingly constraining 
parties of the right and the left to adopt similar political agendas, often blaming 
‘difficult political choices on their lack of choice, citing the foreclosure of options 
born of the pressures of globalization’ (Sjolander, 1996, pp. 608-609), although their 
rhetorical framing of the ways in which this task is to be met may differ slightly. In 
general, what this shared vision of globalisation implies is that states should 
generally ‘provide those social and public services international capital deems 
essential and at the lowest possible overhead cost,’ and more specifically pertaining 
to education is the supposition that because capital is mobile and will locate 
wherever economic advantage dictates but labour is both nationally located and 
relatively static, the state must aid the latter to adjust itself to meet the new pressures 
of international competitiveness (Hirst and Thompson, 1995, p. 414). 
 
 In Australia, as Frankel (2001, p. 26-35) explains, the policies of the 
mainstream political parties – that is, the Australian Labor Party and the Coalition (of 
Liberal and National Parties) – both share this presupposition of the need to reform 
Australian institutions and populace for globalisation, although their policies differ 
owing to the competing industry sectors and other cultural and political sources of 
influence that prevail within them. Differences aside, however, the apparent exposure 
of Australia’s economy and society to international market forces has led successive 
governments to frame internal reforms as a response to these external pressures. This 
is typified by what Frankel (2001, p. 27) has termed the project of ‘Australia Inc.’ 
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whereby globalisation becomes the pretext used by governments and business groups 
to forge a new political economic entity consisting of a transition to a modern 
nationwide market society. This new level of national standardisation then allows for 
the institution of markets that can achieve mobility across State and national lines 
through the use of corporate performance criteria that seek to augment efficiency 
(see Frankel, 2001, p. 25). According to the logic of this concerted political project: 
 
The exposure of Australia’s economy and society to 
international pressures and developments has necessitated a 
parallel ‘nationalisation’ of institutional and market forces. 
[...] within the Australian federation we are witnessing the 
consolidation of national political and economic fields over 
the historical dominance of State spheres. State political 
fields remain important, but cultural and economic processes 
carried out at State level continue to be rationalised or 
integrated nationally. (Frankel, 2001, p. 24) 
 
As Frankel (2001, p. 24) goes on to list as an example, and as I shall elaborate 
below with regard to the field of education in Australia, this has involved a parallel 
expansion, on the one hand, of a national standardisation of education that seeks to 
prepare future worker-citizens in the face of a globalising labour market, and on the 
other hand, the institution and facilitation of a market in school choice in order to 
harness competitive efficiencies in meeting these training requirements. The 
mediating nexus between education standardisation and the market is the regulatory 
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mechanism of accountability measures, which as I shall elaborate further in Chapter 
5, establishes a plane of statistical equivalence between schools and disparate 
communities across the national territory (Lingard, 2010, p. 131). The important 
point to restate here is this: that insofar as this presupposition about globalisation is 
understood as necessitating the reconfiguration of institutions like education is 
shared across the mainstream of politics and policy-making as common sense, the 
prevailing regime in Australia can be understood as structured by a hegemonic neo-
liberal discourse. 
 
As a theoretical concept, neo-liberalism has recently been subject to 
contestation due to its wide usage and hence an apparently inconsistent definition. 
According to Clarke (2008), for example, the term suffers from ‘promiscuity 
(hanging out with various theoretical perspectives), omnipresence (treated as a 
universal or global phenomenon), and omnipotence (identified as the cause of a wide 
variety of social, political and economic changes),’ so much so that he claims ‘the 
concept of neo-liberalism is now so overused that it should be retired’ (p. 135). 
Likewise, Grossberg argues that the term is used in a way that assumes the rhetoric 
of its ideologues to be the truth of things. Consequently, ‘we tend to believe or take 
at face values ‘their’ stories, and then assume that our task is to show their negative 
effects, in the end assuming and reenacting the claim that there really is a neoliberal 
order’ (Grossberg, 2010, p. 107). While I address the specificities of what I interpret 
to be a neo-liberal regime below in a way that attempts to circumvent such criticisms 
of conceptual haziness or uncritical adoption of ‘face value’ assumptions, I also 
contend along with Hall (2011, p. 10) that neo-liberalism as a concept remains a 
useful, albeit provisional, analytical device at a general level in order to describe 
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some recent economic and political trends driven by a perceived globalisation of 
markets, especially in relation to the broader liberal discursive tradition outlined 
above of which it represents a specific configuration (hence the prefix ‘neo’) (Hall, 
2011, pp. 12-16).  
 
In addition, I argue that compared to other commonly used terms often for 
naming the present conjuncture like ‘neoclassical economics,’ ‘global capitalism’ or 
‘globalisation,’ neo-liberalism appears to be the most comprehensive term because 
each of these potential alternatives only capture certain aspects of the present regime 
(see Haley and Davis, 2008, pp. 71-72): neoclassical economics designating a school 
of economic theory propounded by Hayek, Milton Friedman and others generally 
associated with the Chicago School of Economics; global capitalism describing a 
broad organisational tendency in terms of transnational production and marketing; 
and ‘globalisation,’ as mentioned above, as a vision of the inevitable convergence of 
global market economies. To name the present regime neo-liberal, I argue, has the 
benefit of capturing both the political and economic components of its discourse 
while accounting for neoclassical economic theory and its subsequent development 
into ‘Human Capital’ and ‘Public Choice’ theories that provide an intellectual basis 
for the neo-liberal regime, as well as presupposing global capitalism as its normative 
transnational project and globalisation as its teleological vision. It is important to 
note that while such a characterisation functions as an ideal type, neo-liberal policy 
expressions are divergent across time and place. Political economist David Harvey 
(2006) describes this divergence as ‘pragmatic neoliberalism’ or the difference 
between neo-liberalism in theory and in practice. He suggests that while the theory 
advances ‘individual liberty and freedom [as] the high point of civilization’ and then 
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goes on to argue that ‘individual liberty and freedom can best be protected and 
achieved by an institutional structure, made up of strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade,’ successive economic crises since the 1980s have meant that 
‘there were some major adjustments that occurred in the theory’ to suit different 
circumstances. This implies that the shape neo-liberal regime in Australia is likely to 
bear both particular institutional arrangements suited to its historical and political 
context as well as general tendencies that align with the broader traits of neo-
liberalism. 
 
As a starting point, then, I shall take as a starting point Harvey’s (2005) widely 
cited definition of neo-liberalism: 
 
[Neo-liberalism] is in the first instance a theory of political 
economic practices that proposes that human well-being can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve 
an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The 
state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity 
of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police, 
and legal structures and functions required to secure private 
property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the 
proper functioning of markets. (p. 2) 
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On the basis of Harvey’s definition, neo-liberalism as an ideal type can be 
broadly understood as a mutation of two discursive elements within the Anglo-liberal 
tradition hitherto outlined: firstly, a restructuring of the role of the state as providing 
the necessary infrastructural conditions for globalising markets – including 
regulatory frameworks and the training of future worker-citizens as potential labour; 
and secondly, that market exchange in all spheres represents the most effective 
means for generating efficient outcomes in relation to that prior end. I shall presently 
elaborate on these two, interlocking elements in relation to the genealogy of 
liberalism furnished so far before moving onto a consideration of how education in 
general, and religious education in particular, are framed within such a regime. 
 
In the first instance, despite the rhetoric of ‘deregulation’ or ‘privatisation,’ 
neo-liberal discourse prescribes a restructuring of the state’s role (rather than its 
reduction in an absolute sense): a selective removal of regulations in some industries 
and a reduction in welfare measures while, at the same time, enhancing industry 
assistance such as the linking of education policy to industry demands and increasing 
‘law and order’ expenditures (Jones, 1996, p. 30). For insofar as neo-liberalism 
remains formally committed to the liberal paradigm of security and prosperity of 
formally free individuals through the contingent governmental balancing of the 
market economy and state regulation, as argued above, neo-liberal regimes are 
likewise marked by an inescapable co-presence of market individualism and state 
regulation. In short, a change in the form of the state under a different political 
regime ‘by no means presages the end of the state’ (Bobbitt, 2002, p. xxiii). 
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While often framed in the libertarian rhetoric of deregulation and the 
juxtaposition of the market and the state in antagonistic terms, then, market 
individualism and state regulation can in practice be seen as two moments 
encompassed within the neo-liberal regime. These two moments have been described 
by Peck and Tickell (2002) as constituting a ‘roll-back’ moment focused on the 
restructuring of prior social liberal arrangements along the lines of private sector 
corporations – which were characteristic of the ‘commercialisation’ reforms of 
Australian public sector services (rather than an absolute withdrawal of the state per 
se) under the Coalition government led by John Howard from the mid-1990s to mid-
2000s that sought to simultaneously reduce the size of the public service while 
increasing its productivity (Dixon, Kouzmin & Korac-Kakabadse, 1996; Rundle, 
2001) – and a ‘roll-out’ moment that seeks to construct and consolidate neo-liberal 
markets through regulatory mechanisms – the latter moment being characteristic of 
‘Third Way’ social democratic governments typified in Australia by the government 
of the Australian Labor Party led by Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard in the late-2000s 
(Pierson and Castles, 2002; see also Gamble, 2001). 
 
Thus, contrary to the representation of neo-liberalism by its proponents and 
some of its detractors as engendering a withdrawal of the state, neo-liberalism in 
practice requires a strong regulatory state to institute and create the right conditions 
for markets, regulate their operation and attenuate their more pernicious effects at the 
level of industries, groups and individuals (Chang, 1997; Levi-Faur, 2005). More 
pointedly put, the popular neo-liberal rhetoric of the state as somehow ‘outside’ and 
therefore ‘interfering’ with economic markets is unworkable, for, as Jones (1996) 
points out:  
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There is no such thing as a pure economic system of free 
market forces, there never has been in the past and there 
could not be in the future [because] [t]he state has been 
integral in providing the conditions for the continual success 
of capitalism. Capitalist competition (so-called ‘market 
forces’) has required perennial state assistance – in the form 
of subsidies or rationalisation measures, especially in times of 
crisis. (pp. 29-30) 
 
Indeed, as institutional economist Ha-Joon Chang (2001: 6) comments, 
attempts at defining a free market apart from a consideration of its political 
institution is at the deepest level a pointless exercise because no market is in the end 
‘free’: ‘[A]ll markets have some state regulations on who can participate in which 
markets and on what terms.’ (also Chang, 1994; Fligstein, 1990) In addition, extra 
cost responsibilities for the state also arise due to the new layers of bureaucracy that 
have been created to facilitate and regulate ‘deregulated’ markets (Cahill, 2009: 13). 
Political commentator Chris Berg (2008), for example, has drawn together data from 
Australia to illustrate how the quantities of ‘subordinate legislation’ – that is, laws 
for regulation – actually increased significantly in the historical periods of the 1980s-
2000s and during the Howard Coalition Government of 1996-2007, both of which 
are commonly characterised as neo-liberal (see Figures 11 and 12). 
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Figure 11: Pages of Commonwealth subordinate legislation, 1962-2006 (Berg, 2008, p. 16) 
 
 
Figure 12: Average pages of Commonwealth Acts of Parliament passed per year, by government 
(Berg, 2008, p. 9) 
 
To simply accept such characterisations of neo-liberalism as entailing a 
‘smaller state’ owing to deregulation and privatisation en toto is to risk missing the 
ways in which the state is the key institutional ingredient for marketisation in 
Australia (Grenfell, 2004: 84). In light of this, neo-liberalism is better seen as a 
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reconfigured type of liberal regime with a state apparatus whose mission is to 
facilitate and regulate institutions that prepare Australia and its citizenry for the 
impending globalisation of the economy, in conjunction with a tendency to 
emphasise the efficacy of market exchange for fostering competitive behaviour and 
disciplining inefficient performance23  – a project Robison (2006) and others have 
encapsulated as ‘forging the market state’  (see Figure 13; also Wiseman, 1998, p. 
38). While consistent with a broad Anglo-liberal social arrangement, the key 
differences between the social liberal nation-state and the neo-liberal market-state are 
captured concisely by legal and political theorist Philip Bobbit (2002): 
 
Whereas the nation-state, with its mass free public education, 
universal franchise, and social security policies, promised to 
guarantee the welfare of the nation, the market-state promises 
instead to maximize the opportunity of the people and, thus, 
tends to privatize many state activities and to make voting 
and representative government less influential and more 
responsive to the market. (p. 211) 
 
                                                          
23 This is why pronouncements heralding the ‘end of neo-liberalism,’ such as those of former 
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in his essay ‘The Global Financial Crisis’ (2009), are 
mistaken. Such conclusions are based on a misunderstanding of neo-liberalism as constituted by a 
‘retreat of the state.’ According to this logic, the return of regulation necessarily marks the end of neo-
liberalism. However, contrary to neo-liberal theory, neo-liberalism in practice has seen the state play 
an active and indeed expanding role in the creation, facilitation and maintenance of neo-liberalism. 
Even after the ‘financial crisis’ of 2008, the dominant means of ‘rescue’ implemented by various neo-
liberal regimes worldwide have involved not curtailing the operation of markets in finance, for 
example, but rather an injection of liquidity into financial markets. As Cahill (2009, pp. 13-14) points 
out, such actions are consistent with the modus operandi of neo-liberal regimes, which over three 
decades have seen the growth of the state through the proliferation of new social and economic 
regulations that aid in the ‘marketisation’ of various sectors. 
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Figure 13: A neo-liberal regime as entailing an emphasis on market exchange, with the state as an 
active regulator, institutor and facilitator of the market economy 
 
In the second instance, for its popular appeal, neo-liberalism can be understood 
to deploy elements of classical Anglo-liberal discourse (e.g. Locke) with its rhetoric 
on individual freedom, private property rights and contractualism, but with a greater 
emphasis on competitive market exchange as the medium of social relations and 
means of social discipline that guarantees performance (cf. Hall, 2011, p. 16; Gill, 
1995). For the proponents of neo-liberal discourse, this emphasis recalls a return to 
the concerns of liberal political economy; that is, the standpoint of the market, the 
sphere of voluntary commodity exchange regulated by law whose proper functioning 
is considered to be an important end in itself, as well as the best means to the 
achievement of certain national ends (Gamble, 1979, p. 5). A chief instance of this 
process in the field of education is the measurement of human potential in the 
discourse of ‘Human Capital Theory,’ which posits the possession of education and 
skill of individuals as a saleable commodity on the globalising labour market (Luke, 
1997), and which represents in practice the ‘liberation of individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms’ under neo-liberalism in Harvey’s definition above. In short, this discourse 
is the political expression of the belief that market value represents a good measure 
of human value and market exchange is the primordial form of human freedom 
(Gray, 1996, p. 21). 
 
Market 
economy
State regulation
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This intensification of market logics under neo-liberalism for the purposes of 
market exchangeability can also be seen as consistent with the logics of nominalism 
and Protestantism within the Anglo-liberal tradition in its rejection of the intrinsic or 
divine value of people and things. As argued in the previous chapter, insofar as 
nominalism advocated severance of the divine from the immanent and worldly, and 
Protestantism subsequently defined religion as individual belief that would in the 
liberal tradition come to be demarcated as the ‘private’ sphere, it endowed with 
sanction – or at least indifference – the subordination of both people and the 
environment to the needs of the state and the economy, both of which had previously 
been considered to occupy positions, arrangements and roles of social, political, 
cosmic and religious significance (Fromm, 1969, pp. 58-59, 70-72; Milbank, 2009, p. 
20). The ‘de-sacralisation’ of human practices and the environment within this 
discursive tradition are, at least in part, the conditions of possibility for the rejection 
of intrinsic qualitative value of different human labours and material objects for their 
commensurable, quantitative value as determined by what others are willing to pay 
for it. Within a neo-liberal market, as Milbank (2009) points out, ‘any notions of ‘just 
wage’ or ‘just price’ which would symbolize the ‘sacred’ worth of roles and items 
for a specific society must be abandoned’ (p. 31). 
 
These twin tendencies in neo-liberal discourse – a restructured market-state to 
prepare for the onslaught of globalising markets and the emphasis on market 
exchange and discipline – have been widespread in the field of education in 
Australia. Two intertwined features in particular can be noted that correspond to 
these: firstly, the proliferation of accountability measures in order to facilitate the 
regulation of educational institutions towards the end of creating skilled worker-
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citizens, the operation and enforcement of which highlights the ever-present role of 
the market-state; and secondly, on the basis of such accountability measures, the 
institution of a market for ‘choice’ between competing educational institutions, 
which it is believed will generate efficiencies for the achievement of educational 
objectives defined by the neo-liberal regime. 
 
The market-state and education  
 
With regard to the restructuring of the state vis-à-vis education, the period of 
crisis in the social liberal regime inevitably saw Australian schooling come under 
intense scrutiny. Yet while the education system was being significantly blamed for 
social and economic problems of the 1970s and 1980s, the power of education to 
deliver the goals of the emergent regime has never been questioned in official circles 
(Brown et al, 1997, pp. 7-8). Indeed, according to Brown et al (1997), there is now a 
‘consensus’ on both the left and right of the political spectrum defining education as 
‘the key to future economic prosperity’ (p. 7). This consensus on education as a 
means to economic success was evident in Australia, where between 1981 and 1987, 
21 major reports on education were produced by state and federal education 
authorities, as well as complementary reports linking education to labour market 
structures, technological change and youth policy (Marginson, 1993, p.148ff.). 
Unsurprisingly, a Commonwealth Department of Employment, Education and 
Training (DEET) report in 1987 summed up Australia’s poor productivity 
performance, low rates of technological innovation and exposure to volatile 
commodity prices from the 1970s to the mid-1980s as a question of the adequacy of 
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the national skills base and the hitherto prevailing educational arrangements that 
provide for skill formation (Marginson, 1993, p.148ff.).  
 
Likewise, in a paper entitled Strengthening Australia’s Schools (1988), neo-
liberal education policy reformer and one-time Federal Treasurer John Dawkins 
called for a national focus on student assessment and standards monitoring in order 
to ascertain the attainment of skills deemed necessary for Australia’s global 
economic competitiveness. A report similarly disposed was released by the 
Economic Planning and Advisory Council (1986), underlining the necessity of 
education for ‘upgrading the quality of the stock of human capital’ (p. 12; see also 
Dawkins, 1985). As a DEET report entitled Meeting Australia’s skill needs asserted 
in 1987, all education must now be seen as part-and-parcel of national 
macroeconomic policy:  
 
The primary question then is no longer whether education 
and training are factors in economic performance, but rather 
what needs to be done to improve their provision, by what 
means, and which directions and where responsibility for 
action lies. As a complement to broader macroeconomic 
policy measures, these ‘structural’ issues will demand closer 
attention over the next few years if Australia is to 
successfully negotiate the major adjustment tasks with which 
it is currently faced. (DEET, 1987, p. 4) 
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This unequivocal positioning of the education system as linked to 
macroeconomic goals is also tied up with an accompanying tendency that a range of 
scholars such as Meredyth (1998), Marginson (1997), Connell (2003) and Lingard 
(2000) have described as an increasing ‘marketisation’ of educational institutions in 
Australia.  Neo-liberal reforms, it is argued, have involved successive Australian 
governments emphasising ‘choice’ within an expanding educational market, 
appealing to discourses of flexibility, enterprise and autonomy for legitimacy and 
treating students, families and employers as customers and clients of education 
(Lucas, Pudsey, Wadham and Boyd, 2007, p. 79). In turn, schools are to compete for 
customers and clients of their services primarily by reference to their achievements 
as measured on the basis of their efficiency as determined by accountability 
measures – most prominently results in standardised testing, and secondarily on the 
‘values’ such as religious affiliation that may influence the choices of potential 
customers and clients who seek to provide what Ball (2003) describes as a ‘morally 
adequate account of themselves’ through their schooling preferences (p. 117; see also 
Campbell, Proctor & Sherington, 2009, pp. 160-178). This has led to the 
downplaying of the contribution of education as a generalised good for the nation as 
was characteristic of the social liberal regime and, concomitantly, an emphasis on the 
private benefits of education accruing to individuals that are well-prepared to 
compete effectively in the perceived globalisation of the labour market, which in turn 
fulfils the market-state’s imperative for the formation of a more flexible, multi-
skilled workforce (Lucas et al, 2007, p. 97; also Avis, 2000; Meredyth, 1998).  
 
Under the neo-liberal regime, then, education in general and schooling in 
particular are framed as a key means of ‘habituation’ for the allegedly new globally 
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competitive labour market (White, 1997, p. 236). The 1990s, for example, saw four 
key publicly commissioned reports that sought to align the demands for economic 
growth and international competitiveness: firstly and most significantly, the Young 
People’s Participation in Post-Compulsory Education and Training (Australian 
Education Council and Ministers for Vocational Education, Employment and 
Training, 1991) report, also known as the Finn Review after its committee chair, 
IBM executive Brian Finn. This review introduced the language of ‘competencies’ 
through its identification of ‘six key areas of competence’ that were necessary for 
students in senior secondary schools and above – i.e. Language and Communication, 
Numeracy, Scientific and Technological Understanding, Cultural Understanding, 
Problem-solving, and Personal and Interpersonal Skills (Lugg, 2002, p. 311) – which 
remain the skeletal underpinning across all Australian schooling systems. The three 
key documents that followed – The Australian Vocational Certificate and Training 
System (Employment and Skills Foundation Council, 1992; also known as the 
‘Carmichael Report’), Putting general education to work (AEC and MOVEET, 
1992; also known as the ‘Mayer Committee Report’) and the Setting National Skills 
Standards  (National Training Board, 1991) paper – were all concerned with the 
dissemination and implementation of the Finn Review, as well as the practical 
alignment of schooling curricula with the key competencies ‘determined by business, 
industry and the unions to be relevant to the existing and future needs of Australia’s 
workplaces’ (Lugg, 2002, p. 311) 
 
Taken together, a shift is detectable in the ends to which education is directed: 
for while the earlier social liberal regime emphasised educational policies for what 
was considered a national good as exemplified in the Karmel Report of 1973, a 
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second Karmel Report – the 1985 Quality of Education Review Committee – 
subsequently produced by Australian Federal Government signified a new insistence 
on common competencies and skills that were supposedly required by workers to be 
competitive in a global market. Indeed, Lingard and Rizvi (2002) point out that 
already from the time of the first Karmel Report in the mid-1970s, governments at 
state and federal levels were concerned to ensure the ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ 
of institutions such as schools, with ‘efficiency/effectiveness’ defined as ‘doing more 
with less and stressing outcomes rather than inputs,’ accompanied by a push towards 
‘more managerialist and market-driven priorities’ (p. 10).  Of particular importance 
is the accompanying propagation of accountability measures that regulate schools, 
facilitate relative comparisons and competition between schools in Australia, as well 
as rendering Australian schools on aggregate measurable and comparable on a global 
scale (Rizvi and Lingard, 2009, p. 18).  
 
In both religious and non-religious sectors of Australian schooling alike, such 
policy revisions have been evident in the increasingly standardised approaches to 
evaluation and comparison in educational governance that were first signalled in the 
later Karmel Report and developed further in the 1988 Strengthening Australia’s 
Schools report – known as the Dawkins Report – which called for a national focus on 
student assessment and standards monitoring in order to ascertain the attainment of 
skills (Rowe, 1999). This has led to the proliferation of standardised testing and 
reporting across schooling systems for the purposes of ascertaining the relative 
efficiency of individual schools in comparison to one another in achieving national 
economic imperatives (Singh, 1990). Rowe (1999) concurs, echoing Lingard and 
Rizvi’s diagnosis that such standards are a result of a shift in policy toward markets, 
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especially for the purposes of disciplining poor performance: ‘the focus on allowing 
market forces to predominate makes it possible for governments and educational 
regulatory bodies to locate blame for ‘poor performance’ or ‘ineffectiveness’ at the 
local and/or school level.’  Consistent with my argument regarding the inevitable 
‘balancing act’ characteristic of liberal regimes, therefore, neo-liberalism according 
to these authors should be envisaged not so much as the absolute rule of deregulation 
or privatisation, but rather as encompassing a less directly interventionist regulation 
with greater control over coordination and policy development or ‘steering,’ insisting 
on more efficient educational service delivery or ‘rowing’ by private providers – 
what is known as ‘government at a distance’ or simply ‘governance’ (Van Gramberg 
and Bassett, 2005, p. 2; also Jessop, 1998, 1999). The particular regulatory 
instruments deployed for such ‘steering’ – such as legislation (Berg, 2008), audits 
(Power, 1997) and inspections (Braithwaite, Healy and Dwan, 2005) – can be 
understood in this regard as what Rose and Miller (1992), following Foucault, call 
‘technologies of government’ that channel the conduct of individuals and groups on 
the one hand, and abet competitive market exchange and discipline on the other. 
 
It is important at this point to note that while the differences between the first 
and second Karmel Reports may well mark a discontinuity, as Rowe, Lingard and 
Rizvi variously suggest, between a social liberal or ‘social democratic’ policy ethos 
on the one hand and a neo-liberal, market-driven one on the other, I argue in 
concurrence with Hunter (1994, p. 122-136) that this passage is also intelligible in 
part as being continuous with the ‘problematic of government’ within the Anglo-
liberal discursive tradition. For the precondition for establishing a market for choice 
in schooling, in particular one involving different religious schools and non-religious 
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schools, requires in the first place a levelling of substantive plurality of practices and 
ends between schools onto a simple space in order to render them comparable on a 
common scale. This, as I have outlined above, was a key achievement of the first 
Karmel Report: the articulation of religious schools and non-religious schools on a 
single plane of administrative comparisons was effected by a nominalistic 
presupposition that the ‘religious’ dimension of religious schooling is extrinsically 
related – and hence merely incidental for administrative purposes – to ‘schooling-in-
general’ that can be regulated. In this way, regulation through the state provided, and 
indeed still provides, the institutional preconditions for a market in education based 
on the private preferences of its consumers; for the religious aspects of such schools 
do not bear out substantively on the type of education received, but merely provide 
added ‘values’ that may figure favourably or otherwise depending on the preferences 
of the individual student or family.  
 
This continuity is also detected by Luke (1997), who charts the changes within 
the education system broadly (and tertiary education more particularly). He points 
out likewise that beginning in what I have termed the social liberal period, education 
reform:  
 
[W]as legitimated in terms of the expansion of access and 
equity while the latter has stressed accountability for the 
expenditure of public funds through ‘quality assurance.’ The 
former was justified as a strategy for the expansion of 
technological and educational expertise nationally; the latter 
on the premise that such expansion... could be monitored and 
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regulated through quantification and centralised evaluation 
and planning. 
 
By the 1990s, as Luke (1997) goes on to point out, ‘educational policy and 
institutional practice [were] being pushed along a continuum towards reduced 
government expenditure, and increased marketisation and privatisation of remaining 
state-supported operations,’ whereby the existence of educational institutions 
‘depends almost exclusively now on rationalised and quantified performativity in an 
increasingly less regulated educational market’ (p. 1). While I have argued and will 
argue further below and in the chapters that follow that such a marketisation does not 
entail less but more – albeit different – regulation, the point to be stressed here is 
both the discontinuity and continuity between the educational policies of the social 
liberal period and the new directions they have taken under a neo-liberal regime.  
 
With regard to religious education, then, the proliferation of regulatory 
measures for ‘governance’ and the marketisation of education under the neo-liberal 
regime marks a discontinuity from the social liberal regime insofar as more religious 
schools are permitted to enter the market, with each permitted to achieve the 
stipulated standards in different ways. However, it also represents continuity with the 
preceding regime insofar as both share the presuppositions of the liberal discursive 
tradition: a definition of religion primarily as belief with no intrinsic relationship to 
practices and its consignment to the private sphere. Religious schools – despite their 
formal status as ‘private’ educational service providers in the market for school 
choice – thus remain linked to the (integral) market-state insofar as they are regulated 
232 
and steered through various accountability measures. The key difference is that they 
are articulated to the imperatives defined by neo-liberal discourse, which is to train 
worker-citizens in preparation for globalisation, as opposed to equality or diversity 
for good of the nation as with the previous social liberal regime (see Figure 14).  
 
 
Figure 14: Religious education steered through regulation and linked to the market state for the 
imperatives of neo-liberal discourse 
 
If the 1973 Karmel Report marked the moment when such so-called ‘private’ 
religious schools were initially brought into the purview of the state, then the growth 
of such schools under this administrative arrangement was augmented by the 1996 
abolition of the Commonwealth Government’s New Schools Policy. This latter 
policy, which was established in 1985 by the then-Labor Federal Government in 
partnership with various State governments, enforced a set of guidelines that were 
intended to promote the principle of ‘planned educational provision’ to maximise the 
use of national funding resources and to discourage the duplication of school services 
(Ryan and Watson, 2004, p. 11). Under these guidelines, prospective new private 
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schools were required to demonstrate that their existence would not have an adverse 
impact on existing schools – both state-run public and religious or non-religious 
private – within a given geographical area (Ryan and Watson, 2004, p. 11). The 
abolition of this policy in 1996 by the Howard Coalition government marked the 
lifting of federal restrictions on the establishment of new non-government schools, 
and as a result is widely seen as a deregulation and marketisation of the schooling 
sector that resulted in a substantial change in the number and size of private schools 
– including religious schools – as well as making Federal funding accessible for the 
establishment and maintenance of such schools (see McMorrow, 2008). 
 
Yet, as I have argued, such moves toward a marketisation of schooling do not 
represent a deregulation or privatisation of schooling and a diminution of state 
involvement in a strict sense. Rather, they entail on the one level what is known as a 
reduction of ‘barriers to entry into the market’ for new private schools (as ‘entrant 
firms’ in neoclassical economic theory; see Pehrsson, 2009), while on another level it 
involves a simultaneous re-regulation of religious ‘private’ schools on another level 
with respect to their articulation to the imperatives of the neo-liberal regime. In this 
reckoning, the state – albeit restructured as a market-state – still plays a key role by 
providing the infrastructure for the market in school choice and through the 
‘rationalisation’ and ‘harmonisation’ of disparate educational efforts in line with the 
development of human capital for global competitiveness. This concurs with 
attempts being made in neo-liberal regimes around the world, according to education 
and Gramsci scholar Peter Mayo (2011), to leave as little as possible in schooling to 
the vagaries of difference despite the neo-liberal rhetoric of ‘free choice.’ As he goes 
on to elaborate, this is most evident with ‘the onset of standardization, league tables, 
234 
classifications and... more recently, harmonization,’ which renders ‘agencies of the 
state, or those that work in tandem with the state through a loose network (a process 
of governance rather than government), more accountable, more subject to 
surveillance and ultimately more rationalized’ (p. 61). 
 
As regards Australia, such state-led ‘rationalisation’ and ‘harmonisation’ is 
underscored by the operation and enforcement of regulatory instruments for 
measuring accountability, which have the effect of increased state governance of 
schools, including religious schools as formally private agencies ‘that work in 
tandem with the state,’ to use Mayo’s expression (see Van Gramberg and Basset, 
2005, p. 2). This development while novel is perhaps unsurprising, for the 
precondition for markets as a clearinghouse for preferences is precisely state 
regulations that institute certain standards for which the measure of success is a 
school’s effectiveness in organizing and ordering the conduct of individual schools 
according to ‘objective’ needs of training predetermined by the hegemonic discourse 
while leaving religious schools for example free to pursue their ‘subjective’ 
preferences. The rationale behind the contemporary policies that regulate 
performance through accountability measures can thus be understood as the 
institution of conditions for a market in schooling whereby competition between 
schools of qualitatively different traditions is made possible by reference to common 
standards. As will be explicated in Chapter 5 with reference to NCPC schooling, 
religious schooling arising from particular traditions may exist and express their 
religious discourse as long as the established standards of schooling are delivered. 
This then enables its expressions of religiosity to be exercised ‘acceptably’ within the 
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bounds of a hegemonic discourse that defines the public purpose of education (see 
Wright, 2004, p. 24).  
 
The proliferation of regulatory instruments in the form of accountability 
measures is best exemplified in the present emphasis on standardised testing and 
reporting. For instance, in the Australian Commonwealth Government’s standardised 
National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) introduced in 
2008 and the introduction of the My School website in 2010, which makes publicly 
accessible and comparable certain sets of demographic information derived from 
individual schools, as well as results from NAPLAN tests and post-school 
destinations of each. According to the Government-issued Information for Parents 
(ACARA, 2010a) brochure: 
 
From January 2010, you [i.e. parents] will be able to access a range 
of information about schools, including the number of full-time 
teachers, number of student enrolments, attendance rates, school-
level NAPLAN results, and post-secondary school outcomes in 
some states and territories. My School will also provide an 
opportunity for schools to showcase their mission statement and 
achievements to the wider public on their school’s profile page. 
[…] You can quickly locate performance and contextual 
information about schools in your community and compare them 
with statistically similar schools across the country. 
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According to Barton (as cited in Beckman & Cooper, 2004), what informs such 
an accountability mechanism for comparing and contrasting is both the linking of 
funding arrangements to measurable efficiencies in performance, as well as the 
expectation that schools will become more effective, efficient and generally improve 
their educational performance because of competition for students (and parental 
preferences). While My School is by no means the first or only standardised testing 
and reporting mechanism in Australian schooling, as I shall explain in Chapter 5, it is 
significant as the culmination of over two decades of rationalisation and 
harmonisation of assessment and reporting across the states and territories. This is 
because My School along with NAPLAN serve as exemplars of the neo-liberal 
construal of schooling in the nexus of regulation and marketisation in the two ways 
touched on by Barton. Firstly, while these accountability measures are presented as 
the objective way of rating school performance, standardised measures like 
NAPLAN and My School function effectively as steering mechanisms that ensure 
schools comply to the ‘public purpose of education’ as defined by neo-liberal 
discourse. The sheer scale and scope of these measures represent an unprecedented 
regulatory coordination of schooling by the Federal Government for the end of 
training worker-citizens. 
 
Secondly, as apparently ‘value-free’ accountability instruments that measure 
the relative effectiveness of various schools in achieving given objectives, 
standardising measures like NAPLAN and My School facilitate a market for school 
choice by rendering all schools comparable and commensurable on a national scale, 
as well as on smaller scales between schools in proximate locales and ‘statistically 
similar schools,’ all of which are meant to increase the ability of parents to choose 
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led by calculative decisions on the most effective means of obtaining desired 
educational outcomes for their children (Lucas et al, 2007, pp. 80-81; also Teese and 
Posel, 2003) – or in the words of former Minister of Education and current Prime 
Minister Julia Gillard, let ‘parents vote with their feet’ (as cited in Caro, 2008).  
 
The marketisation of education  
 
This latter point, as I shall explain in more detail in Chapter 6, highlights how 
such accountability measures and consumer preferences in the market become 
mutually reinforcing through the regulation and facilitation of the market-state 
(Ranson, 2003: 466) – most prominently through the framework of what has come to 
be known as ‘Public Choice Theory.’ In brief, public choice theory, according to its 
chief advocate James Buchanan (2003), presupposes that ‘human interaction depends 
critically on predictable responses to measurable incentives’ – that is, individual 
preference maximisation – and so ‘extends the idea of the profit motive from the 
economic sphere to the sphere of collective action’ (p. 15). Hence, it is assumed that 
by making performance measurements of schools known, individual students and/or 
families will respond through their choices in a way that maximises their educational 
benefits. In turn, schools will be compelled to increase their performance as 
measured by such scales or else face public censure and possible closure. As neo-
classical economist and advocate of public choice in schooling Catherine Hoxby 
(2003) asserts: ‘The basic logic is that choice would give schools greater incentives 
to be productive because less productive schools would lose students to more 
productive schools’ (p. 288). 
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Religious schools in such a reckoning come to be seen as offering either values 
that stand alongside but separate from the facts of educational performance, or as 
nominally ‘value-added’ religious education that supplements the established public 
purpose, as some scholars analysing the field of religious education have already 
intimated of similar experiences in the US and UK (e.g. Carnoy, 2000; McPherson, 
1993; Morris, 2005; Schagen & Schagen, 2005). Value-adding with regard to 
religious schools concerns whether the latter adds a positive benefit to the education 
process, and are concerned with discerning whether, quantitatively, religious schools 
perform more successfully than other schools in standardised tests or, qualitatively, 
whether religious schools create a more ‘caring, supportive and well-ordered 
environment would provide a climate in which teaching and learning would flourish, 
and that... would lead in turn to high achievement.’ (Schagen & Schagen, 2005, pp. 
213-214)  
 
According to a study of Australian private schools by Meadmore and 
Meadmore (2004), such value-adding takes on increased importance in a competitive 
market for school choice because: ‘Decisions about the value-addedness of education 
are central to school selection. Parents are actively engaged in accessing the school 
market and choosing the right school, as well as supporting their children through the 
increasingly lengthy schooling process’ (p. 378). Hence schools, in an appeal to 
potential clients (i.e. students and parents) in the marketplace of schools, are at pains 
to demonstrate their value-added services in promotional activities: ‘All possibilities 
are targeted and various angles used as vantage points, ranging from prospective 
parents to alumni, from commercial sponsorships to endowments, from community 
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participation to an emphasis on individual achievement’ (Meadmore and Meadmore, 
2004, p. 378). With regard to religious schools in particular, Meadmore and 
Meadmore (2004) point out that the shift toward competition in the market for school 
choice has seen the repackaging of traditional religious discourses from substantive 
principles to value-added qualities as ‘selling points’: 
 
In the promotional literature of these [Christian] schools, it is 
increasingly apparent that seemingly unpopular Christian 
principles can be taken up for market advantage in new ways. 
Parents seeking to purchase self-esteem and/or emotional 
literacy in an educational package can be captured through 
the judicious articulation of religious rhetoric in which the 
spiritual and the emotional are closely relational. 
Paradoxically, at a time when church attendance is steadily 
declining, Christian values, as promulgated by the schools… 
are becoming more important as a selling point. (p. 384) 
 
In so (re)defining religious discourse, however, religious schools run the risk of 
naturalising the hegemonic definitions of ‘religion’ and ‘education’ within the 
present regime. Such schools (notwithstanding the possible protestations both within 
and without) are then liable to be concerned less about the development of inquiry 
and critique within and between particular discursive traditions regarding the 
appropriate ends of education – what Paul Ricoeur (2004) calls a ‘conflict of 
interpretations’ – and more about the percentage of students who attain the requisite 
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results, proceed to prestigious post-school universities and careers, and/or present as 
an attractive choice according to the demands of the market with reference to each 
school’s effectiveness in achieving the ends of the present hegemonic discourse on 
education’s purpose (see Nixon, Walker & Carr, 2004, p. 168). Within this prevailing 
order of things, then, religious schools may seek leverage by marketing how the 
values that it inculcates into individual students are at once derived from particular 
discursive traditions and amenable to ‘performance’ defined by the prevailing neo-
liberal regime. ‘In a secular commercial culture,’ Turner (2011) surmises broadly, 
‘religious belief and practice is infused with commercial ideas and practices about 
selling religion and marketing religious institutions’ (p. 150). 
 
This phenomenon can be compared to a movement in the US towards what 
Michael Apple (2006) describes as ‘conservative modernisation,’ which is a 
hegemonic project incorporating not only the agenda of neo-liberal politicians who 
want educational policy to be centered around competitive, contractual exchanges in 
a market economy, but also includes the articulation of conservative evangelical 
Christians. The latter are described as seeking to bring their particular ‘values’ on 
theology, national politics and gender and race relations to bear on segments of the 
population through the assertion of ‘parental choice’ in the market for schooling. 
According to Apple (2006), then, it is this conservative religious complement to neo-
liberal education policy that draws proponents of religious schooling in the US. 
 
So far, I have conjectured broadly at some of the processes by which religious 
schools in general may become articulated to politically hegemonic imperatives in 
Australia in the present time. However, any such articulation between the discourse 
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of the neo-liberal regime and particular types of religious schooling need to be 
examined more closely in order to discern how this might occur through specific 
religious discourses. In other words, how do religious schools that arise from 
different discursive traditions negotiate and relate to this dominant discourse. And in 
turn, how does the neo-liberal regime accommodate such schools within the bounds 
of its Anglo-liberal presuppositions? 
 
In the remaining chapters of this thesis, I shall draw on the NCPC schooling 
movement as an example of a type of religious private schooling that operates within 
this contemporary context. This movement is an interesting example because of its 
passage from an explicitly antagonistic discourse to the then-mainstream education 
system in Australia in the 1950s to its present status as a growing institutional 
presence within it. How does NCPC schooling negotiate its simultaneous insistence, 
on the one hand, of its fidelity to the movement’s unique founding principles that 
define all education as inherently religious in stark contrast with the Anglo-liberal 
tradition, and on the other hand function as a schooling movement that is accountable 
to the standards of the present regime and its marketisation of schooling? Before 
turning to this question in Chapters 5 and 6, however, it is necessary to provide an 
account of religious education as understood within the neo-Calvinist discursive 
tradition and the conditions of its emergence in Australia. This is the concern of the 
following chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
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In this chapter, I have sought to offer a genealogy of how the Anglo-liberal 
discursive tradition was extended and developed in Australia after 1788 – in 
particular in the colony of New South Wales – and particularly how it came to define 
religious education as consisting of the transmission of belief in a Supernatural 
Being, Thing or Principle with its associated practices and values/ethics on the one 
hand, and the governed and standardised delivery of government-approved 
educational services for the training of desired citizens and workers on the other. 
 
In the first section of this chapter, I registered the politics at the foundation of 
the education system in NSW and Australia more generally in relation to the Anglo-
liberal discursive tradition. In particular, I focused on the establishment of a ‘secular’ 
schooling system and conversely, the conflict between Roman Catholic discourse 
and the discourse of the emergent system over the appropriate place of religion in 
education. The institution of the former over the latter, I argued, can be understood to 
be an effect of the political rapprochement between Protestant and liberal discourses 
that gave rise to a historic bloc. While the hegemonic Anglo-liberal tradition 
presupposed a nominal connection between particular religions and general 
educational practices, as well as the Protestant definition of religion as primarily a 
matter of private conviction with a secondary connection to public morality, the 
former insisted on a definition of religion as intrinsic to educational and social 
practices. As I have outlined above, the passage from the 1866 Public Schools Act to 
the 1880 Public Instruction Act in NSW – which distinguished, on the one hand, 
between a ‘general’ religious education consisting of some Christian practices and 
morals that were considered secular owing to their generality within the historic bloc, 
and on the other hand a ‘specific’ religious education based on particular Protestant 
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traditions – can be understood as an expression of the predominance of Anglo-liberal 
definitions of religious education buoyed by a fervent politics of anti-Catholicism. 
For the liberal regime, religious education, if it is to exist must be at once 
generalisable to the civic needs of the majority and/or confined to specific times (i.e. 
in the allocated hours after school) and places (i.e. at Churches on Sundays and in the 
inner life of the individual). 
 
In the following section, I considered how this discursive tradition was 
developed in the period of nation-building under the hegemony of a social liberal 
regime, and specifically the place and function of religious education within such a 
regime. Given the interminable problematic of government in liberal regimes – that 
is, a constant negotiation between the institution of a market for the expression of 
individual preferences (i.e. liberal ‘freedom’) and state regulation to facilitate and 
delimit the operation of the market – social liberalism in Australia from the time of 
Federation in 1901 to the 1980s can be understood as a series of institutional 
configurations weighed toward the latter aspect for the sake of a ‘national good.’ 
Religious education as defined according to the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition 
thus had to occupy either the public realm by recourse to broadly generalisable 
‘values,’ or remain confined to the realm of private devotion. This was especially so 
after the 1973 Karmel Report and the re-establishment of state funding for religious 
schools, where the possibility of school autonomy through ‘devolution of 
responsibility’ was coupled with a ‘responsibility to justify’ school practices in 
accordance with what were considered the ‘actual tasks of schooling.’ So while so-
called ‘independent’ or ‘private’ schools based on particular religious (and non-
religious) traditions proliferated in this time, they were simultaneously levelled onto 
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a simple space of administrative comparison with reference to their contribution to 
the hegemonically-defined ‘national good.’ Religious particularities in such schools 
were thus positioned as ‘values’ that were incidental to the ‘fact’ of education (i.e. its 
practices), which was geared to the training of workers and citizens. 
 
Finally, I critically examined the broad impacts on education of the shift from a 
social liberal regime to a neo-liberal regime from the 1980s-on, which can be 
characterised by a shift away from nation-building toward an emphasis explicated in 
numerous reports on forging a nation populated with skilled worker-citizens for what 
is presumed to be a globalising world market economy. However, I also made the 
point that while neo-liberal regimes are often characterised as dogmatically and 
rhetorically positing free markets, state regulation is still required in order to 
institute, facilitate, regulate and delimit such markets. The state, which can be 
labelled the ‘market-state’ owing to its restructured socio-political function, is 
evident in the proliferation of accountability measures like standardised testing and 
reporting in order to regulate schools across the nation in alignment with the 
educational imperatives of the neo-liberal regime. By establishing a simple space of 
commensurability and comparability between schools on the basis of these 
measurements – a process that I argued was initiated beginning with the 1973 
Karmel Report and culminating in the 1996 abolition of the New Schools Policy – 
the market-state thus creates the regulatory conditions of possibility for the 
marketisation of education based on parental choice. The religious elements of 
religious schooling are thus confined to expressing private ‘values’ apart from the 
public ‘facts’ of education defined by the hegemonic discourse, and/or function as 
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‘value-added’ supplements that appeal to the private preferences of parents as 
consumers in the market for school choice.  
 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I shall address the question of how a particular type of 
religious education that was initiated as an explicitly antagonistic response to the 
mainstream educational system in Australia has come to function within and be 
accommodated by it. Through the case of the NCPC schooling movement, I explore 
the discursive antecedents and processes through which particular types of religious 
education may become integrated within the present neo-liberal regime. Before 
turning to this task, however, it is necessary to provide an account of religious 
education as it is understood within the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition, how it 
emerged in Australia and what it claims to be uniquely offering educationally. 
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Chapter 4 – ‘Christ, who is Sovereign over all’: Religious education 
in the neo-Calvinist tradition 
 
Oh, no single piece of our mental world is to be hermetically sealed 
off from the rest, and there is not a square inch in the whole domain 
of our human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over 
all, does not cry: ‘Mine!’ (Kuyper, 1998[1880], p. 488) 
 
Introduction 
 
The NCPC schooling movement, as mentioned with reference to Maddox 
(2011) in the introduction, is an overlooked sector in the Australian education market 
because it has received little attention in scholarly literature. Yet this type of 
religious schooling is an important case because it simultaneously asserts positions 
that may appear to be in contrast to the prevailing understanding of religious 
education and its place in the formation of citizens on the one hand and, on the other, 
receives funding from the Australian Government as a result of its ability to 
demonstrate accountability to state-mandated standards and its viability as an option 
in the schooling market. How, then, does the NCPC schooling movement legitimate 
itself both to the adherents of the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition that may insist on 
the former principle and the requirements of the prevailing regime built on the 
Anglo-liberal tradition? While I shall address this question more specifically in the 
following chapters, my purpose in this chapter is to first understand the discursive 
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tradition from which NCPC schools arise in order to discern their unique construal of 
religious education and how this is negotiated within the Australian context. In doing 
so, I seek to chart how a religious schooling movement that initially emerged to 
challenge the ‘commonsense’ of privatised religious education in Australia 
proliferated and became an institutional feature of the Australian education system. 
 
It is necessary to attend to the task abovementioned because the neo-Calvinist 
discursive tradition, while representing an adjacent one to the dominant Anglo-liberal 
tradition (i.e. in being both originally Western European and inaugurated at the 
Protestant Reformation), has been developed in ways that are not reducible to the 
latter, much less a generalised notion of religion or religious education. As Asad 
(1999) points out, the ‘historical elements of what come to be conceptualized as 
religion have disparate trajectories’ (p. 192). Hence, I argue, it is important when 
studying a particular type of religious discourse to first seek to understand what it 
means when it uses particular terms and how its way of interpreting the world has 
come to be as it is. 
 
Following Asad’s exhortation to attend to the specific historical trajectories of 
what is categorized as religion today, I explore a discursive tradition of religious 
education in this chapter that stands adjacent to the dominant Anglo-liberal one: that 
of NCPC schools from its genealogical antecedents in Calvin’s theo-political vision 
of social order, to the politics of Dutch neo-Calvinism of van Prinsterer and Kuyper, 
to Dutch migrants to Australia who inherited this tradition and inaugurated the 
NCPC schooling movement. I begin by considering the initial similarities and 
differences between Calvinism and the Protestantism of Luther, especially as it 
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pertains to the relationship between theology, politics and education. This is followed 
by an account of the how the NCPC schooling movement arose as a consequence of 
an initial antagonism between the neo-Calvinist tradition and the understanding of 
religious education in Australia predicated on the Anglo-liberal tradition, an 
antagonism that was placated by the articulation of neo-Calvinist schools within the 
broader Australian schooling system. I follow this by outlining key theological 
themes of NCPC schools today, and how they can be understood as being in 
continuity with their Calvinist and Dutch neo-Calvinist tradition while being a novel 
iteration of it in a new context. I conclude by posing the question of how NCPC 
schooling, with its unique theological convictions and educationally specific 
‘foundational values,’ articulates these in the present neo-liberal context. 
 
Calvin and the sovereignty of God 
 
According to the historical accounts recorded by education scholar Charles 
Justins (2002), the neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ (NCPC) schooling movement in 
Australia was initiated in the early-1960s by Dutch migrants of a neo-Calvinist 
tradition. Neo-Calvinism as a type of religious discourse can be traced to a novel 
iteration of the creeds of the Calvinist tradition (Mouw, 1989), derived from the life 
and work of the second generation Swiss reformer and ‘preeminent theological 
systematizer’ (Greengrass, 2008, p. 113) John Calvin. According to Greengrass 
(2008), ‘Calvin’s overwhelming ambition was to create a single, overarching 
theological framework that would unite God’s truth and human wisdom’ (p. 113), a 
framework that was laid out most prominently in his influential 1559 Institutes of the 
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Christian Religion. While it is unnecessary to rehearse at length Calvin’s formidable 
social and theological corpus, it is important to note three interrelated points in the 
latter’s instructions on the relationship between Christians and their socio-political 
contexts that are most germane to the eventual development of NCPC schooling vis-
à-vis the Anglo-liberal tradition. 
 
Firstly, and akin to the theology of Luther, Calvin built upon the dominant 
nominalist presuppositions of the Protestant Reformation. Like the former, Calvin 
stressed the irrational will of God as the primary attribute of divine omnipotence. 
Unlike Luther, however, he envisaged this will of God to be all-pervasive in the 
world and not just within the inner-worlds of believers or in certain Protestant 
territories. According to Tillich (1968, pp. 264-265), Calvin conceived of a general 
operation of God in preserving and governing the world, so that everything that 
exists depends on divine movement. This is known as the doctrine of ‘providence,’ 
whereby: ‘God is the world’s perpetual preserver, not by a certain universal action 
actuating the whole machine of the world and all its respective parts, but by a 
particular providence sustaining, nourishing, and providing for everything he has 
made’ (as cited in Tillich, 1968, p. 265). The whole world, to summarise the 
foundational basis of Calvin’s framework, is a ‘theatre erected for displaying the 
glory of God’ (Calvin, 2008[1559], I, sec. 5.5). 
 
Yet unlike the discourse of natural law advanced by medieval scholasticism 
whereby all human practices aiming toward a good in the material and finite world 
are seen to participate in the divine, Calvin maintains the nominalist understanding of 
God and the good as utterly beyond human effort. ‘For what the schoolmen advance 
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concerning the priority of charity to faith and hope,’ he argues, ‘is a mere reverie of a 
distempered imagination’ (Calvin, 2008[1559], III, sec. 2.41). Hence for Calvin, all 
things in the world have a merely instrumental character at the hand of divine 
omnipotence: ‘Things are used as instruments of God’s acting, according to his 
pleasure.’ (Tillich, 1968, p. 265) This notion of the instrumentality of the world and 
things also brings up a key point of contrast with Luther, for whom all worldly 
practices are in vain insofar as the inner faith is sufficient for attaining God’s grace. 
For on the one hand, Calvin too believed – if not more so – in the futility of human 
effort in attaining to anything good let alone the divine, arguing that: ‘All we assign 
to man is that, by his impurity he pollutes and contaminates the very works which 
were good’ (Calvin, 2008[1559], III, sec. 15.3). Yet on the other hand, there is an 
increased emphasis in Calvin on the importance of moral effort in the world. This is 
so not because of some good innate to the practices or things, but because in doing so 
the Christian demonstrates outwardly that they are amongst those who acknowledge 
the supremacy of God in the world: 
 
[I]n all our cares, toils, annoyances and other burdens, it will be no 
small alleviation to know that all these are under the 
superintendence of God. The magistrate will more willingly 
perform his office, and the father of the family confine himself to 
his proper sphere. Every one in his particular mode of life will, 
without refining, suffer its inconveniences, cares, uneasiness, and 
anxiety, persuaded that God has laid on the burden. (Calvin, 
2008[1559], III, sec. 10.6) 
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This novel understanding of worldly practice combined with a nominalistic 
understanding of divine omnipotence thus drives an apparent ‘necessity of unceasing 
human effort’ and ‘the development of a frantic activity and a striving to do 
something’ (Fromm, 1969, p. 110) amongst certain adherents of Calvin’s theology 
(see also Weber, 2002, pp. 32-33). So while in Protestantism under Luther there was 
a formal separation between the ‘Two Kingdoms’ corresponding in practice to a 
division between an outer-world of practices and politics and an inner-life of 
religion, for Calvin this was dissolved insofar as the sovereignty of God and his 
glorification affects all things. Yet it is important to re-emphasise that for Calvinism, 
the relationship between religion and practice presupposes a nominal relationship 
between them; for all subjects and objects in the world are merely instruments 
through which an utterly powerful God works in every moment (Tillich, 1968, p. 
265). As Marcuse (2008[1972], p. 24) points out, this novel synthesis of religion and 
practice manifests itself in the political realism and pragmatism of Calvin’s 
followers, particularly in the concept of an ‘occupation as a vocation’ and Calvin’s 
extensive and intensive theo-political prescriptions for government that is appropriate 
to the sovereignty of God.  
 
This brings up the second key point in Calvin’s teachings that have persistent 
influence on NCPC schooling: his approach to government. Akin to Luther, Calvin 
also distinguishes between two jurisdictions that he considered ‘things completely 
distinct’: i.e. ‘Christ’s spiritual Kingdom’ on the one hand and ‘the world’ and its 
‘authorities’ on the other (Calvin, 2008[1559], IV, sec. 20.22; Marcuse, 2008[1972], 
p. 23). However, unlike Luther, Calvin insists that though distinct they ‘are not at 
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variance’ and do not represent ‘Two Kingdoms.’ For the latter, the distinction is 
merely functional because God is ultimately sovereign over all the world; while for 
Luther (1962[1523], p. 91) civil authorities are necessary as a means of controlling 
evil given that ‘the whole world is evil and that among thousands there is scarcely a 
single true Christian,’ for Calvin (2008[1559]) even that which is apparently evil is 
an instrument of divine will insofar as God ‘fulfils his righteous will by the wicked 
wills of men’ (I, sec. 28.3). Regarding this, Tillich (1968, p. 266) explains that: 
 
Such statements which seem to make God the cause of evil 
are only understandable in the light of Calvin’s idea that the 
world is the ‘theatre of the divine glory.’ God shows his glory 
in the scene we call the world. In order to do this, he causes 
evil, even moral evil. Calvin said that to think that God 
permits evil because of freedom is frivolous, because God 
acts in everything that goes on; the evil man follows the will 
of God although he does not follow [God’s] command. 
 
So while Calvin also sees the necessity of state coercion as a means of 
attenuating evil arising from the sinfulness of human beings (Calvin, 2008[1559], IV, 
sec. 20.31), he posits that the state too is subordinate to God’s sovereignty. This 
formulation presents a unique ‘theo-political’ synthesis, for while the ‘outer’ civil 
authorities are a God-ordained magistracy of a different order to the ‘inner’ 
government of the soul by the church, the former ‘has as its appointed end to cherish 
and protect the outward worship of God, to defend sound doctrine of piety and the 
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position of the church, to adjust our life to the society of men [sic]… and to promote 
general peace and tranquility’ (Calvin, 2008[1559], IV, sec. 20.22). In addition, 
Calvin’s prescriptions for civil government differ markedly from Luther’s notion of 
‘law around the sacred’ (ius circa sacrum). While for Luther civil authorities have 
jurisdiction over all matters except the religious, for Calvin (2008[1559]) it ‘prevents 
idolatry, sacrilege against God’s name, blasphemies against His truth, and other 
public offenses against religion’ (Institutes, IV, sec. 20.22). It can thus be supposed 
that Calvin does not conceive of the social order as constituted by Two Kingdoms 
like Luther but one; the role of Christians is to submit to the state, which in turn has 
been entrusted to enforce God’s laws, for ‘authority over all things on earth is in the 
hands of kings and other rulers [by] divine providence and holy ordinance’ (Calvin, 
2008[1559], IV, sec. 20.20; see also IV, sec. 20.22). This direct ordination of the 
system of worldly authorities by God, when combined with the nominalist and 
Calvinist concept of God as an absolutely inscrutable ‘sovereign,’ has the effect of 
increasing the power of civil authorities (Marcuse, 2008[1972], p. 26). In fact, 
‘[Calvin] goes so far as to argue that revelation is the basis of temporal law!’ (Boer, 
2009, p. 10) 
 
It is useful to place Calvin’s theo-political vision of societal order in the socio-
political context of Calvin’s discursive production – that is, the theocratic city-state 
of Geneva in the sixteenth century; for ‘the Reformed church established there by 
Calvin was not a church of voluntary membership, but a city-state church, [thus] 
Calvin accepted that the church needed the support of the secular arm in order to 
enforce discipline.’ (Lotz-Heumann, 2008, p. 254; also Benedict, 2004, pp. 460-489) 
Therefore, Calvin’s theo-political vision of social order, based as it is on the 
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pragmatics of both religion and government, eschews a sharp division between 
temporal and spiritual realms; thus ‘more than the Lutheran does the Calvinist feel 
himself [sic] to be placed in the midst of life and the world with a positive God-given 
task with regard to material and spiritual culture, and with regard to social and 
political life’ (van de Pol, 1964, p. 149; also Marcuse, 2008[1972], pp. 27-28; 
Weber, 2002[1905]).  
 
However, it is here that a peculiar paradox is latent in Calvin’s theocratic 
conception of civil authority. For while his discourse on the ‘sovereignty of God’ 
over all aspects of life is emphatic in its insistence on the obedience due to civil 
authority ‘since their [i.e. rulers’] power is from God’ (Calvin, 2008[1559], IV, sec. 
20.22), Calvin (2008[1559]) allows an exception: penultimate obedience to temporal 
authorities must not be allowed to interfere with ultimate obedience to God:  
 
…but that obedience [to authorities] is never to lead us away from 
obedience to Him [i.e. God], to whose will the desires of all kings 
ought to be subject, to whose decrees all their commands ought to 
yield, to whose majesty their sceptres ought to be submitted. And, 
indeed, how preposterous were it, in pleasing men [sic], to incur 
the offence of Him for whose sake you obey men! The Lord, 
therefore, is King of kings. When He opens His sacred mouth, He 
alone is to be heard, instead of all and above all. We are subject to 
the men who rule over us, but subject only in the Lord. (IV, sec. 
20.32) 
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Thus, while Calvin’s discourse predominantly legitimates the office of civil 
authorities and the duty of submission to them, he does not foreclose, as does 
Protestantism after Luther, the possibility of or justification for disobedience and 
indeed revolt against an officiating authority that is perceived to be violating God’s 
law (Boer, 2009, 2009a; Hall, 2003; Marcuse, 2008[1972], p. 25; van Gelderen, 
1992, pp. 266-269). Thus, while all worldly power was understood by Calvin to be a 
‘derivative right’ insofar as ‘authority is a jurisdiction as it were delegated from 
God,’ insofar as ‘obedience to the officiating authority leads to transgression of 
[God’s] law, this authority loses its right to obedience’ (Marcuse, 2008[1972], pp. 
26, 25; see also Troeltsch, 1992[1931], pp. 616-629). 
 
The last of Calvin’s instructions of relevance here deals with the religious 
education of children. Calvin (2008[1559], II, sec. 8.49; also IV, sec. 19.13) held that 
‘Godly’ parents were expected to nurture their children physically and spiritually, 
which included strict discipline including corporal punishments such as beating in 
moderation. Calvin like Luther placed significant importance on learning beginning 
at a young age so as not to ‘leave the Church a desert for [the] children’ (as cited in 
Morrison, 2001). In addition to theological application, Calvin’s emphasis on 
parenting and childrearing within families can also be seen as a pragmatic political 
move to secure a comprehensive social order structured by a clear hierarchy of 
authority and predicated on the sovereignty of God: 
 
It was firstly a necessary consequence of the toppling of the 
Catholic hierarchy; with the collapse of the (personal and 
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instrumental) mediations it had set up between the individual and 
God, the responsibility for the salvation of the souls of those not 
yet responsible for themselves, and for their preparation for the 
Christian life, fell back on the family and on its head, who was 
almost given a priestly consecration. On the other hand, since 
authority of the temporal rulers was tied directly to the authority of 
the pater familias (all temporal rulers, all ‘lords’ became ‘fathers’), 
their authority was consolidated in a very particular direction. The 
subordination of the individual to the temporal ruler appears just as 
‘natural,’ obvious, and ‘eternal’ as subordination to the authority of 
the father in meant to be, both deriving from the same divinely 
ordained source (Marcuse, 2008[1972], p. 30). 
 
In addition to reinforcing the patriarchal family, Calvin also reorganized the 
existing elementary schools in Geneva – the schola privata and schola publica – for 
wider access to children, stressing disciplined behavior, cleanliness and promptness 
while teachers were elevated to one of the four divinely ordained orders of office in 
the church (Sundquist, 1990, p. 94). Like Luther in curricular matters, Calvin was 
convinced that for every person to be ‘adequately equipped to ‘rightly divide’ God’s 
Word, he or she had to be educated in language and the humanities. To that end he 
founded an academy for Geneva’s children, believing that all education must be 
fundamentally religious’ (Armstrong, 1992). 
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In sum, three points of Calvin’s theo-politcal vision have been most influential 
in the development of the NCPC schooling movement. Firstly, building upon the 
nominalist notion of God as an inscrutable force, Calvin envisaged the sovereignty of 
God to be all-pervasive in the world and not just within the inner-worlds of believers 
as with Protestantism under Luther. However, this expansive view of the power of 
God in the world – which is known as the doctrine of ‘providence’ – stands in 
contrast to the Scholastic notion of goodness and divinity being immanent to 
particular practices and the world at large. For Calvin all practices and things in the 
world have an instrumental character for the sake of demonstrating God’s utterly 
transcendent sovereignty, and hence it is incumbent upon Christians to work in the 
world in order to demonstrate their cognizance of this. This basis gives rise to the 
second and third key points in Calvin’s theo-political corpus that is of relevance to 
the development of NCPC schooling: that is, the sovereignty of God over civil 
authorities and the family. With regards to these, Calvin conceptualizes all such 
authority to be bestowed upon by God for God’s purposes. In the case of civil 
authorities then, Calvin envisages government to be functional insofar as it is an 
instrument of God that carries out what is required to sustain social order and punish 
offences against religion. For this reason, Christians are obliged to obey government 
authorities as a norm. However, he also considers the authority of government to be 
derivative. So in the event of an antagonism between God’s rule and the rule of civil 
authorities, the former takes precedence and the Christian is obliged to resist the 
latter. Likewise in the sphere of the family, Calvin frames parents also as derivative 
authorities instituted by God with the expectation that they will nurture their children 
in a manner congruent with this conception of the sovereignty of God. The 
development of these three points of Calvin’s theo-political discourse can be 
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discerned in the discourse of the NCPC schooling movement, which can be 
understood to align itself firmly within the Calvinist tradition via its novel 
reconfiguration in the Dutch Reformed Church, or what is called ‘neo-Calvinism.’  
 
Neo-Calvinism and sphere sovereignty 
 
Neo-Calvinism emerged in the context of the resurgence of interest in 
Calvinistic Christianity in the Netherlands in the mid-to-late nineteenth century 
(Bartholomew, 2004). The peculiarity of this ‘revival’ of interest was not merely its 
sociological attributes insofar as large numbers of professing Christians ‘placed great 
emphasis on God’s work with the soul’ and on ‘personal knowledge of belonging to 
those ‘who are known by God’’ (van de Pol, 1964, p. 182; also Bartholomew, 2004; 
McGoldrick, 2000). More significantly, it was also a unique iteration of Calvinism 
that attempted to push the focus of faith further from the private sphere and into ‘a 
vigorous social movement intent on proclaiming and advancing the Lordship of Jesus 
Christ over all of life’ (Bartholomew, 2004). Wolters (1983) describes members of 
the movement as cognisant that ‘their views were a development, not simply a 
restatement, of the classical Calvinism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’ (p. 
5). In fact, the label ‘neo-Calvinism’ was, according to Naugle (2001), originally 
coined by Kuyper’s opponents, ‘but was eventually accepted by him and his 
followers since it suggested that their views were not simply a restatement of the 
reformer’s original convictions, but were a positive and progressive development of 
them’ (n25). 
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By contrast to their North Atlantic Calvinist counterparts, who adopted a more 
‘Puritan’ emphasis on personal piety and a ‘Christian experience and… corporate 
revival based upon the preaching of the Bible and wrought by the Holy Spirit’ (Kapic 
& Gleason, 2004, p. 32; also Packer, 1994), these continental Calvinists insisted that 
Christianity must be understood as ‘world-formative’ (Wolterstorff, 1983). In other 
words, while both forms of Calvinism ‘recognise the presence of that which is 
inferior or evil in human society, the difference [is] that otherworldly Christianity 
turns away from this world to seek something better outside of it, while world-
formative Christianity seeks to transform society to better it’ (Gousmett, 1991, p. 3). 
 
Out of this theological ferment emerged the Dutch ‘Anti-Revolutionary Party’ 
(Dutch: Anti-Revolutionaire Partij [ARP]) – a political organisation vehemently 
opposed to the liberal-enlightenment underpinnings of the 1789 French Revolution – 
and its leading politicians Guillame Groen van Prinsterer and his successor Abraham 
Kuyper, whose work formed the theological basis of NCPC schools. Van Prinsterer 
was an overtly devout Calvinist statesman and historian who founded the ARP and 
who tried in the decades after the great liberal breakthrough to transform the 
‘spiritual-cultural conservatism’ of the neo-Calvinist movement into an anti-liberal 
political conservatism (von der Dunk, 1978, p. 746). One of the key anti-liberal 
struggles of van Prinsterer was in the debate over schooling. He argued that the state, 
having been separated from the church, could not govern education according to its 
own discretion and insight without destructive ends (Justins, 2002, p. 37). 
Particularly for van Prinsterer, the liberal state as such should be regarded as what 
Calvin deemed an ‘ungodly ruler’ and thus had no claim on parents who regard the 
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education provided by state-run schools to be contrary to Christian faith. To compel 
them, he argued, is tantamount to coercion: 
 
Parents who, with or without sufficient grounds, are 
convinced that the direction of education in existing schools 
is un-Christian, must not be prevented from giving their 
children such education, directly or indirectly, for which they 
believe they can give account to God. Coercion – I say it 
openly – is unbearable and ought to be ended. It is a 
presumption originating with theories of the revolution that 
holds that children are considered to be the property of the 
state, disregarding the rights of parents (as cited in van 
Brummelen, 1986, p. 23; see also Justins, 2002, p. 37) 
 
Further, van Prinsterer maintained that where state-run schooling was imposed 
on the people without regard to their religious convictions, then the people were to be 
considered ‘oppressed’ because despite its claims to neutrality, such education was 
‘religionless education… forced upon a Christian nation’ (quoted in Van Essen and 
Morton, 1990, p. 84; see also Justins, 2002: 37). However despite his pioneering 
articulation of neo-Calvinism into a political party, the movement did not achieve 
wide influence until van Prinster found in Kuyper an articulate and ideologically 
compatible successor (Rodgers, 1992).  
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Kuyper is particularly influential in the NCPC schooling movement. As a 
clergyman, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands (1901-1905), a respected 
theorist of political philosophy, and founder of the Free University of Amsterdam, it 
was Kuyper’s unique and systematic early twentieth-century re-articulation of the 
Calvinist tradition that has remained persuasive in the stated vision and mission of 
the NCPC schools (Naugle, 2001; Justins, 2002, pp. 38-40; Edlin and Thompson, 
2006). In particular, Kuyper opposed pietist forms of Christianity that, like Luther, 
separated the ‘inner’ from ‘outer’ person, soul from body, and existence in the world 
from heaven. In an 1898 lecture entitled ‘Calvinism as a Life System,’ for example, 
Kuyper (2007[1931], p. 22) drew a sharp distinction between what he saw as 
Lutheran Protestantism’s overriding concern with soteriology (i.e. how faith justifies 
individuals before an inscrutable God) and Calvinism, which he interprets as being a 
total form of life predicated on ‘the general cosmological principle of the sovereignty 
of God.’  
 
Developing Calvin’s insistence on the sovereignty of God, Kuyper 
(2007[1931]) put forward a political vision for neo-Calvinism with what he held to 
be its universal implications: ‘[That] the Sovereignty of God holds good for all the 
world, is true for all nations, and is of force in all authority which man [sic] exercises 
over man; even the authority which parents possess over children’ (p. 85). Thus, 
asserted Kuyper, the omnipotence of God had normative implications over all 
aspects of reality, life, thought, and culture (Naugle, 2001). This social and 
theological vision is crystallised in his assertion, often quoted in writings and 
documents of the NCPC schooling movement: ‘there is not a square inch in the 
whole domain of our human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over all, 
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does not cry: ‘Mine!’’ (Kuyper, 1998, p. 488) On this basis, then, Kuyper developed 
an expansive vision encompassing politics, art, families, commerce, intellectual life 
and the entire social order more generally, a vision crystallized in his conception of 
sphere sovereignty, which would come to be extremely influential in the NCPC 
schooling movement. 
 
For Kuyper, sphere sovereignty is effective in three distinct areas under which 
all human life fell: the state, society and the church. With regard to the first, Kuyper 
(2007[1931]) argued in line with Calvin that the authority of the state was derivative, 
for ‘all authority of governments on earth originates from the sovereignty of God 
alone’ (p. 82). Hence, the state is delegated sovereignty over the sphere of human 
coexistence merely in order to umpire the relations between its members and not as 
an authority unto itself – whether by popular or state sovereignty24 – but merely as an 
instrument of God’s providence (Kuyper, 2007[1931], p. 83; cf. Budziszewski, 2006, 
p. 58). However, given its delegated sovereign status, every other sphere ‘has an 
obligation to render whatever dues necessary for the maintenance of the overall unity 
of society as protected by the State’ (Kuyper, 2007[1931], p. 125). As education 
scholar Robert Long (1996, p. 22) points out rightly in his work on ‘new Christian 
                                                          
24 Kuyper lambasts both the ‘atheistic’ French theory of popular sovereignty and the ‘pantheistic’ 
German theory of state sovereignty, which he argues may seem apparently opposed but are ‘at heart 
identical’ in rejecting the sovereignty of God (Kuyper, 2007[1931], pp. 85, 90; cf. Budziszewski, 
2006, p. 57). 
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schools’ in Australia – what he calls ‘themelic’25 (i.e. ‘Christ-centred’) schools – the 
notion of sphere sovereignty means that: 
 
[R]eformed [i.e. neo-Calvinist] schools tend to be able to 
associate more readily with other government schools and 
government directives. They are able to perceive the truth 
and good present in the government system in general more 
than schools that are driven by a theological dynamic which 
understands the state as the Antichrist. 
 
Paralleling the delegated sovereignty to the state, God according to Kuyper 
(2007[1931], p. 90) has also delegated sovereignty to society, which he takes to be 
made up of smaller ‘sub-spheres’ of social life, each of which is understood to be 
sovereign over its own domain. These sub-spheres are categorized by Kuyper into 
four groups (Hexham, 1983): firstly, the sphere of social relationships, which 
describes the relational space of interaction between individuals; secondly, the 
corporate sphere, in which he includes all groupings of people in a corporate sense 
such as the university, trade unions, employers, organizations, companies, unions, 
etc.; thirdly, the domestic sphere, which encompasses family issues and includes 
                                                          
25 The term ‘themelic’ derives from the Koine (i.e. New Testament) Greek word themelios, which in 
its New Testament usage denotes foundations, beginnings or first principals, usually referring to an 
institution or system of truth (Thayer, 1977). When referring to schools, it follows the work of Long 
(1996, p. 2), who groups new Christian schools in Australia into the category of ‘themelic schools’ 
based upon their use of the term ‘Christ-centred’ as a marker of distinction from other Christian 
schools which are either Catholic, Protestant denominational or ecumenical. For the purposes of this 
thesis, I do not use the category of themelic schools because this term covers disparate Christian 
schools in the post-Karmel report era from movements such as the Christian Community Schools, 
Christian Schools Australia, Accelerated Christian Education, neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ 
schools and other independent Christian schools, it is not sufficiently precise for conducting a 
genealogy of a given movement as stemming from a particular discursive tradition. 
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marriage, education of children and private property; and finally, the communal 
sphere, which includes all spaces of a communal nature like streets, villages, towns, 
cities, etc. Each of these spheres, Kuyper argues, has its own pattern of development 
and individual laws over which the sovereign God has delegated sovereignty and the 
state has no power to alter (Hexham, 1983). This has tremendous implications for 
how neo-Calvinists approach the state, as Budziszewski (2006, p. 58) points out, 
insofar as the latter cannot extend or rule over an area of life demarcated by Kuyper 
as a sovereign sphere or sub-sphere. The state, asserts Kuyper (2007[1931]), ‘[must] 
never become an octopus, [but must] honor and maintain every form of life which 
grows independently in its own sacred autonomy’ (pp. 96-97). Hence, as Long 
(1997) again rightly points out on contemporary NCPC schooling (as part of his 
broader category of themelic schools): ‘Management in themelic schools is parent-
centred. Themelic schools emphasise the biblical role of the parents as the primary 
educators of their children’ (p. 29), notwithstanding what he argues to be ‘the lack of 
definition of what is meant by ‘parent-controlled’’ (p. 30). 
 
Finally, where Kuyper (2008[1931]) diverges most prominently from the 
instructions of Calvin is in the third sphere of the church; for while the latter 
legitimated the intervention of civil authorities into matters of religion, the former 
declares that the modern state ‘lacks the data of judgment’ to intervene on religious 
matters, and hence any such intervention ‘infringes the sovereignty of the church’ (p. 
105). It is important at this point, however, to be cognisant that the neo-Calvinist 
notion of sphere sovereignty does not correspond with the Anglo-liberal tradition’s 
division between religion in the private sphere contra secular political practices in 
the public sphere. For Kuyper’s conception of sphere sovereignty, it must be 
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recalled, is predicated on a prior, absolute vision of the sovereignty of God over all 
things.   
 
This expansive socio-political vision was a formative influence for the 
generation of Dutch neo-Calvinist migrants to Australia, who drew upon Kuyper as 
their primary resource in thinking about education and the religious rationale behind 
it. According to Deenick, a pioneer of the NCPC schooling movement in Australia, 
Kuyper’s views were prevalent and influential in its establishment: 
 
Kuyper’s perspective was part and parcel of your whole 
being …. the worldview was Kuyperian, and you never 
questioned that - the Christian newspaper, the Christian trade-
union, the Christian political party etc, you never questioned 
that that was the way it should be, … The issue straight away 
was how to bring faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, and the 
teachings of the Word of God to permeate through the whole 
of the curriculum (as cited in Justins, 2002, p. 41). 
 
Neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schools in Australia 
 
Justins (2002, p. 40) and Fowler (1976, p. 8) point out that the Dutch migrants 
to Australia of the 1950s held values and attitudes toward schooling that were shaped 
not only by the struggle for neo-Calvinist schooling in the Netherlands initiated by 
van Prinsterer and Kuyper, but also by a firmly neo-Calvinist discourse from the 
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Reformed (Calvinist) Churches in Australia which had promoted and sustained this 
struggle. The impetus for the establishment of NCPC schools began because its 
Dutch migrant founders, having experienced neo-Calvinist schooling communities in 
the Netherlands, wanted the same for their children (Christian Parent Controlled 
Schools [CPCS], 1992, p. 2). In addition, they felt that their neo-Calvinist 
convictions – in particular the anti-liberal sentiments of van Prinsterer and the 
totalizing theological and social vision of Kuyper – conflicted with both the 
institutional form and curricular content of Australian schools undergirded by the 
Anglo-liberal tradition. According to Hoekzema, a pioneer of the movement:  
 
Some Dutch migrants of Reformed persuasion arrived in this 
country in the early fifties and woke to the fact that 
something they had always taken for granted, a Christian 
school, was not available, non-existent. This was quite 
baffling for a supposedly Christian country and mind you, 
these migrants’ grandparents had won the battle for equality 
of education only forty years before. … They realised they 
would need to establish Christian schools because on arrival, 
choosing a school for their children was taken right out of 
their hands. There was only the state school and from the 
reactions of the children, it was soon evident there was 
conflict between the home and the school. … At home they 
spoke of God the creator, at school it was the Darwinian 
theory. Sure there were some lovely Scripture lessons, but 
this very method would lead the children to believe that God 
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and religion was something separate and had little or nothing 
to do with real life. After all, are we not to acknowledge God 
in all things? … Frustrated by the lack of control over the 
education of their children and the means to effect any 
change, they started doing something (as cited in Justins, 
2002, p. 59). 
 
Of particular note in the passage above is the neo-Calvinist rejection of the 
Anglo-liberal tradition’s definition of religious education as belonging to the private 
sphere separate from educational practices – that is, one that presupposes the 
Protestant confinement of religion to the private convictions of the individual quite 
apart from public education. This antagonistic relation to the prevailing schooling 
system also coalesced with a lack of affordable options for confessional Protestants 
in Australia. Unlike the families of students that attended more affluent and 
established church (i.e. mainly Anglican) grammar schools, Justins (2002, p. 61), 
following Van Zetten and Deenick (1991), suggests that the Dutch immigrants drew 
from the lower middle classes and the upper lower classes. In addition, there was a 
perception that the option of either a state-run or a church-based schooling violated 
the Kuyperian notion of sphere sovereignty. In particular, as Justins (2002, p. 45) 
depicts it, there was a direct relationship between this concept of sphere sovereignty 
and the perspective of the Dutch migrants that education was a responsibility given 
to parents by God and should not therefore be left to other agencies such as the 
government or the church. This is exemplified in a study book that was widely 
circulated amongst neo-Calvinist youth in the 1960s, which stated that: 
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The school is a sphere of life which has for its purpose the 
bringing to development of all the functions of the child. […] 
No school ought to be ecclesiastical. The Church does not 
have as its task the developing of all the functions of a child 
by means of generally formative instruction. [...] We 
decidedly reject a church-school… but urge a broad basis of 
cooperation among all who recognise Christ as King. […] 
The State can never act as educator because it must be neutral 
[…] The State may not play the schoolmaster any more than 
the Church (De Jongste & Krimpen as cited in Justins, 2002, 
pp. 44-45). 
 
It was this sense of alienation from the prevailing education system, as well as 
the strong Kuyperian sensibility that children should be formed as ‘Christians [who] 
should be concerned with and involved in all aspects of life, including politics, trade-
unions and newspapers’ (Justins, 2002, p. 41), that gave rise to the movement in 
Australia.  
 
Understood schematically therefore, the pioneers of the movement can be 
broadly understood as embodying a tradition that interpreted the then-prevailing 
system of schooling –predicated on a division between private religion and public 
education – as antagonistic to its vision of ‘God in all things’ and a threat to their 
God-given responsibilities for their children. Insofar as a radical disjunction and 
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inadequacy was understood through the neo-Calvinist lens of the Dutch migrants 
within their newfound situation in Australia, then the birth of the NCPC schooling 
movement can be seen as a novel iteration of the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition in 
response to the then-prevailing social liberal order built upon an Anglo-liberal 
tradition. 
 
In response to this circumstance, the first association for Christian ‘parent-
controlled’ schools in Australia was formed in Kingston and Hobart (Tasmania) in 
1953, which eventually led to the establishment of Calvin Christian School in 1962. 
The first association was followed by other associations in the mid-1950s in Mount 
Evelyn (Victoria) and Wollongong (NSW) in 1954, and in Blacktown (NSW), 
Brisbane (Queensland) and Perth (Western Australia) in 1957 (Justins, 2002, p. 92; 
also Long, 1994). In January of 1966, the National Union of Associations for Parent 
Controlled Christian Schools (NUPCCS) network was formed by representatives 
from the first NCPC schools and associations across Australia who intended to 
establish similar schools in other parts of the country. At its inauguration, pioneer 
Deenick reaffirmed the distinctive neo-Calvinist tradition that necessitated the 
establishment of the NCPC schooling movement. He did so by emphasizing that 
education for their children should be an expansive Christian education that beyond a 
mere inner belief is also marked by a view for what this means for all for ‘life’ and 
‘culture’: 
 
It is for this and for no other purpose that we establish our 
Christian day school movement. Education ought to be 
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Christian education, ought to acknowledge the Cross and the 
Crown of Jesus Christ, and ought to prepare for his return, so 
that generations come and go, but the church remains and 
Christian service and Christian life and Christian culture and 
Christian learning remain (Deenick, 1966). 
 
Under the NUPCCS, two further schools were established in the 1960s and, 
coinciding with the extension of Federal Government education funding to 
community and religious schools after the 1973 Karmel Report (see Chapter 3; also 
Long, 1996a, p. 21), the NCPC schooling movement established five schools in the 
1970s and five in the early-1980s through independent associations under its banner 
(Justins, 2002, p. 26; Justins, d’Arbon & Sanber, 2002). In 1988, the movement 
changed its name from Parent Controlled Christian Schools to Christian Parent 
Controlled Schools (CPCS)  and established a national office to ‘represent Christian 
schooling at government level and to co-ordinate curricular, organizational and 
training initiatives’ (CPCS, 1992: 2). The organisation retained its name and 
structure until it rebranded itself as Christian Education National (CEN) in 2008 
(CEN, 2011). At the time of writing, the movement encompassed an Australia-wide 
grouping of 53 member associations that together govern over 80 schools of 
approximately 23,000 students and 2,000 teaching staff (CEN, 2011; see Figure 15). 
They have become, according to Justins et al (2002): 
 
...an increasingly significant component of the non-
government, non-Catholic schooling sector in Australia. They 
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have experienced rapid growth in the forty years of their 
existence... These schools have frequently asserted that they 
promote explicitly Christian values. They tend to be non-
elitist and are widely accessible through their low fee paying 
policies. 
 
 
Figure 15: Locations of CEN member schools in Australia (CEN, 2010) 
 
Theological underpinnings and foundational values of neo-Calvinist ‘parent-
controlled’ schools 
 
If a distinguishing feature of contemporary NCPC schools is their frequent 
assertion of ‘explicitly Christian values’ as Justins et al (2002) illustrate, or insist on 
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the self-description of their schooling as being ‘truly Christian,’ ‘really Christian,’ or 
‘fully Christian’ as Long (1996, p. 9) reports, then it is necessary to provide an 
outline of what these might consist of in order to discern how such schooling 
interacts with the present, neo-liberal regime. As detailed above, the genealogy of 
this discursive tradition can be discerned from aspects of Calvin’s conception of 
social order, through its iteration and development in the neo-Calvinism of van 
Prinsterer and Kuyper, to the impact of the latter statesmen on the dispositions to and 
expectations of education amongst post-war Dutch Calvinist migrants in Australia, 
and who in turn pioneered the establishment of the NCPC schooling movement and 
its schools. Justins (2002) discerns two levels of ‘Christian values’ expressed by 
NCPC schools: at one level are the ‘foundational values’ of NCPC schools that are 
focused specifically on schooling while undergirding these are a set of common neo-
Calvinist ‘theological motifs’ that, although encompassing a wider scope than 
education, continue to be operative ‘below’ the ‘foundational values’ of the 
geographically and demographically disparate schools (pp. 245-247; also Justins et 
al, 2002). I shall first outline the theological motifs of the contemporary NCPC 
schooling movement with regard to the broader neo-Calvinist discursive tradition, 
offering a sketch of how as a particular iteration it may differ from the antagonistic 
position adopted at its inception. This will be followed by an outline of two key 
foundational values that are seen by the NCPC schooling movement to be a key 
reflection of their fidelity to their tradition in the present conjuncture. 
 
The socio-political context around contemporary NCPC schooling is different 
from that which it confronted at the time of its inception in post-war Australia. With 
the passage of time, numerical growth, demographic changes and a shift to a neo-
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liberal regime (with accompanying changes in the educational policy environment) 
now constituting the present, the question thus arises as to what tendencies might 
characterise its task today. In order to discern how the NCPC schooling movement 
understands its continuity with the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition, I shall draw 
primarily from statements announced by the movement to address this new situation 
and subsequently published as the Transforming Christian Education (Christian 
Parent Controlled Schools [CPCS], 1992) document, which was jointly written and 
produced by twenty-four of the NCPC schooling movement’s key pioneers and 
emerging ‘new pioneers’ to mark thirty years since the opening of the first of their 
schools, as well as the circumstance whereby the ‘first generation of Christian parent 
controlled schooling is passing’ (CPCS, 1992, p. 3). In explicating the constituent 
elements of what the NCPC schooling movement considers as the basics of a 
‘Christian World View,’ the document sums up its theological position concisely in a 
paragraph: 
 
Christian view of the world finds its foundation in the 
character and activity of God evident in the world He has 
made, perfectly expressed in Jesus, God’s Son, and 
communicated reliably in the Bible. The Scriptures tell who 
God is. They proclaim His creative and redemptive activity in 
the world which is the work of His hands. The Scriptures tell 
who we are and proclaim God’s calling to all human kind to 
be His People in His World (CPCS, 1992, p. 4). 
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I shall presently unpack this paragraph, written in language specific to neo-
Calvinist theology, into three distinct themes that emerge and what it might mean for 
the movement’s approaches to its project of ‘ongoing reclamation of this most vital 
sphere of education’ (CPCS, 1992, p. 3). In addition to the Transforming Christian 
Education document, I shall also explore the articulation and development of such 
themes as expressed in supplementary writings by the academic proponents, 
principals, teachers and parents of the movement since that time, especially as it is 
contained in their two key publications – Pointing the Way: Directions for Christian 
education in a new millennium (2004) and Engaging the culture: Christians at work 
in education (2006), and two periodicals – Nurture: Journal for Home & School and 
The Christian Teachers Journal  – which are widely circulated in the movement26. 
 
Firstly, in describing its Christian view of the world as finding ‘its foundation 
in the character and activity of God evident in the world He has made, perfectly 
expressed in Jesus, God’s Son,’ the NCPC schooling movement is affirming a 
perspective known as the ‘Biblical worldview.’ According to Richard Edlin (2004), a 
former principal of the teacher education arm of the NCPC movement – the National 
Institute for Christian Education (NICE), this theme is expressed in the insistence 
that: ‘Education is never neutral. Christian education must ensure that students learn 
about the world and their places and tasks in it from a biblical worldview’ (p. 2). 
                                                          
26 According to CEN (2011), Nurture is mainly targeted to families and the wider community. ‘The 
attractive page format features issues relevant to both home and school and shares news among school 
communities. Many schools subscribe on behalf of all school families so that it forms a part of their 
community building and education program. Some schools distribute copies to local churches, 
doctors’ surgeries and hairdressers, where a range of people can read about Christian education.’ The 
Christian Teachers Journal, on the other hand, is a professional journal targeted at teachers, 
academics and administrators within the movement. It is ‘published quarterly by Christian Education 
National through the National Institute for Christian Education. It is published by teachers and for 
teachers as a forum for the exchange of ideas and practices to advance the cause of Christ centred 
education.’  
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This notion of Biblical worldview stems from the discursive tradition of neo-
Calvinism, which holds that the Bible in its entirely is an ‘unfolding narrative,’ 
consisting in a ‘comprehensive and integrated understanding of creation, fall and 
redemption’ (Bartholomew, 2004).  
 
More specifically, according to an article in The Christian Teachers Journal by 
Koyzis (2006), creation in the first place refers to how ‘the biblical story begins 
[when] God created the heaven and the earth (Genesis 1:1). We further learn from 
scripture that God created everything after its own kind (Genesis 1:11, 12, 21, 24, 
25)’; secondly, fall denotes a moment when ‘Sin enters the picture when God’s 
image bearers rebel against the patterns of obedient living he has ordained for them 
in that creation,’ which are exemplified by ‘failing to follow such commandments as 
marital fidelity, respect for life and property, speaking truthfully and so forth’; and 
finally, redemption referring to ‘redemption in Jesus Christ, renewal in the Holy 
Spirit and the consummation of God’s kingdom,’ which ‘does not remove us from 
God’s creation; it restores it to its intended purpose, including the pluriformity of 
communities that make up human society […] its proper task of doing justice […] 
uniting spouses and generating new life [i.e. procreation], [and] restore the 
educational enterprise to its designated task of teaching students to live and work 
obediently in God’s world’ (p. 16). The importance of this threefold ‘Biblical 
Worldview’ theme for NCPC schools sets them, at least in theory, apart from the 
division of religious education from non-religious education in the Anglo-liberal 
tradition. This is a point underscored in Edlin’s (2004) assertion that: 
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A sound grasp of this worldview should be a basic tool in 
every Christian teacher’s intellectual toolkit. It must be used 
to shape the Christian school’s view of the child. It will give 
foundational insight into curriculum construction. It will 
guide school and classroom relationships (p. 7). 
 
Given the weight placed on a ‘Biblical worldview,’ the second theme – 
centrality of the Bible – emerge as a necessary corollary insofar as the former is 
predicated on being ‘communicated reliably in the Bible [because the] Scriptures tell 
who God is.’ According to Edlin (2004), this theme affirms that: ‘The Bible, God’s 
written word, has the pre-eminent place in the life of the Christian. Divinely inspired 
and inerrant in original form, it is authoritative for all of life, including the life of the 
Christian school’ (p. 3). This appears superficially to position NCPC schools within a 
broad camp of so-called ‘Bible-believing’ protestant, evangelical and fundamentalist 
schools – what Long (1996) has identified as a commonality in all ‘themelic’ schools 
to ‘subscribe to the doctrine of the infallibility and/or the inerrancy27 of the Bible and 
understand this to be foundational to their identity as Christian’ (p. 5; also 1994, 
1996a, 1997). This is a position that appears to be confirmed by the language used in 
the Transforming Christian Education document to further describe the Bible: 
 
                                                          
27 ‘Biblical infallibility’ denotes the ‘claim to teach, and particularly to define doctrine, without the 
possibility of error’ while ‘Biblical inerrancy’ denotes the claim that ‘the Bible is absolutely true and 
contains no error, not only in matters of faith and doctrine, but also in matters of history or the 
physical sciences’ (González, 2005, p. 87). While often used in conjunction or interchangeably, I 
submit that the difference between these hermeneutical approaches may bear significant variances in 
educational practice. 
277 
The Scriptures testify to Christ. Emanating from God 
Himself, the Scriptures carry God’s authority. Their purpose 
is to lead us to salvation through faith in Jesus and to equip us 
thoroughly for a life of faith. [Therefore] The Scriptures 
should occupy the pre-eminent place in Christian parent-
controlled schools. As a movement we confess in our basis, 
our statement of faith, that the Scriptures are ‘the only 
absolute rule for all faith and conduct and therefore also for 
the education of our children at home and at school. (CPCS, 
1992, p. 5) 
 
However, while Christian symbols and high modality language are used to 
describe the centrality of the Bible in NCPC schools, it is also important to note that 
the movement’s neo-Calvinist approach is unique in its insistence that the Bible not 
be used as a prescriptive textbook, proof-text or rulebook for the day-to-day 
operation of schooling (Edlin, 2004, pp. 4-5). This stands in contrast with the claims 
of Long (1996), who argues that the Bible in such schools ‘is used cosmetically to 
support the assumptions assimilated from themelic culture’ with ‘heavy influences of 
fundamentalist literalism within the movement’ (p. 12), and which are in turn argued 
to be ‘founded in naive realism anchored in the dogma of inerrancy’ (Long, 1997, p. 
21). In a publication produced by the NCPC schooling movement, for example, 
Christian education scholar Trevor Cooling (2006) concurs with Edlin by exhorting 
NCPC schools against a method of ‘literal or naïve realism’ that sees the 
‘authoritative teaching of Scripture as having an unambiguous meaning that can be 
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downloaded from the Bible and then transmitted to Christians irrespective of the 
cultural context of their generation’ (p. 79). Rather, as a pioneer of the NCPC 
schooling movement Doug Blomberg (2005) is keen to emphasise, ‘[a] Christian 
school is not a school that focuses on the Bible, but one that uses the Bible to focus 
on all creation. It means having a biblically informed perspective’ (pp. 19-20). This 
means emphasis is placed more on seeing the world through the grid of its ‘Biblical 
worldview’ than literalist readings of the text. This ideal is expressed by NCPC 
school principal van der Schoor (2005) as ‘the radical effect of looking at history, 
mankind [sic], the future, culture, the arts, society, technology etc through ‘Christ, 
who makes all things new’’ (p. 21).  
 
A third notable theme is also evident in the abovementioned theological 
position statement from the Transforming Christian Education document, and which 
can be seen as an expression of the first two themes; for insofar as the Bible and 
Biblical worldview ‘proclaim His [i.e. God’s] creative and redemptive activity in the 
world which is the work of His hands,’ these are also held to ‘tell who we are and 
proclaim God’s calling to all human kind to be His People in His World.’ In other 
words, according to Edlin (2004), NCPC schools seek to foster what is labeled 
‘responsive discipleship’ that constitutes this knowledge of self (‘who we are’) and 
the task of proclaiming ‘God’s calling’ (p. 3). As he elaborates:  
 
Christian education is not just an introspective activity. It 
exists to equip young people to share God’s dynamic 
message of hope and peace in Christ, in every vocation and 
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activity, with a lost and forlorn generation. […] Christian 
schools should not be equipping young people to be the next 
generation of pew-sitters. They should be equipping young 
people, as they come to know King of Kings, to be his 
ambassadors in the world, seeking to bring his peace into all 
of life (Edlin, 2004, p. 12). 
 
Edlin’s exhortation is a common theme amongst contemporary neo-Calvinists, 
i.e. the belief that there is a struggle that forms the basis of every culture in every 
generation and within every human person: ‘a struggle between the inclination to 
submit to God and the inclination to rebel against God’ (Bartholomew, 2004). 
Resonant with the socio-political vision of Calvin and the expansive neo-Calvinist 
politics of Kuyper, and in contrast to the nominalist and Protestant presuppositions 
undergirding the Anglo-liberal tradition’s division of religion-in-private/public 
politics,  this approach rejects the consignment of this struggle to a purely spiritual 
realm, avowing this struggle between the submission and rebellion as an immanent 
struggle in everyday life and in all spheres of culture insofar the ‘Biblical worldview’ 
asserts ‘that creation is God’s’ and that ‘Jesus Christ is the one who restores the 
covenant [i.e. relation of divine grace28] between God and his creatures’ (Middleton 
and Walsh, 1984, p. 149). Thus, as prominent expositors of the neo-Calvinist 
                                                          
28 A ‘covenant’ can be understood most generally as ‘an agreement made between two or more 
persons or groups in which each agrees to perform certain acts with reciprocal response from the 
other. Faithfulness is expected as a measure of integrity between each party and the mutual trust 
between them’ (Coats, 1990, p. 166). Within the Reformed and Neo-Calvinist tradition in particular, it 
is held that God entered into a covenant with humans and with the created order at the beginning of 
time. This covenant was broken by human sin, but is ultimately and comprehensively restored through 
Jesus as the Christ in the New Kingdom. See Bartholomew (1995)  
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perspective Middleton and Walsh (1984) explain, involvement with the broader 
culture is not an option for the ‘Biblical Christian’: 
 
Fleeing from the world is no option for a Christian. ...such a 
dualistic attitude is unbiblical, discredits the gospel and 
cannot really function as a viable world view. We live in this 
culture—there is no escape. Jesus’s call for us to proclaim his 
kingdom means that healing must be offered to our dying 
culture. (p.  150) 
 
In NCPC schooling, this theme of ‘responsive discipleship’ is understood as 
having broad cultural implications, which appears to stand in contrast to claims by 
Long (1997, p. 21) that the ‘revolutionary messages of the Bible regarding politics, 
economics, history, social justice, technology, poverty and management are highly 
domesticated.’ Such disjunctions between the Bible and its socio-political 
implications do not appear to be borne out for the NCPC schooling movement, at 
least in its stated mission. Rather, it seeks to ‘model and nurture responsive 
discipleship’ by, amongst other things ‘conserving and passing on the story and 
worldview of its tradition,’ ‘encouraging critical analysis, different ways of knowing, 
inquiry and testing,’ a ‘vision of a new and better world [that] leads students to be 
reforming agents in society,’ and students who ‘celebrate the Lordship of Christ 
through glorifying him in ‘every nook and cranny’ of life, which means ‘educating 
the ‘whole student’ in all their ways of functioning (e.g. the intellectual, moral, 
cultural, aesthetic, social, physical, vocational, etc) for responsive discipleship in all 
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of life’ (Hanscamp, 2003, p. 7). In practice, this would apply to ‘the Christian in 
commerce, industry, service industries, homemaking, the arts, the military, health 
care and other areas’ (Edlin, 2004, p. 13). 
 
Taken together, the three themes outlined here undergird a subtle shift in 
emphasis within the NCPC schooling movement since the time of its inception, albeit 
remaining firmly articulated within the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition; in 
particular, a certain easing of antagonism between the tradition of neo-Calvinism and 
the Australian schooling system in general. While the movement affirms the 
continuity of its tradition through a stated desire to foster a ‘new set of pioneers’ that 
embody an ‘ongoing vision [to] be humble servants of the living God’ (CPCS, 1992, 
p. 3), it is also cognisant of its changing approach to the prevailing socio-political 
context. As the Transforming Christian Education document frames it, the early 
Dutch pioneers’ ‘initial concerns were with survival – funding teachers and 
providing facilities at a time when there was little government funding’ while for the 
latter day movement, ‘when the schools grew to be strong and established, attention 
shifted to articulating educational positions and developing curricula. […] It was a 
time of innovation, rapid expansion and some robust debate between people and 
schools’ (CPCS, 1992, p. 2). This change can also be detected in the form through 
which the centrality of the Bible and a Biblical worldview are articulated, with an 
emphasis on the one hand on its translation and application through ‘engaging the 
culture’ (i.e. ‘history, mankind [sic], the future, culture, the arts, society, technology 
etc’) and enacting ‘redemption’ in the world (e.g. through ‘doing justice,’ ‘uniting 
spouses,’ etc), and on the other hand avoiding introspection and literalism (e.g. ‘not a 
school that focuses on the Bible, but one that uses the Bible to focus on all creation’). 
282 
 
The connection between these theological themes from the neo-Calvinist 
tradition and its application to contemporary education can be most evidently 
detected in the ‘core values’ of NCPC schooling – or what Justins (2002) identifies 
as the ‘foundational values’ derived from the translation and application of these 
‘theological motifs’ into education-specific contexts (pp. 117-159; also Justins et al, 
2002). In particular, two distinctive core values that NCPC schooling affirms as a 
movement are: Firstly, ‘[u]pholding a community of Christian parents having a 
determinative and ongoing involvement in setting the direction for the school which, 
under God, educates their children’; and secondly, ‘[c]omplementing the roles of 
parents and the Church in the education of children for responsive discipleship, 
equipping them to share God’s life and hope with all people and within the structures 
of all cultures, including their own’ (CPCS, 2007). As it is on the question of how 
these values of NCPC schooling are interpreted within the present neo-liberal context 
that the following chapters are based, I shall presently elaborate on the NCPC 
schooling movement’s understandings of these key values and its connections to the 
theological motifs they affirm, as well as to the broader neo-Calvinist discursive 
tradition sketched above. 
 
Firstly, the role of parents as emphasised in NCPC schooling is linked to the 
neo-Calvinist insistence that God has delegated to parents the primary authority and 
responsibility for the education of their children. This means that while: 
 
[T]eachers make many decisions in the day to day operation 
of the school… In principle, none of these decisions are 
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exempt from scrutiny, revision, and if necessary, change by 
the parents through the appropriate channels. Parental 
authority cannot be confined to the broad framework or to 
general principles. It also reaches to details of the curriculum 
and classroom implementation of those principles (CPCS, 
1992, p. 9). 
 
As Edlin (2004) surmises of this core value: ‘God has given to parents the 
primary responsibility for the nurture of their children. The Christian [i.e. NCPC] 
school partners with parents to assist them in carrying out this responsibility’ (p. 3). 
The function of NCPC schools is framed as operating in ‘partnership’ with parents 
and to ‘assist’ parents, which is important in this regard because of the Kuyperian 
notion of sphere sovereignty that places education squarely within the domestic 
sphere of the family. Hence, Edlin (2004) goes on to assert that this is a ‘biblical 
mandate’ that cannot be abrogated to the school, for: 
 
This responsibility applies to all of the nurturing parents 
provide – physical, spiritual, and educational. Christian 
parents do not yield this authority at the school gate... Parents 
carry out their biblical mandate by ensuring that the policies 
and procedures of the institution conform to biblical patterns 
and by being involved in the life of the institution in 
appropriate ways.  
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Because parental nurture is a God-given responsibility, 
Christian [i.e. NCPC] schools should beware of language, 
structures and a school culture that strip parents of this 
responsibility (p. 9) 
 
Of note in this elaboration of NCPC schooling’s core value of parental 
responsibility for the nurture of their children is its intimation of what such a 
responsibility entails in practice: in the first place, for parents, the rightful exercise of 
this responsibility involves ensuring the overall practices of the educational 
institution where their children are placed coheres with the biblical worldview – or 
what Edlin (2004) has termed ‘biblical patterns’ in this instance – and an active 
involvement in the institution in ‘appropriate ways,’ which include constantly 
monitoring ‘that their children learn about the world and their places and tasks in it in 
a way that celebrates the lordship of Christ over all creation,’ and direct classroom 
involvement ‘where parents are encouraged to observe and participate in a non-
disruptive manner’ (pp. 8, 9). This notion of ‘partnership’ is concisely expressed, for 
example, by NCPC school parent Joan Dixon (2006) who explains that:  
 
Christian school education will contribute to a triangular 
partnership comprising school, family and church, that will 
establish the foundations of a Christian worldview that, I 
pray, will stay with my children forever. My children are 
going to a Christian school because I want them to develop a 
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true understanding of their lives in the context of God’s 
creation (p. 5) 
 
Like the reinforcement of the Christian worldview through the ‘triangulation’ 
of home-school-church explicated above, Adele Smith (2005), a parent of children at 
Southern Highlands Christian School in Bowral, NSW, also emphasises a 
distinctively neo-Calvinist interpretation of partnership between the spheres of home 
and school in order to consistently reinforce ‘Christian values’: 
 
[D]o you leave your child’s education to the teachers? It 
won’t work, because family is the primary source of a child’s 
education. If a family’s example conflicts with the values 
taught at school, the child ends up confused. But if parents 
live what they ‘preach,’ you can be assured that the school 
will reinforce your Christian values (p. 21). 
 
As a consequence of this insistence on parental responsibility and partnership, 
then, NCPC schools are in turn expected to reflect the Christian values expressed in 
the homes of their students, for ‘[t]he school and the home can only be mutually 
supportive where meaningful cooperation and interactions occur, and where a 
biblical perception of the relationship between the two exists’ (Edlin, 2004, p. 9). 
Such a ‘biblical perception’ is expected to underline the conviction that the locus of 
educational responsibility lies with parents while the Christian school is a partner in 
this, a conviction expressed as unequivocally God-given by Vernon Clark (2009), 
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who writes as principal of Maranatha Christian School in Victoria and as a parent of 
children in NCPC schools that: 
 
I am sure that the responsibility regarding who educates our 
children will be answered in different ways, depending on 
what roles are accorded to the government and to us parents. 
But, when it comes to the church or Christian school, the 
locus of responsibility takes on a whole new dimension. 
Because God gives those of us who are parents the 
responsibility of educating our children for himself, we also 
have been given the control of education. 
[…] 
At Maranatha Christian School, we believe that the Bible 
places responsibility for each child’s education squarely on 
the shoulders of that child’s parents and that the home is the 
foundation upon which children are educated. We do not 
abrogate this responsibility from parents, but support these 
Christian values in giving parents a choice in education (p. 
15) 
 
Here, what is most significant for the present thesis is the connection 
established between the first passage that draws directly on a neo-Calvinist 
injunction for parental responsibility of the education of their children, and the 
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second passage, which frames NCPC schooling as a ‘choice’ that is consistent with 
that injunction. Given that the rhetoric of ‘choice’ is also deployed within a neo-
liberal regime that seeks to marketise schooling in Australia, how then does the 
NCPC schooling movement negotiate the God-given responsibility of educating their 
children in such a context? In turn, how does the neo-liberal regime accommodate 
the particularity of the NCPC schooling movement’s claim for parent responsibility 
and control as a divine mandate? These questions will form the basis of Chapter 5, 
which will draw on the discursive antecedents of the neo-Calvinist and Anglo-liberal 
traditions outlined in the present and previous chapters that undergird the 
contemporary NCPC schooling movement and the prevailing neo-liberal discourse 
respectively, as well as a consideration of the discursive processes that characterise 
the relations between the two, giving rise to the institutional arrangements of 
Australian education in the present. 
 
The second core value of the NCPC schooling movement arising from the 
theological themes of the neo-Calvinist tradition is the stated desire to train students 
to be responsive disciples within the structures of all cultures. According to Edlin 
(2004), this is taken to mean that: ‘Christian education is not just an introspective 
activity. It exists to equip young people to share God’s dynamic message of hope and 
peace in Christ, in every vocation and activity, with a lost and forlorn generation’ (p. 
12). This core value is, in turn, undergirded by the neo-Calvinist understanding of 
children as a gift made in God’s image and who should hence be rightfully oriented 
toward glorifying God. The Transforming Christian Education document affirms 
that children are ‘God’s creatures – made in His image to live in relationship with 
Him’ and hence NCPC schooling’s ‘leading of children should not be to simply 
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socialize them into acceptable ways of behaving, but should give opportunities for 
learning, living and serving as citizens of God’s Kingdom’  (CPCS, 1992, p. 8).  
 
Drawing on the biblical worldview narrative framework of Creation-Fall-
Redemption, Edlin (2004) elaborates by describing children as ‘individually gifted 
image bearers of God’ who are nonetheless ‘impacted by the fall and need to find 
redemption in Christ. The school should [thus] help students to discover God’s peace 
and purpose for themselves and for the world in which they love as stewards 
responsible to the creator’ (p. 11). This ultimate goal of NCPC schooling is 
highlighted by NCPC schoolteacher and NICE lecturer Fiona Partridge’s (2004) 
reflection on the ‘unique role of the Christian school’: 
 
Through Christian education we aim to prepare students to be 
active workers in God’s kingdom and therefore need to 
purposely face students toward God and his sovereignty over 
all things. Just as a mirror reflects whatever it is in front of, 
we need to line our students up with God so that their lives 
can reflect him. […] In a Christian school environment, we 
can address one area of our students’ lives that they were 
created for; their spiritual relationship with their creator (p. 5) 
 
Likewise, NCPC school principal Hanscamp affirms that the NCPC school 
exists, in large part, to train its students inwardly in order that they may be 
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outwardly-oriented for the purpose of glorifying God in all areas of human life. 
According to him: 
 
The [NCPC] school is not just a ‘skills equipper’ or a 
preparatory ground for employment, even though this will 
naturally result from the effective work of the school. A 
Christian school will seek to model and nurture responsive 
discipleship within the kingdom contours of the word of God 
and is characterized by a number of features [which include]: 
- Discovering student’s gifts. The Christian school helps the 
student to unfold their gifts, which God has given for doing 
works of service in the building of his kingdom. 
- Educating for all of life. The Christian school will celebrate the 
Lordship of Christ through glorifying and enjoying him in 
‘every nook and cranny’ of life. This means educating the 
‘whole’ student in all their ways of functioning (e.g. the 
intellectual, moral, cultural, aesthetic, social, physical, 
vocational, etc) for responsive discipleship in all of life. 
(Hanscamp, 2003, p. 7) 
  
Two points from this exposition of NCPC schooling’s stated aim of cultivating 
responsive discipleship are of interest in the present thesis: Firstly, while NCPC 
schooling is described as being more than a mere ‘skills equipper’ for future 
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employment, it is nonetheless assumed that such skilling is a natural result of the 
NCPC school if it is operated effectively; and secondly, through the framing of 
students as bearers of ‘gifts’ bestowed by God, it is envisaged that the NCPC school 
will produce students who have actualised these gifts in various respects (e.g. 
‘intellectual, moral, cultural, aesthetic, social, physical, vocational, etc’) so as to 
serve God/Christ in every arena of social life. Again, given that the neo-liberal 
discourse frames education as a means of human capital investment in order that 
future worker-citizens may actualize their abilities in the globalising labour market, 
how does NCPC schooling negotiate the dual demands of skilling of students for 
work and the actualization of God’s gifts? And again, the inverse question arises as 
to how the neo-liberal regime manages to accommodate schools such as those within 
the NCPC schooling movement, whose particular religious discourse may bring forth 
ends such as ‘responsive discipleship’ that are not immediately synonymous with the 
educational objective of the former?  
 
These questions are the concern of the following chapter, which attends both to 
how the prevailing public purpose of education is defined and the accountability 
measures put in place to regulate schools in accordance with this purpose, as well as 
the approach of the NCPC schooling movement to the public purpose so defined. In 
seeking to address these questions, I attempt to avoid the judgment of the NCPC 
schooling movement as either being ‘true’ and ‘faithful’ or ‘contradictory’ and 
‘unfaithful’ to some essence of the neo-Calvinist tradition, let alone some ‘core’ of 
Christianity. Long (1997), for example, makes the argument that:  
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The practical nature of schooling activity sets itself against 
the utopian and absolutist claims of much of the language of 
the lay parent body [that govern NCPC schools]. So at one 
level there is much talk about the ideals of themelic schooling 
and on another the very real business of the pragmatic nature 
of schooling. There is also a difference between thinking at a 
systemic leadership level and the school level of thinking and 
action (p. 24). 
 
By contrast, I argue for the purposes of a conjunctural analysis that the 
different ways in which the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition is interpreted for such 
circumstances as the ‘practical nature of schooling activity’ or the ‘very real business 
of the pragmatic nature of schooling’ cannot simply be assumed to be separate or 
contradictory to some unsullied truth of its religious discourse, as if the apparently 
‘utopian and absolutist claims’ or ‘ideals of themelic schooling’ are merely a sui 
generis discourse that is concerned with otherworldly ideals or absolute moral 
beliefs. Rather, I follow the likes of Asad and Hall in arguing that the ‘religious’ 
elements of neo-Calvinist discourse can be understood as meaningful only in its 
articulation with apparently ‘non-religious’ elements like literacy, examinations and 
marketing, which are in turn related to the education system within a broader 
political formation. As Asad (2003) specifies, the ‘selectivity with which people 
approach their tradition doesn’t necessarily undermine their claim to its integrity. 
Nor does the attempt to adapt the older concerns of a tradition’s followers to their 
new predicament in itself dissolve the coherence of that tradition’ (p. 195). Instead, 
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such articulations of religious discourse are ‘precisely the object of argument among 
those who claim to be upholding the essence of the tradition’ (Asad, 2003, p. 19). So 
rather than seeing a disjuncture between the NCPC schooling movement’s religious 
claims on the one hand and the pragmatics of schooling on the other, I abide by 
Hall’s (1996, p. 142) point that the meaning of religious claims comes with what else 
they are articulated to and their position within a political formation. As such, in 
addressing how the NCPC schooling movement relates to the neo-liberal regime and 
vice-versa, I shall attend to the discursive antecedents of both the NCPC schooling 
and the neo-liberal regime that may account for their possible affinities, then 
continue by determining the processes through which the elements of each are 
interpreted and acted upon in relation to the other. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I offered an account of religious education as it is understood 
within the neo-Calvinist tradition. In the first section, I traced a genealogy of the 
theological stances and foundational values of NCPC schools, which are predicated 
on Calvin’s sixteenth century theopolitical vision of social order and the politics of 
Dutch neo-Calvinism in the nineteenth century. This discursive tradition, with its 
expansive definition of religious education as all-encompassing, was embodied by 
Dutch migrants to Australia in the 1950s. However, given the then-prevailing system 
of education and its definition of religious education – drawn from the Anglo-liberal 
tradition – as separate from ‘secular’ education, an antagonism arose from 
participants of the neo-Calvinist tradition. Specifically, the latter rejected the 
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demarcation of religion from educational practices, which they perceived ‘would 
lead the children to believe that God and religion was something separate and had 
little or nothing to do with real life’ (Hoekzema, see above).  Thus, associations were 
formed in the 1950s across Australia that would see the formation of NCPC schools 
from the 1960s onwards, a process which would receive further impetus in the 1970s 
after the implementation of the 1973 Karmel Report that made state funding 
available for religious schools, as I have outlined in the previous chapter. Despite the 
articulation of NCPC schools onto a plane of administrative comparison and 
government under the social liberal and then neo-liberal regimes since that time, the 
proponents of NCPC schooling persist in arguing that the movement maintains a 
vision consistent with its neo-Calvinist discursive tradition. 
 
In the final section of this chapter, I considered at length some of the 
theological motifs and foundational values affirmed by NCPC schools. The former, 
which form the basis for the more educationally specific claims of the latter, include 
an emphasis on a biblical worldview that consists in seeing the world through a 
narrative of ‘creation-fall-redemption,’ an attendant regard for the centrality of the 
bible in educational practice, and a determination to foster ‘responsive discipleship,’ 
which entails a training of students informed by a biblical worldview to occupy 
positions in all spheres of contemporary social life. These theological motifs then 
give rise to the foundational values of NCPC schooling, of which two were 
highlighted: one, the importance of parental responsibility in the nurture of their 
children; and two, the stated goal of training students to responsive disciples who 
will occupy various social spheres for the purpose of glorifying God/Christ. In  light 
of the prevailing neo-liberal regime in Australia and its discourse on the urgency of 
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training future worker-citizens and the efficacy of market choice in schooling, then, 
questions arise as to how the NCPC schooling movement interprets these 
foundational values in relation to these two imperatives. These questions will form 
the overarching basis for the next two chapters. 
  
295 
Chapter 5 - Fulfilling their God-given Talents: Neo-Calvinist 
schooling and the neo-liberal ‘public purpose of education’ 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I portrayed the inauguration of the NCPC schooling 
movement in the 1950s by Dutch migrants as an alternative educational practice 
arising from an antagonism between their expansive view of religious education 
arising from a neo-Calvinist discursive tradition and the mainstream of Australian 
schooling. This tradition can be located within a broader Anglo-liberal tradition that 
encompasses both nominalist and Protestant presuppositions on religion and religious 
education. The pioneers of the NCPC schooling movement such as Deenick asserted 
that education for Christian children ‘ought to be Christian education, ought to 
acknowledge the Cross and the Crown of Jesus Christ, and ought to prepare for his 
return’ (as cited in Justins, 2002, p. iv), as opposed to the then-prevailing 
arrangements for religious education as an addendum to secular public education. 
Yet by the mid 1970s, NCPC schools were placed within the Australian education 
system alongside other religious and non-religious schools owing to the Federal 
Government’s extension of public funding to community and religious schools at that 
time. This meant that NCPC schooling could set up new schools with such funds 
under the condition that they justified their operational decisions in accordance with 
the educational objectives of the social liberal regime, which is to train workers and 
citizens for the good of the nation-state.  
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I also made the point in Chapter 3 that the supersession of the social liberal 
regime by the neo-liberal regime in the late 1980s led to a restructuring of the nation-
state in Australia into a market-state, as well as to the reshaping of the overall 
objective of its education system: from serving the good of the nation to forging 
competitive, future worker-citizens in light of the inevitable globalisation of world 
markets. This has led to a proliferation of regulatory mechanisms that seek to ensure 
that schools are accountable for this newly defined public purpose. 
 
In this chapter, I shall examine the relationship between the NCPC schooling 
movement and this imperative of the neo-liberal regime. I will pay particular 
attention to the prevailing public purpose of education and the accountability 
measures put in place to regulate schools in accordance with this purpose, and how 
NCPC schools in turn approach these. Drawing on government declarations and 
educational policy platforms, I begin with a sketch of how these might reflect the 
prevailing notions of what constitutes the public or national good and the role of 
education in achieving it. I then move on to examine the NCPC schooling 
movement’s construal of schooling and its purpose in relation to the broader ‘public 
purpose of schooling’ and centralised accountability measures like standardised 
testing and reporting. Drawing on the background given in the previous chapter, I 
point out certain nominalist antecedents within neo-Calvinist discourse that have 
been articulated with tendencies within neo-liberalism, particularly Calvin’s 
portrayal of the world, social institutions and practices as instrumental for glorifying 
God and Kuyper’s notion of Sphere Sovereignty, which implies that all people have 
an obligation to ‘render whatever dues necessary’ for the state to maintain society. 
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Finally, drawing from the case of NCPC schooling in relation to the present 
education system presented in this chapter, I submit that the public/private distinction 
between religious and non-religious schools may well be conceptually inadequate for 
understanding the place of religious schooling in Australia today. More specifically, I 
show through this particular case of NCPC schooling how framing the question of 
religious schooling as such may obscure a circuit of power that moves between 
public/private spheres to sustain the hegemony of neo-liberal discourse in defining 
the ‘public purpose of education,’ as well as the hegemonic definition of what 
constitutes ‘acceptable’ education in ostensibly private religious schools. On this 
basis, as I shall argue in the next chapter, a market for differently religious and non-
religious schools is made operable insofar as differences are contained within the 
range of acceptable education so defined. 
 
Neo-liberal discourse on the public purpose of schooling 
 
As postulated in Chapter 3, education policy within a neo-liberal regime can be 
understood as prioritising the perceived needs of a global market economy in the 
context of international competitiveness and the formation of a more flexible, multi-
skilled workforce (Lucas et al, 2007, p. 97; also Avis, 2000; Meredyth, 1998). 
Contrary to the prevailing understanding of neo-liberalism as entailing a withdrawal 
of the state, however, this has in fact necessitated the strengthening presence of the 
state in ‘steering’ education in general and schooling in particular as a key means of 
habituation for future workers in this new, globally competitive labour market. 
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Framed as a response to apparently inevitable global economic trends, the 
introduction of institutional changes in the form and direction of education were 
accepted as the acts of responsible governments introducing measures necessary for 
individual, institutional and national economic survival. Under neo-liberalism, as 
Davies and Bansel (2007) put it, ‘both government and society have taken up, as 
their primary concern, their relationship with the economy’ (p. 250). These changes 
were evident in Australia in the proliferation of reports on education and schooling 
since the 1980s concerned with ‘upgrading the quality of the stock of human capital.’ 
(EPAC, 1986, p. 12) The inevitability of global economic trends and the need to 
prepare future worker-citizens for it has – within a neo-liberal context – become a 
commonsense assumption undergirding education policy. 
 
This perspective on education is that of a conduit for the skilling of future 
workers typifies what is known as ‘Human Capital Theory’ within neo-liberal 
discourse, which frames investment in education as a contribution to economic 
development by improving the stock of knowledge and skills necessary for future 
workers (Quiggin, 1999). In this view: ‘Just as physical capital is created by changes 
in materials to form tools that facilitate production, human capital is created by 
changes in  persons that bring about skills and capabilities that make them able to act 
in new ways’ (Coleman, 1997, p. 83). 
 
Consequently, education in a nation like Australia can be construed as a 
positive and ‘enriching’ investment insofar as it seeks both to gear students in 
general as future workers to compete effectively against workers in other nations, as 
well as sorting those considered ‘best and brightest’ in particular as exemplars of the 
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correlation between educational and economic achievement. This admixture of 
education both as a national investment and as a means of individual gain is, as Rizvi 
and Lingard (2010) surmise, based on an ‘updating’ of human capital theory for the 
exigencies of neo-liberal globalisation:  
 
At a very general level, a new human capital theory has 
informed discussions of educational values… The new 
human capital theory extends this claim to the requirements 
of the global economy and to the competitive advantage of 
individuals, corporations and nations within the transnational 
context. (p. 80; see also Biesta, 2010; Wolf, 2002) 
 
In the present, this assumption is evinced in the government statements and 
policy platforms that give rationalisations for the purpose of schooling in Australia at 
the Federal and State levels of government. For example, in the opening paragraph of 
the 2008 Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians 
published by the Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and 
Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) – which consists of the joint Australian Federal and 
State Government ministers of education, the government advisory bodies like the 
Australian Qualifications Framework Advisory Board and statutory agencies like the 
Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA) and the 
Curriculum Corporation – states that the purpose of education as a key instrument for 
the future prospering of citizens and the nation as a whole in the context of allegedly 
global economic trends:  
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In the 21st century Australia’s capacity to provide a high quality of 
life for all will depend on the ability to compete in the global 
economy on knowledge and innovation. Education equips young 
people with the knowledge, understanding, skills and values to take 
advantage of opportunity and to face the challenges of this era with 
confidence. (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 4) 
 
What is evident from this opening statement is the assumption that the 
competitive employability of Australian citizens and their economic productivity are 
central to the future quality of life in Australia. Framed in this way, education is 
primarily concerned with developing the skills required for a person to become an 
economically productive member of the nation. While it may be argued that state-run 
education as a social institution in Australia has always been instrumental for state 
management of populations as citizens and to prepare young people for productive 
and responsible adult lives as workers in a historical sense (see Seddon, 2008, p. 18), 
as pointed out in Chapter 3, the shift in emphasis from education as primarily a 
‘national good’ for the ends of the nation-state to the primacy of skilling of 
individuals for competition on a global market scale marks a difference between a 
social liberal to neo-liberal regimes. As Robertson (2000) characterises it, the task of 
the market-state is taken to be creating ‘appropriately skilled and entrepreneurial 
citizens and workers able to generate new and added economic values, [which] will 
enable nations to be responsive to changing conditions within the international 
marketplace’ (p. 187). 
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Given the dominance of this perspective on the public purpose of education, it 
is neither surprising that there has been a steady push by the Federal Government in 
Australia to regulate schooling through the institution of measures such as 
standardised curricula, testing and reporting, nor extraordinary that there is a 
concomitant emphasis on the need for schools to be held accountable to such 
measures as proof of their efficient use of public funding. For under conditions of 
urgency framed as a result of inexorable global economic tendencies, educational 
institutions such as schools are accordingly being pressured to simultaneously 
improve their ability to equip students for competitiveness in labour markets and new 
work conditions while at the same time being made more accountable to the public 
for their performance based on this goal (Hursh, 2010). In this way, measures like 
standardised curricula, testing and reporting can be seen as a means of regulating 
schools in accordance with neo-liberal discourse, which enables a determination of 
schools’ return on public investment into human capital – or more specifically in the 
language of human capital theory, a ‘social rate of return’ that can account for public 
investment on a cost-benefit basis (Whitehall, 1997). 
 
To be ‘accountable,’ as understood conventionally, is to be ‘held to account,’ 
defining a relationship of formal control between parties, one of whom is 
mandatorily held to account to the other for the exercise of roles and stewardship of 
public resources (Ranson, 2003: 460). As such, accountability in turn always implies 
an evaluation of performance according to a predetermined set of standards, as well 
as some hierarchical system involving the distribution of commendations or 
sanctions: 
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[T]he account when rendered, is to be evaluated by the 
superior [worker] or superior body measured against some 
standard or some expectation, and the differences noted: and 
then praise or blame are to be meted out and sanctions 
applied. It is the coupling of information with its evaluation 
and application of sanctions that gives ‘accountability’ or 
‘answerability’ or ‘responsibility’ their full sense in ordinary 
usage. (Dunsire, 1978, p. 41; see also Ranson, 2003, p. 460) 
 
Any system of accountability is thus, as Ranson (2003: 462) points out, a form 
of social practice that channels individual and institutional behaviours and 
dispositions – that is, ‘their taken for granted ways of perceiving, judging, imagining, 
and acting’ – toward the pursuit of particular purposes, which are in turn always 
defined by particular political relations and evaluative procedures. ‘Accountability 
and control,’ put in a nutshell by Mulgan (2000), ‘are intimately linked because 
accountability is a vital mechanism of control’ (p. 563). In this way, the introduction 
of standardised testing in the Australian education system can be understood as a 
regulatory vehicle for the greater specification of what constitutes education, which 
in turn enables accounts of achievement to be presented in public reporting that 
facilitates comparisons between schools. 
 
A prime example of this is the Federal Government’s 2008 introduction of the 
National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) for all students 
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nationwide in Years 3, 5, 7 and 9, which was administered by the Curriculum 
Corporation – a regulatory body established under the delegated authority of the 
MCEETYA. From the data collected from NAPLAN testing, individual and 
comparative school ratings on ‘Reading, Writing, Spelling, Grammar and 
Punctuation, and Numeracy’ measured by a ‘national minimum standard’ have 
subsequently been made publicly accessible through the My School website as of 
2010, which makes commensurable and comparable certain sets of demographic 
information derived from individual schools, as well as results from NAPLAN tests 
and post-school destinations of each (ACARA, 2010). 
 
It is important to emphasise at this point that accountability through 
standardised measures are not entirely new. While the introduction of NAPLAN and 
My School has been met with furore amongst schools and teacher unions (see 
Australian Education Union, 2010; ‘Gillard stares down teachers over My School,’ 
2010), it is by no means novel; as Meadmore (1995, p. 17) points out, Australian 
States have since the mid 19th century always been involved directly with the 
governing of school populations through the technical means afforded by the 
examination (see also Goodman, 1968). In Australia, a key historical moment in the 
standardisation of testing and reporting was the 1989 State, Territory and 
Commonwealth Ministers of Education’s Hobart Declaration on Schooling 
(Australian Educational Council, 1989); a declaration informed by the Finn, Mayer, 
Carmichael and especially Dawkins reports (as mentioned in Chapter 3) on the link 
between schooling and the economy. The Hobart Declaration boasts of having 
achieved a consensus on ‘ten national goals for schooling’ which, for the first time in 
Australian history, initiated ‘a framework for co-operation between schools, States 
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and Territories and the Commonwealth’ and formed a basis for ‘schools and school 
systems to develop specific objectives and strategies, particularly in the areas of 
curriculum and assessment.’ The ‘national consensus’ about the public purpose of 
education established in the Hobart Declaration is manifest in the subsequent 
development of ‘standards frameworks’ and measures of student learning outcomes 
by education departments across states and territories (Rowe, 1999). By the mid 
1990s, as Hill (1995) describes, ‘accountability pressures’ arising from the Hobart 
Declaration had already cemented state-wide, standardized and high-stakes 
assessment and reporting routines with a view to creating national standards: 
 
All government school education systems in Australia, except 
the ACT, now operate programs to monitor educational 
standards. [...] The principal motivation behind current 
assessment programs is to meet public demands for 
educational systems to be accountable for maintaining and 
indeed improving standards. (p. 4) 
 
While eventually superseded in 1999 by the Adelaide Declaration on National 
Goals for Schooling in the Twenty-First Century, which was in turn superseded by 
the Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians (2008), the 
first declaration ‘represents a shift to a centrally governed curriculum, formally 
endorsed by the Australian states and territories,’ as well as a strong emphasis on ‘a 
national framework of competency-based curricula and assessment’ (Meadmore, 
1995, p. 17). 
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Within this historical context, then, the introduction of NAPLAN and My 
School in the late 2000s can more specifically be seen as the culmination of a 
coordinated nationwide educational standardisation that commenced with the Hobart 
Declaration in 1989. What NAPLAN and its accompanying My School website 
represents is the historical apogee of this tendency toward enforcing school 
accountability and efficiency by extending uniform standards across the nation. This 
is implied in the explanation of the ‘Purpose of NAPLAN’ by the ACARA, the 
statutory agency responsible for generating NAPLAN tests, processing the data and 
publishing it through My School; NAPLAN, the ACARA (2010) states, ‘has a 
number of purposes including reporting national and jurisdictional achievements in 
literacy and numeracy as well as providing accurate and reliable measures of student 
and school performance.’  
 
By rendering school data and performance available on this scale, it is 
envisaged that standardised testing and reporting will function as regulatory 
instruments that hold schools accountable to the established public purpose of 
education. As the Melbourne Declaration states: 
 
The community should have access to information that 
enables an understanding of the decisions taken by 
governments and the status and performance of schooling in 
Australia, to ensure schools are accountable for the results 
they achieve with the public funding they receive, and 
governments are accountable for the decisions they take. The 
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provision of school information to the community should 
enhance community engagement and understanding of the 
educational enterprise. This includes access to national 
reporting on the performance of all schools, contextual 
information and information about individual schools’ 
enrolment profile. (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 17) 
 
In sum, the public purpose of schooling within a neo-liberal context to which 
schools are accountable can be characterised as a means of training future worker-
citizens to be competitive in an allegedly globalising, competitive labour market and 
in being so, secure the future prosperity of the nation. By rendering individual 
schools across the nation accessible, commensurable and comparable on a common 
scale using certain regulatory instruments like standardised testing and reporting 
amongst others, schools are compelled to demonstrate that they are the efficient in 
their use of public investment in the development of human capital, and hence 
accountable to this public purpose of schooling. As McLaren (2005) points out, 
governments around the world have made ‘strong efforts at intervention to ensure 
schools play their part in rectifying economic stagnation and ensuring global 
competitiveness. And standardised tests are touted as the means to ensure the 
educational system is aligned well with the global economy.’ What, then, is the 
position of the NCPC schooling movement as particular type of religious schooling 
in this context in relation to the ends and means of this broader public purpose? 
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The neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schooling movement on the public 
purpose of schooling 
 
The political lobbying arm of NCPC schooling – the AACS – states explicitly 
in its ‘Policy Positions – October 2010 and Beyond’ document that it is both 
committed to the broader public purpose of schooling and supportive of government 
accountability measures directed toward this end:  
 
AACS is committed to ‘the public purpose of schooling’ that 
is required under the registration procedures in all states and 
territories. 
AACS is firmly committed to best practice and ethical 
conduct in all its schools and, to that end, is supportive of 
additional Government scrutiny where necessary. (AACS, 
2010, p. 14) 
 
The first statement of AACS’s policy position quoted above implies that the 
NCPC schooling movement as a whole, as represented by AACS, is dedicated to 
achieving the aforementioned public purpose of schooling. As well, what the 
proceeding statements further suggest is that as a sign of its commitment to this 
objective, NCPC schools not only accept the legitimacy of present accountability 
measures that might evince it, but would also support an extension or expansion of 
such measures. With regard to the recent NAPLAN testing and My School reporting 
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of results and comparative ratings, for example, the stated position appears to be one 
of cautious consent:  
 
AACS has no concerns in relation to the existing format of 
individual and school based reporting of results from 
NAPLAN tests in Years 3, 5, 7 and 9 to parents and schools. 
[...] 
AACS has no objection to the publication of individual and 
school results to the schools but has significant concerns 
about the potential for the data to be used unscrupulously in 
the hands of the media. (AACS, 2010, p. 12) 
 
The addition of the caveats ‘to parents and schools’ and ‘to the schools’ in both 
statements about standardised testing and reporting imply that for NCPC schooling 
movement, it is neither the legitimacy of standardised testing and reporting that is of 
concern nor the governmental purposes for which these standards are designed, but 
rather the ‘potential for the data to be used unscrupulously in the hands of the 
media.’ Taken together, these policy positions of the AACS suggest a broad 
agreement between the NCPC schooling movement and the prevailing public 
purpose of schooling and the accountability measures used to ensure conformity to 
this purpose. This alignment between NCPC schooling and the public purpose of 
education is further underscored by executive officer of the AACS, Robert Johnston, 
who in a 2007 debate over religious schooling stated unequivocally that: 
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As registered and accredited schools, all non-government schools 
that receive taxpayer dollars must demonstrate through a rigorous 
inspection process, that they serve a public purpose as prescribed 
by the office of the [NSW] Board of Studies – an agency whose 
functions are firmly enshrined in state legislation.  
 
The public purpose that is served encompasses all manner of 
standards and expectations that the society, through the BOS, 
deems necessary for young men and women to demonstrate in 
order to acquit themselves adequately for the many roles that they 
will have to fulfill in the society and economy beyond their school 
days. 
 
The content of curricula, the standards of performance, the values 
required for responsible citizenship, processes required for child 
protection, facilities required to support curricula, qualifications 
required of staff, technology required to keep pace with changing 
paradigms and a host of other compliance protocols – all are 
aspects of the standard laid down to protect the public purpose of 
schooling; all these and  more are pre-requisite standards for any 
registered and publicly funded school. (Johnston, 2007; emphases 
in original) 
 
310 
In this statement by Johnston in defence of ‘non-government’ schools, the 
point is stated through repetition and emphasis that such schools – including NCPC 
schools – serve the ‘public purpose.’ It is asserted that they do so in three broad 
ways: firstly, by submitting to the legislative requirements for licensing – that is, 
‘registration and accreditation’ – by State educational authorities (i.e. the New South 
Wales Board of Studies); secondly, by fulfilling the ‘standards and expectations’ that 
society places upon schools for the training of students for their future roles as 
participants in society and the economy citizens and workers; and thirdly, by 
complying with all accountability measures laid out by State and Federal 
Governments with regard to these established purposes. The fact that such a ‘public 
purpose’ is taken to be helping students ‘acquit themselves adequately for the many 
roles that they will have to fulfill in the society and economy beyond their school 
days’ nonetheless raises questions about the terms upon which religious ‘non-
government’ schooling in general – and NCPC schooling in particular – 
accommodates the present commonsense about the role of education as defined by 
the neo-liberal discourse. 
 
The approach of the NCPC schooling movement to the broader public purpose 
of schooling can be brought to the fore more specifically in the statements by various 
NCPC schools with regard to how they envisage the connection between their 
religious discourse rooted in the neo-Calvinist tradition, their goals for schooling in 
relation to this tradition, and the role of academic achievement more broadly in the 
realisation of these goals. For example, Wycliffe Christian School, located at the 
outer edges of metropolitan Sydney, states in its foundation statement that: 
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Wycliffe sees a commitment to the pursuit of both academic 
excellence and authenticity in Christian education as not only 
highly compatible twin goals but also as an act of 
stewardship in outworking the opportunities provided to us to 
nurture the gifts and talents of children and young people 
entrusted to our care. (Wycliffe Christian School, 2010, p. 2) 
  
From the passage cited above, it can be discerned that for Wycliffe Christian 
School, there is a broad alignment between academic achievement and imperatives 
of neo-Calvinist discourse. For this NCPC school, the pursuit of academic excellence 
is held to be the outworking of its function as a Christian school – that is, the latter 
constitutes its ‘act of stewardship’ to nurture the God-given gifts and talents of its 
students. In a similar vein but with greater specificity, the chairman of the board at 
Dubbo Christian School in Central-western NSW affirms that: 
 
Our mission is to provide high quality Christ Centred and 
Bible Based education which is both balanced and 
responsive. Our commitment is to produce young people who 
have an understanding of their purpose and a willingness to 
contribute to and serve their communities under the 
leadership of God. Our students are engaged in the local, 
national and international community, and equipped to fulfil 
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the Lord’s call on their lives. (Dubbo Christian School 
[DCS], 2010, p. 3) 
 
In this statement, the affirmation of a ‘Christ Centred’ and ‘Bible Based’ 
education reflects with the broader NCPC schooling movement’s theological 
discourse on the purpose of schooling – that is, as stated in the Transforming 
Christian Education document and elaborated in Chapter 4, a Biblical worldview 
perspective that holds to the primacy of Christ in the narrative of the Creation-Fall-
Redemption of the world and the centrality of the Bible as pre-eminent in the life of 
Christians. The function of the school, based on this understanding, is accordingly to 
produce graduates who work usefully in and for communities at every level – local, 
national and international – who work under God as an expression of their calling. 
This latter point corresponds to the third purpose of schooling according to the 
NCPC schooling movement’s theological discourse – to foster ‘responsive 
discipleship’ that works to bring the implications of God/Christ into every sphere of 
culture and society. What is the relationship, then, between this school’s stated 
mission to ‘prepare’ and ‘equip’ for their societal calling on the one hand, and 
academic achievement as defined by established educational standards on the other? 
In the same statement, the chairman of the board of Dubbo Christian School also 
claims that: 
 
Our literacy and numeracy NAPLAN testing results are 
excellent. Our students have achieved very good HSC results 
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and the school has taken great pleasure in making a 
significant contribution to the academic, spiritual and 
character development of our students. It is the constant 
encouragement, nurturing, and mentoring which our students 
receive along with the teaching inputs from our exceptional 
staff which allow each individual student to develop their 
GOD given talents. (Dubbo Christian School, 2010, p. 3) 
 
Here, like Wycliffe Christian School, Dubbo Christian School evinces its 
achievements in developing individual students’ ‘God-given talents’ with reference 
to the ‘excellent’ and ‘very good’ results attained in standardised tests at the Federal 
(i.e. NAPLAN) and State (i.e. Higher School Certificate or HSC) levels respectively. 
Notwithstanding the mention of its contributions to students’ ‘academic, spiritual and 
character development,’ these achievements in standardised tests are taken to be, at 
least in part, the fulfilment of their God-given talents owing to the work of the school 
(i.e. through ‘constant encouragement, nurturing, and mentoring’ and ‘teaching 
inputs from our exceptional staff’). Also noteworthy is the individual nature of such 
God-given talents celebrated by Dubbo Christian School, and for which 
achievements in standardised tests serve as one indication. From this perspective, a 
broad correlation is established between academic achievement and the development 
of students’ God-given talents, which then prepares students for responsive 
discipleship in different societal occupations.  
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The link between the actualisation of God-given talents and gifts and academic 
achievement is also made by Tyndale Christian School and Covenant Christian 
School in metropolitan Sydney. Commenting on the overall results of their students 
in Federal and NSW State-wide tests, the former avers that: 
 
Senior School staff are committed to ensuring that students 
achieve results commensurate with their ability, and KLA 
[i.e. Key Learning Area] Coordinators work with staff to 
maximise student performance. Teachers are committed to 
ensuring that students are enabled to perform to their ability 
academically, not only because of the importance of student 
results in accessing further study options but also because of 
the understanding that students should use their gifts to the 
utmost, in order to prepare themselves for a life of service to 
God and others. (Tyndale Christian School, 2010, p. 19) 
 
In this passage, Tyndale Christian School points to the commitment of its staff 
to maximise student performance in standardised tests because academic 
achievement represents both a means to further study and as an expression of 
students’ use of their God-given gifts to the utmost. It is expected that students will 
then use these gifts, actualised in the form of academic achievement, as instruments 
to serve God in their future lives. This commitment is also shared by Covenant 
Christian School, which states on its school website that: 
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Our aim at Covenant Christian School Sydney is not only for 
academic excellence but a broad all-round education which will 
enable our young men and women to take their place as Christians 
in our society. For some this will involve further study at 
University or TAFE, while others will join the workforce. We 
encourage our students to develop their God-given talents to the 
full, academically, spiritually, socially, creatively and physically. 
 
Covenant Christian School Sydney’s HSC results are 
excellent and well above State average. Past students are 
working in many fields, including law, medicine, various 
trades, computing science, design, media, hospitality, full 
time ministry and numerous service industries. (Covenant 
Christian School, 2012)  
 
Here, it is stated unequivocally by Covenant Christian School that it does not 
aim ‘only for academic excellence’ but an education that will enable its students to 
‘take their place as Christians in our society.’ Yet the following paragraph 
immediately states that its HSC results are ‘excellent and well above State average.’ 
The connecting statement that links the first paragraph to the second paragraph is the 
claim that Covenant Christian School encourages their students to ‘develop their 
God-given talents to the full, academically, spiritually, socially, creatively and 
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physically,’ which when expressed through academic achievements enables its 
graduates to enter various professions as Christians in society. 
 
From these examples of NCPC schooling and the AACS’s policy positions, 
two points can be made in relation to the movement’s approach to the public purpose 
of schooling and the accountability mechanisms used to ensure adherence to this 
purpose: firstly, there is a broad coherence between NCPC schooling’s desire to 
actualise the God-given talents of its students in order that they may be responsive 
disciples of God/Christ in society on the one hand, and the prevailing public purpose 
of schooling on the other, which is to train future worker-citizens to compete 
effectively for employment in the context of a global economy. The mediating nexus 
between these objectives, which arise from two historically distinct discourses, is 
academic achievement in schooling as measured by its comparatively good results in 
tests and consequently, the post-school destinations of its graduates. Secondly – and 
perhaps to a degree in consequence of its favourable results – while the NCPC 
schooling movement appears cognisant of the limitations of such measures of 
education achievement in relation to Christian education as a whole, it nonetheless 
regards the state’s implementation and enforced observance of them as valid and 
legitimate. Thus, on the basis of these examples, Johnston’s and the AACS’s point 
that such schools serve the public purpose, and in addition abide by its standards and 
expectations of schooling to prepare students for future roles in society and the 
economy appears to be compelling.  
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It is at this point worth quoting the AACS’s most recent statement on its 
contribution to the public, which highlights its understanding of the role of NCPC 
schools with regard to the societal and economic structures of the nation, as well as 
its compliance to state legislation and the standard curricula and testing directed 
toward these ends: 
 
[NCPC Christian] schools are registered by government 
authorities and serve a recognised public purpose. They offer 
curricula based on state syllabi and present students for 
public tests and exams. They are intensely accountable under 
approximately 50 pieces of federal and state legislation. Their 
graduates have an established record of taking their place in 
the multitude of institutions that make up the economy, the 
public service and the societal structures of our land. The 
beliefs, values and attitudes taught in Christian schools have 
flavoured their graduates’ citizenship of the nation and 
contributed significantly to the moral capital and the cultural 
mix of the country. (AACS, 2012) 
 
As this statement asserts, then, the NCPC schooling movement positions itself 
as part and parcel of the education system in Australia, which serves the ends of the 
nation and its public by contributing to cultural diversity and the training of citizens 
for their place in the economy and society. This is in turn evinced, as the AACS is at 
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pains to emphasise here and in Johnston’s statements above, by its shared subjection 
to state-mandated curricula, tests and exams amongst other regulations. Yet how has 
it come to be that the NCPC schooling movement, which was inaugurated in the 
1950s as antagonistic to the aims and forms of the mainstream education system in 
Australia, now exists as one institutional manifestation of it within a neo-liberal 
regime? In what follows, I argue that this institutionalisation of NCPC schooling is, 
in part, an effect of the conjunctural articulation of elements from neo-Calvinist and 
Anglo-liberal discursive traditions outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 and Chapter 4 
respectively. 
  
Neo-Calvinist schooling for the training of worker-citizens: Discursive 
antecedents 
 
As I have outlined in Chapter 4, the NCPC schooling movement is built upon 
the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition. For neo-Calvinists, the sovereignty of God is 
to be seen in all things, encompassing this-worldly politics in relation to such social 
institutions as the state, as well as practices like education. For the latter, to (re)quote 
Calvin (2008[1559]), the whole world is a ‘theatre erected for displaying the glory of 
God’ (I, sec. 5.5). This discursive tradition led the pioneers of NCPC schooling to 
reject the state-run education system in Australia in the 1950s despite its provision 
for extra-curricular religious education, which for them would effectively lead to the 
separation of God from life. ‘After all,’ asked NCPC pioneer Hoekzema rhetorically, 
‘are we not to acknowledge God in all things?’ (as cited in Justins, 2002: 59, see 
Chapter 4) How then is the contemporary NCPC schooling movement, for whom a 
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stated end is to form ‘responsive disciples’ who actualise their God-given talents for 
‘God’s kingdom,’ to be understood in relation with the goals of the neo-liberal 
regime?  
 
The answer to this lies in part with the shared nominalist construal of religion 
latent in the discursive tradition of neo-Calvinism. The particular alignment of this 
religious discourse with neo-liberal discourse can be traced to the instrumental 
treatment of worldly institutions and practices within the former, which gives rise to 
a type of Christian realism and pragmatism that seeks to influence in a Christian way 
– or in the language of neo-Calvinism, to ‘transform’ – actually existing societal 
institutions like the state and the market while treating them as a given owing to the 
providence of God. This then leads NCPC schooling to seek the actualisation of 
students’ God-given talents in accordance with a given regime and its institutions, 
bringing to bear their Christian ‘values’ within them. The means of achieving this is, 
in part, through academic achievement as measured by prevailing educational 
standards. 
 
In the first instance, one may locate a nominalist construal of religion latent in 
the neo-Calvinist tradition in the work of Calvin himself. For instance, while 
affirming that all things are sustained by the providence of God, Calvin nonetheless 
held that the world and human practices were not innately good in themselves. 
Rather, they are instrumental at the hands of Christians for the purposes of 
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demonstrating the glory of the utterly omnipotent God they believe in. Recall that for 
Calvinists, the world is a divinely-given means:  
 
This does not mean that the world is somehow ‘sanctified’ in the 
Christian sense: it is and remains an order of evil men [sic] for evil 
men, an order of concupiscence. But in it, as the absolutely 
prescribed and sole field for their probation, Christians must live 
their life to the honour and glory of the divine majesty, and in it the 
success of their praxis is the ratio cognoscendi (reason of knowing) 
of their selection [as those who know God]. (Marcuse 
(2008[1972]), p. 23) 
 
So in Calvin’s schema, Christians demonstrate their status as those who know 
God through work in the world not as a good in itself, for the world is sinful, but 
rather as an instrument for glorifying God. This nominal relationship between 
religion and practices is reflected in contemporary neo-Calvinism’s understanding of 
the empirical world as ‘fallen’ and in need of ‘redemption’ in the name of God, 
which is the task of Christians and NCPC schooling’s envisioned mission for its 
graduates. As NCPC schooling advocates Edlin and Thompson (2006) assert: 
 
The gospel is truly good news. God has said ‘Yes’ to this 
world and ‘No’ to sin in the death and resurrection of Jesus. 
[...] He is reclaiming all things – trees, rocks, elephants, 
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kangaroos, kiwis, governmental structures, music, art, space 
and aviation, technology, the imagination, and education, and 
he empowers his people to be transformational witnesses to 
his gospel in the twenty-first century. (p. 6) 
 
So what the NCPC schooling movement seeks to achieve, as Edlin and 
Thompson indicate, is the empowerment of its students to occupy positions within 
the world and its various institutions in order to effect a ‘transformational witness,’ 
which is taken to mean the glorification of God in their respective future 
occupations. This way of conceiving of the world tacitly draws on a distinction 
between the ‘structure’ of the social world and its ‘direction’ as advanced by the neo-
Calvinist tradition and formalised by Albert Wolters, a scholar widely influential in 
the NCPC schooling movement (see ‘Suggested Further Resources’ in CEN Board 
Members’ Handbook, 2007; also Edlin, n.d.).  
 
According to Wolters, ‘structure’ refers to God’s creation, which encompasses 
everything in human experience including the laws of nature and societal institutions 
that govern society. This structure, according to Wolters (2005[1985]), is inherently 
good insofar as it is anchored in God’s providence – that is, ‘the correlation of the 
sovereign activity of the Creator and the created order’ (p. 14). This truism extends 
beyond the natural world to ‘the structures of society, to the world of art, to business 
and commerce. Human civilization is normed throughout... There is nothing in 
human life that does not belong to the created order’ (Wolters, 2005[1985], p. 25). 
The ‘direction,’ on the other hand, is the orientation of the structure towards or away 
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from God. ‘Anything in creation,’ according to Wolters (2005[1985]), ‘can be 
directed either toward or away from God – that is, directed either in obedience or 
disobedience to his law’ (p. 59). As a consequence, for neo-Calvinists, God’s 
intention is that the ‘original good creation is to be restored,’ with the ‘obvious 
implication… that the new humanity (God’s people) is called to promote renewal in 
every department of creation’ (Wolters, 2005[1985], p. 73). Edlin and Thompson’s 
exhortation for NCPC schools to train ‘transformative witnesses’ is thus 
comprehensible within this framework as a call for its graduates to inhabit various 
social institutions (or ‘structures’) in order to change their ‘direction’ away from sin 
towards God. 
 
By presupposing a separability between structure and direction – or put 
differently, between facts and values – what such a way of seeing the world and its 
institutions entails is a form of ‘Christian realism’29 and pragmatism that tends to 
emphasise practical activity based on prevailing societal definitions of problems and 
how to transform the world as Christians for the sake of God (Edlin, 2006; also 
2006a, pp. 67-69). For if it is stressed that Christians must interpret the general will 
of God in terms of its applicability to the current situation, which is defined by some 
form of ‘expert’ empirical analysis in what Wolters calls ‘every department of God’s 
creation,’ then the diagnosis of the latter must in practice take the leading role in the 
development of a ‘moral response’ (Milbank, 2009, p. 78). According to theologian 
Stephen Long (with Fox, 2007, pp. 62-63), such a sensibility draws its basis not only 
                                                          
29 ‘Christian realism,’ according to its chief systematisers Reinhold Niebuhr and H. Richard Niebuhr, 
can be understood broadly as the imperative for Christians to take responsibility for their actions and 
to do whatever they can to achieve demonstrable results that express their social convictions. See 
Wogaman, J.P. (2004). 
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from Calvin, but also owes to the frameworks of modern sociologists Max Weber 
and Ernst Troeltsch who see in Calvinism an exemplar of a religion in modern 
society. For Weber (1978, pp. 24-26) as mentioned in Chapter 1, ‘rational actions’ 
designated those activities that are strictly calculable based on empirical evidence in 
a sphere of activity, and which are held in contrast to ‘value forms of action’ that are 
pursued under some law or principle deriving from traditional or affective sources. 
Thus, religious and moral action are for Weber ‘the irrational remainder’ beyond 
rational action, but which may nonetheless provide values that can be appended onto 
the latter as an addition to it (as cited in Long, 2007, p. 63). So the NCPC schooling 
movement’s stated goal to train transformative witnesses in every sphere of society, 
and who are motivated to align ‘directionally indifferent’ social structures to God’s 
will because of the gospel, is reminiscent  of Weber’s (1958) argument in Science as 
a Vocation that while the ‘historical and cultural sciences’ can ‘teach us how to 
understand and interpret political, artistic, literary, and social phenomena in terms of 
their origins,’ nonetheless ‘they give us no answer to the question, whether the 
existence of these cultural phenomena have been and are worthwhile’ (p. 123). 
 
According to Long (2007, p. 63), Weber’s conception of spheres of rational 
action vis-à-vis values became the dominant form of Christian ethical engagement in 
liberal societies through the work of Troeltsch, particularly the latter’s influential 
book Social Teaching of the Christian Churches (1992[1931]). This was achieved 
specifically through Troeltsch’s simplification of Christian religious expression into 
a typology of three types – the church, the sect, and the mystic – and argument that 
only the first type can provide an effective social and political engagement. 
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According to him, the perennial ‘social problem’ is a tension between the state and 
society for which the church is a mediating instrument (Troeltsch, 1931, p. 12). 
Troeltsch (1931) accordingly frames the central question for Christian ethics as: 
‘How can the Church harmonize with these main forces in such a way that together 
they will form a unity of civilization?’ (p. 32) The answer, according to him, is that 
Christian ethics must always work within the rationality of the prevailing social order 
to be effective among the greatest number of people. This is because: 
 
Nowhere does there exist an absolute Christian ethic, which 
only awaits discovery… all that does exist is a constant 
wrestling with the problems which they raise. Thus the 
Christian ethic will also only be an adjustment to the world-
situation, and it will only desire to achieve that which is 
practically possible. (Troeltsch, 1931, p. 1012) 
 
There is an affinity between Troeltsch’s work and the type of Christian realism 
and pragmatism exemplified by the NCPC schooling movement’s approach to the 
social world. This is especially apparent via American Christian realist H. Richard 
Niebuhr’s highly influential30 book Christ and Culture originally published in 1951, 
from whom Wolters (e.g. 1990), Edlin (e.g. 2009) and other key figures within the 
                                                          
30 Although Niebuhr was himself a Protestant liberal, Christ and Culture has been ‘read by many 
seminary students throughout the past 40 years’ (Barrett, 1996) and his ideal types have been applied 
to purposes ranging from international politics (see Gustafson, 2001) to Christian youth ministry (see 
Erwin, 2010), as well as having a wide purchase across the Christian theological spectrum and beyond 
(e.g. applied to Islamic movements, see Hermansen, 2009). In Australia, Hynd (2008) observes that 
‘the assumptions and analysis underpinning Niebuhr’s influential Christ and Culture typology have 
been carried forward […]into much current work in public theology.’ (p. 1) 
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NCPC schooling movement have directly drawn their approaches for the 
‘transformation’ and ‘renewal’ of the world (e.g. Van Brummelen, 1989; Lambert, 
1994), and which remains significant in the shaping of future leaders of the NCPC 
schooling movement (see NICE, 2009). In a direct reference to Troeltsch’s work, 
Niebuhr (2001[1951]) frames his own fivefold typology31 as an attempt to address 
the ‘enduring problem [of] the relations of Christianity and civilization’ (p. 1; see 
also Budde, 1992, pp. 30-31). According to Niebuhr, the transformational approach 
to culture – to which he credits to Calvin and Calvinists more generally – affirms the 
universality of sin, but maintains that cultures can be converted. This means that sin 
has only perverted culture that was created good, and which remains inherently good 
and capable of reform even when misdirected by sin (Niebuhr, 2001[1951], pp. 190-
229). As is evident from this cursory treatment, what Niebuhr puts forward as the 
ideal approach for the Christian realist is analogous with contemporary neo-
Calvinism’s Biblical worldview of ‘Creation-Fall-Redemption’ that is foundational 
for the NCPC schooling movement (see Chapter 4). 
 
                                                          
31 Niebuhr provides a typology of five ‘exclusive’ and ‘systematic’ models that Christians must 
choose from (Bevans, 1992, p. 30): (1) Christ against culture, (2) Christ of culture, (3) Christ above 
culture, (4) Christ and culture in paradox, and (5) Christ the transformer of culture. Firstly, Niebuhr 
explores the notion of ‘Christ against culture’ and finds some precedent in the Christian tradition for 
the radical juxtaposition of Christ and human cultural values. At the opposite end of the spectrum is 
the ‘Christ of Culture’ type. The proponents of this option practice an ‘accommodation to culture’ 
(Niebuhr, 2001[1951], p. 83) by claiming that Christ is to be understood as the highest aspiration and 
fulfillment of human civilization. The third approach is the ‘Christ above culture’ type, where Christ 
is understood to be part of the culture, but located its absolute apex as both its ideal and source 
(Niebuhr, 2001[1951], p. 135). The fourth ideal type outlined by Niebuhr is ‘Christ and culture in 
paradox,’ where the relationship between Christ and culture are understood as ‘two realms’ that while 
good are ultimately irreconcilable, therefore there exists a paradoxical tension between Christ and 
culture (Niebuhr, 2001[1951], p. 171ff). The fifth and final type that Niebuhr explores is the 
formulation of ‘Christ the transformer of culture,’ which understands Christ as simultaneously 
standing above and beyond human culture on the one hand, and on the other hand immanent in the 
midst of human activity as a force compelling positive transformation (Niebuhr, 2001[1951], pp. 191-
194). Apart from being rhetorically positioned within the argument of the book as the preferred 
model, this final option is understood by Niebuhr to be a theme within the Reformed tradition and 
advocated by Calvin (Niebuhr, 2001[1951], p. 195). 
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This approach to social and cultural transformation can be detected at a basic 
level, for example, in the textbook for the ‘Certificate for Christian Education’ – 
NICE’s introductory in-service program for beginning teachers in NCPC schools – 
which posits that if God can be taken to create and sustain the world, ‘then His 
redemptive work through Christ will also involve a restoration of the physical 
creation and the work of redeeming the distorted aspects of culture’ (NICE, n.d., p. 
4). This means, as it goes on to specify in language reminiscent of Niebuhr, that all 
human activity in spheres like the economy and politics are ‘not decreed off limits for 
Christians but embraced as an opportunity to transform.’ (NICE, n.d., p. 4) As 
education scholar and NCPC schooling advocate Ian Lambert (1994a) states 
explicitly with reference to Niebuhr, the purpose of such NICE programs is to ensure 
that education in NCPC schools is:  
 
[I]n line with the ‘Christ the transformer of Culture’ model 
that is the preferred Christ/culture relationship in Christian 
Parent Controlled Schools in Australia [so] the development 
of in-service courses with a teacher as researcher focus, aims 
to encourage frame transformation from the bottom up, that 
is, by seeking to affect some kind of cognitive/ideational 
alignment within school communities. 
 
Politically, the goal of this type of Christian realism and pragmatism is 
therefore to ‘consider both the integral witness and discourse of Christian faith and 
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speak with broader ‘public’ or ‘universal’ purpose’ (Werpehowski, 2005, p. 204; see 
also Dorrien, 2009), while the effectiveness of Christian engagement is measured by 
the influence of its religious values within societal structures. However, as 
Anabaptist theologian John Yoder (1996) points out, Niebuhr’s Calvinistic 
transformational approach to culture also contains two normative views about the 
prevailing social order: firstly, ‘that it is the responsibility of the [Christian] to stand 
within the ‘mainstream’ of his own religious civilization’ and therefore not resist or 
divide from it unnecessarily; and secondly, ‘the necessity of managing society from 
the top and [the] identification of political control with ‘culture’,’ which implies that 
Christians should seek to inhabit and influence the state, not reject it, because ‘the 
government becomes exemplary for all of culture.’ (p. 66) 
  
So by assuming a priori that ‘God has said ‘Yes’ to this world and its existing 
structures like the government, the economy and the education system in an effort to 
influence its direction, what neo-Calvinist discourse as expressed by Edlin and 
Thompson and the NCPC schooling movement appears to elide are that ‘all things’ 
are always already manifestations of historically specific discourses that shape how 
one sees the world – a seeing that, as Taylor (1989) points out, ‘also helps effect what 
it sees,’ that is, ‘conceived not simply as a response to what [the world or culture] is, 
but as what makes it such’ (p. 449). Drawing on this point made by Taylor and 
Wittgenstein, theological ethicists Brian Goldstone and Stanley Hauerwas (2010) 
argue more specifically in relation to religion that: ‘the vocabularies by which the 
objects of our inquiries are conceived and apprehended are themselves 
manifestations of historically specific pedagogies connected, so Wittgenstein might 
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say, to ‘how one sees things’—and, in seeing them, intuiting how properly to live 
with them’ (p. 767). Hence, ‘to ‘see something as something’ is, in large measure, 
already to have been made by it – or, at the very least, to find oneself journeying 
down a path where the potentiality for such reordering [of perception] is ubiquitous.’ 
(Hauerwas and Goldstone, 2010, p. 786)  
 
In other words, what the neo-Calvinist discourse of the NCPC schooling 
movement holds to be ‘the world-as-it-is’ and the institutions within which 
Christians should operate as transformational witnesses – for example, governmental 
structures and the education system – are not simply facts that are merely a given. 
Rather, the ‘world-as-it-is’ is always already constituted by a hegemonic discourse. 
As Chia (2000) stresses, ‘[d]iscourse as multitudinal and heterogeneous forms of 
material inscriptions or verbal utterances occurring in space–time, is what 
aggregatively produces a particular version of social reality to the exclusion of other 
possible worlds.’ (pp. 513-514) Thus, it is to be understood not merely as a 
subjective gloss on the world, but constitutive of the world insofar as it ‘carves out’ 
particular social realities to the exclusion of other ways of seeing. In Australia, as I 
argued in Chapter 3, that prior discourse arises from developments within the Anglo-
liberal tradition, which institutes ‘natural’ features of social reality such as the state 
and the market as necessary for securing the freedom of private preferences, as well 
as social institutions like the education system and schooling that serve them.  
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For neo-Calvinist discourse, because ‘the world-as-it-is’ is taken to be the 
providence of God and instrumental for God’s glory, it is precisely these already 
existing social realities and institutions that must be occupied by transformational 
witnesses. Put differently, such a reckoning of the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition 
positions NCPC schooling as ‘having a stake in Christianising the social order’ 
(Hauerwas, 2000, p. 25; see also Maddox, 2011, pp. 310-313). The nominalism 
inherent in this type of Christian realism and pragmatism leads, on the one hand, to 
an approach to social reality that commits it to a form of empiricism ‘in which it 
appears that [the] starting point is merely a series of present social phenomena’ 
(Milbank, 2009, p. 87). Religious discourse, on the other hand, provides the moral, 
ethical and/or spiritual values for practices within the limits of what has been defined 
as problems in reality. Consequently, religious discourse in such a reckoning is taken 
not to entail substantive forms of political life as an alternative to the prevailing 
social order but rather, in Cavanaugh’s (1994) words, ‘a ‘spirituality’ for the 
frustrating tasks of the pragmatist engaged in worldly politics’ (p. 77). In so framing 
the world as such, then, the NCPC schooling movement is liable to correlate the task 
of glorifying God closely to the prevailing societal definitions of development and 
achievement in education – that is, as an essentially good structure (i.e. facts) albeit 
misdirected by sin (i.e. ‘bad’ values). This, I argue, is manifest in NCPC schooling 
within the present conjuncture that corresponds to its approaches to the prevailing 
public purpose of education more broadly, and its accountability to the state 
regulated standards of education more specifically. 
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Stemming from a neo-Calvinist type of Christian realism and pragmatism, 
then, NCPC schooling can be understood as seeking to actualise the God-given 
talents of its students in a manner that is effective in the world and its actually 
existing institutions for the glory of God. For instance, as Edlin (1999) states in his 
capacity as the principal of the NICE:  
 
Our task is to encourage our students to bring the dynamic 
light of God’s revelation upon themselves and the world in 
which they live and then go out into that world as active 
disciples, seeking to restore it in the name and power of Jesus 
Christ. At school, and later when they graduate, those trained 
in Christian schools should be prominent citizens in law, 
commerce, medicine, education, the arts, homemaking, and 
blue collar employment. (pp. 162-163) 
 
According to this approach, then, the task of NCPC schooling is seen as 
forming ‘prominent citizens’ in various institutions like law, commerce, education 
and the family with a Calvinist sense of ‘occupation as vocation’ – that is, as 
ordained by God for demonstrating his glory (see Calvin, 2008[1559], III, sec. 10.6; 
cf. Marcuse (2008[1972], p. 24). At no point does the question arise as to whether the 
terms of expression or the prevailing discourse of what constitutes a ‘prominent 
citizen’ are legitimate. Rather, it is assumed that the task of Christians is to 
‘transform’ the existing social and economic structures in order to render these more 
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aligned to the neo-Calvinist conception of what glorifies God. In consequence, 
‘active disciples’ are seen to be operant primarily, if not only through existing 
institutional forms of social life, which are seen to be the most effective mechanisms 
for this purpose. In a similar way, Geoff Wilson, who is the curriculum coordinator 
of Mount Evelyn Christian School in Victoria and sessional lecturer at the NICE 
argues in a three-part article published in The Christian Teachers Journal that the 
posture of radical critique and subtraction from the state and the capitalist economy 
adopted by minority Christian groups like the Anabaptists is unsound and inadequate 
for NCPC schooling because: 
 
Not only do we need to teach our students about civics and 
citizenship, but we need to be active as Christians in the way 
in which we participate as Christian schools and Christian 
citizens in the civil life of our local, state and national 
communities. […] The posture of cultural withdrawal is not 
one that most Christian schools adopt as they engage in 
contemporary culture, politics, education or economics. 
(Wilson, 2006, p. 28) 
 
Given this position, it is unsurprising that the NCPC schooling movement sees 
no conflict between its key function to cultivate students’ God-given talents and 
equip them to participate effectively as Christians in the institutions of the present 
social order to glorify God, and the prevailing public purpose of education. This is 
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because actualising God-given talents and the active participation of Christians is 
taken to necessitate the skills and accreditation that the present educational system 
provides. As such, Fenema (2006) explains in the NICE publication Engaging the 
Culture: Christians at Work in Education that academic achievement is taken to be 
an essential part of this task: 
 
This cultural mandate [i.e. to glorify God in the world and all 
institutions] is still in effect today, and students are to be equipped 
to carry it out. To do so, they must become thoroughly familiar 
with every aspect of God’s general revelation [i.e. providence], the 
world over which they are to be caretakers and stewards. This 
involves studying the content of the various school disciplines. It 
also requires the skill areas – the maths, computer [sic], language – 
as tools with which to rule over and develop creation (p. 50). 
 
From this passage, it is important to note how Fenema construes academic 
achievement in NCPC schooling as synonymous with learning about God’s 
providence and students’ roles as ‘caretakers and stewards.’ The specific contents 
and competencies listed for fulfilling the latter vocation are taken to be maths, 
computing and language, which incidentally overlap with the knowledge and skills 
required by future worker-citizens in Australia. According to the Melbourne 
Declaration (MCEETYA, 2008): 
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Literacy and numeracy and knowledge of key disciplines 
remain the cornerstone of schooling for young Australians. 
Schooling should also support the development of skills in 
areas such as social interaction, cross-disciplinary thinking 
and the use of digital media, which are essential in all 21st 
century occupations. (p. 5) 
 
By defining academic achievement in literacy, numeracy and ICT as tools for 
the glory of God in a way that is consonant with the broader public purpose of 
schooling, the NCPC schooling movement is thus able to at once maintain its 
distinctive religious character while insisting on its accountability to state regulations 
and requirements. For Fenema, the implication is that such skills are merely ‘tools’ 
that can be directed to various ends. This encourages a view of literacy, numeracy 
and ICT as skill-specific competences which can be imparted to students regardless 
of their content and context (cf. de Castell and Luke, 1983). Yet as critical 
pedagogues such as Paulo Freire (2007[1974], pp. 29-52; with Macedo, 1987, pp. 37-
46), Ira Shor (1992, 1997), Peter McLaren (1988, 1992), Henry Giroux (1988, 1992) 
and others have long pointed out, such apparently neutral ‘tools’ like literacy, 
numeracy and technology are in fact already in service of a prior politics. With 
particular regard to Australia, education scholar Ilana Snyder (2008) has charted how 
the definition of literacy was (and is) itself a product of highly-politicised debates – 
what she has dubbed the ‘literacy wars’ – that are marked by the broader cultural 
politics of national identity and the dominant moral order. As Australian advocate of 
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critical literacy Allan Luke (1999) explains, ‘neutral’ skills like literacy are always 
already defined by certain discourses and framed within particular political relations: 
 
[W]ork on the history of literacy pedagogy, literacy curricula, 
and the manufacture of ‘literacy crises’ by governments [has] 
taught us that literacy refers to a malleable set of cultural 
practices shaped and reshaped by different – often competing 
and contending – social institutions, social classes, and 
cultural interests. If the formation and distribution of literacy 
is indeed about the construction of social, cultural, and 
economic power, how it is constructed and who gets access to 
its practices and potentials is hardly a foregone conclusion of 
skill acquisition, behavioral patterns, or natural patterns of 
creativity and development. (also Luke, 1994; Luke and 
Freebody, 1997) 
 
For the NCPC schooling movement, however, encouraging academic 
achievement defined with reference to prevailing norms and articulating these with 
the language of actualising God-given talents enable its schools to demonstrate both 
accountability to the state-defined standards of education and continuity with its neo-
Calvinist discursive tradition. A more specific instance of how this articulation may 
occur is given in Edlin’s account of what counts as the ‘biblical approach to the 
evaluation of students’ proper to NCPC schools. According to him, ‘[e]valuation in 
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school is not wrong. As well as being surrounded by numerous examples of formal 
and informal evaluations in all of life, we also find that the Bible lays out clearly for 
us the principle that evaluation is an important part of life’ (Edlin, 1999, p. 171). 
Based on a particular interpretation of the Parable of the Talents32 in the Gospel of 
Matthew 25:14-30), Edlin (1999) posits what is conceived as normative for NCPC 
schooling through key references to neo-Calvinist discourse as follows: 
 
In this story, Jesus is giving a picture of the evaluative aspect of his 
Second Coming. It is very important to see what does and does not 
happen in the evaluation of the three servants. Their evaluation is 
not comparative. The response of the master to each servant is not 
influenced by the performance level of the other servants. Rather, 
the key to assessment that occurs here is a concern with how well 
each servant has used the talents that he had been given. [...] The 
                                                          
32The Parable of the Talents as found in Matthew 25:14-30 (in the New Revised Standard Version) 
reads as follows: ‘For it is as if a man, going on a journey, summoned his slaves and entrusted his 
property to them; to one he gave five talents, to another two, to another one, to each according to his 
ability. Then he went away.The one who had received the five talents went off at once and traded with 
them, and made five more talents.In the same way, the one who had the two talents made two more 
talents.But the one who had received the one talent went off and dug a hole in the ground and hid his 
master’s money. After a long time the master of those slaves came and settled accounts with them. 
Then the one who had received the five talents came forward, bringing five more talents, saying, 
‘Master, you handed over to me five talents; see, I have made five more talents.’ His master said to 
him, ‘Well done, good and trustworthy slave; you have been trustworthy in a few things, I will put 
you in charge of many things; enter into the joy of your master.’ And the one with the two talents also 
came forward, saying, ‘Master, you handed over to me two talents; see, I have made two more 
talents.’ His master said to him, ‘Well done, good and trustworthy slave; you have been trustworthy in 
a few things, I will put you in charge of many things; enter into the joy of your master.’ Then the one 
who had received the one talent also came forward, saying, ‘Master, I knew that you were a harsh 
man, reaping where you did not sow, and gathering where you did not scatter seed; so I was afraid, 
and I went and hid your talent in the ground. Here you have what is yours.’ But his master replied, 
‘You wicked and lazy slave! You knew, did you, that I reap where I did not sow, and gather where I 
did not scatter? Then you ought to have invested my money with the bankers, and on my return I 
would have received what was my own with interest. So take the talent from him, and give it to the 
one with the ten talents. For to all those who have, more will be given, and they will have an 
abundance; but from those who have nothing, even what they have will be taken away. As for this 
worthless slave, throw him into the outer darkness, where there will be weeping and gnashing of 
teeth.’’ 
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Master and Jesus start with the talents that have been given to each 
of us, proceed through and look at the task that has been set, and 
conclude with an evaluation of us on the basis of how well we each 
have used our talents to carry out the task. Whether one person 
concludes with a more substantial return or less substantial return is 
not of primary importance. The key evaluative principle is how 
well each person has used the talents given to him/her. (pp. 172-
173; emphasis in original) 
 
Here, Edlin draws on the figure of Jesus and the language from the Parable of 
the Talents to argue that the evaluation of performance in the NCPC school should 
be based on a relative scale, with the criteria of judgment being the extent to which 
each individual has actualised their God-given talents. This is striking for two, 
related reasons: Firstly, because his interpretation correlates in a broad sense with 
prominent proponents of neo-liberal discourse such as former Prime Ministers John 
Howard in Australia and Margaret Thatcher in the UK (1979-1990). In her infamous 
‘Sermon on the Mound’ in 1988, the latter states unequivocally that the social and 
political lesson to be learnt from the Parable of the Talents is that ‘[w]e are told we 
must work and use our talents to create wealth.’ She would come to further elaborate 
on this claim six years later in the United States when urging her listeners of the 
theological correctness of capitalism: 
 
Remember the ‘Parable of the Talents’ in the New Testament? 
Christ exhorts us to be the best we can be by developing our skills 
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and abilities, by succeeding in all our tasks and endeavors. What 
better description can there be of capitalism? In creating new 
products, new services, and new jobs, we create a vibrant 
community of work. And that community of work serves as the 
basis of peace and good will among all men [sic]. (Thatcher, 1994) 
 
What Thatcher’s interpretation of the parable shares with Edlin here is the 
identification of Christ with the figure of the unrelenting master, while the three 
slaves represent expressions of Christian life with two possibilities; that is, ‘to be the 
best we can be by developing our skills and abilities, by succeeding in all our tasks 
and endeavours,’ or to suffer the censure not only of society, but also (implicitly) of 
Christ. This is a sentiment shared by John Howard, the equally long-serving former 
Prime Minister of Australia (1996-2007), who in a speech delivered to a large 
Pentecostal church in Sydney asserted that: 
 
The Parable of the Talents, to me has always been, has 
always seemed to me to be the ‘free enterprise parable.’ The 
parable that tells us that we have a responsibility if we are 
given assets to add to those assets. (as cited in Iggulden, 
2007) 
 
For Howard as for Thatcher, then, the Parable of the Talents is functionally a 
religious text that essentially correlates to the promotion of individual achievement, 
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competitive behavior and capitalist markets in neo-liberal discourse – a correlation 
directly contested by Biblical studies scholars like Rohrbaugh (1993), Herzog (1994) 
and Myers (2012), who argue for collectivist and anti-capitalist interpretations of it. 
By implying that this interpretation of the parable is resonant with the normative 
ideal of evaluation in the NCPC schooling movement – that is, the key to assessment 
is to measure how well each has used the talents given to them by God – Edlin 
establishes an analogy between money (i.e. denotation of ‘talents’ as used in the 
parable; see Hahn, 2009, p. 99ff.), education and individual God-given abilities in a 
way that parallels human capital theory, which measures how education ‘increases 
the productivity and efficiency of workers by increasing the level of cognitive stock 
of economically productive human capability which is a product of innate abilities 
and investment in human beings.’ (Olaniyan & Okemakinde, 2008, p. 158; also 
Becker, 1962) Chief proponents of this latter view such as Michaels, Handfield-Jones 
and Axelrod (2001), for example, also interpret the parable similarly, claiming that: 
‘The moral is that talent is a gift that must be cultivated, not left to languish’ (p. xii). 
In their widely-acclaimed book – The War for Talent (2001) – they concur with 
Edlin when they point out that the principle behind this parable is: ‘God’s will that 
people exercise their innate talents through hard work.’ (Michaels et al, 2001, p. xii) 
So while Michaels et al (2001) note that the ‘meaning of talent... has grown in 
abstraction – from a unit of weight to a unit of money to a person’s innate abilities to 
gifted people collectively,’ it remains ‘[a] code for the most effective leaders and 
managers at all levels who can help a company fulfil its aspirations and drive its 
performance’ (p. xii). 
 
339 
Consequently – and this is the second striking point about Edlin’s extrapolation 
of the biblical model for evaluation within the NCPC schooling movement – there is 
a particular homology and amenability between its individualised view of God-given 
talents and recent state-imposed standardised testing and reporting of individual 
students. With regard to NAPLAN, for example, the ACARA states that the ‘use of 
common scales covering Years 3, 5, 7 and 9 for each area or domain assessed [in 
NAPLAN] allows for an individual student’s achievement to be mapped as he or she 
progresses through schooling’ (ACARA, 2010). This resounds with Edlin’s model of 
sound biblical evaluation that measures the development of students’ God-given 
talents on the basis of an individual’s relative progress, a position shared more 
broadly by the NCPC schooling movement. NCPC school principal and editorial 
board member of the Christian Teachers Journal Brian Cox (2008), for example, 
affirms with regard to assessment and the Biblical metaphors of ‘blessing’ and 
‘justice’ that: ‘Blessing would include a commitment to do everything possible to 
help the student being blessed to be successful’ (p. 3). On justice in assessment, he 
states that this should be defined by formal equality and constant assessment and 
feedback:  
 
Justice makes sane decisions about achievements but ensures 
they are based on fairness. It makes sure, for example, that 
assessments refer to the most recent performance. [...] Thus 
we will provide constant assessment and feedback and both 
learner and teacher will have a commitment to success... The 
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resultant learning will be proficient and enjoyable.  (Cox, 
2008, p. 3) 
 
In a similar vein and dealing with NAPLAN more specifically, NCPC 
schooling advocate Stephen Fyson (2008) states that: ‘On the constructive side, it 
seems almost a truism to say that we need ways of tracking how our students are 
going in some of the more concrete aspects of their learning’ (p. 9). Drawing on the 
prescriptions of neo-conservative education scholar E.D. Hirsch – who frames 
education as ‘intellectual capital’ that ‘functions like money capital in that it enables 
the accumulation of more capital’ (Hirsch, 1996, p. 244) – Fyson (2008) declares that 
an ideal form of testing for NCPC schools ‘should establish core facts in key learning 
areas for each stage and then test and report on all students the same way to note 
their progress’ (p. 10). The position of Fyson along with Cox on student assessment 
in NCPC schooling, which emphasise ‘success’ and ‘progress’ based on ‘blessings’ 
at an individual level, is demonstrably consistent with Edlin’s interpretation of the 
Parable of the Talents.  
 
Taken together, the position of these key figures in the NCPC schooling 
movement are also discernibly consonant with NAPLAN’s focus on individual 
performance and relative progress. For just as Christ and the Master in the parable 
are said to hold each individual to account on the basis of their actualisation of God-
given talents and how they are used to glorify God in various societal occupations, so 
the market-state through these tests holds each individual student – and schools as 
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aggregates of individual students – to account on the basis of their actualisation of 
innate abilities into key skills deemed necessary by neo-liberal discourse for the 
future world of work. When such an interpretation is taken together with NCPC 
schooling’s realist and pragmatic views on academic achievement, it can be inferred 
that NCPC schooling will see such standardising measures for accountability toward 
neo-liberal imperatives not only as legitimate, but perhaps also as consistent with its 
mission to create ‘responsive disciples’ and ‘transformative witnesses.’ 
 
So far, I have argued that the nominalism borne in the neo-Calvinist discursive 
tradition – specifically its approach to social reality and human practices as merely 
instrumental for Christians to demonstrate their knowledge of God’s glory – leads to 
certain Christian realism and pragmatism that takes actually existing societal 
institutions as the arena in which Christians are to be transformative witnesses by 
bringing their values to bear. This is the foundational impetus of the NCPC schooling 
movement’s desire to actualise their students’ God-given talents so that the latter 
may be prominent, Christian citizens who inhabit various institutions (e.g. 
government, business, the market, etc.), and to which the educational standards 
defined by the prevailing public purpose of education are seen as instrumental for 
this purpose. These antecedents allow the NCPC schooling movement to claim 
fidelity to its expansive view of religious education that actualises students’ God-
given talents so that they may be responsive disciples and transformative witnesses 
of God more particularly, as well as demonstrate that it is accountable to the public 
with reference to established educational standards more generally. 
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The neo-liberal regulation of religious schooling: Discursive processes 
 
If it is indeed the case that the present standardisation of education is impelled 
by the supposed necessity to hold schools accountable for the training of future 
worker-citizens according to neo-liberal discourse, then how does the market-state 
maintain this imperative while regulating differently religious schools, such as those 
within the NCPC schooling movement that might bear different accounts of 
education? 
 
The key to this lies partly in the nominalist construal of religion in the Anglo-
liberal discursive tradition upon which the neo-liberal regime is built. As outlined in 
Chapter 2, nominalism operates on the presumption of an absolute division between 
religion/worldly practices. This separation, I argue, persists in the contemporary 
Australian discourse on religious education insofar as it assumes that it primarily 
entails the transmission of subjective beliefs that originate in the private realm. On 
such a nominalist basis, the education system within a neo-liberal regime is able to 
accommodate religious schooling like NCPC schools, presupposing that religious 
discourses may be expressed in such contexts while simultaneously expecting that 
such discourses will not bear substantively on the educational practices they are 
obliged to deliver. The market-state within a neo-liberal regime is then able to at 
once ‘roll back’ state-run educational services and permit religious schools with their 
particular discourses to provide such services, while at the same time ‘roll out’ 
regulatory instruments that hold such schools accountable to the established 
standards of education. 
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The logic of such a distinction can be characterised as one that takes particular 
religious discourses as subjective and distinct from the objectives of education, 
which are supposed to be self-evident. Religion, in short, is held to be a matter of 
belief without any essential connection to practices. It follows that because it is 
impossible to judge between different beliefs – for example, those regarding 
supernatural Beings, Things or Principles – then differences pertaining to religion 
cannot be rationally settled. As a result, from the perspective of the state, it is held 
that objective empirical standards are the only things for which a public agreement 
can be reached once private preferences are ‘bracketed out’ from what is apparently 
obvious to all (MacIntyre, 1998, p. 33; Putnam, 2002, pp. 43-44).  
 
In the case of NCPC schooling, then, this effectively means that elements of 
religious discourse are permitted up to a point, beyond which such schools must be 
held accountable for the standards of education – that is, the empirically measurable 
knowledge and skills that all students should be imparted as future worker-citizens in 
Australia. In turn, religious discourse framed as such is relegated to the realm of 
subjective difference and irrationality, with potential dysfunctional effects if mixed 
with the objective aspects of schooling (Rowland, 2003, p. 60). By confining 
religious discourse to the realm of private belief, then, neo-liberal discourse is thus 
able to define the standards of education and its public purpose, the latter of which 
religious schools are held accountable to. The former – which in the case of NCPC 
schooling was expressed in the form of neo-Calvinist injunctions to actualise the 
God-given talents of students and the training of responsive disciples or 
transformative witnesses – is permitted insofar as it bears no discernible ‘negative’ 
consequences on either the form or content established educational standards that 
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serve the broader public purpose as defined by neo-liberal discourse. Standardising 
measures like testing and reporting operate in such a context as regulatory 
mechanisms within such a regime to steer NCPC schooling so as to ensure that 
education so defined is effectively delivered.  
 
In turn, religious schooling is responsible to prove by reference to these 
measures that it is accountable to the public purposes of education and, hence, 
represent a reasonable return on public investment. With regard to the case of NCPC 
schools in particular, the latter serve the public within a neo-liberal regime by 
ensuring that their religious aspects are held as private, particularistic values that bear 
only a nominal relationship to their publicly accountable educational practices. This 
nominalist partitioning is consonant with the type of Christian realism and 
pragmatism put forward by proponents of NCPC schooling, where religious 
discourse functions to define the ‘direction’ of education while its ‘structure’ is taken 
to be instrumental for this purpose. It is thus unsurprising, as Ryu (2007) describes in 
his survey of the NCPC schools in Australia, that the neo-Calvinist ‘cultural 
mandate’ ‘has led, in most of the [NCPC] schools, to a situation where structures and 
academic disciplines are comparable to most other Australian schools, save for 
Christian perspectives in subject content.’ (p. 98) 
 
By separating the religious aspects of education (i.e. ‘Christian perspectives’) 
from the practices of education (i.e. ‘structures and academic disciplines’) that are 
taken to be objectively established, this has the effect of rendering religious discourse 
as it is expressed in NCPC schooling largely confined to the realm of the other-
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worldly and irrational. As Javier Martínez (2004) characterises it, the religious as 
such tends to correspond with the unreal: 
 
As soon as the sphere of the religious, in which Christianity 
as a whole is placed, designates a particular sphere of human 
activity next to other spheres (philosophy, morality, the 
sciences, the arts, and so on), it is thereby severed from all 
other human realities. Becoming autonomous, it also has to 
become unreal. This is because every parcel of reality 
possesses its corresponding sphere of knowledge, in relation 
to which it is completely transparent. The implication of this 
fact is that the different spheres of knowledge expect 
complete dominion over their assigned parcel of the real 
world. To religion there is no reality left, and therefore it 
cannot even be a kind of knowledge but instead has to belong 
to the purely private and subjective realm of sentiment and 
preference. Its concern, if it is conceded that it is for 
something ‘real,’ has to be for a wholly otherworldly 
‘reality.’ Since this ‘reality’ has no relationship to or bearing 
on anything in this world, it will, in the end, have no reality 
outside of the purely subjective imagination. (pp. 11-12) 
 
In short, what nominalism effects is a treatment of the religious dimension of 
schooling as an instance of subjective expression of beliefs without any necessary 
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correspondence to worldly social, political and/or educational realities. This process 
of confinement of religion into the purely subjective entails in consequence, as 
Rowland (2003, p. 60) describes of a parallel process in Australian Catholic schools, 
that the religiosity of the institution, to the extent that it exists at all, is 
compartmentalised and cut off from its general operation. What is billed as the 
uniquely religious component of the educational institution usually turns out to be ‘a 
weird little subculture, like the bar in Star Wars, that has little connection to the 
sociological reality beyond the gates of the campus.’ (Rowland, 2003, p. 60) 
 
This tendency appears to correlate with Soucek’s (1995, p. 131) observation 
that under a neo-liberal regime, there is a tendency to reduce education into a form 
that can be standardised and measured. According to him, this has had a negative 
impact insofar as the drive for quantifying achievement has ‘achieved an aura of 
prominence, but at the expense of non-quantifiable outcomes, which have been 
practically banished from educational discourse.’ (Soucek, 1993, p. 13) This is a 
concern that is also shared by the NCPC schooling movement; the AACS (2010) 
states, for instance, that it ‘believes that schools must never be forced into 
compromising their philosophy of education or their valued outcomes simply to 
conform with pragmatic benchmarks that are tied to funding eligibility criteria (e.g. 
My School benchmarks).’ However, as the preceding investigation of NCPC 
schooling movement has shown, Soucek’s observation and the AACS’s concern are 
not entirely well-placed because ‘non-quantifiable outcomes’ in religious schools 
have not been wholly banished. As the case of NCPC schooling demonstrates, its 
neo-Calvinist discourse of actualising students’ God-given talents, training 
prominent citizens to glorify God/Christ in various societal institutions, and so on 
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that are not measurable exist palpably with standardised measures of educational 
achievement. Rather, in the case of NCPC schooling, I argue that religious schooling 
can more accurately be explained as being articulated through a nominalist 
separation of religion from educational practice into a logic of equivalence under this 
latter purpose as defined by neo-liberal discourse. 
 
A logic of equivalence, as understood within the Gramscian analytic of Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985), occurs when differential demands and interests of various 
classes, groups and individuals are held together under a sign of common cause that 
establishes an interrelation of elements under a broadly-encompassing empty 
signifier – which is a name, word or phrase that is held up as a privileged reference 
point around which other discourses are ordered so as to create an overall unity 
(Jørgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 26). According to Laclau (2005, p. 108), the unity of 
any equivalential ensemble, of any irreducibly collective will in which particular 
equivalences crystallize, depends entirely on the social productivity of a given empty 
signifier, which often takes the form of a ‘name’ that disparate groups and 
individuals can identify with.  
 
A good example of this, drawing on Chapter 3, is the populist movement for a 
state-run system of schooling in NSW that gave rise to the 1880 Public Instruction 
Act, which involved establishing a logic of equivalence between the liberal and 
Protestant positions on the place of religion in education under ‘the Nation.’ This 
‘holding together’ of different positions occurs through articulation, which describes 
the active linking of different discourses and discursive traditions like Anglo-
liberalism, Anglicanism, Baptists, Presbyterianism and others into a chain of 
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equivalence under an empty signifier – in this instance, ‘the Nation’ as promulgated 
by Parkes and others at the time – is the basic form of any hegemony. 
 
This example also highlights another common feature of a logic of 
equivalence: that is, the coherence of disparate elements into a unitary bloc often 
manifests itself in the establishment of a political frontier, which makes reference to 
an antagonistic relation between ‘we/they’ or ‘friend/enemy’ and allows the elements 
to be equivalent to one another with reference to a common threat (Mouffe, 1999, pp. 
1-6, 38-53; 2000, pp. 36-59; 2005, p. 11ff; 2005a; see also Schmitt, 2007). This was 
evident at the inception of the 1880 Public Instruction Act, which unified the liberal-
Protestant bloc against that of the Roman Catholics who did not fit with this new 
order of things. The latter was thus represented as a threat to the unity of ‘the Nation’ 
and its progress through ‘spreading popery,’ as opposed to all other groups that 
supported national progress. 
 
So in suggesting that NCPC schooling movement is articulated into a logic of 
equivalence within the neo-liberal regime, I posit that although it may have arisen 
from a distinct discursive tradition and was initially established in Australia as an 
alternative to the then-mainstream education system, within the present conjuncture 
it is articulated into a unitary bloc with other religious and non-religious schools 
insofar as it actively aligns itself to the public purpose of education as defined by the 
dominant discourse of this regime. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, this 
is exemplified in the statements of Australian governments at Federal and State 
levels, whose operating assumption about a broad consent to Federally-stipulated 
educational priorities encompasses particular religious schools such as those within 
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the NCPC schooling movement and others within the present education system. As 
the Melbourne Declaration envisages:  
 
The Melbourne Declaration will be supported by a series of action 
plans, commencing with an action plan for 2009–12. The action 
plans will outline the strategies and initiatives that Australian 
governments will undertake, in collaboration with all school 
sectors, to support the achievement of the Educational Goals for 
Young Australians. (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 18; emphasis added) 
 
As this statement of intention states, the achievement of the goals of the 
education system in Australia entails concerted governmental action ‘in collaboration 
with all school sectors,’ which implies a common consensus to a general purpose for 
all schools regardless of whether they are religious or non-religious schools, public 
or private. This common consensus is elaborated more fully by the then-Minister for 
Education and current Prime Minister Julia Gillard in a keynote speech to the leaders 
of independent (i.e. ‘private’) schools in 2008, where she asserted that all schools 
regardless of their particularities are joined by a ‘shared purpose’ – that is, to train 
Australian students to be ‘citizens of the global age’: 
 
...we have lists of things we agree on. And lists of urgent 
educational priorities for the country. All of us – the 
Government, public schools, independent schools and 
Catholic schools – ultimately have the same interest: ensuring 
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every Australian child gets the very best education possible to 
equip them to be citizens of the global age. I don’t pretend 
that everybody will have the same view or the same interest 
on every issue. But I am confident in our shared purpose. 
(Gillard, 2008) 
 
In addition to a clear demarcation of a boundary through the use of inclusive 
pronouns such as ‘we’ (i.e. ‘lists of things we agree on’) and ‘us’ (i.e. ‘All of us’), a 
logic of equivalence is here detectable through the articulation of the different 
schools as ultimately having the same interest – which is crystallised in the empty 
signifier ‘our shared purpose.’ Presumably, this means that all schools addressed as 
‘we’ – including those religiously identified like NCPC schools – share in the 
common purpose of schooling to equip students with ‘the ability to compete in the 
global economy on knowledge and innovation’ as consistent with the MCEETYA’s 
Melbourne Declaration (2008), of which Gillard herself was the lead signatory. This, 
of course, begs the question of who ‘they’ (i.e. the enemies) might be. An indication 
is given by Gillard in that same speech, where she states that the ‘we’ of Australian 
schooling constituted by schools of different sectors and religious particularities can 
be distinguished from certain ‘unacceptable’ others: 
 
In reality, there are examples of excellence, and examples of 
unacceptable underperformance, in schools of every sector. I 
do not think it serves anybody’s interests to perpetuate the 
assumption that certain types of school are inherently, or 
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even generally, likely to perform better because of their 
sectoral status. (Gillard, 2008) 
 
In this instance, a logic of equivalence is established by the demarcation of a 
political frontier that frames an antagonistic relationship between the ‘we’ and those 
schools who are castigated as ‘examples of unacceptable underperformance,’ and 
who are implied to stand in the way of ‘our shared purpose’ held by all schools 
regardless of their sectoral status or religious particularities (e.g. NCPC ≡ Catholic ≡ 
State schools). The determination of ‘excellence’ or ‘unacceptable 
underperformance’ is, in turn, made with reference to established educational 
‘protocols and standards which reflect the shared interests of all school systems in 
Australia’ (Gillard, 2008). Agencies such as ACARA and measures such as 
NAPLAN and My School thus serve as part of a regulatory regime that seeks to hold 
schools accountable to the shared or public purpose of education defined by the 
imperatives of neo-liberal discourse. Through its insistence on sharing this ‘shared 
purpose’ and its consent to the concomitant state-imposed accountability measures, 
NCPC schooling can be seen as one articulated element in a chain of equivalences 
encompassing schools within the prevailing regime in opposition to certain schools 
which, owing to their underperformance in these measures, are castigated as those 
who do not share this purpose and/or who are not accountable to the public (see 
Figure 16). These latter schools thus constitute the ‘enemy’ against which those that 
are able to demonstrate accountability toward this shared purpose can be contrasted. 
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Figure 16: The logic of equivalence between schools (Catholic ≡ State ≡ NCPC) that are designated 
as performing under a ‘shared/public purpose’ as measured by state-enforced standards. This unitary 
bloc is set against schools that display ‘unacceptable underperformance’ and are separated by a 
political frontier (---), which demarcates schools identified under the shared/public purpose and those 
who are ‘enemies’ of this purpose. This is buttressed by NCPC schooling’s consent to the neo-liberal 
regime through its articulation of neo-Calvinist discourse in ways amenable to the shared, public 
purpose of schooling as defined by the neo-liberal discourse 
 
Based on this explanation, the hegemony of the present regime and its neo-
liberal discourse on education is sustained by a logic of equivalence between 
different schools via a shared/public purpose. Within such a regime, regulatory 
instruments like NAPLAN and My School enable a common measure for 
determining those who are included within the equivalential chain of schools who 
share this purpose, and who are distinguished from schools that are examples of 
‘unacceptable underperformance.’ As plainly asserted by Gillard (2008), ‘that is why 
we have independent agencies and institutional structures to validate and report in 
the public interest.’ In this way, such measures function as ‘technologies for 
governing at a distance’ (Rose & Miller, 2008, p. 55), which link the ‘powers of 
expertise’ vested in regulatory agencies like the ACARA and the Curriculum 
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Corporation who are presumed to have privileged access to how education should be 
conducted with the ‘local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, management, 
incitement, motivation and encouragement.’  
 
For the NCPC schooling movement, such ‘local tactics’ can be exemplified by 
terms like actualising God-given talents and forming prominent citizens to glorify 
God/Christ. A circuit of power is thus operant insofar as these accountability 
measures thus function to regulate NCPC schooling as a form of so-called private, 
religious schooling by steering it toward the purposes of the market-state as defined 
by neo-liberal discourse, whose hegemony is in turn buttressed by an active 
‘translation’ of the moralities, epistemologies and idioms of this particular religious 
discourse into a generalised discourse of education and academic achievement 
defined by neo-liberal discourse. In this way, NCPC schools are articulated to the 
prevailing regime insofar as they have ‘come to understand their situation according 
to a similar language and logic, to construe their goals and their fate as in some way 
inextricable’ (Rose & Miller, 1991, p. 14). This goal and fate is encapsulated, as I 
have argued, in the shared notion of the public purpose of education – a public 
purpose that appears to traverse the line of secular-public/private-religious schools. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that the public purpose of education in the 
present conjuncture is taken to be the training of future worker-citizens to compete 
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effectively in an allegedly unstoppable globalising labour market. Drawing on 
government declarations and the educational policy platforms of the present Federal 
government in Australia, I focused on the consensus on education as defined by the 
hegemonic neo-liberal discourse – that is, education represents an investment in the 
human capital of the nation, and consequently, that regulatory instruments such as 
standardised testing and reporting to make certain that schools are accountable to this 
purpose and ensure a ‘return on public investment’ for the nation’s future. 
 
NCPC schooling, as I demonstrated above with reference to several AACS and 
individual NCPC schools’ statements, is aligned with this public purpose of 
education through its accountability measures by seeing these state imposed 
accountability measures as a legitimate avenue for its students to exercise their God-
given talents. As I have argued, this alignment can be explained as a consequence of 
the nominalist construal of religion as separate in essence from practices held by both 
the neo-Calvinist and Anglo-liberal discursive traditions, the latter of which is the 
basis of the neo-liberal regime. For the former, the world and human practices are 
framed as but instrumental to the glory of God, which leads it to adopt a form of 
Christian realism and pragmatism that sees social reality and its institutions as 
providentially-derived. Accordingly, the NCPC schooling movement seeks to 
actualise the God-given talents of its students so that they may inhabit and work in 
these institutions as synonymously Christian witnesses and prominent citizens, which 
coincides with the broader public purpose of education to train worker-citizens. 
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Simultaneously, for the neo-liberal regime built upon the nominalist 
presuppositions of the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition, religious schooling is 
regulated through a rendering of its religious discourse as subjective and private. 
Particularistic religious beliefs are thus permitted to be expressed as long as the 
standards of education according to the public purpose are executed and accounted 
for. In this way, the hegemony of neo-liberal discourse is sustained by the 
articulation of religious schools like those within the NCPC schooling movement 
into a logic of equivalence under a public purpose of schooling shared by all, thereby 
regulating particular religious schools by obliging accountable performance while 
still permitting them the expression of their particular religious discourses.  
 
Within this context, as the AACS’s statements quoted above suggest, religious 
discourse must be translated into a generalised form that the public can consider 
reasonable, where ‘the public’ is here understood as represented by and delimited by 
‘Australia’ as a nation-state. For the NCPC schooling movement, its particular claims 
‘will always need to be channelled through the state to achieve legitimacy, as only 
the state can gather the diversity of interests into a transcendent unity.’ (Cavanaugh, 
2011, p. 31) In order to exert influence in this socio-political context, then, religious 
discourse in NCPC schools must be channelled into publicly acceptable modes like 
academic and post-school achievement (e.g. from God-given talents to academic 
achievements and prominent citizens), or translated into generalized ethical demands 
(e.g. from responsive disciples and transformative witnesses to positive contribution 
to economy and society) that are more digestible for public policy. As Cavanaugh 
(2002) argues following Asad, religion as a discourse that is effectively detachable 
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from and indifferent to specific practices internal to its tradition is a specifically 
nominalist innovation of liberal regimes that have facilitated the absorption of 
religious groups into the modern secular state:  
 
Religion may take different cultural and symbolic 
expressions, but it remains a universal essence generically 
distinct from political power which then must be translated 
into publicly acceptable ‘values’ in order to become public 
currency. Religion is detached from its specific locus in… 
practices so that it may be compatible with [its] subjection to 
the discipline of the state. (p. 82) 
 
Rather than religious schools like NCPC schools representing a strict 
privatisation of schooling, then, it can more accurately be understood as what Levi-
Faur (2005) calls a ‘new division of labour between state and society,’ which ‘is 
accompanied by an increase in delegation, proliferation of new technologies of 
regulation, formalization of inter-institutional and intra-institutional relations, and the 
proliferation of mechanisms of self-regulation in the shadow of the state.’ (p. 13) 
Within such a regime, as Laclau (2000) argues, ‘everything points in the direction of 
complex processes of decision-making which could be approached in terms of 
hegemonic logics, but certainly not on the basis of any simple distinction 
public/private.’ (p. 53) Based on the example of the NCPC schooling movement, I 
conjecture that the neo-liberal regime effectively articulates religious private schools 
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like those within the NCPC schooling movement into a logic of equivalence, which 
establishes a single plane of measurability through such regulatory instruments as 
standardised testing and reporting.  This achieves two outcomes: firstly, as I have 
argued in this chapter, it enables the market-state to channel particular religious 
discourses like neo-Calvinism toward the end of training worker-citizens; and 
secondly, this in turn makes a market for school choice between public and private, 
religious and non-religious schools operable by rendering all schools comparable 
against a common scale. Yet far from representing an increase in school diversity or 
representing a threat to secular public sphere, as I shall argue in the following 
chapter, such a market for school choice allows for different types of schooling only 
insofar as they are nominally different. 
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Chapter 6 - A God-given Responsibility to Choose: Neo-Calvinist 
schooling and the neo-liberal market for school choice 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I sought to demonstrate how the NCPC schooling 
movement articulates its particular religious discourse in a manner that is amenable 
to the public purpose of schooling as defined by neo-liberal discourse, which is to 
train students as future worker-citizens in a globalised labour market. Drawing from 
antecedents within the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition outlined in Chapter 4, I 
argued that the nominalism implicit in Calvin’s treatment of the world and human 
practices as instrumental for the purposes of glorifying God is interpreted by the 
NCPC schooling movement in a specific way, which in turn allows for its 
articulation within the prevailing neo-liberal regime: that is, a particular Calvinistic 
form of Christian realism and pragmatism, which is expressed in the NCPC 
schooling movement’s mission to train and equip students to inhabit existing social 
institutions as ‘responsive disciples’ and ‘transformative witnesses.’ One key way 
this is done is through NCPC schools’ facilitation of students’ academic 
achievements, which is determined with reference to the established standards of 
education. 
 
In turn, the neo-liberal regime – which is built upon nominalistic 
presuppositions regarding religious education from the broader Anglo-liberal 
discursive tradition – articulates its educational priorities with NCPC schooling 
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through the confinement of religious discourse into the realm of the subjective and 
private, whereby the latter is permitted to be expressed as long as the objective public 
standards of education are executed and accounted for. Measures for enforcing such 
standards like the recently introduced NAPLAN and My School, as well as the 
planned national curriculum to be introduced in 2013/14, serve as key regulatory 
instruments that channel the particular religious schools like those of the NCPC 
schooling movement toward the broader neo-liberal discourse on the public purpose 
of education.  
 
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between the NCPC schooling 
movement and the neo-liberal regime’s institution of a market for school choice. 
Particular attention is paid in the present chapter to how particular elements within 
the discourse of the former, as well as antecedents within the neo-Calvinist 
discursive tradition more broadly, may lend credence to the imperatives of the latter. 
As I argue in the case of NCPC schooling and in continuity with the previous 
chapter, a condition of possibility for marketised school choice is the privatisation of 
religious discourse in religious schools, which then allows differently religious and 
non-religious schools to be comparable on a single plane of performance that 
measures their efficiency in delivering education as defined by neo-liberal discourse. 
By articulating their particularistic religious discourses in a manner that draws on the 
language of markets and choice, religious schools like those within the NCPC 
schooling movement, far from bringing a diversity religious education geared 
towards substantively plural ends, are articulated within an overarching equivalence 
which permits the expression of private preferences between nominally different 
options. 
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Neo-liberal discourse on a market for school choice 
 
Labor values the great strengths of open, informed and 
competitive markets but believes that clear rules are 
necessary for markets to function fairly and efficiently. (ALP, 
n.d.) 
 
Free, competitive and efficient markets should be the basis 
for the Australian economy. The Coalition believes free and 
competitive markets produce and distribute goods and 
services more efficiently than any other mechanism. Free 
markets also maximise community well-being: they give 
individuals maximum opportunity to take control of their 
own destiny and make the most of their own efforts and 
skills. (Liberal Party of Australia, 2010, p. 4) 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the Australian Federal Government’s 
implementation of standardising measures is part of a push for schools to be 
accountable in their use of public funds for the purpose of training future worker-
citizens. Such regulatory instruments like NAPLAN and My School amongst others, 
in ensuring that schools are accountable for their performance in attaining toward the 
stipulated national objective, function to articulate diverse schools onto a common 
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measure that renders them comparable. In so doing, they also abet a certain design 
for the education system according to neo-liberal discourse: the belief that a market 
for school choice is the most potent means for achieving desired efficiencies. 
 
In liberal discourse, a market can be most broadly defined as a social 
arrangement allowing for the expression of private preferences through the voluntary 
exchange of goods and services. This is in turn predicated on a liberal assumption 
that economic activity is located primarily at the level of individual volition, which 
causes markets to emerge spontaneously through suppliers responding to demands, 
thus creating a space of voluntary exchange between individuals in society (Grassl, 
2011, p. 2). Owing to this methodological individualism, markets and ‘free’ societies 
are in this view inextricably linked, whether society is seen predominantly as a 
complex of market transactions as implied in the Coalition’s Economic Principles, or 
whether markets are rather treated as the key organisational form of society governed 
by rules as implied in the Australian Labor Party’s policy platform cited above 
respectively. Under a neo-liberal regime that emphasises the primacy of the market, 
as Bell and Hindmoor (2009) point out, the market is usually defended on the 
grounds that it is the most efficient means of achieving societal ends because 
competition: ‘[is] believed to give firms and entrepreneurs incentives to develop new 
products and anticipate consumer demand. [Hence,] the invisible hand of the market 
is, according to liberal ideology, said to harness individual self-interest for the 
collective good.’ (p. 115) 
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The logic of this discourse is expressed by the MCEETYA in relation to the 
institution of a market in schooling. For the Federal and various State Ministers of 
Education that constitute the former, the stated desire for school accountability is 
envisaged to generate information that will facilitate a market for school choice. 
According to the Melbourne Declaration (2008): ‘Information about the performance 
of individuals, schools and systems helps parents and families make informed 
choices and engage with their children’s education and the school community’ (p. 
17). By encouraging ‘informed choices’ by parents and families in a market for 
school choice, it is expected that competition for potential consumers of their 
services will ensure schools are economically efficient, hence producing optimal 
returns on public investment as accounted for through measurable benchmarks (see 
Abdulkadiroğlu, Che & Yasuda, 2012; cf. Redden & Low, 2012).  
 
This expectation reflective of what has come to be known as ‘Public Choice 
Theory,’ which is based on a methodological individualism that ‘presumes all 
choices are made by individuals who weigh costs and benefits and choose those 
alternatives that will maximize their own net income or welfare potential’ (Ostrom, 
1975, p. 844). Consequently, state provision of collective goods like education will 
fail because ‘individuals will have an incentive to take advantage of whatever is 
freely available and to minimize costs by withholding his [sic] own contribution to 
the joint efforts,’ unless ‘fiscal equivalence’ is achieved – that is, where ‘the 
boundaries of a jurisdiction to procure a public good or service [are] drawn so that 
potential benefits and costs for the potential users can be internalized’ (Ostrom, 
1975, pp. 847-848; see also Olson, 1969). Hence, the implementation of a market 
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design in traditionally non-market spheres of life can be seen as means of achieving 
fiscal equivalence insofar as it allows simultaneously for the maximisation individual 
preferences through choice and the minimisation of fiscal expenditure by the 
‘internalisation’ of potential benefits and costs by individuals. As James Buchanan 
(1987) – Nobel Prize winning exponent of public choice theory – claims: ‘the 
ultimate sources of value’ originate ‘exclusively in individuals’ who seek their own 
interests (pp. 586-587). The conclusion is thus that markets are more efficient at 
giving individuals what they want rather than governments and conversely, there is 
no such thing as a common good outside of individual wants and preferences.  
 
When applied in the field of education33, public choice theory can be 
characterised as the belief that both greater schooling efficiency and general social 
benefit will be achieved through the increasing of competition among schools and 
the matching of students to schools that reflect individual or family preferences 
respectively (Levin, 1992, p. 279; cf. Bowe, Ball & Gerwitz, 1994). Such matching 
may concern religious or philosophical preferences amongst others like academic 
merit and sporting achievements. Rhetorically, then, public choice approaches to 
education represent ‘an attempt to provide options to parents and students by giving 
them opportunities to choose among different schools or school districts within the 
                                                          
33 Interestingly, for Mancur Olson who put forward the notion of ‘fiscal equivalence’ for collective 
goods, education is named as a possible sphere where public choice theory may be held as 
inapplicable. He states that: ‘Where education of children is at issue, the desire to satisfy consumer 
(parent?) preferences may be subordinated to a more general interest in the future strength and 
productivity of the nation.’ (Olson, 1969, p. 484) This is because according to the methodological 
individualism of Olson’s approach, the benefits and costs of education exceed those of the individual 
and school: ‘If children in one locality get a poor education, this could make the national democracy 
ultimately work less well. If the children of that locality often migrate to another locality, this poor 
education becomes a problem for the recipient community. Thus each local school district finds that 
its educational expenditures provide an external economy to the rest of the nation, and it therefore will 
spend too little on education.’ (Olson, 1969, p. 485) 
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public sector’ (Levin, 1992, p. 279; also Chubb & Moe, 1990; Nathan, 1989) while 
effectively, public choice advocates argue that ‘in a market system of control, 
competition will motivate schools to be more responsive to the needs of their current 
and potential clients.’ (Byrk and Lee, 1992, p. 448) The condition of possibility for 
such a market system, ab initio, is a common scale of measurement between different 
schools as comparable options. It is here that established educational standards come 
again to the fore. The imposition of centralised national education policies – such as 
the institution of NAPLAN and My School in 2008 and the planned national 
curriculum soon after – are according to Apple (2006) ‘the first and most important 
steps toward increased marketisation’ insofar as they ‘provide the mechanisms for 
‘comparative’ data that ‘consumers’ need to make markets work as markets.’ (p. 71) 
In short, such nationwide measures are what make a national market operable. This 
link between standardised education and the institution of a market for school choice 
on a national-scale is stated clearly in the Federal Government’s education policy 
platform: 
 
The education and health sectors include schools, universities, 
hospitals and aged care facilities – with a diverse range of 
providers from the public, private and non-government sectors, and 
services where competition and value are often held back by 
jurisdictional red tape and the lack of seamless national markets. 
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The microeconomic reform required in these sectors involves 
improved market design – so that we work to create the 
conditions in which markets serve the public interest through 
vigorous competition, transparent information, greater choice 
and becoming more responsive to the needs of service users. 
 
That is why the Government has delivered landmark educational 
reforms like My School, a national school curriculum, national 
teaching professional standards and trials of performance pay – to 
drive the transparency, accountability, national consistency and 
higher standards that will create better schools for Australian 
children. (Commonwealth of Australia, n.d.) 
 
According to this policy platform, the institution of a market for school choice 
is construed as both a means for making schools more competitive, transparent and 
responsive to their clients as potential options. Such a position on school reform is 
characteristic of neo-liberal discourse’s emphasis on markets designed according to 
public choice theory as resulting in more efficient and more effective schools, which 
according to Hursh (2005) and others (e.g. Whitty et al 1998, Hatcher 2003) reflects 
a broader tendency detectable in other Anglo-liberal societies like the United States 
and the United Kingdom that have embraced markets as a means of improving 
education. As chief proponents of school choice John Chubb and Terry Moe argue in 
their highly influential Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools (1990) – a book 
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whose impact has reached far beyond the bounds of the United States to other 
nations such as Australia (see Gannicott, 1994 and 1997; cf. Ayres & Braithwaite, 
1992) – school choice is to be understood as a panacea for the present ills of the 
education system because: ‘It has the capacity all by itself to bring about the kind of 
transformation that, for years, reformers have been seeking to engineer in myriad 
other ways.’ (p. 217; see also Braithwaite, 1992) 
 
In addition, the Federal Government’s framing of the problem in education as 
primarily the fault of ‘jurisdictional red tape and the lack of seamless national 
markets’ implies a familiar neo-liberal refrain that schools are inefficient and 
unresponsive to the interests of the people they serve – what is known in public 
choice theory as ‘producer capture’ (see Crew & Rowley, 1988; Boyne, 1996; cf. 
Thomas, 1992; Robertson 2000) – and for which freed consumer choice through 
markets are the solution. As Macey (1989) explains of this logic in brief, the 
advocacy of market design posits that:   
 
[A]s a firm increases beyond a certain size, high transactions 
costs, particularly the costs of monitoring employee shirking, 
render efficient deployment of assets within the firm 
extremely costly. Moving transactions out of such a firm and 
into the marketplace reduces the need to monitor the marginal 
productivity of particular assets, and thereby reduces the 
costs of inefficient asset use. (pp. 43-44) 
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According to this rationale, then, public institutions like schools (as firms) and 
their employees (i.e. teachers) are seen as likely to be unresponsive and evade work 
(‘shirking’) either because of lack of public access to information about performance 
or because parents cannot take their children elsewhere. Therefore, as the enthusiasm 
for the marketisation of schooling by the Australian Government demonstrates, there 
is a belief that efficiency and equity in education can only be addressed by moving 
education into a market model, where families and/or individuals as potential 
consumers of educational services can bear the responsibility of monitoring schools’ 
productivity and efficiency (Robertson, 2000, p. 174; also Hursh, 2005, p. 4). 
 
What is noteworthy about the abovementioned policy platform for facilitating 
school choice is that it does not entail the withdrawal of the state from the market, 
but instead the persistent presence of the state in implementing regulatory measures 
on schooling, the latter of which is expressed primarily in the push for a national 
standardisation of testing and reporting in order to facilitate informed choices. This is 
an important point because as Bell and Hindmoor (2009) point out, the extent to 
which markets have replaced governmental hierarchy and regulation can easily be 
greatly exaggerated, not least because ‘marketisation and the metagovernance of 
markets frequently require the exercise of massive hierarchical authority.’ (p. 116) 
 
Rather than a replacement of the state, then, the shift to marketisation through 
the rubric of public choice theory in the field of Australian schooling can be better 
understood to largely represent ‘an attempt by government to enhance or restore their 
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power to achieve their economic and social objectives’ (Keating 2004, p. 6), or what 
Peter Self (1993) has summed up with the phrase ‘government by the market.’ For 
within such a schema, moves toward national standardisation can be seen to function 
not only for regulating schools in relation to certain goals derived from the public 
purpose of schooling (see Chapter 5), but also as mediating instruments that pave the 
way for the institution of competitive relations and a market for choice in education 
by effecting the comparability of quantitative performance between schools that are 
qualitatively different owing to their respective geographic, demographic and indeed 
religious locations. Taken together, the simultaneous standardisation of schooling 
under its prevailing public purpose and the institution of a market for school choice 
can be seen as mutually constitutive phenomena under a neo-liberal regime. As 
Apple (2006) explains, there is ‘no necessary contradiction between a general set of 
marketising and deregulating interests and processes’ on the one hand, and on the 
other ‘a set of enhanced regulatory processes such as plans for national or state 
standards, curricula and testing’; for such regulatory mechanisms permit the state to 
maintain ‘steerage’ over the aims and processes of different schools from within a 
market mechanism, particularly ‘where such ‘steerage at a distance’ has often been 
vested in such things as national standards, national curricula, and national testing.’ 
(p. 70) 
 
Under a neo-liberal regime, then, it can be supposed that there are two 
simultaneous pressures on schools in Australia: firstly, to conform to the demands of 
performance measures that keep schools accountable to the established educational 
standards for skill training; and secondly, there is also an expectation that schools 
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will be responsive to parents and students by marking out their differences 
competitively in a market for school choice. In turn, it is envisaged that a market for 
school choice will free parents to express their preferences by taking more control 
and being less dependent – especially being less ‘welfare dependent’ – for the 
education of their children (Proctor, Campbell and Sherington, 2009, p. 5). As 
Proctor et al (2009) point out, it is believed in neo-liberal discourse that: ‘[s]uch 
parents are more likely to take responsibility for the future of their families.’ (p. 5) 
Given that, as mentioned in Chapter 4, parental responsibility over education is also 
understood within the NCPC schooling movement as a crucial outworking of their 
neo-Calvinist convictions, what then is the relationship between the latter and the 
prevailing neo-liberal context, which also emphasises parental responsibility and its 
expression through the institution of a market for school choice? 
 
The neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schooling movement on school choice 
 
For the AACS as the peak political lobby group of the NCPC schooling 
movement, it is unequivocal that the state should have a limited role in determining 
the education of children. This is because the primary responsibility for education, 
according to them, lies with parents: 
 
We affirm that the responsibility for the education and guidance of 
children lies in the first instance with their parents or legal 
guardians, and that governments are duty bound to provide, without 
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distinction and on general terms of equality, both the legal right 
and the opportunity for parents and guardians to choose for their 
children schools, other than those established by public authorities, 
that provide for the education of their children in conformity with 
their own convictions. (AACS, n.d.)  
 
In this reckoning, the role of the state is taken to be providing opportunities for 
parents to choose schools other than state-run schools for their children that are 
congruent with their ‘convictions.’ As the political lobbying arm of the NCPC 
schooling movement, this affirmation can be inferred as an attempt to protect the 
rights of parents to choose NCPC schools for their children in accordance with their 
neo-Calvinist religious tradition. The legitimate role of the state in this reckoning is, 
in turn, to secure the right and opportunity for parents to choose between schools. At 
the outset, then, there is a clear affinity that can be discerned between the NCPC 
schooling movement’s insistence on the primary responsibility of parents for 
choosing education, the right of parents to choose religious schools, and neo-liberal 
discourse’s aforementioned emphasis on market choice in schooling adjudicated by 
the state. This is further borne out explicitly in the political lobbying work of the 
AACS. For example, in an official letter to the former Minister for Vocational 
Education and Training David Kemp, dated 29 November 2001, the chairman of the 
AACS stated:  
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On behalf of AACS, we want to take this opportunity to 
thank you for your dedication to education and your 
commitment to ensure choice for Australian parents in 
schooling. Very soon after your election to government in 
1996, you honoured your undertaking to abolish the New 
Schools Policy. This enabled many middle and working class 
families in Australia to look forward to an affordable choice 
of Christian schooling in their communities. (AACS, 2001, p. 
15) 
 
Apart from reinforcing the importance of school choice in congratulatory 
tones, the AACS in this letter also expresses gratitude at the then-Coalition Federal 
Government’s abolition of the ‘New Schools Policy.’ For Lingard (1998), this move 
marked the then-Coalition government as ‘using its funding clout to establish a more 
market-driven relationship between government and non-government schools and 
giving greater emphasis to parental choice in schooling.’ (p. 6) Likewise, Marginson 
also points to this as a key moment in the creation of a large-scale market for school 
choice: 
  
By abandoning the ‘new schools policy’ and increasing the 
grants to non-government schools, while taking the money 
for these off its allocation to Government schools, the Federal 
Government is creating a deregulated market in private 
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schooling but one that is heavily subsidised by the 
government and in a manner designed to induce a big shift of 
enrolments to non-government schools. (as cited in Potts, 
1999) 
 
If it is indeed the case that the 1996 abolition of the ‘New Schools Policy’ was 
a watershed moment in the augmenting of a market for school choice under the neo-
liberal regime as characterised by Lingard and Marginson – notwithstanding the 
latter’s characterisation of this change as ‘deregulation,’ which I have argued above 
and in the previous chapter to be a misnomer – then the AACS letter above 
implicates it directly in support of this cause. This position of the AACS is 
corroborated by another letter from the then-chairman of the AACS Jack Mechielsen 
to the outgoing then-Shadow Minister for Education Michael Lee, also dated 29 
November 2001. Here, again, in expressing gratitude to this Federal Member of 
Parliament, the overwhelming emphasis by the chairman of the AACS is on school 
choice: 
 
Consistent with ALP policy, you continued to advocate 
choice for Australian families and a needs-based funding 
regime that would support that choice, particularly for the 
socially and economically disadvantaged. We know that this 
was not always a popular position with elements of your 
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party’s constituency. We, therefore, doubly value your public 
commitment in this area. (AACS, 2001, p. 17) 
 
Beyond the statements of the AACS directed at the policy level, NCPC schools 
have also reaffirmed the priority of parental choice on their individual websites and 
prospectuses, as well as in various joint advertising and marketing campaigns 
targeted at potential patrons. While examples of the former include such broad 
statements as ‘[the] Christian Parent Controlled School is based on the concept that 
the education of children is primarily a parental responsibility and not simply the 
responsibility of the State’ (Illawara Christian School (2010) and ‘[a] Christian 
parents controlled school gives you, the Christian parent, the right to choose’ 
(Davenport Christian School, n.d., p. 3), exemplary of the latter is the Why Christian 
Schools? booklet published in 2010, which represents a concerted elaboration by the 
contemporary NCPC schooling movement as a whole on their guiding ethos.  
 
The Why Christian Schools? booklet contains an extensive appeal to particular 
motifs within the neo-Calvinist tradition in its justification and promotion of NCPC 
schools, an appeal that will be explored in more detail below. Most relevant at 
present is the manner in which this document repeatedly charts the different socio-
political contexts where education in the form of schooling has been instituted, the 
various institutions like the church and the state that have historically taken on the 
responsibility to educate, before reinforcing the neo-Calvinist injunction of parents as 
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primarily responsible for the education of their children. In the section ‘Why Pay for 
Education?,’ for example, it states:    
 
Historically, education for most was provided by parents. At 
times it has depended more on churches. More recently it has 
been considered a government responsibility. 
 
However God has given to parents the primary responsibility 
for the nurture and care of their children. This responsibility 
has not changed over time. It has also not been delegated to 
government, the church or even teachers. 
 
If we do believe parents have responsibilities for raising 
children then parents also need to have choices. They should 
have options of where and what their children will be taught. 
Christian schools give parents a choice. (Why Christian 
Schools?, 2010, p. 8) 
 
In this booklet, the responsibility of parents for the education of their children 
is given as an immutable and timeless fact owing to God’s sanction. This is in turn 
held in contrast to educational provision by both the state and churches. In addition, 
it establishes a direct link between this God-given responsibility and the need to have 
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choices in schooling, with Christian (i.e. NCPC) schooling put forward as an 
exemplary expression of school choice by framing itself as the responsible choice for 
Christian parents. 
 
From this booklet and the examples from AACS’s political lobbying cited 
above, three points can be made with regard to the NCPC schooling movement’s 
affirmative position in relation to the institution of a market for school choice within 
a neo-liberal context: firstly, while affirming a legitimate but limited role for the state 
in guaranteeing conditions for education through schooling, the NCPC schooling 
movement maintains that the responsibility for the education of children lies 
primarily with their parents. Secondly and in consequence of this, the NCPC 
schooling movement through the AACS has taken to lobbying various governments 
to advance the cause of greater choice in schooling, most prominently in its 
enthusiastic support for the abolition of the ‘New Schools Policy’ that limited the 
scope for private and religious schools to expand. Finally, the reason given for the 
emphasis on parental responsibility for education and the translation of this into its 
political position on expanding school choice is rooted in an understanding of a God-
given parental responsibility, which can be traced to particular antecedents within the 
neo-Calvinist discursive tradition. It is to this latter point that I shall presently turn. 
 
Neo-Calvinist schooling as market choice: Discursive antecedents 
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In the section entitled ‘Who is responsible for your children?’ in the NCPC 
schooling movement’s Why Christian Education? (2010) booklet, there is an 
acknowledgment that even amongst those who identify broadly as Christians, 
‘Christian schooling is often seen as a contentious issue’ (p. 3). However, this 
acknowledgment of different opinions is immediately followed by what is asserted as 
an incontrovertible principle with reference to the Bible: 
 
Yet most would agree the Bible teaches that parents are 
responsible for raising and educating their children. Whether 
Christian parents choose home schooling, secular, private or 
Christian schools this responsibility remains. The Bible says: 
‘Fathers, do not exasperate your children; instead, bring them 
up in the training and instruction of the Lord’ (Ephesians 
6:4). (p. 3) 
 
By initiating and enfolding its appeal with the Bible as an authoritative source 
of life and conduct for Christians and, importantly, in its emphasis on the centrality 
of parental responsibility in raising and educating their children, this assertion can be 
seen as deriving from certain aspects of the broader neo-Calvinist tradition from 
which the NCPC schooling movement draws. Recall Calvin’s deliberate approach to 
the religious education of children discussed in Chapter 4, which can be broadly 
categorised as twofold:  firstly, the emphasis on the parental responsibilities entailed 
in bringing up children, with the pater familias as foundational locus for the 
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sustenance of social order and the church (Calvin, 2008[1559], II, sec. 8.49; IV, sec. 
19.13); and secondly, reorganisation of elementary schooling in Geneva in order to 
expand its popular reach (Sundquist, 1990, p. 94). The import placed on education by 
Calvin as expressed in these two aspects of his teaching and practice can in turn be 
respectively placed within his broader understanding of divine providence and his 
theological discourse on membership within the Christian community – or ‘the elect’ 
in strictly Calvinist terms. In the first place, given that all human life exists under 
divine providence for Calvin (2003), children are therefore to be seen not as 
‘begotten… by a secret instinct of nature or the ‘fruit of chance’ but are gifts of 
God.’ (p. 110) Being so, parents must bear the burden of responsibility for their 
children not as merely biological offspring, but as objects of God’s providence. 
Secondly, for Calvin, ‘the elect are from birth full inheritors of God’s covenant and 
members in the church’ (as cited in Pitkin, 2001, p. 164). This means that in addition 
to children framed as gifts of God, they are also to be seen as future Christians who 
will constitute the (Calvinist-Reformed) church. So parents, as Calvin states, ‘ought 
to consider that children in the home constitute a ‘mirror of God’s grace,’ a sign that 
God cares for the family, and from this consideration be moved to fulfil their parental 
obligations’ (in Pitkin, 2001, p. 173). The strong emphasis by the NCPC schooling 
movement on parental responsibility for the education of their children can thus be 
seen as a present day expression of this broader neo-Calvinist lineage. As 
contemporary neo-Calvinist educator and NCPC schooling advocate Fenema (2006) 
posits: ‘Children don’t really belong to parents; they belong to God through Christ. 
Parents have been designated by God to be his stewards – caretakers – of children... 
God has consecrated these children to himself. They belong to him. Parents, in turn 
are to consecrate their children back to God.’ (p. 10) 
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Drawing on this background, then, the Why Christian Schools? (2008) booklet 
proceeds to position NCPC schools as a means through which parents can express 
their fidelity to their God-given responsibility:  
 
Christian schools are not a way to escape from other 
education systems, nor take over the task of home or church. 
Christian schools are an expression of Christian parents 
attempting to fulfil their responsibility to raise and train their 
children in a godly manner. They do this by co-operating 
with, or teaming up with, other like minded parents. (p. 3) 
 
According to the NCPC schooling movement, then, the exercise of parental 
responsibility held by neo-Calvinist discourse can be consistently exercised through 
the placement of their children into a Christian (NCPC) school. An important caveat 
repeated often is included that such schools do not seek to ‘take over’ this God-given 
responsibility, but rather represent a ‘co-operation’ or ‘teaming up’ with other 
parents who take equally seriously this responsibility. It is on this basis that ‘choice’ 
emerges as a legitimate expression of God-given parental responsibility in the 
discourse of NCPC schooling: 
 
In selecting a school parents are choosing who they will partner 
with for the education of their child... Choosing a school which 
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employs practising Christians as teachers gives parents a greater 
say in who will be a role model for their children. Christian 
teachers are not perfect. Nor do they have all the answers. Yet they 
are part of a wider Christian community working together with, and 
on behalf of, parents. (Why Christian Schools?, 2008, p. 4) 
 
Again, through the use of terms such as ‘partner with,’ ‘a greater say,’ 
‘working together with’ and ‘on behalf of,’ the NCPC schooling movement is at 
pains to evince that parents remain the principal agents in the education of their 
children. This is a crucial point, for in affirming the consistency between Christian 
parents’ responsibility and ‘selecting’ or ‘choosing’ a NCPC school, a link is 
presumed upon which correlates the discharge of such responsibilities with the 
(right) choice of schools. For in choosing an NCPC school that seeks, as the booklet 
goes on to explain, ‘to work with parents as an extension of the family home,’ such a 
choice allows parents to at once avoid ‘providing a different, or even inconsistent, 
environment’ from the home because ‘Christian schools aim to reinforce what is 
taught at home.’ (Why Christian Schools?, 2008, p. 7) From here, it is not difficult to 
understand the impetus for the NCPC schooling movement’s emphasis on school 
choice as expressed through the political lobbying of the AACS abovementioned. 
For if the right to choose an NCPC school is tied to the exercise of God-given 
parental responsibility to raise children as Christians as is obliged by the neo-
Calvinist tradition, then its potential circumscription through the lack of school 
choice – whether real or imagined – will be perceived as a threat to the very exercise 
380 
of this God-given task. The former principal of the NICE, Richard Edlin (1999) 
formulates the political implications of this logic explicitly: 
 
Most Christians who appreciate Christian schools will agree 
with the arguments favouring the ‘school choice’ position. 
They have always maintained that education is the 
responsibility of parents and that parents should have access 
to the educational tax dollars that are taken from them so that 
they can use them in an educational environment of their 
choice, not of the government’s dictation. (p. 95) 
 
Here, the link between parental responsibility as inherited from the neo-
Calvinist discursive tradition and the contemporary impetus for a market for school 
choice within a neo-liberal regime is unequivocally established. For Edlin (1999), a 
market for choice is beneficial, in the first place, to parents because ‘[t]hey see 
private education as offering much better educational alternatives and outcomes than 
their expensive problem-ridden public schools’ (p. 94), and also because it augments 
‘the necessity for Christian schools to develop and maintain strong vision and 
purpose statements,’ as well as an opportunity for ‘schools to insist upon pre-
admission information and to state to parents clearly and lucidly the schools’ reasons 
for existence.’ (p. 95) It is envisioned that in being able and obligated to 
communicate its vision and reasons for operating, NCPC schools will be able to 
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communicate the distinctiveness of its vision and integrity (see Edlin, 1999, pp. 75-
96).  
 
Yet within a neo-liberal context, such a market for school choice has arguably 
the opposite effect because the precondition for such a market is the establishment of 
measurability and comparability of different schools against a common scale, a scale 
determined by established educational standards and enforced by various 
accountability measures. As de Lissovoy and McLaren (2003) explain, similarly 
performing schools – as far as standardised testing and reporting are concerned – are 
formally interchangeable regardless of differences in their locations, student 
populations, teachers or curricula as long as their numerical representation is the 
same:  
 
As far as standardized tests are concerned, the scoring units 
represent the universal equivalent... in terms of which 
students, schools and districts can be compared. This process 
of reification is not new, but the subtlety of its hegemony is 
being stripped away, as complex human and social processes 
are more and more flattened into crude representations that 
will conform to the logic of commodity production and 
exchange [i.e. a market design]. (p. 133; see also Adorno, 
1995, pp. 146-147) 
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While I shall consider the particular discursive processes that operate to effect 
such a levelling of substantive differences like religious discourse further below, at 
present it is necessary to emphasise the significance of the correlation that is 
established between the parental responsibility for the nurture of children in neo-
Calvinist discourse and the NCPC schooling movement’s advocacy of school choice.  
 
As mentioned above, ‘choice’ is understood within neo-liberal discourse 
through the frame of public choice theory. In such a reckoning, the promise of a 
market in school choice is to expand students’ and families’ access to schools beyond 
the restricted boundaries of locality defined both geographically and 
demographically. As such, it is assumed that choice will coincide with the freedoms 
of individual or family – i.e. private – preferences. The emphasis on parental choice 
by the NCPC schooling movement thus concurs with the sentiment of Buchanan 
(1991), who argues that ‘individuals are the ultimate sovereigns in matters of social 
organization’ (p. 225), the latter of which includes religion as an individual choice as 
consistent with the presuppositions of the broader Anglo-liberal tradition (Buchanan, 
2005). 
 
By presuming a simple correspondence between parental responsibility as 
understood within the neo-Calvinist tradition with market choice, the NCPC 
schooling movement can be seen as effectively articulating neo-Calvinist discourse 
in a way that is amenable to the register of neo-liberal discourse. Yet it is important 
to emphasise that despite many antecedents within the neo-Calvinist tradition that 
may be interpreted as ‘naturally’ allied with the marketisation of schooling through 
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the valorisation of parental choice – not least from Calvin’s work itself – Hall’s 
(1996, p. 142) point cited in the introduction that there is no necessary political logic 
(or ‘deep ideological structure’) to religion still appears valid for the neo-Calvinist 
tradition in particular. Apart from neo-Calvinist scholars and commentators like Bob 
Goudzwaard (1986; with Fikker, Reed, García de la Sienra & Skillen, 2001), Brian 
Walsh and Sylvia Keesmaat (2004), Craig Bartholomew (2009) and Michael Goheen 
(2009; 2011) who interpret the present regime of neo-liberal globalisation and 
marketisation as ‘idolatrous’ and inimical to the ‘Kingdom of God’ from an 
explicitly neo-Calvinist standpoint, there remain other elements from within this 
discursive tradition that may also be differently articulated. For example, even while 
stressing the authority and sovereignty of parents over their children’s education, 
Calvin nonetheless asserts that those parents (and indeed any authority) who is taken 
to transgress God’s laws – particularly those having ‘no regard for rectitude and 
justice’ (Calvin, 2008[1559], II, sec. 7.10) – must necessarily be disobeyed. 
 
So while it is indeed the case that there are elements within the neo-Calvinist 
tradition that may give rise to the emphasis on the primacy of parental authority over 
education and hence a market for school choice, there are also less-often (or indeed 
never) emphasised elements within it that may conversely be deployed to exhort 
children to rebel against parental and other authorities within the present political 
regime, which may arguably be interpreted as transgressing ‘rectitude and justice’ 
(see Boer, 2009, 2009a). What this highlights, therefore, is that the position of the 
NCPC schooling movement represents a particular interpretation of the neo-Calvinist 
tradition in a way that emphasises the former elements in the present conjuncture of 
schooling. I shall presently explore how this leads to an alignment of the NCPC 
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schooling movement with the neo-liberal regime in two ways: firstly, in a broader 
sense as demonstrated by Edlin’s statement above, it sanctions a market for school 
choice by framing such an arrangement as the one most suitable for the expression of 
their religiosity; and secondly, in a more particular sense, by positioning NCPC 
schooling as one choice in a market of schools it effectively treats such religious 
schooling as an expression of private preferences. Considering these in turn, I shall 
also highlight certain antecedents from within the neo-Calvinist tradition that are 
deployed in order to justify this alignment. 
 
In the first place, the correlation between parental responsibility with market 
choice by the NCPC schooling movement means that it has a stake in the 
maintenance or expansion of the marketisation of schooling. This is because such an 
arrangement is seen as the primary condition that makes possible the ‘free’ 
expression of their convictions regarding religious education. As Edlin (1999) 
asserts, the only way to achieve a ‘biblically obedient’ outcome is for the state to 
underwrite the right of parents to choose the type of education desired for their 
children:  
 
It is the task of the government to maintain justice in 
education so as to allow parents the right to exercise their 
God-given authority and responsibility in determining the 
character of the nurture, education and schooling that their 
children receive. It is in this context alone that the two 
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elements, the role of the state and the role for the parent, can 
come together in a biblically obedient manner. (p. 104) 
 
According to the logic of this discourse said to be ‘biblically obedient,’ the 
regulation of education by state government is indeed necessary, but only insofar as 
it sets the institutional conditions for school choice. This may well mean that, as 
Edlin (1999) goes on to state, ‘the Christian education community must be proactive 
in ensuring legitimate state demands concerning the education of children are met’ 
(p. 105) but nonetheless, the:  
 
Christian education community must be vigilant in analysing 
current trends and developments in education in order to 
confront those that are improper and then to provide a legal 
and moral force that mitigates against unjust intrusions by the 
state into education. (p. 105)  
 
This dual emphasis on ‘just’ state regulation and its circumscription at the point 
of parental control of their children’s schooling, an emphasis which is expressed in 
the AACS’s persistent lobbying for school choice exemplified above, reflects the 
influence of Kuyper and his conception of sphere sovereignty on the NCPC 
schooling movement.  
 
According to neo-Calvinism under a Kuyperian interpretation, education is 
understood to rightly belong under the God-appointed sovereignty of the domestic 
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sphere (see Chapter 4), which implies that the power of the state over education is 
limited and that freedom of education – or the boundary between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ 
intrusions in education as understood by Edlin above – means that responsibility for 
bringing up children lies with parents, not the state (Hoezkema, 2001). Indeed, as 
Bacote (2005, pp. 84-85) and McGoldrick (2000, pp. 199-200) describe, upon 
entering Parliament in the Netherlands in 1874, Kuyper fought primarily for two, 
closely connected political goals: one, to establish free Christian schools, i.e., schools 
free from government control; and the other, to obtain government financing for 
these Christian schools so that Christian parents would not have to pay taxes to 
support public education and tuition to support Christian schools (see also Rodgers, 
1980).  
 
The sway of Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty concept on the NCPC schooling 
movement’s advocacy of school choice is of little doubt. Mouw (2012, p. 49), for 
example, traces the strong emphasis on ‘parent-controlled’ Christian schools in 
Dutch neo-Calvinist communities in the US to Kuyper’s insistence that the education 
of children was primarily a parental responsibility. In his analysis of the concept of 
sphere sovereignty, Klapwijk (1980) concurs, stating that ‘the idea of the peculiar 
competency and responsibility of the different spheres of life still operates in wide 
circles [of neo-Calvinists], albeit practically and unconsciously. This probably 
explains the strong Christian defense of family life [and] the direct involvement of 
Christian parents in education and local schools’ (p. 4). According to Justins in his 
extensive study of the founding of NCPC schooling in Australia, Kuyper’s 
demarcation of sovereign spheres and the placement of education within the 
sovereignty of the family were foundational for the NCPC schooling movement: 
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As a consequence of the belief that Christian parents were 
responsible for the education of their children, it was argued 
by the pioneers that control of the educational destiny of their 
children should remain with parents, rather than with federal 
or state governments, or even a church. Part of the 
background to this value was the theological concept of 
sphere sovereignty developed [by] Kuyper which argued that 
the family operated within a sphere of responsibility in which 
it had authority over other institutions, thus parents should 
shape the purposes of their children’s education. (Justins, 
2002, p. 124) 
 
Based on this, the advocacy for a market in school choice as exemplified by Edlin 
and the NCPC schooling movement can be seen as a specific translation of the 
Kuyperian emphasis on the sovereignty of the domestic sphere within the present, 
neo-liberal context. 
 
In addition, I argue, support for the notion of a ‘free’ market for school choice 
within the NCPC schooling movement can be taken as consistent with the Kuyperian 
division of social reality into autonomous, self-sustaining spheres, which is in turn 
predicated on Calvin’s notion of divine providence. According to Kuyper 
(2007[1931], p. 83) and as mentioned in Chapter 4, the state must never ‘become an 
octopus’ that stifles other autonomous spheres because each sphere is secured by 
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‘divine mandate’ (Kuyper, 2007[1931], p. 83). Consequently, the institution of a 
market in school choice can also be seen in this view as operating on the basis of 
divine providence as originally formulated by Calvin – a God-given arrangement for 
parental choice that a just state should not meddle with. Bringing this connection 
between Kuyper’s providentially sustained spheres and the market to the fore is 
Novak (2002), who argues that public choice theory and the market design are in this 
sense consistently Kuyperian insofar as they place primary importance upon treating 
the individual and their choices seriously without government interference, hence 
‘allowing the market to function as an intermediary structure for transactions 
enhances our ability to serve [God/Christ].’ (p. 78) Extending this logic, Novak 
(2002) asserts that: ‘the best that man can do is to strive to do well and to live a 
Christian life; and that being done, the proper structures will gradually emerge.’ (p. 
78) What such an assumption about providential operations through markets 
effectively entails is the underwriting of the market order with divine transcendence 
because while ‘the market is still seen as emerging from the logic of life itself’ 
(Milbank, 2008, p. 130) – that is, the immutability of free choice based on private 
preferences – this logic tends to be interpreted within a neo-Calvinistic account of 
providence as embodying an order laid down by God regarded as the one who moves 
it. In this way, ‘a constitutive capitalist excess to its own rule-governed market norms 
is finally underwritten by a positive transcendent instance.’ (Milbank, 2008, p. 130; 
also Schwarzkopf, 2012)  
 
Such a view of markets as a providential vehicle appears to undergird the 
conviction of the NCPC schooling movement that a market in school choice is the 
most effective means for achieving its purposes, and that it is God’s will that such an 
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arrangement be put in place.  Writing in reflection on the lobbying efforts of the 
AACS for its first ‘essential principle’ of ‘parental choice of school’ (AACS, 2001, 
p. 11) as described above, the chairman of the AACS also invokes the connection 
between providence and this political aim implicitly by suggesting that its public 
policy impact – including the abolition of the ‘New Schools Policy’ – was effected 
by God: 
 
God has enabled us to achieve in representing the interests of 
Christian schooling and affecting public policy... Our 
response to this should be grateful thanks to the Lord and a 
determination to continue to use the AACS to effectively 
represent the interests of Christian schooling and all 
education in Australia. (AACS, 2001, p. 1) 
 
This insistence on a linkage between a God-given parental responsibility for 
the education of their children and a market for school choice as the most 
appropriate, God-given, sphere for its expression brings up a second way in which 
the NCPC schooling movement buttresses the legitimacy of the present neo-liberal 
regime: the positioning of religious schooling, particularly one built upon the neo-
Calvinist tradition, as a matter of private preferences expressed through choice.  
According to the AACS’s ‘Freedom of Religion and Belief in the 21st Century 
Submission’ (2009) to the Australian Human Rights Commission, NCPC schools are 
framed primarily as an extension of religion as belief in the home: 
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For the most part, our schools have an open enrolment policy, 
but are specifically designed to support Christian parents in 
the education of their children from a Christian perspective. 
As such, together with parents, the schools are an integral 
part of the formation of religious beliefs (in the Biblical 
Christian tradition). (p. 2) 
 
Here, NCPC schools are understood to be an expression of parents’ desire to 
educate their children in a way that is consistent with their ‘religious beliefs.’ As 
mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, the notion of religion as a private belief – that is, its 
loci are the private spheres such as the individual and family – and religious 
education as the transmission of that belief are effects of a specifically Protestant and 
Anglo-liberal inheritance. This stands in contrast to the neo-Calvinist tradition as 
outlined in Chapter 4, because the religious dimension is not seen as occupying the 
space of private belief, but rather as undergirding all things as summed up by 
Kuyper’s famous declaration that: ‘there is not a square inch in the whole domain of 
our human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over all, does not cry: 
‘Mine!’’ So it may be argued that while Kuyper (1994) divided social reality into 
autonomous domains through his concept of sphere sovereignty, he nonetheless 
asserted that no sphere ‘is conceivable in which religion does not maintain its 
demands that God shall be praised, that God’s ordinances shall be observed, and that 
every labora shall be permeated with its ora in fervent and ceaseless prayer’ (p. 54). 
This Kuperian sensibility undergirded the expansive view of religion expressed by 
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the pioneers of NCPC schooling in Australia, who rejected any method that ‘would 
lead the children to believe that God and religion was something separate and had 
little or nothing to do with real life’ (Hoekzema as cited in Justins, 2002, p. 59). In 
positioning NCPC schools primarily as a reinforcement of private belief whose locus 
is in the home then defending the right to its existence with reference to a ‘freedom 
of religion and belief,’ what the AACS’s representation of NCPC schooling as a 
matter of free choice on the market indicates a unique interpretation of the neo-
Calvinist tradition within the conjuncture of schooling in alignment with the 
presuppositions of the Anglo-liberal tradition. 
 
By framing its schools as expressions of private belief, the NCPC schooling 
movement is thus able to advance its cause by articulating the ‘right to religious 
freedom’ with the ‘right of parents to choose schools’ for their children via a market 
which seeks to allocate goods efficiently based on individuals’ private preferences. 
Hence, the choice of an NCPC school is taken to be tantamount to the expression of 
private preferences, particularly in relation to religious belief. The Why Christian 
Schools? (2008) document states this articulation of religious belief and choice 
clearly when it puts forth a response to the question of whether parents should pay 
for sending their children to a NCPC school: 
 
Parents do need to carefully consider the financial cost of 
education if they choose a Christian school. It will come 
down to setting priorities. The apostle Paul taught… 
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‘Everything is permissible - but not everything is beneficial. 
Everything is permissible - but not everything is 
constructive.’ (1 Corinthians 10:23) 
 
Paul faced choices. He felt some decisions were better than 
others. As a parent you face the choice of ‘which school 
should I send my child to? (p. 8) 
  
Here, the NCPC schooling movement draws on a particular quote from the 
New Testament to argue that parents should order priorities towards choosing an 
NCPC school for their children. In other words, the choice of an NCPC school is 
taken to be tantamount to the expression of private preferences in relation to religious 
belief.  The authority of the Apostle Paul is evidently deployed here in order to draw 
an equivalence between the latter’s framing of choices as bearing serious socio-
political implications34, the (Christian) religious convictions of parents, and NCPC 
schooling. Interestingly, it poses the problem as a question of choice – ‘which school 
                                                          
34 The social and political context for Paul’s statement in 1 Corinthians 10:23 can be understood to be 
very different to the one to which the Why Christian Schools? (2008) booklet is addressed. It has been 
interpreted, for instance, as directly addressing the elitism of some first century Christians – i.e. what 
is referred to in the preceding lines of this New Testament passage as the ‘knowledge of the strong’ – 
and their responsibilities to the poor members of their community. As Biblical scholar Neil Elliot 
(2006, p. 206) argues: ‘The ‘knowledge’ of the ‘strong’ in Corinth (8:4; 10:23) served to rationalize 
for higher-status Christians their own social expectations as responsible Roman citizens. Cultural 
codes for acknowledging status in a heavily stratified society underlie the practices that Paul considers 
abuses at the Lord’s Supper (11:17-34).’ Hence, while the ‘choice’ that the Apostle Paul posed is used 
in the NCPC schooling booklet as synonymous with parents’ school choice, it can also be interpreted 
from a more historical-critical angle as one addressed to Christians in the elite, whose superior wealth 
and knowledge could be deployed as a marker of their distinction from poorer Christians as was 
within their right as Roman citizens. 
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should I send my child to?’ – with the implication that Christian religion is expressed 
in this instance in the choosing of an NCPC school. This is further underscored in the 
closing paragraph of the document that follows, which states one the one hand that 
Christians should be thankful for choice in itself, and on the other hand that parents 
are accountable to God for them: 
 
We can be thankful we do have a choice. Like all choices we make, 
it is one for which we will be accountable to God. Our choices can 
have short-term, long-term and eternal consequences. Whatever 
you decide, we hope and pray that this booklet has been helpful in 
your choosing a school for your child. (Why Christian Schools?, 
2008, p. 8) 
 
The important point to stress in this passage is the emphasis on the import 
placed on choices in schooling per se. While stressing the sanction and judgment of 
God entailed in the making of decisions, it ultimately assumes that schooling is a 
matter of parental choice to which it appeals. Edlin (1999) is perhaps more 
forthcoming in spelling out, with reference to neo-Calvinist discourse, the stakes 
perceived to be involved for parents in choosing schools: 
 
The choice for Christians is this: send their children to 
training institutions where humankind is the object of 
worship in all activities or send their Children to training 
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institutions where God, and His plan for life, is the object of 
worship in all activities. For the Christian, such a choice 
should really be no choice at all! (p. 29) 
 
Yet even in this stronger assertion of the religious correctness of NCPC 
schooling vis-à-vis other (presumably state-run) schooling, Edlin’s argument still 
pivots on the notion of choice, which is consistent with his position on the superior 
efficacy of market choice for schooling cited above. Taken together, what Edlin and 
the NCPC schooling movement’s position on school choice entails is a supposition 
that the institution of the market is a vehicle of divine providence, which offers the 
freedom for Christians to choose religious schools in accordance with their private 
convictions. It is the combination of these antecedents as expressed in the correlation 
of contemporary market choice discourse with the parental responsibility for the 
education of their children derived from the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition that 
are the condition of possibility for the inclusion of NCPC schooling as a feature 
within a market for school choice instituted under a neo-liberal regime. 
 
The neo-liberal marketisation of religious schooling: Discursive processes 
 
According to Friedrich Hayek (1976) – who is widely considered to be a key 
authority in the rhetorical invocation of free markets in neo-liberal discourse (see 
Turner, 2007) – markets are seen to obviate the need for any collective or societal-
level decisions about the purposes to be served by economic activity. This is 
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considered extremely advantageous since in modern societies, no agreement is 
assumed to be attainable about such collective purposes, or about their relative 
priority. The market thus ‘devolves’ choices to individuals, who are able to pursue 
their own freely chosen preferences, in voluntary cooperation with one another, 
within the neutral framework of the market (Keat, 2008, p. 243). In such a ‘market-
based’ society, as MacIntyre (1999, pp. 115-118) characterises it, the only unchosen 
constraints on behavior and commitments are those dictated by a rationality guided 
by the motive of preference maximisation. Mahmood (2001) points out likewise that 
the primacy in such a context is accorded to choice based on individual volition: 
 
In order for an individual to be free, it is required that her 
actions be the consequence of her ‘own will’ rather than of 
custom, tradition, or direct coercion. Thus, even illiberal 
actions can arguably be tolerated if it is determined that they 
are undertaken by a freely consenting individual who acted of 
her own accord. (p. 207) 
 
So while other commitments and responsibilities may well exist in this view, 
say from religious traditions, they are considered to be chosen with regard to private 
preference and volition. For the neo-liberal regime, then, there is a stress on the 
importance of the market order as ‘an indispensable mechanism for efficiently 
allocating resources and safeguarding individual freedom’ because, as neo-liberal 
discourse maintains, ‘unfettered markets produce a natural order in society from the 
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voluntary exchange of goods and services, promoting productive efficiency, social 
prosperity and freedom’ (Turner, 2008, p. 4). 
 
Yet while rhetorically advocating the freedoms afforded by markets, in practice 
neo-liberal regimes like Australia demonstrate the persistence of the state in 
instituting and underwriting market relations.  This is because according to neo-
liberal discourse, a market is understood to be constituted by formal contractual 
exchanges among individuals seeking to actualise their own private preferences, and 
which is therefore allegedly indifferent in its structure to any substantive goods or 
commitments of the person (Walker, 2003). In light of this, the state has the primary 
responsibility for securing and regulating the social exchange so as to safeguard the 
market order from devolving into chaos (Turner, 2008, p. 5). Such a vision for 
ordering societal exchange cannot triumph and retain its predominance without the 
support of a powerful institution, and the one institution best fitted for the role is the 
state (Walker, 2003, p. 31). This fact betrays the convention (in claims made by 
politicians and academics) to draw a sharp distinction between public and private and 
between markets and a state regulatory hierarchy, for it ‘takes for granted the 
elaborate institutional infrastructure that underpins the effective functioning of 
markets.’ (Bell and Hindmoore, 2009, p. 123; also Jones, 1996). 
 
In the field of Australian schooling, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, a 
key aspect of such an institutional infrastructure is the standardisation of education, 
which is exemplified in the Federal Government’s implementation of accountability 
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measures such as NAPLAN and My School on a national scale. By rendering all 
schools measureable and comparable against a common scale, what such 
standardisation effects is the articulation of particular differences between schools 
across the nation onto a plane of equivalence. In such a way, the state can be seen to 
first create a market through the exercise of hierarchical command (i.e. legislative 
power and statutory authority), and then proceed to govern through them by steering, 
resourcing the market through the provision of information, and monitoring the 
effectiveness of market players – a governmental practice that Bell and Hindmoor 
(2009, p. 124) call ‘metagovernance.’ This refers to the ‘ongoing steering and 
resourcing, as well as the monitoring of effectiveness and the provision of 
accountability and legitimacy.’ (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009, p. 124) Thus while so-
called ‘privatisation’ may have created apparently freer markets, through 
metagovernance it has also led to more regulations. In addition to effecting the 
articulation of all schools under the purview of the market-state’s regulatory and 
administrative omniscience, the creation of a measurable space also serves as a 
precondition for a market in school choice.  How, then, are religious schools like 
those within the NCPC schooling movement positioned within such a market design 
in a neo-liberal context? 
 
In order to frame religious schools as options in a market for school choice, I 
contend that neo-liberal discourse presumes upon the definition of religion as an 
expression of private belief as borne by the Anglo-liberal tradition. This definition is 
in turn historically derived, as I outlined in Chapter 2, from the nominalist separation 
of religion from practice, the Protestant individualisation of religion as belief, and the 
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consignment of religion into the private sphere by contrast to the state and politics in 
the public sphere in early-modern English liberalism. Within a regime built upon 
such a definition, religion may up to a point be held as a private theory by individuals 
or groups, but any serious attempt to embody it in education will be proscribed 
beyond the point where the ‘givens’ of schooling – that is, the standards that bear on 
the public purpose of schooling as defined by the prevailing political regime and that 
can be accounted for – are thought to lie. Religious discourse that is permitted within 
such an arrangement, as MacIntyre (1988) points out more broadly with regard to 
different conceptions of the human good, can only be in the idiom of private 
preference: 
 
What is then permitted in that arena is the expression of 
preferences, either the preferences of individuals or the 
preferences of groups, the latter being understood as the 
preferences who make up those groups, summed up in one 
way or other. It may well be that in some cases it is some 
nonliberal theory or conception of the human good which 
leads individuals to express the preferences they do. But only 
in the guise of such expressions of preference are such 
theories and conceptions allowed to receive expression. (p. 
336) 
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In (re)defining religion as an expression of private preferences like any other 
claim on the human good, the institution of a market in school choice can thus serve 
as a vehicle for the expression of such preferences. Diverse religious schools may be 
permitted in such a market insofar as these too are but an expression of the private 
volition of individuals or families. Yet this way of framing religion occludes neo-
liberalism’s mediation of it. Being so occluded, the dominant regime maintains a 
formal commitment to a ‘free’ market for schooling between competing schools of 
different religious (and non-religious) identities, presupposing the liberal definition 
of what constitutes religion, as well as preserving for itself the determination of 
formal-juridical procedures which make possible such a market.  
 
So just as religion is formally permitted because it is something freely chosen 
as a private preference, so a market for school choice within a neo-liberal context 
may be framed rhetorically as offering a formal freedom to parents and families to 
choose schools according to any religion (or none). However, at the same time, it 
mediates this freedom to choose via a specific discourse that defines what religion is 
and exact regulatory mechanisms that supervise how it is to be properly expressed in 
schooling. Fredericks (2004), in his study of a parallel process with regard to 
Buddhist institutions under such an arrangement, argues that the confinement of 
substantive religious and moral discourse to the private sphere serves the economic 
and political status quo because, on the one hand, such discourses are removed from 
the realm of public discourse and through state regulation are allowed to be 
expressed only in private and the market as an arena of contesting wills and private 
preferences. On the other hand, while the state regulation compels individuals, 
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families and schools to express religiosity in private and in an agonistic marketplace, 
the political regime itself and its aims are seldom called into question (Fredericks, 
2004, p. 94).  
 
What this way of framing religion means is that the neo-Calvinist tradition 
within a neo-liberal regime is seen not as a matter of certain practices located within 
a substantive way of life and education, but confined to the realm of private 
preference in harmony with the presuppositions of the Anglo-liberal discursive 
tradition – or ‘the soul’ as is characteristic of the latter’s Protestant inflection – while 
its educational practices are regulated by the standards of the market-state. This latter 
process, which creates a simple space across differences within the national territory, 
then creates the illusion of diversity – that is, as exemplified in My School, the view 
that schools of different religious and non-religious traditions all occupy the same 
virtual space marked by the plurality of their private beliefs and preferences in 
conjunction with the ‘facts’ of their performance. The AACS (2012) in its defence of 
NCPC schooling appeals precisely to such a diversity undergirded by a regulatory 
conformity and public commitment to building the nation: 
 
Yes, there are differences between schools that are framed by 
the worldviews that they subscribe to. But when [NCPC] 
schools are kept accountable within the terms of legislation 
and regulation, these differences should not be caricatured as 
‘fringe’ or ‘divisive’ but rather celebrated as part of the rich 
diversity of the nation. 
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By affirming the regulation of NCPC schooling and framing its religious 
difference as ‘worldviews’ that are both inconsequential to its ability to perform 
accountably and contribute to the ‘rich diversity of the nation,’ the AACS reinforces 
NCPC schooling as an option on the market for school choice, but one that is ‘merely 
different’ insofar as ‘different religions are just so many ‘different’ ways of saying or 
experiencing or striving for the ‘same’ ultimate thing’ (Surin, 1990, pp. 74, 76). The 
religious elements of education, in such a reckoning, become a nominally ‘value-
added’ extra to standard schooling in order to attract parental preferences in the 
schooling market (see Meadmore and Meadmore, 2004), an actuality acknowledged 
and celebrated by some proponents of NCPC schooling. Framing religious schooling 
in this way, for example, is UK Christian education scholar Trevor Cooling – 
featured not infrequently in the NCPC schooling movement’s publications (e.g. 
Cooling, 2006, pp. 75-90), websites (e.g. Cooling, 2010) and conferences (e.g. 
Cooling, 2011) – who points out how Christian schools can make a ‘value-added 
contribution to the [standard] curriculum.’ (Cooling, 2005, p. 2) In a 2005 address 
delivered in Australia, he summarises how such value-adding functions as a way of 
enabling Christian schooling to be more religiously distinctive on the one hand, 
while also sharing in the values of broader society on the other: 
 
In terms of a value added curriculum in a distinctively 
Christian but inclusive school this has two implications. 
Firstly it means the curriculum becomes distinctive when the 
values taught are earthed in Christian teaching... Secondly the 
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curriculum will be inclusive because there are shared values 
to be celebrated... We do this by promoting shared values. 
(Cooling, 2005, p. 10) 
 
Cooling’s attempt to articulate the religious discourse of Christian schooling as 
a value-added dimension to the curriculum as summarised above presupposes, of 
course, that religion’s relationship to the material practices of education (i.e. the 
curriculum) is in the first place nominal and auxiliary as ‘values’ as distinct from its 
‘facts,’ and in the second place in alignment, to a large extent, to the values of 
society at large. Such an approach to religious discourse in education as value-added 
has the effect of rendering religious schools at once accountable to the public 
purpose of schooling (or what Cooling calls ‘shared values’) as determined by the 
market-state, as well as encouraging the deployment of its religious discourse in 
order to gain leverage in a market for school choice. This dual effect is exemplified 
in the public statements of Wycliffe Christian School, an NCPC school in the 
outskirts of metropolitan Sydney, which states that: 
 
Educational authorities often speak of value-adding. Reference to 
academic results later in this report will provide evidence, in part, 
of the manner in which WCS adds value academically. However 
WCS’s commitment to academic excellence is not limited to the 
support provided for more able students. Academic value-adding is 
just as significant for the students at WCS who receive support 
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through its extensive Education Support Program. However even 
more significant in terms of value-adding is WCS’S commitment 
to promoting a holistic view of education that is outworked through 
four key processes: Nurturing Faith; Unwrapping Truth; 
Encouraging Discernment; Enabling Thoughtful Action. Students 
are encouraged to wrestle with real life issues from a distinctly 
Christian worldview within a pastorally supportive environment (a 
pastorally supportive environment for which Wycliffe is well-
known). (Wycliffe Christian School, 2010, p. 3; emphases added) 
 
So for Wycliffe Christian School, value-adding consists initially in what it does 
as a school to achieve good results in academic performance and aiding those 
students who do not do so well through its ‘Education Support Program.’ In this 
sense, it is aligned with the broader public purpose of schooling. Its distinctively neo-
Calvinist discourse, which it claims to be central to its educational program, is 
framed here as a significant value-added feature of the school. These include a 
‘distinctly Christian worldview’ as is consistent with the discourse of the broader 
NCPC schooling movement and, as is emphasised through repetition and accolade, a 
‘pastorally supportive environment.’ As with Cooling’s framing of Christian schools, 
then, Wycliffe Christian School is in this sense demonstrably regulated and 
accountable in its delivery of standardised education (measured by its ‘academic 
results’ and ‘academic excellence’), as well as seeking to distinguish itself in a 
market for school choice through its religious discourse as implying (‘more 
significant’) value-added qualities. In effect, by associating standard education with 
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something larger than itself, what such value-adding may be argued to amount to is 
the selling of particular values with a generic educational product, a symptom of a 
broader tendency that Carette and King (2005) describe as the instrumental use of 
religion for marketing under neo-liberalism. This occurs, they claim, by associating a 
product with something larger than itself so that ‘a distinction can be made between 
the generic product and what is actually being sold,’ that is, ‘by selling a value with 
the product.’ (Carette & King, 2005, p. 160) Through such processes, Carette and 
King (2005) go on to argue: ‘religious systems and traditions are ‘merged’ in a 
manner that makes them fundamentally supportive of the single truth of 
neoliberalism’ (p. 150). 
 
Therefore, what Cooling’s remarks about value-adding in general and the 
example of Wycliffe Christian School in particular demonstrate is that the market for 
school choice has entailed a specific redefinition of religiosity in religious schools – 
that is, the latter are permitted only as a choice based on individual or family 
preferences, which is in turn derived from private beliefs with nominal connections 
to the educational practices of schooling. Simultaneously, religious schools such as 
those within the NCPC schooling movement are compelled to compete for such 
private preferences, which is done primarily by associating the delivery of a standard 
product (i.e. educational service of schooling) with its religious discourse confined to 
exhortations to choose (NCPC schools) with a view to being ‘accountable to God’ 
and as value-added qualities in marketing itself. This reflects a market-driven 
understanding of the private individual or family as having the authority of choice 
even over religious matters, so that ‘people are increasingly treating religion as 
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providing commodities – acting with self-informed authority to choose those 
components of the religious sphere which best suit their own particular consumer 
requirements’ (Heelas, 1994, p. 102). 
 
The amenability of schools within the NCPC schooling movement to such an 
arrangement can be understood, in some significant sense, as a conjunctural 
articulation of elements from the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition like parental 
responsibility outlined above with the presuppositions of the Anglo-liberal tradition 
that religion is primarily a matter of belief whose locus is in the private realm, and 
hence is best expressed through the free choices of individuals or families. On this 
basis, I argue, NCPC schools are thus rendered amenable to being contained within a 
market for school choice marked by a logic of nominal difference – that is, as 
mentioned above, where differences are non-substantive insofar as they are 
subordinate to a higher equivalence.  
 
By contrast to the logic of equivalence which foregrounds the division of the 
social field into two, simplified camps of us/them and friend/enemy – for example, 
schools that are articulated under a ‘shared, public purpose’ versus ‘examples of 
unacceptable underperformance’ as discussed in the previous chapter – a logic of 
difference entails emphasising the opposite. According to the Gramscian analytic of 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 130ff.), it involves a dispersion of the simplified social 
polarities of equivalence into a larger number of more specific identities by 
dissolving existing chains of equivalence and incorporating those disarticulated 
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elements into an expanding order (also Jørgensen & Philips, 2002). However, the 
logics of difference and equivalence should not be seen as mutually exclusive, for 
‘just as the logic of difference never manages to constitute a fully sutured space, 
neither does the logic of equivalence ever achieve this’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 
129). This means that both logics are always existent in a given conjuncture because 
equivalence will always entail some acceptable differences encompassed within the 
‘we’ and conversely, a logic of difference will always entail some limits, i.e. 
‘acceptable’ versus ‘unacceptable’ differences.  So whereas the foregrounding of a 
logic of equivalence as exemplified in parts of Gillard’s speech to the AISNSW cited 
in the previous chapter seeks to divide schools into an ‘us/them’ axis when speaking 
of school performance, a logic of difference attempts to weaken and displace 
antagonistic polarities through dissolving commonalities. This may take the form of 
an expansive notion of ‘diversity’ where differences are considered different within a 
broadly conceived ‘mainstream,’ as for example through policies of 
‘multiculturalism’ or ‘social inclusion’ of disparate discourses as mere ‘life-style 
choices’ (cf. Bauman, 2000, pp. 38-52) or, in the case of NCPC schools a form of 
value-added choice derived from private preferences. This too can be exemplified in 
Gillard’s (2008) speech to the leaders of independent private schools where, 
notwithstanding the clear demarcation and exclusion of those schools she has 
castigated as unacceptable, the right of parents to choose between schools that are 
presumably within the range of acceptable differences is highlighted: 
 
It is education – starting in the early years, going through our 
schools and extending to TAFE, universities and beyond – that will 
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shape the future productivity and wellbeing of Australia. And I 
want to reiterate here the Government’s support for the full right of 
parents to choose the school that best meets the needs of their child. 
 
What is notable and revealing in this passage from Gillard is the valorisation of 
parental choice while simultaneously demarcating the diversity of schooling within a 
unity of an end – ‘the future productivity and wellbeing of Australia.’ It is here that 
the logic of difference – or what I more specifically call a logic of nominal difference 
– is most evident; for while the push toward a nationally standardised education may 
at the outset imply a negation of market choice, this is not the case. For absent such 
standards, there is neither a measurable base of information for school choice, nor for 
identifying what constitutes ‘high-performing schools’ as implied by the Federal 
Government. Thus, measures like NAPLAN and My School are concerned with 
facilitating school choice by making clear, comparable and accessible information 
available demonstrates an apparent logic of acceptable differences in the market 
insofar as qualitative differences of schools are articulated onto a single plane of 
measurement under the ‘shared/public purpose on education’ at the level of 
government (i.e. Catholic ≡ State ≡ NCPC schooling). 
 
Simultaneously on the level of the market for school choice, schools are 
compelled to mark out their differences to court parental preferences primarily 
through competition established quantitatively in their relative performances toward 
these educational standards, and secondarily by emphasising their religious (or non-
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religious) distinctions as qualitative, ‘value-added’ features (Catholic ≠ State ≠ 
NCPC schooling – see Figure 17). In short, as McLaren (2001) puts it, ‘diversity and 
difference are allowed to proliferate and flourish, provided that they remain within 
the prevailing forms of capitalist social arrangements.’ (p. liv) 
 
 
Figure 17: A logic of difference in the market that positions NCPC schooling as nominally ‘different’ 
vis-a-vis other forms of schooling (Catholic ≠ State ≠ NCPC). Regulation of differences is effected 
through state-enforced standards for the ‘shared/public purpose of schooling.’ This functions as a 
higher logic of equivalence (Catholic ≡ State ≡ NCPC) that then enables a space of nominal 
differences for ‘parental choice’ (notwithstanding those who are excluded for ‘unacceptable 
underperformance’). NCPC schooling actively consents to the hegemony of neo-liberal discourse by 
rendering neo-Calvinist discourse in alignment with the market for school choice 
 
So contrary to the neo-liberal definition of markets as ‘free’ and the neo-
Calvinist notion of markets as operating autonomously owing to God’s providence as 
inferred from Kuyper, this case of the Australian schooling market demonstrates how 
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government action is unremitting in any market order. Indeed with particular 
pertinence to religious schooling, Turner (2011) elucidates that from the ‘economic 
or market view of religion’: 
 
[S]tates will be interested in the ‘quality’ of religious 
products on the market. Just as states intervene in issues to do 
with secular consumerism – for example testing the quality of 
food and the cleanliness of restaurants through various 
agencies charged with the oversight of public health and 
hygiene – so we can expect secular states to manage religions 
through testing the quality of their products, especially their 
relations with minors. (p. 176) 
 
Within such an arrangement, the circuit of power between the market-state and 
individual religious schools like those within the NCPC schooling movement is 
sustained because a market predicated on different private preferences will always 
need to be undergirded by a ‘higher synthesis’ (or logic of equivalence) that absorbs 
the many into the one, thus creating a minimal commonality in difference. For ‘[i]n 
the absence of shared ends, devotion to the state itself as the end in itself becomes 
more urgent.’ (Cavanaugh, 2011, p. 31)  
 
Within such a context, religious discourse in schools like those within the 
NCPC schooling movement can be expressed, but this tends to take the form of 
bearing value-added qualities like Christian values in the curriculum or a supportive 
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pastoral care environment in order to appeal to private preferences in a market for 
school choice. So even for those schools in the market from religious traditions like 
neo-Calvinism that contain voices who decry the excesses of neo-liberal regimes 
(e.g. Goudzwaard, Walsh and Keesmaat, Bartholomew and Goheen cited above), the 
tying of their institutional survival to competitive market relations will increase the 
pressures to practically conform to its logic. As Fanfani (2003) argues of the logic of 
the market vis-à-vis religious principles: 
 
[I]n a society in which two or more individuals have something to 
offer (supply), and x individuals require that something (demand), 
it is obvious that if one of the two in command of the commodity, 
in the absence of any impediment in the civil law (the only law that 
has coercive force today), puts himself in a position to supply those 
who require it with greater ease, his competitors will be obliged to 
imitate him under pain of serious losses, even if to do so they will 
have to do violence to convictions or ideals to which they would 
normally have remained faithful.  (pp. 62-63) 
 
In turn, because such a market for school choice also requires the prior 
institution of an equivalential space for its functioning, it cannot brook a substantive 
pluralism of ends that the presence of religious discourses potentially represents. To 
attenuate this potential, as demonstrated in the case of NCPC schooling, a general 
commitment is established in the form of a ‘shared public purpose for schooling’ and 
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its accompanying state regulation is implemented under its aegis – owing to the 
status of ‘civil law’ as ‘the only law that has coercive force today’ as characterised 
by Fanfani above – with the result that the ‘religious’ dimension of religious 
schooling will only bear a nominal connection to accountable and measureable 
educational practices. Differences in religious schooling are thus submitted to a 
higher equivalence, which brackets off its religious elements by designating as 
‘belief,’ ‘values,’ ‘value-added’ and/or ‘culture-specific’ all the historically and 
politically substantive particularities potentially borne by various discursive 
traditions, thus effecting a consignment of different religious discourses into the form 
of what Surin (1990) calls ‘hyper-abstracted idioms’ that have but a nominal 
connection to educational practices (pp. 81-82). 
 
In their various studies of a structurally homologous neo-liberal market for 
‘controlled choice’ in Israel, Shapira, Haymann and Shavit (1995), Bekerman (2000) 
and Yonah, Dahan and Markovich (2008) also find that where religious schools are 
taken to be ‘service providers’ – that is, where education is a ‘service’ provided by 
the school while students and parents are individuated ‘customers’ – the implication 
is that such schools are subject to the principles of supply and demand in a 
‘deregulated’ competitive market, as well as to a concomitant ‘re-regulation’ by the 
market-state under the signs of ‘quality,’ ‘objective setting’ and ‘accountability’ 
where each school ‘is obligated to evaluate and assess its [own] activities and 
achievements with complete transparency’ (Yonah et al, 2008, p. 208). Ironically in 
the case of the NCPC schooling movement in Australia, despite its founding 
commitment to an education as religiously primary and all-encompassing, its 
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repackaging as a religious ‘service provider’ regulated by the secular state is abetted 
by its advocacy of privatised parental choice in a providentially sustained market for 
schools, which is in turn justified through a particular configuration of elements from 
within the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition. Far from autonomous spheres that are 
self-sustaining as portrayed by Kuyper, then, its conceptual reduction of potential 
patrons to the status of individual agents (whether individual persons or individual 
families) pursuing religious education as private preferences will tend to buttress the 
institution of a market for school choice, one which will necessitate the secular 
market-state’s perpetual (meta)governance in order to guarantee the freedom of each 
to express their religion as a market choice, as well as to actively regulate and sustain 
the space required for such choices to be made. The label for this paradox of 
religious schooling within a neo-liberal regime put forward by Shapira et al (1995) 
appears, in this instance, to be apt: ‘Autonomy as ethos, content as commodity.’ 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I argued that according to neo-liberal discourse, a market in 
school choice is seen as the most efficient means of achieving the public purpose of 
schooling. Based on the methodological individualism of liberal discourse and the 
framework of public choice theory, proponents of such a market design – including 
both the Federal Government and the Opposition in Australian politics – have lauded 
its ability to generate competitive efficiency between schools while offering 
individuals and families a freedom of choice to suit their preferences. In order to 
institute and sustain such a market for school choice, however, requires the 
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imposition of a common scale of measurement across schools differently located 
geographically and demographically across the nation in order to facilitate 
comparison between options.  
 
Here, the federally-implemented standardised education measures like the 
testing and reporting instruments of NAPLAN and My School, as well as the planned 
introduction of the Australian National Curriculum in 2013, come to the fore not 
only because they regulate schools in accordance with the broader public purpose for 
schooling as defined by neo-liberal discourse (see Chapter 5), but also insofar as it 
creates the conditions of possibility for a national market in schooling. This latter 
function is perhaps unsurprising, for the imposition by the state of uniform measures 
across a given space is characteristic of the creation of national capitalist markets 
since the time of their inception. As economic historian Fanfani (2003) describes of 
this historical process: ‘[One] means of unifying the market is the establishment of 
uniform weights and measures. The absolute States made a certain progress in this 
direction, and sometimes succeeded in abolishing or reducing the inconveniences of 
local systems of weights and measures.’ (p. 101) While the market-state under a neo-
liberal regime cannot simply be equated with the early-modern absolute state 
described by Fanfani, it nonetheless remains what Gamble (1979) calls a ‘strong 
state,’ a state that has to be active in order to maintain the conditions which 
guarantee ‘individual liberty’ as expressed through market choices. In this view, the 
tendency toward greater standardisation of education in Australia through national 
testing, reporting and curricula can be seen as a key means through which the state 
creates and sustains the conditions for a market in school choice by imposing a 
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uniform measure of schooling nationwide, thus allowing individuals and families to 
compare and contrast different schools on its basis. 
 
The NCPC schooling movement’s view on the institution of such a market for 
school choice, as I canvassed above, appears to be overwhelmingly positive. Based 
on the affirmation that the primary responsibility for education lies with parents, the 
NCPC schooling movement has, through the political lobbying of the AACS, 
ardently supported the cause of school choice in Australia. The role of the state, 
according to the AACS, is to provide opportunities for parents to choose schools 
other than state-run schools for their children that are congruent with their religious 
beliefs. This is also evinced in the Why Christian Schools? booklet published by the 
NCPC schooling movement, which underlines God’s delegation of responsibility to 
parents for the nurture of their children by contrast to educational provision by both 
the state and churches, as well as by teachers. Like the AACS, this booklet 
establishes a correlation between this God-given responsibility drawn from neo-
Calvinist discourse and the need to have choices in schooling, with Christian (i.e. 
NCPC) schooling put forward as an exemplary expression of responsible school 
choice for Christian parents.  
 
This position of the NCPC schooling movement on market choice, I argued, 
can be seen as a conjunctural interpretation of elements within the neo-Calvinist 
discursive tradition. Specifically, the NCPC schooling movement aligns Calvin’s 
injunctions on parental responsibility for the nurture of children with market choice 
as understood by neo-liberal discourse. This effectively buttresses the present social 
order, in the first place, by sanctioning a market for school choice through its 
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framing of such an arrangement as the one most suitable for the expression of their 
religiosity and fidelity to their tradition. In turn, this is underwritten by an implicit 
identification of the market order with a transcendent or providential self-sufficiency, 
which involves a specific reading of Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty concept and the 
autonomy of arenas of social life from the state.  
 
In consequence of such a conjunctural interpretation of sphere sovereignty, the 
NCPC schooling movement abets the prevailing neo-liberal regime in the second 
place by framing NCPC schooling as one choice in a market of schools, which 
effectively positions religious schooling as an expression of private preference. Yet 
in advancing such a market-driven position, the NCPC schooling movement occludes 
the persistence and presence of the state in regulating schools through the market via 
the mechanisms through which it institutes and sustains the latter. 
 
In turn, according to neo-liberal discourse, I argued that private choice on the 
market – whether stemming from the preferences of individuals or families – is 
emphasised as the arena through which freedom is realised apart from the state 
regulation. Yet because of the neo-liberal belief in the efficacy of the market, the 
state persists through the exercise of hierarchical authority to create markets, and 
then proceeds to govern through them by steering, resourcing the market through the 
provision of information and monitoring the effectiveness of market players. The 
market in school choice can be seen in this way not as an expression of diversity as 
such, but as an institutional space made operable through the levelling of differences 
onto a plane of equivalence under governmental regulation, which is in turn geared 
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toward preparing for globalisation and market comparison between nominal 
differences. 
 
The basis for such an arrangement for religious schooling derives from the 
presupposition borne by the Anglo-liberal tradition that religion is a personal and 
private matter. Hence, the religious discourse in religious schools within a neo-liberal 
regime may be professed as private belief by individuals, families and schools to a 
certain extent, but such matters of personal preference must be cordoned off from 
those standards of education that are accountably-provable and measurable. So when 
this privatisation of religion is taken in conjunction with the valorisation of parental 
choice of schooling, the market-state can be seen to articulate religious schools like 
those within the NCPC schooling movement into a logic of nominal differences. By 
levelling out substantive differences, the market for school choice gives the illusion 
of diversity. For religious schools like NCPC schools within such a market of 
nominal differences, I have argued that its religious aspects come to serve as a 
‘value-added’ feature of such schools seeking to gain leverage in the market.  
 
This presumption that religion in religious schooling is divisible from a certain 
way of life and materiality reveals the neo-liberal regime’s historical specificity as a 
product of a particular discursive tradition. More specifically, the presuppositions 
derived from Protestantism define religion as primarily a product of private belief 
and preference, and hence freedom of religion is expressed, in one way, as the 
freedom of private individuals or families to choose a ‘private’ religious school. The 
political implications of such a discourse generates a mystifying view of the state as 
ethically and religiously neutral, bearing a ‘thin’ procedural notion of justice defined 
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as the adjudication of an agonistic market for preference expression; a notion of 
justice shared by the AACS and Edlin in their interpretation of Kuyper’s arguments 
for a limited state.  
 
In effect, what such a regime allows is not a ‘rise of religious schooling’ that 
can be expressed and embodied substantively in a way that opposes the secular 
public sphere, whether this is taken to be a positive or dangerous development 
depending on the side taken in the debate along the secular/religious line. As legal 
scholar Bhandar (2009) points out with regard to cultures in general, within a 
putatively secular and multicultural society that is structured along neo-liberal lines, 
the normative type of subject is one that is formally sovereign, autonomous and free 
to choose in the image of the ‘consumer citizen subject’ – in particular, one who is 
opposed to a self that is constrained by substantive religious obligations and desires 
(or should desire) to ‘live a lifestyle that comports with free-market economic 
principles.’ (pp. 320-321) Hence, she goes on to argue that in such a society: 
‘Cultural practices and traditions, festivals, dance, music, food, and clothing have all 
been embraced within multiculturalism that not only tolerates difference but 
celebrates it in the form of commodification and consumption.’ (Bhandar, 2009, p. 
321; see also Brown, 2005, pp. 151-154) By extension, if it is the case as Turner 
(2011) argues that ‘all multicultural societies are multi-faith societies’ because ‘in 
practice it is difficult to separate ‘religion’ from ‘culture’’ (p. 175), then religion of 
the sort articulated by the NCPC schooling movement can also be seen as acceptable 
insofar as it adopts the commodity form for sovereign, autonomous and freely 
choosing consumers.  
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Conclusion 
 
Religion is permitted – not as a substantial way of life, but as 
a particular ‘culture’ or, rather, life-style phenomenon: what 
legitimizes it is not its immanent truth-claim but the way it 
allows us to express our innermost feelings and attitudes. 
(Žižek, 2004) 
 
In the introduction to this thesis, I noted several questions that had arisen out of 
the debates and controversies surrounding the new visibility of religious schooling in 
Australia. Specifically, they concerned what and who defines ‘religion’ and 
‘education,’ how these terms have come to be defined and debated, particularly along 
the lines of public/private and secular/religious with regard to religious schooling in 
Australia today. In addition and on the basis of an inquiry into the above questions, I 
further asked how these definitions are acted upon in the present, what the effects of 
such definitions on religious schooling are and, within the present conjuncture, for 
what ends. In particular, these latter questions also dovetailed with those arising from 
reflection upon my own experiences at the intersection of religion and education. For 
example, are some forms of religious schooling considered more acceptable than 
others? If so, how are the religious claims of such ‘acceptable’ religious schools 
understood to be substantiated in the context of the present educational system? Are 
particular religious schools so different if, in their manifold variety, they can be rated 
and ranked beside differently religious and non-religious schools? And, if religion 
does not exist as a transcendent object above the fray of history, society and politics 
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but always involves immanent practices, then what is the role of religious schooling 
within the present social order? In this conclusion, I shall seek to address these 
questions , in part, on the basis of the argument developed in the preceding chapters. 
In addition and in cognisance of the limits of this thesis, I shall also gesture towards 
further important but unattended areas of inquiry raised by this present work, 
especially pertaining to religious education in non-Christian traditions within a neo-
liberal context. 
 
Religious schooling: Privatisation, anti-secularism, or neo-liberal hegemony? 
 
With regard to whether some forms of religious schooling considered are more 
acceptable than others, I began in Chapter 1 by canvassing what is considered to be 
religious education in Australia today. Drawing on the one hand on the ASCRG and 
the High Court’s definition of ‘religion’ – that is, as primarily concerned with belief 
in a Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle and its associated moral conducts that are 
taken to give effect to that prior belief – and ‘education’ through schooling on the 
other hand as a means of training future citizens for employment and civic 
participation on the other, I surmised from these definitions that the articulation of 
these two elements in the form of ‘religious education’ – most visibly in its 
institutionalized form of ‘religious schooling’ – denotes a particular conjunction of 
belief transmission and the training of desired worker-citizens. 
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Yet as I also highlighted in Chapter 1, how ‘religion’ and ‘education’ are 
variously defined – and indeed debated – is dependent on the contingent historical 
and political settlements in any given context. Following the work of critical 
pedagogy scholars in the case of the latter element and contemporary scholars of 
religion like Asad, Fitzgerald, Cavanaugh amongst others in the former, I argued that 
the way religion and education are commonly understood is a product of specificities 
in the cultural and political field that define, demarcate and fix them in a given time 
and place. In other words, I take leave from the a priori assumptions that religion 
and/or education are phenomena ‘out there’ or ‘in essence’ that can be defined in a 
self-evident or unproblematic way, preferring to highlight how their conjunction in 
the present form of religious education – particularly in the institutional form of 
contemporary religious schooling – is descended from historical and political 
contexts that have articulated both religion and education differently over time.  
 
In order to demonstrate the contingency of how religious education is defined 
and debated in the present, I offered a genealogical account of how religious 
education in Australia came to be defined as it is via the discursive continuities and 
discontinuities within the predominant Anglo-liberal tradition in Chapter 2 and 3. In 
tracing the genealogy of how religion has come to be conceived as primarily a set of 
beliefs in a supernatural Being, Thing or principle that give rise to a set of moral 
conducts, and religious education broadly defined as the transmission of such 
religion, I pointed to three key historical moments in the Anglo-liberal tradition: 
firstly, the rise of the late-Medieval theology of nominalism, which effectively broke 
the unity of religion and practical reason by positing a conception of God as 
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inscrutable and distant, thus separating the world into distinct orders of an apparent, 
secular natural world knowable by reason and a supernatural religious realm 
attainable only by belief; secondly, the Protestant reformation triggered by Luther 
and his doctrine of the ‘Two Kingdoms,’ which developed the nominalist definition 
of faith as belief by delimitating its locus to the ‘inner’ life of individual subjects 
while ‘outer’ worldly practices are merely secondary expressions of inner faith, with 
the latter being appropriately subject to and governed by secular authorities who are 
appointed by God’s divine fiat; and thirdly, accompanying the rise of the modern 
state as the apex of legitimate authority, the realm of religion is designated by early-
modern liberals – most prominently in Britain by Locke – as belonging in the private 
realm where individuals strive for the salvation of their souls by worshipping God 
while the realm of civil society/government in public is concerned with the socio-
political order of this world. 
 
However, I further argued in Chapter 2, the liberal insistence on such a 
separation exemplified by Locke tends to betray the theological discourses of 
nominalism and Protestant religion in England that gave rise to hegemonic 
assumptions about religion through its ‘private’ influence on ‘public’ citizens and 
officials who, in turn, determine what forms of religion are acceptable or 
unacceptable for social order. A chief means of such private influence, I conjectured 
through a reading of Locke’s pioneering formulation, was through so-called private 
religious education and its formation of subjects that eventually come to inhabit the 
realm of public politics and the state. Rather than accepting the liberal framework of 
a separation between politics and religion corresponding to the public/private 
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division, which is itself predicated on a nominalist rendering of religion as belief 
apart from practical reason in the world and a Protestant separation of ‘Two 
Kingdoms,’ I posited an alternative view based on Gramsci’s notions of ‘hegemony’ 
and the ‘integral state.’ In this latter schema – which I adjudged to be more 
efficacious in foregrounding the political effects of the Anglo-liberal tradition’s 
public/private and secular/religious distinctions in education – so-called ‘private’ 
institutions can be understood not as a separate apolitical realm, but rather as the site 
of hegemony whereby dominant discourses are disseminated at the level of popular 
belief. Such popular beliefs – or commonsense – then exert an influence in the public 
sphere involving, amongst other things, the institution of the state, legislation, legal 
doctrine and politics. As such, the public sphere of liberal politics encompassing 
these elements is better seen as forming a ‘circuit of power’ in conjunction with the 
private sphere of religion. In turn, religious education can be seen as a conduit for the 
circulation of dominant discourses insofar as its ‘acceptable’ forms are regulated by 
the liberal state on the one hand, while on the other it (re)produces constituent 
citizens of the state that adjudge ‘acceptability’ by reference to the predominant 
definitions of religious education. 
 
The effects of this circuit of power between the public and private spheres, and 
by implication the domains of the secular and religious, were borne out most clearly 
in the foundation of ‘public’ and ‘secular’ schooling in NSW after the colonisation of 
Australia in 1788. As I highlighted in Chapter 3, the establishment of the latter was 
defined in active opposition to the minority Roman Catholic discourse of the time 
that insisted on a definition of religion as intrinsic to educational practices. By 
contrast, the discourse of the emergent public and secular system, which presupposed 
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a nominal connection between the discourses of particular religions and general 
educational practices, as well as a Protestant definition of religion as primarily a 
matter of private conviction with a secondary connection to public morality. Drawing 
again on a Gramscian reading, I argued that the eventual institution of this latter 
conception of religious education as hegemonic over the Roman Catholic conception 
can be understood to be an effect of the populist articulation of Protestant and liberal 
discourses that gave rise to a historic bloc under the sign of ‘the Nation’ that was 
opposed to Roman Catholic religious education (and Roman Catholicism in general), 
which was castigated as ‘unjust and oppressive,’ ‘hateful and anti-national,’ ‘against 
the enlightened progress of the age’ and so on. In this frame, the establishment of 
public and secular education in NSW (and in Australia more generally), far from 
being what had been popularly described by the liberal discourse at the time as 
educational progress owing to the operation of an inevitable law, can in fact be 
understood as the codification of hegemonic nominalist, Protestant and liberal 
assumptions about religious education against the Catholic view. 
 
The specificity and effects of the Anglo-liberal tradition’s understanding of 
religious education as a private affair versus public education as secular and 
universally-accessible was also brought to the fore when placed alongside the neo-
Calvinist discursive tradition. This latter tradition, which is predicated on the 
expansive social and political visions of Calvin in the sixteenth century and Dutch 
neo-Calvinist politicians in the nineteenth century as outlined in Chapter 4, bore an 
expansive definition of religious education as all-encompassing. This tradition was 
embodied by Dutch migrants to Australia in the 1950s, which led to an antagonism 
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with the then-prevailing system of education and its definition of religious education 
as private and separate from public and secular education. This gave rise to a 
movement for separate neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schools from the 1950s 
onward across Australia and the formation of NCPC schools from the 1960s, an 
educational movement that was integrated into the educational mainstream only after 
the implementation of the 1973 Karmel Report that made state funding available for 
religious schools. 
 
The integration of religious schools such as those from the NCPC schooling 
movement (as well as the hitherto separate Roman Catholic schools) into the 
Australian education system in the 1970s after the Karmel Report brings up two 
further questions posed in the introduction to this thesis: How are the religious claims 
and values of ‘acceptable’ religious schools understood to be substantiated in the 
context of the present educational system? And are particular religious schools so 
different if, in their manifold variety, they can be rated and ranked beside differently 
religious and non-religious schools? In Chapter 3, I considered the place of religious 
education in the period of nation-building under the hegemony of a social liberal 
regime from the time of Federation in 1901 to the 1980s. Religious education under 
this political regime was demonstrably built upon the presuppositions of the Anglo-
liberal discursive tradition, which maintained that the former could either occupy the 
public realm by recourse to broadly generalisable values that contributed to the good 
of the nation, or remain confined to the realm of private devotion. So while so-called 
‘independent’ or ‘private’ schools based on particular religious (and non-religious) 
traditions like NCPC schooling were eventually assimilated into the educational 
mainstream in the 1970s, they were under a social liberal regime also simultaneously 
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levelled onto a space of administrative comparison with reference to their 
contribution to the hegemonically-defined national good – that is, they were judged 
according to their efficacy in training workers and citizens for the nation. In short, 
religious differences in such schools were positioned as ‘values’ that, while 
nominally expressing the diversity of belief, were incidental to the ‘facts’ of 
education (i.e. its practices), which they shared in common with non-religious 
schools.  
 
These Anglo-liberal presuppositions about religion in education were further 
built upon in the shift from a social liberal regime to a neo-liberal regime from the 
1980s on, which can be broadly characterised as a shift away from nation-building 
toward an emphasis on forging a nation populated with skilled worker-citizens for 
what is presumed to be a globalising labour market. I argued that while neo-liberal 
regimes are often characterised as dogmatically and rhetorically positing free 
markets – including a market in school choice – the state is still prominent in 
instituting, facilitating, regulating and delimiting such markets. This restructured 
state, which can be labelled the ‘market-state’ owing to its redefined function, is 
evident in the simultaneous proliferation of accountability measures like standardised 
testing and reporting in order to regulate schools across the nation in alignment with 
the educational imperatives of the neo-liberal vision of globalisation on the one hand, 
and on the other hand in encouraging a market for school choice on the basis of 
performance according to such measures. Despite the rhetoric of school diversity 
offered in a market for school choice propounded by neo-liberal discourse, then, I 
argued that religious schooling under this regime remains confined to expressing 
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private ‘values’ apart from the public ‘facts’ of education deemed necessary owing to 
globalisation, while the market for school choice allows for the possibility of 
religious discourse to be framed as ‘value-added’ supplements that appeal to the 
private preferences of potential consumers. The most immediate effect of persisting 
in categorising religious schools as private in contrast to secular public schools is 
thus to obscure how the former – despite their formal status as ‘private’ educational 
service providers in the market for school choice – remain linked to the (integral) 
market-state insofar as they are regulated and steered through accountability 
measures towards the end of education as defined by neo-liberal discourse. 
 
I considered the political effects of this manner of categorising religious 
schools more specifically with regard to the NCPC schooling movement in Chapters 
5 and 6. This religious schooling movement, was initiated in the 1950s in explicit 
opposition to the mainstream education system in Australia, advancing instead an 
expansive view of its religious discourse as affecting all educational practices. 
Despite its integration into the mainstream education system today, the movement 
remains insistent on its distinctive neo-Calvinist theological motifs that in turn 
undergird its ‘foundational values’: namely, the importance of parental responsibility 
in the nurture of their children and the training students to responsive disciples who 
will occupy various social spheres for the purpose of glorifying God/Christ. How 
then, I inquired, are these foundational values interpreted by the NCPC schooling 
movement within the present neo-liberal conjuncture? This inquiry can be considered 
a partial address to the broader question I had posed in the introduction: that is, if 
religion does not exist as a transcendent object above the fray of history, society and 
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politics but always involves immanent practices, then what is the role of religious 
schooling within the present social order? 
 
In Chapter 5, I examined more closely how the NCPC schooling movement’s 
foundational value of the training students to responsive disciples of God/Christ is 
related to the ‘public purpose of schooling’ as defined by neo-liberal discourse, 
which is taken to be the training of future worker-citizens to compete effectively in 
an (allegedly) inexorably globalising labour market. Through a consideration of the 
statements made by the NCPC schooling movement, I argued that despite its 
formally ‘independent’ or ‘private’ label, it aligns itself with this public purpose of 
education through accountability measures like standardised testing and reporting, 
seeing such measures as legitimate and as an avenue for its students to exercise their 
God-given talents. This alignment can be explained, I argued, as a consequence of a 
shared nominalist construal of religion as separate in essence from practices as held 
by both the neo-Calvinist and Anglo-liberal discursive traditions, the latter of which 
is the basis of the neo-liberal regime. For the former, the world and human practices 
are interpreted as but instrumental to the glory of God, which leads it to adopt a form 
of Christian realism and pragmatism that sees social reality and its institutions – most 
prominently the state – as providentially-derived. Accordingly, the NCPC schooling 
movement seeks to actualise the God-given talents of its students so that they may 
inhabit and work in these institutions as synonymously Christian witnesses and 
prominent citizens, which coincides with the broader public purpose of education to 
train worker-citizens.  
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Simultaneously, for the neo-liberal regime built upon the nominalist 
presuppositions of the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition, religious schooling is 
regulated through a privatisation of its religious elements whereby the latter are 
permitted to be expressed as long as education arranged according to the 
hegemonically defined public purpose are executed and accounted for. On a 
Gramscian reading, I surmised that the neo-liberal regime is thus able to sustain its 
hegemony by articulating religious schools like those in the NCPC schooling 
movement into a logic of equivalence under this public purpose of schooling, thereby 
regulating religious schools by obliging accountable performance while still 
permitting them the expression of their particular, private religious discourses. In 
addition, I also conjectured that the recent federal implementation of standardised 
testing and reporting instruments in the form of NAPLAN and My School serves not 
only to regulate schools in accordance with the broader public purpose for schooling 
as defined by neo-liberal discourse, but also to institute and sustain a market for 
school choice, which requires the imposition of common measures across all schools 
differently located geographically and demographically across the nation in order to 
facilitate comparison between options. 
 
In Chapter 6, I furthered this argument by considering the how the NCPC 
schooling movement’s foundational value of parental responsibility for the nurture of 
children relates to the neo-liberal exaltation of a market in school choice as the most 
efficient means of achieving the public purpose of schooling. Based on statements 
and promotional literature from the former, I surmised that the NCPC schooling 
movement’s view on the institution of such a market for school choice appears to be 
overwhelmingly positive. Based on the affirmation that the primary responsibility for 
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education lies with parents, the NCPC schooling movement has, through political 
lobbying, ardently supported the cause of school choice in Australia. This position of 
the NCPC schooling movement on market choice, I argued, can be seen as a 
conjunctural interpretation of elements within the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition 
which aligns Calvin’s injunctions on parental responsibility for the nurture of 
children with market choice as understood within a neo-liberal regime. This 
effectively buttresses the present social order by sanctioning a market for school 
choice as the arrangement most suitable for the expression of their religiosity and 
fidelity to their tradition, a sanctioning that is underwritten by an implicit 
identification of the market order with a transcendent or providential self-sufficiency 
derived from a specific reading of Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty concept and the 
autonomy of arenas of social life from the state.  
 
In turn, for the neo-liberal regime based on the presupposition that religion is a 
personal and private matter derived from the Anglo-liberal tradition, religious 
discourse in religious schools may be professed as private belief and consumer 
preference by individuals, families and schools to a certain extent, but such 
subjective convictions must be cordoned off from those objective standards of 
schooling that are accountably-provable and measurable. When this privatisation of 
religion is taken in conjunction with the NCPC schooling movement’s valorisation 
parental choice of schooling, I argued that the political effect is the absorption of 
religious schools like those within the NCPC schooling movement into a logic of 
nominal differences on a common scale of comparability wrought by the market-
state’s accountability measures. For religious schools like NCPC schools within such 
a market of nominal differences, I inferred that its religious aspects come to serve as 
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a ‘value-added’ feature for appealing to the private religious preferences of potential 
consumers in the market for school choice. 
 
On the basis of the findings presented and arguments developed in these 
chapters, then, it is appropriate at this point to pose the final question raised in the 
introduction: what are some of the limitations, if any, in the way the recent rise of 
religious schooling in Australia has been commonly conceived? I put forward the 
case that approaching the new visibility of religious schooling in Australia through 
the categorisations of public/private and secular/religious lines is limited on three 
counts. In the first place, I claim that the public/private categories obscure how 
religious education formally considered to occupy the private sphere – specifically 
religious private schooling like that represented by the NCPC schooling movement – 
is linked to the public sphere in a circuit of power that sustains the hegemony of the 
prevailing neo-liberal regime. Drawing on a Gramscian reading of religious 
schooling, I conjectured, more helpfully foregrounds the present case of religious 
schooling as site of political hegemony, despite its formal status as private schooling. 
In other words, as Buttigieg (1995) summarises following Gramsci, ‘civil society 
[i.e. the private sphere] is the arena wherein the ruling class extends and reinforces 
its power by non-violent means.’ (p. 26) Hence, insofar as those activities that are 
claimed to belong to the private sphere like religious education actually serve to 
reaffirm the public ‘reality’ of the dominant political regime – for example, the 
public purpose of education as training in anticipation of globalisation and/or the 
naturalness of the market – commentary on or scrutiny of the former must always 
imply attention to its links and positioning with latter. 
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Put more pointedly, what becomes obvious in the formal division of private 
religious schooling versus public secular schooling is the absence of questioning of 
the broad consensus on the purpose of schooling in relation to the hegemony of the 
‘actually existing’ political regime and economy. As Mouffe (2000) rightly points 
out from a Gramscian frame: ‘Consensus in a liberal-democratic society is – and 
always will be – the expression of hegemony and the crystallization of power 
relations.’ (p. 49) This consensus on the purpose of schooling traverses both sides of 
the public/private divide because it is sustained by both formally public and private 
spheres. With regard to the education system within the present neo-liberal regime in 
particular, it is thus evident that while ‘deregulation’ and ‘privatisation’ are often put 
forward as its chief modus operandi, there appears to be a concomitant expansion 
and extension of regulation into formally private religious schooling to ensure the 
conformity of the latter to the public purpose. Levi-Faur and Jordan (2005) are thus 
arguably right to surmise that: ‘If we were to judge neoliberalism by the degree of 
‘deregulation’ it attained, it would be a failure. If we were to judge it by the degree of 
‘regulation’ it promoted, it would be, on its own terms, a fiasco.’ (p. 7) 
 
A second limitation of the present approaches to religious schooling is wrought 
by the dichotomy of the secular/religious. For while both proponents and opponents 
of religious schooling seek to defend, preserve and perpetuate the integrity of 
education ordered along the lines of each term in the dichotomy, it occludes how 
religion in religious schooling is itself increasingly mediated and transformed by the 
institution of a market for school choice. As Mahmood (2008) stresses with acuity, 
despite the common framing of the secular and the religious as inimical, both are 
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actually interdependent and mutually linked insofar as changes to how rationality is 
conceived in one invariably affects the other: 
 
It is quite common to hear voices from all sides of the 
political spectrum posit an incommensurable divide between 
strong religious belief and a secular worldview. Despite this 
intense polarization… the religious and the secular are not so 
much immutable essences or opposed ideologies as they are 
concepts that gain a particular salience with the emergence of 
the modern state and attendant politics – concepts that are, 
furthermore, interdependent and necessarily linked in their 
mutual transformation and historical emergence. Viewed 
from this perspective, as a secular rationality has come to 
define law, statecraft, knowledge production, and economic 
relations in the modern world, it has also simultaneously 
transformed the conceptions, ideals, practices and institutions 
of religious life. Secularism… is understood not simply as the 
doctrinal separation of church from state, but the 
rearticulation of religion in a manner that is commensurate 
with modern sensibilities and modes of governance. To 
rethink the religious is to also rethink the secular and its truth 
claims, its promise of internal and external goods. 
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In relation to religious schooling, I argue in concurrence with the logic of 
Mahmood’s argument that the secular involves the re-articulation of religion in a 
manner that is commensurate with prevailing sensibilities and modes of governance. 
In this instance, religion is defined in accordance with the formally ‘secular’ 
rationale of the neo-liberal regime – specifically, that a market design is the most 
effective means for simultaneously achieving both the public purpose of education 
and the satisfaction of private preferences in belief. What this mode of governance 
has, in turn, achieved is the articulation of the religious elements in religious 
schooling as a value-added enhancement that marks out nominal differences for 
attracting potential consumers of educational services. Thus, far from being a 
substantive religious threat to the secular social order, schools like those within the 
NCPC schooling movement can be seen to express religiosity in ways that are 
commensurable with the prevailing non-religious rationality of neo-liberal discourse. 
 
Lastly, I argue that framing the question of religious schooling along 
public/private and secular/religious lines elides the specificity of how religion and 
religious education – and by implication secular and public education – are defined 
in Australia as derived from the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition. The presumption 
of autonomy pertaining to each of these categories does not take into account the 
contingent historical and political shifts and settlements that have given rise to these 
bifurcations of the social world – shifts and settlements that are infused with specific 
theological and religious impetuses. In particular, I claim that by not confronting the 
provincial antecedents of the Anglo-liberal tradition’s categorisations of education 
into public/private and secular/religious raises a significant problem: namely, what is 
the position of religious schools that do not ‘fit in’ easily with the nominalist 
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assumption that religion concerned with the supernatural is separable from 
substantive educational practices and the Protestant-inflected definition of religion as 
principally privatised belief? This question is especially pertinent with regard to 
religious schooling arising from non-Christian traditions of religious education like 
Judaic, Buddhist or Islamic schools, which were regrettably not able to be explored 
in this thesis. 
 
Recall, for example, the controversy over a proposed Islamic school in the 
Sydney suburb of Camden mentioned in the introduction to this thesis. What is 
striking about the denouncements levelled against it – in particular as exemplified in 
the letter from the Protestant ‘Camden Ministers Fraternal’ – is the homology 
between the arguments deployed here in opposition to Islamic religious education in 
the present and the arguments deployed against Roman Catholic religious education 
in the late Nineteenth century leading up to the establishment of so-called secular and 
public education in NSW as outlined in Chapter 3. It thus appears from this cursory 
reading that religious education that falls outside of hegemonic nominalist, Protestant 
and Anglo-liberal assumptions is still taken as a threat to the nation. In addition, what 
this example of the controversy surrounding the proposed Islamic school in Camden 
also underlines is the circuit of power between established ‘private’ religious 
institutions like Protestant churches and the secular ‘public’ sphere of Australian 
government and legislation, which sustains the hegemonic political order and its 
definition of ‘acceptable’ religion and religious education.  
 
If it is indeed so that liberal-secular tolerance and freedom of religion – and by 
extension, religious education – are biased toward hegemonically established 
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religions like Protestantism, then what are the political effects of this on religious 
education from traditions that, unlike the NCPC schooling movement, may not bear 
nominalist antecedents, share a Protestant construal of religion and/or accept the 
Anglo-liberal consignment of religion to the private sphere?  
  
This is a pressing question that I have not addressed in the present thesis. What 
is clear from the present work, however, is that such questions about religious 
education cannot be adequately treated simply along the categories of public/private 
and secular/religious that have hitherto framed the definitions and debates over 
religious schooling in Australia. Calhoun (2011) rightly points out in this regard that 
‘[t]o attempt to disengage the idea of public reason (or the reality of the public 
sphere) from religion is to disconnect it from a tradition that continues to give it life 
and content’ (p. 81), and that ‘continuing to articulate norms of citizenship that seem 
biased against religious views [i.e. secularism] will needlessly drive a wedge 
between religious and nonreligious citizens’ (p. 88). By contradistinction, as I have 
attempted to put forward in this thesis, what is required is an approach that is 
cognisant both of particular instances of religious education – which may well bear 
their substantive traditions of historical and political interpretations of social reality – 
and the discursive processes that characterise its relationship with the historical and 
political specificities of the present conjuncture. ‘How and under what conditions 
[differences between traditions] can be so resolved,’ argues MacIntyre (1988), ‘is 
something only to be understood after a prior understanding of the nature of such 
traditions has been achieved’ (p. 10). Short of such a sensibility, I fear that moving 
beyond the disputes over the new visibility of religion in education, let alone 
supplanting the neo-liberal regime, may well be a distant prospect. 
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